This whole debate is throughly saturated in neoliberal subjectivity on
both sides of the fence. The rejection of nationalism is being constructed through the same atomisation of the self that the embrace of it is. To that extent,
BigMoaner is spot on when he points out that saying “I don’t feel British” is really the same thing as saying “I do feel British” — they both construct an idea of Britishness, and merely assign it opposite valence as part of the individual ego. And the claiming of peoples outside the UK as “also like me” and “I have more in common with…” is similarly constructed around the idea of the essential individual ego and its actualisation through free expression. But this strong divide between the ego and others in the core of the self, combined with a fuzzy and porous boundary around different sets of kinship groups is not a universal or even particularly common way of defining the self across the globe — in itself, it’s already a pretty Westernised construct. It’s more common to have a sense of self that is fuzzy between the ego and the immediate kinship group (e.g., a common sense of shared future, shared ideals, shared resources) and hard lines between that kinship group and outsiders. (NB: a massive simplification, there, but it’s broadly right). So, ironically, the very claiming that you personally, as an individual, have lots in common with someone in Syria may itself be an expression of the opposite.
The debate also conceives of nationalism as something actively engaged in, and thus subject to conscious choice. But one of the all time greats in psychology, Michael Billig, wrote a book about this in 1995 called
Banal nationalism that suggests the opposite. At the time, Billig was very focused on discursive psychology, i.e. how social reality is constructed moment-to-moment through the action of speech and other symbolic representations. The book is a classic so forgive me if I just nick bits of the Wikipedia summary:
Billig devised the concept of 'banal nationalism' to highlight the routine and often unnoticed ways that established nation-states are reproduced from day to day.
Examples of banal nationalism include the use of flags in everyday contexts,
sporting events,
national songs, symbols on money,
[6] popular expressions and turns of phrase, patriotic clubs, the use of implied togetherness in the national press, for example, the use of terms such as
the prime minister,
the weather,
our team, and divisions into "domestic" and "international" news. Many of these symbols are most effective because of their constant repetition, and almost
subliminal nature. Banal nationalism is often created via state institutions such as schools.
[7]. It can contribute to bottom-up processes of nation-building.
[8]
Michael Billig's primary purpose in coining the term was to clearly differentiate everyday, regular nationalism from extremist variants. He argued that the academic and journalistic focus on extreme nationalists,
independence movements, and
xenophobes in the 1980s and 1990s obscured the strength of contemporary nationalism, by implying that nationalism was a fringe ideology rather than a dominant theme in contemporary political culture
Long story short, I can understand — really, honestly, understand — how the ideological desire to reject the structures of capitalism creates a need to deny the ancillary social structures that support it, like the nation-state. But it just isn’t that straightforward. Even if you manage to define yourself in opposition to it, the act of rejecting it still acknowledges the social reality and importance of it. As Bourdieu pointed out, most of what we understand we
are is actually through identifying what we
are not. And it’s extremely likely that there are ways in which you still understand your group identity through expression of that nationalism one way or other, because it’s like a fish understanding itself through the water it swims in.
