It was still in a growth period that they allowed debt to grow, the grapth demostrates that growth.
being a Whig, you should be
au fait with the old adage "speculate to accumulate". That is, some borrowing, to support infrastructure development/renewal, is a good thing, even if it means increasing borrowing in a growth period (and you do realise that borrowing during such a period is generally cheaper and more politically-acceptable too, right?).
Germany had less of a defecit before the financial melt-down then we did. The extent to which banks have had to be bailed out has more to do with domestic real-estate than regulation.
It had little to do with domestic real estate, except insofar as there's only a very small speculative market for property in Germany, so there was no property bubble.
I do hope you're not trying to insinuate, either, that the domestic property bubble here was more than an extremely minor contributory factor in the financial crisis here.
German banks have much closer regulation on what they're able to invest in. The fact that their domestic banks weren't exposed to financial instruments loaded with toxic debt to anywhere near the degree of our domestic banks, is what left them on a better footing.
There would have been consequences, but transferring all the private debt to public debt wasn't without consequences including the public sector cuts we are now seeing as a reaction to the sovereign debt crisis that has spread across Europe.
Take a look at 20th century history in "the west". There is an
inevitable consequence to bank failure. A domino effect onto even sound banks that causes them to also fail: Panic behaviour among depositors. If those debts hadn't been transferred, we'd be looking at such consequences as currency devaluation, high inflation, and massive capital flight. We've been here before.
Oh, and to most economists, cuts aren't an issue, but rather how and where you make the cuts, over what period, and at what taper.