Grenfell Tower fire in North Kensington - news and discussion

[Lurdan]

In case anyone was worried about the state of American satire

Here's the ITV report on this weeks protest by Grenfell United outside the French Embassy, trying to get the French Government to put pressure on Arconic's current and former employees who are refusing to give evidence citing French law. (It also deals with the Justice for Grenfell protest at Downing Street).




According to the Guardian

A French official source said the government’s position was that the inquiry’s requests “do not appear to fall under the scope of … the French blocking statute. We have made it clear to Arconic that we do not share their point of view with its refusal to comply with the summons and its wish to avail itself of the blocking statute,” the official said.

“We have asked Arconic to shoulder its responsibility in this matter. We have informed the inquiry and the UK Foreign Office of our position. [The purpose of the blocking statute] isn’t to obstruct the emergence of the truth or to guarantee immunity for French nationals. This is not a way to evade responsibility.”

In it's opening statement to the Inquiry Arconic said :

Whilst the company obviously can’t control whether any witnesses testify, the company remains willing to do what it can to assist the Inquiry in working with the French government.

which doesn't sound enormously helpful. Surely one of "America's most responsible companies" would jump at the chance to show exactly how 'responsible' it is. Or, then again, perhaps not.

ETA:
Inside Housing story late last night on the current position of the four current and former Arconic employees who had declined to give evidence.
Grenfell cladding company witnesses refuse to attend inquiry despite assurance from French government (archived)

Two former employees are still refusing (one of them Claude Wehrle, author of some of the emails quoted in the opening statement from BSR team 2). One current employee is seeking conditions before agreeing to attend. One is undecided. All are based in either France or Germany. Since the Inquiry has no means of compelling them to come to the UK, the Inquiry had indicated it will empty chair those that don't by presenting the evidence it has and the questions it would have asked them.

 

[Lurdan]

Kingspan have begun repairs to the 'reputational damage' caused by their evidence at the Inquiry. It's CEO issued a Christmas message to staff on Wednesday.

In a letter to staff yesterday, seen by the Irish Independent, Gene Murtagh Jr admitted "historical unacceptable conduct and process shortcomings" within the UK insulation boards division and said the problems were "being addressed with the utmost seriousness". He went on to refer to "undeniable shortcomings that occurred in a part of our organisation that need to be acknowledged and addressed to underpin our unequivocal commitment to proper professional conduct and to fire safety". He said the company would be taking decisive action to begin rebuilding trust, following significant changes already made to its fire testing protocols and a review of its product performance claims.

The 'decisive action' has begun with the announcement yesterday that Peter Wilson, the managing director of Kingspan's insulation division will be retiring at the end of the month and stepping down from the board. The company has also - wait for it -

appointed operations director Jim Carolan as group head of compliance and certification – a newly created role reporting to the group CEO Gene Murtagh Jr – reflecting the increased scrutiny on safety testing for Kingspan's products.

(Quotes from the Irish Independent).

Most detailed account so far is in the Times (archived here)

It remains possible that Mr Murtagh, 50, an Irish billionaire, could be called as a witness after the inquiry was told this month that he was copied into emails about the business’s political lobbying activities in the aftermath of the fire in which 72 people died.
The inquiry has heard no evidence on whether Mr Murtagh read the emails or not. A 2011 newspaper profile said he was a man who emptied his inbox daily because he hated clutter.

And it gives some background:

Mr Murtagh is lionised in Ireland and his company often portrayed as having risen from humble beginnings to become a global success and a leader in the battle against climate change. Operating in more than 70 countries, with annual sales of £3 billion, Kingspan has come a long way from the back yard of a pub in Co Cavan, where Eugene Murtagh began making farm trailers in 1965. The younger Murtagh has driven the expansion that turned Kingspan into an international success.

Mr Murtagh has made a reported £22 million profit by selling shares since the Grenfell fire, including a block that made £3 million just before the inquiry began hearing Kingspan’s evidence. His father is said to have made a £76 million gain on share sales since 2017. The family’s fortune of an estimated £1.95 billion puts it fifth on The Sunday Times Ireland Rich List.

I mentioned on the previous page that in February the company had announced a 12pc increase in trading profit for 2019. It's share price rose as a result and Gene Murtagh Jr sold a large block of his shares raising €5.37 million, before the share price fell again. On March 13th the Irish Times named him it's 'Business Person of the Month'.

Just six days later the big-hearted billionaire announced the company's response to the pandemic. Two months of pay cuts. 50% for executives and 40% for the rest of it's 14,500 global workforce. He

told staff he did not know if the cut in pay from April 1 to June 1 would be sufficient but that it was critical to protecting as many jobs as possible as they face into “a monumental test”.

(Reuters)

 

[hitmouse]

Fire hazards found at block housing Grenfell Tower survivors


Fire hazards similar to those found at Grenfell Tower have been discovered at a block bought by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea to house survivors of the disaster that killed 72 people.

To the horror of residents, round the clock “waking watch” patrols started on Friday at Doveberry Place in north-west London after a risk assessment uncovered problems with fire protection between floors, doors and ventilation.

The residents include Hermine Harris, 81, who escaped from the seventh floor of Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017 and moved into the brand-new block in May 2019. Of the nine flats, four are occupied by former Grenfell residents and the rest from Grenfell’s neighbouring walkways.

The block was bought by RBKC to house traumatised residents, some of whom had spent long periods living in hotels.

“They have put us in a building deemed fit for people to live in and now they are telling us it’s a fire hazard,” said Yvonne Harris, Hermine’s daughter. “Mum is in shock and doesn’t know what to do. She feels, how can they do this to me again? We have been going through trauma for the last three and a half years and now we’re adding further trauma.”

Branislav Lukic, who escaped from the 11th floor of Grenfell and then had to be rescued from a second fire in temporary accommodation, was also housed at Doveberry Place. “Is this really happening to us again?” he said. “I have no words to explain how I feel. Grenfell will repeat again. It’s just a matter of time.”

He said that after a fire in the apartment next door to his temporary accommodation after Grenfell, “they promised they would sort me out … I spent another year in a hotel, and now this,” he said.

Some of the residents were terrified, said Jhangir Mahmood, a lawyer acting for some of those involved. He said it “beggars belief that RBKC would place vulnerable and traumatised former Grenfell residents in a building which is not fire safe”, and added that he was considering legal action on behalf of Harris.

“It is the height of incompetence,” Mahmood said. “One would expect them to carry out a fire risk assessment before putting them in there, and not years afterwards. They must now be transparent and reveal when they first realised this problem.”

 

[Lurdan]

Kate Lamble who produces the BBC podcast has produced a useful year end summary
Grenfell Tower inquiry: 11 key things we’ve learned this year - BBC News

Peter Apps of Inside Housing has also produced a round up in the Spectator. Archived version here:
Eight shocking moments from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry in 2020

The Inquiry itself has published a factsheet for the current module of the Inquiry. It can be found here as a PDF or here as a web page.
Aside from lists of issues to be covered, and the manufacturers and testing and certification bodies to be called to give evidence, it also includes a glossary of some of the terms and key concepts that are referred to. On the web page version that starts here.

 

[Lurdan]

Schmidt was one of four witnesses who had not agreed to give evidence - it was reported in mid-December he was still in discussions with the Inquiry. Details in this post #4,801

The Inquiry is due to resume hearings on Monday February 8th. (They ceased earlier than planned in December when a member of the Inquiry staff tested positive for Coronavirus. Were due to restart on January 6th but postponed again because of the current restrictions).

The resumed hearings will initially take evidence remotely.

The hearings will use a Zoom based video platform and allow all those who would have been required to be onsite for the limited attendance hearings to participate from remote locations. (...) Remote hearings are a temporary measure to be used only for as long as is absolutely necessary.

The Panel recognises that the subject of remote hearings was fully explored with core participants last spring during the first 2020 lockdown, and that it was not in favour of that option for the reasons it gave. However, the Panel has decided it is better to have remote hearings than no hearings at all while the current restrictions are in place, and wishes to emphasise that this is a temporary measure to be used only for as long as it is absolutely necessary. The Inquiry is working with its supplier to make urgent preparations for remote hearings, including safely distributing equipment to witnesses and testing it to ensure that hearings proceed smoothly.

Hopefully this will work with fewer technical glitches than when opening statements for this module of the Inquiry were given remotely. Concerns have also been raised that taking evidence remotely might mean witnesses could be discretely 'prompted' by their lawyers.

 

[Lurdan]

Inquiry hearings resume on Monday. When they were suspended Kingspan's former CEO had just started giving evidence. He will back towards the end of this module (currently pencilled in for mid-March) together with Adam Pargeter, the Kingspan witness who preceded him. Pargeter will be explaing the 'unfortunate' 'mix-up' in which he 'appeared' to testify that Kingspan had misled a Parliamentary sub-committee.

So on Monday there's another Kingspan witness Andrew Pack, then on Tuesday Deborah French the first of the witnesses from Arconic, who manufactured the combustible ACM sheeting which was fabricated into the rainscreen panels used on Grenfell.

Inside Housing have produced a useful catch up piece (paywalled so archived)
Grenfell Tower Inquiry: what to look out for over the coming weeks - Inside Housing

(Inside Housing's coverage of the Inquiry, and of the wider post-Grenfell consequences for residents of a great many buildings, obviously comes from a housing association industry perspective, but it has (IMO) been useful and very extensive. Unfortunately their recent articles, particularly explainers like this one, but also their general news articles, increasingly contain lots of links to their previous reporting which are also paywalled of course. In the case of the article above I've archived the pages it links to, but not the links on those subsequent pages etc etc. I can foresee this might become a bit more of a problem as the Inquiry continues, and the linkages between the multiple issues it's dealing with become more complex).

At the bottom of that article it gives a useful list of the witnesses to come for the rest of this module of the inquiry. They've evidently got this from the Inquiry together with target dates. As has been seen before the Inquiries draft programme can change for many reasons which is why it only issues specific timetables one week in advance. I'd treat those dates as provisional.

For anyone looking to remind themselves further of where we are I'd recommend the end of year pieces I linked to in post #4,804 above. (4804 - bloody hell).

 

[Lurdan]

First day of the resumed Inquiry hearings held remotely by video link. Only very minor technical issues - some noise interference online. The system clearly isn't ideal for taking evidence but today's session went as well as could be expected. Today's witness gave evidence from Dubai. Next week an Arconic executive will be giving evidence over several days from Europe through a translator. Which will be an interesting test of the remote set-up.

Andrew Peck, currently Kingspan's global technical support manager, but until 2010 a technical services manager, gave evidence today. In particular about his involvement in the process through which the LABC (Local Authority Building Control) issued a certificate in 2009 saying that the company's combustible K15 insulation “can be considered a material of limited combustibility”.

Write up in Inside Housing (archived)
Kingspan manager celebrated ‘plainly misleading’ insulation certificate as ‘FANBLOODYTASTIC’

An interesting aspect was that a batch of Kingspan emails had been disclosed while hearings were suspended. These served to 'remind' Mr Peck of things he had forgotten when producing his written statement to the Inquiry. While no 'bombshells' emerged it again highlighted the way in which the statements drafted by lawyers for the corporate witnesses have been structured around the material it was believed the Inquiry would have access to. Not for the first time that belief has been mistaken.

 

[ddraig]

Cladding: Extra £3.5bn for unsafe buildings 'too little, too late'

Ministers say dangerous materials will be removed from England's high-rises "at no cost to residents".

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[Sue]

Not sure if this is quite the right place but...

More or Less on R4 had some stats around cladding/work being done to remove and replace it. (The reporter has been attending the Grenfell Inquiry.)

From about 10 mins 30 secs in.

More or Less - Brexit exports, cladding and are 1 in 5 disabled? - BBC Sounds

Are exports to the EU down since Brexit? Plus removing flammable building cladding.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[teqniq]

Jeez:



unroll of the thread is worth a look:

Thread by @PeteApps on Thread Reader App

Thread by @PeteApps: Lunchtime update from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry: President of Arconic's French arm accepts customers were 'deliberately and dishonestly misled' over fire classification of cladding panels, as ...…

threadreaderapp.com

 

[Lurdan]

Once Arconic's combustible ACM sheeting had been named in the Inquiry's phase 1 findings as the main cause of the fire spread, the company became of particular interest. Not least amongst the other corporates and interest groups looking for a prime villain to point the finger at.

This led to high expectations for Arconic's evidence over the last couple of weeks. However it has actually been a bit of a slow burn.

Deborah French, Arconic's former UK Sales Manager, appeared last week. She was involved in the sale of the ACM used at Grenfell, and emails to and from her have featured in previous evidence.

As she gave evidence however, it became clear that although she had the title 'UK Sales Manager' she was actually just the local rep for Arconic's sales team based in France. (Something confirmed by her successor Vince Meakins, who also appeared). She had no executive role in setting UK sales policy, had no technical knowledge other than what she picked up on the job, and indeed was working from home. She was questioned at length but there were evident limits to what she could give evidence about.

This week Claude Schmidt, the president of Arconic Architectural Products, has given evidence through an interpreter. As the BBC podcast put it, with some understatement, this made the proceedings "grindingly slow". The hearings have produced admissions nonetheless, although not a great deal which had not been trailed previously.

Here are archived versions of the Inside Housing Grenfell Diaries for the last two weeks:

Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 23: ‘That would have come as an earthquake to you at the time, would it not?’

Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 24: ‘Do you accept that Test 5B was Arconic’s deadly secret?’

And transcripts of the BBC podcasts - Week 23 and Week 24.

Notably missing was Claude Wehrle, the former head of Arconic's French-based technical sales support team. He is still refusing to give evidence citing French law. Emails put to his boss Claude Schmidt make it clear that Wehrle was aware how dangerous ACM could be; was actively involved in misrepresenting the Class 0 status of Arconic's PE core product; was actively involved in fraudulently obtaining the BBA certificate used to mis-sell it in the UK; and actively involved in concealing all of this from Arconic's customers.

It was reported in December that Wehrle has been a part-time fireman for 28 years.

Claude Wehrle offers fire safety advice to families in his role as a part-time fire brigade lieutenant in the picturesque town of Colmar. After leaving in January he now works as deputy technical director for construction firm Rinaldi Structal, which also designs building facades.

Claude Schmidt is back again tomorrow followed by witnesses from the Building Research Establishment.

 

[DaveCinzano]

Notably missing was Claude Wehrle, the former head of Arconic's French-based technical sales support team. He is still refusing to give evidence citing French law.

It was reported in December that Wehrle has been a part-time fireman for 28 years.

Pompier circumstance

 

[MrSki]

Cunts.

 

[Lurdan]

This weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary is up (archived here):

Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 25: ‘This is quite an incredible list of omissions and missed instances, isn’t it?’
(At the bottom of that page are links to the daily reports this week - those are working links)

The Diary only deals with the three days of evidence from former employees of the Building Research Establishment (BRE) about the fire tests conducted for Celotex and Kingspan, and to what extent they were aware, or should have been aware, of the ways in which those companies were 'gaming' the fire test system, and then misusing the test results to sell their combustible insulation.

On Monday there was the last day of evidence from Claude Schmidt the president of Arconic Architectural Products. That was covered in this Inside Housing story (archived):

Arconic allowed post-Grenfell certificate for cladding to repeat false fire test claim

 

[Lurdan]

Transcript of this weeks BBC Grenfell podcast here.

Coming up this week :

• more evidence from people who worked at the Building Research Establishment
• an employee of cladding sub-contractor Simco who constructed a test rig at the BRE, on behalf of Celotex, which had been 'engineered' to pass a large-scale fire test
• and, assuming the timetable is held to, the officer from Herefordshire Building Control who issued, on behalf of the LABC, a certificate for combustible Kingspan Kooltherm K15 insulation which said it “can be considered a material of limited combustibility” and as a result was suitable in all situations “including those parts of a building more than 18m above ground”.

 

[Lurdan]

Inside Housing Grenfell Diary for last week (archived)
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 26: ‘You were taking an enormous risk, weren’t you?’

Transcript of this weeks BBC podcast here.

Both useful summaries of a very interesting week (although IMO the podcast drew the various strands together a little better).

Next week a mixed batch of witnesses including from Siderise, who provided the cavity barriers used on Grenfell, and from the British Board of Agrément, who issued certificates for the combustible products produced by Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan.

However the most interesting day may be next Wednesday, billed as "Presentation of Arconic Evidence by Counsel to the Inquiry". The Inquiry had stated they might 'empty chair' the Arconic witnesses who declined to give evidence, by setting out the questions they wished to ask and presenting the evidence and witness statements collected by the Police. Arconic had initially refused to provide anything to the Inquiry :

Through their lawyers, Arconic and the individual witnesses relied on the FBS [French Blocking Statute] as a reason not to provide any documents or information to the Inquiry. They gave disclosure of the majority of their documents, not pursuant to the Inquiry’s own powers of compulsion of evidence, but, in the end, after service of a European Investigation Order as part of a criminal procedure operated by the Metropolitan Police, who then disclosed the documents they received to the Inquiry in turn.

(From the statement made at the Inquiry about Arconic on Feb 9th - transcribed here).

* * * * *​

Last Wednesday was the 100th day of phase 2 of the Inquiry, although because of the pandemic they've taken place over 400 days. (Phase 1 of the Inquiry involved 85 days of hearings).

Over the 1362 days since the fire itself the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea have been managing the Grenfell Recovery Fund. Interesting Byline Times report on how this has gone. Clue: not well :
The ‘Grenfell Industry’: Council Accused of Misspending Disaster Recovery Funds – Byline Times

The Grenfell Recovery Fund is a five-year £50 million budget, to be spent by the RBKC until 2024, designed to provide “services for bereaved and survivors and the wider community”. The fund is roughly split into two pots: one for the bereaved and survivors, known as the Dedicated Services budget; and one for the wider community.

In 2019-20, £2.56 million of the £4.5 million Dedicated Services budget was spent on council staff salaries and council property costs. £601,000 alone was spent on “management” salaries, with a council spokesperson telling the Evening Standard last year that just two managers were employed with this budget.

Aside from managers, the staffing budget pays for dedicated workers who – in theory – act as personal agents for the survivors and the bereaved, fielding their requests and chasing up enquiries within the council. These individuals are paid in the range of £40,000 a year.

In contrast, the bereaved and survivors are granted a £1,000 budget every year if they are an adult, and £2,000 a year if they are a child. This money is not simply deposited in the accounts of the victims on a monthly or annual basis, however. The council controls how and when this budget can be spent.

And so on.

 

[Lurdan]

This weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary is up :
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 27: ‘What will happen if one building made out [of] PE core is in fire and will kill 60 to 70 persons?’

(All the first, and some second level links from this archived version of the page are working, with one exception, beside which I have stuck a [PAYWALLED] tag. That is to their very interesting 2019 investigation into combustible window panels which unfortunately just opens up a whole Russian Doll's nest of more and more levels of paywalled pages).

The Inquiry has published a timetable for resuming limited attendance hearings as pandemic restrictions ease. Current plans are that from the 19th April they return to the same level of limited attendance as before (Inquiry panel, lawyers, essential staff and witnesses only). Then from the 17th May

the Inquiry plans to allow a number of bereaved, survivors and residents to attend to watch the proceedings in person if they so choose. Careful consideration is being given to how this can be done safely and places allocated fairly, and the Inquiry will write to core participants with its plans in due course.

All subject to how the pandemic plays out of course.

 

[Lurdan]

Here's the transcript of this week's BBC podcast.

Coming up this week more witnesses from the British Board of Agrément. We will see if they have a more compelling explanation of how they came to issue inaccurate and/or misleading certificates to Arconic, Kingspan and Celotex for their combustible products, than their first witness last week.

 

[teuchter]

Although I'm quite often complaining about rubbish media coverage of Grenfell, the BBC podcast is really excellent, doing the hard work of condensing things into a manageable form but without dumbing down or over-simplifying. I don't know if there's a big team behind it or if it's mostly put together by the main presenter. Definitely recommended listening.

 

[Lurdan]

This weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary is up (archived) :
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 28: ‘This is a serious safety matter’
Links from it should all be working

The week was taken up with evidence from the BBA who issued inaccurate/misleading certificates for some of the combustible products Grenfell Tower was wrapped in. When the Government contacted the BBA in 2014 about an inaccuracy in the certificate for Kingspan's K15 insulation the BBA responded that this had been due to "human error". One of the humans in question was the BBA's former head of approvals Chris Hunt who gave evidence this week. The Inside Housing account doesn't do justice to the sheer bumbling incompetence Mr Hunt exhibited. Here's an extract from his evidence:

Spoiler: Bloody Hell

Rachel Troup: What was your understanding in 2008, at the time you approved issue 1 of the certificate for K15, of the combustibility or otherwise of the K15 product?

Chris Hunt: I think at the time I would have understood that it's not a---------that it wasn't a non—combustible product or a product of limited combustibility.

Rachel Troup: Right.

Chris Hunt: I think I would have------again, I can't---it’s so long ago, I can't remember exactly what my thought would have been, but I don't think I would have thought of it in that way.

Rachel Troup: No. It’s understandable, it was some time ago. Just to be clear, is your evidence that you did understand in 2008 that K15 was a combustible phenolic insulation material?

Chris Hunt: I would have------I believe so, yes. I know that, you know, combustibility is a scale of----you know, you’ve got non—combustible at one end and then you’ve got----

Rachel Troup: Yes.

Chris Hunt:-----this isn’t a defined term, very combustible at the other end. So most products would lie somewhere within----on that spectrum, I think.

Rachel Troup: Yes. Understood. Your answer was, ”I believe so, yes”, so just to be absolutely clear, you did understand that K15 was combustible?

Chris Hunt: I believe so, yes, a combustible in some-----to some degree, yes.

Rachel Troup: All right. That being the case, can you help me to understand how it could possibly be accurate to state in a BBA certificate for that product, "The boards will not contribute to the development stages of a fire”?

Chris Hunt: I think at the time my understanding would have-------or my reading of that would have been that the----you know, if it-----it’s not non—combustible, but it wouldn’t be one of the initial sources of the fire , it wouldn’t be something that burnt readily at the very start of the fire. You know, once a fire is established, it may then obviously be part of that, but development-----I think I probably read it as development would be the very early stages. But I can't be sure exactly how I read that at the time.

Rachel Troup: No, I’m not really asking you too much about how you read it at the time. Perhaps we will come back to that answer. What I'm trying to understand from you, in very simple terms, is this: if you knew the product to be a combustible material, how could it be accurate to state in definitive terms, without qualification or caveat, "The boards will not contribute to the development stages of a fire”? (...)

Chris Hunt: I-----again, I think it might depend------you know, I think I thought-----would have thought it would depend on the degree of combustibility of the product. So I think obviously my thinking at the time would have been that buildings contain a lot of different products, many of which are combustible. Some products will contribute more to the development of a fire than others. I think I took that to mean that it wasn’t a product that was very combustible and would contribute to the early stages of the fire . I think in my mind, development probably meant early stages, perhaps, rather than later stages. But I’m------in saying that, I'm not, you know, a fire expert and that may not be correct.

Rachel Troup: (...) Did you ever simply go to the project manager who had written it and say, "What does this mean?”

Chris Hunt: I may well have done. I don't recall a conversation along those lines .

Rachel Troup: I see.

Chris Hunt: But I-----it's quite likely that I would have done, yes, and I can’t remember whether that did occur and what his answer was.

Rachel Troup: No, fine. If that did occur, it must be the case, mustn't it, Mr Hunt, given that you later signed off that wording, that he gave you some sort of satisfactory answer as to the source of or basis for that wording?

Chris Hunt: I would believe so, yes.

Rachel Troup: Do you have any idea now what that could be?

Chris Hunt: No, I don’t, I'm sorry.

Rachel Troup: No. Can you accept that in fact, given that K15 is neither non—combustible nor a material of limited combustibility, that wording is in fact misleading and inaccurate?

Chris Hunt: I think it could potentially be read as misleading, knowing what I know now. (...) At the time, I don’t------perhaps I probably wouldn’t have necessarily picked that up.

Rachel Troup: In what circumstances could it not be read as misleading or inaccurate?

Chris Hunt: I think if it related to some of the content in section 7, if it was something that could be taken from some of the testing described there.

Rachel Troup: (...) You said: ”1 think it potentially could be read as misleading, knowing what I know now.” I’m a little confused by that answer because, as I understood it, you knew at the time that the product was combustible. What do you know now that leads you to say that could potentially be read as misleading?

Chris Hunt: Oh, okay. I think probably at the time I wouldn’t have read any great significance into that statement.

Rachel Troup: Why not?

Chris Hunt: I think again because-----and, as I say, rightly or wrongly-----I think in my mind it was------I didn't think that K15 was a non—combustible product, but I didn’t think that it would have a big contribution to the development of the fire. That may be-------

Rachel Troup: Forgive me. On what basis did you think at the time that it would not have a big contribution to the development of a fire? Why do you say that?

Chris Hunt: I can't remember. I can't remember what my thoughts were exactly at the time. (...) I mean, I clearly would have read it at the time, may have had a discussion with George Lee about it, may have had other considerations, but I can’t remember why it was included in those key factors assessed, because it normally wouldn’t have a statement in there that then isn't repeated in the section 7, or just a straight reference to section 7.

Rachel Troup: Or in fact that can’t be founded in any kind of scientific or evidential data?

Chris Hunt: Yes.

Rachel Troup: Right. But I think you said earlier that you didn't pick it up at the time or you didn’t read anything particularly significant into that wording?

Chris Hunt: I don’t think so, no. I can't remember--------I think if I had, you know, we'd have omitted it.

Rachel Troup: Do you think you ought to have done, looking back now?

Chris Hunt: With hindsight, yes, it obviously has caused confusion, so I don’t think at the time I realised that it would cause confusion, but it’s clearly-----I think probably would be better off without it in the certificate .

Rachel Troup: Given what you have just said, I think I do need to ask you this at this stage: on what basis do you say in October 2008 that you were competent to check statements about fire performance in BBA certificates?

Chris Hunt: I don’t think I would be competent to, you know, check a fire —related comment in that particular way. I was probably, I suppose you could say, competent in looking at BBA certificates in general, but I don't---------I didn't have any competence in fire as such-----

Rachel Troup: No.

Chris Hunt:------other than being able to read Approved Document B and the various standards and have some knowledge in that way.

Rachel Troup: All right, but not enough-------is this right?---to pick up that it might be ill—advised to state in the fire performance section of a certificate for a combustible product definitively that the product would not contribute to the development stages of a fire? Is it genuinely your evidence that that did not strike you at the time as a significant or important statement?

Chris Hunt: I don't think it did, not in that front summary. I think I would have perhaps attached more significance within section 7, but I realise that’s not------you know, it does appear in the certificate and therefore, you know, forms part of the certificate . But, yeah------

Rachel Troup: I’m not sure that I do follow. On that basis, and in relation to the answer you’ve just given, how could you possibly, as head of approvals, have any confidence that what was being said within the certificate about the fire performance or properties in fire of that product was correct and accurate? You were the last line of sign-off before the chief executive, were you not?

Chris Hunt: Yes, yes.

Rachel Troup: So how could you have had confidence at the time that your own checks on the technical content of that certificate were good, were accurate, were adequate?

Chris Hunt: I think at the time I clearly thought they were, based on, you know, reading section 7 and knowing something about what was in Approved Document B, but ... I can't really say any more, I don't think.

 

[Lurdan]

Transcript of this week's BBC podcast here.

We are coming to the end of this module of the Inquiry. More evidence this coming week from the BBA, followed by the return of two witnesses from Kingspan. First Adrian Pargeter, Kingspan's director of technical, marketing and internal affairs who will be wishing to 'clarify' the 'mistaken' impression created by his previous testimony that Kingspan misled a parliamentary sub-committee. Then Kingspan's former UK CEO Richard Burnley whose evidence was interrupted when hearings were suspended in December because of Coronavirus. No doubt some of the evidence about Kingspan which the Inquiry has heard since then will be put to them.

Not sure if the intention is to hold hearings beyond this week, but the Inquiry will very shortly be adjourning for its Easter break. It will return on April 19th, commencing with opening statements for Module 3. (There are no closing statements for this Module. Combined closing statements for Modules 1-3 will take place at the end of Module 3).

Spoiler: What does Module 3 cover.

From the Inquiry opening statement at the start of phase 2 of the Inquiry:

Module 3 will be divided into three broad topics. The first topic will investigate the complaints made by residents of the tower before 14 June 2017, which particularly relate to fire safety and concerns that were raised about doors and the quality of workmanship during the refurbishment. We will then examine the responses of the TMO and RBKC to those complaints and the degree of engagement by the TMO in the refurbishment works.

Module 3 will then consider a second topic, namely compliance by the TMO, RBKC and the London Fire Brigade with their obligations under law, namely the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety ) Order 2005, otherwise known often as the RRO. A particular focus of our investigation at this module will be the fire risk assessments carried out by Carl Stokes and their adequacy.

The final topic of Module 3 will contain the active and passive fire safety systems inside the tower — so lifts, fire doors, smoke extraction system — together with the gas supply system.

Module 3 will be looking closely at the Council and the TMO amongst things. Obviously this is evidence bereaved, survivors and residents were particularly interested in being present for. As mentioned above, subject to the state of the pandemic, the Inquiry hopes to extend limited attendance to include some of them from May 17th.

 

[ddraig]

Grenfell Tower inquiry: 9 things we now know about the cladding

A public inquiry has questioned employees of the metals firm that supplied cladding for Grenfell.

www.bbc.co.uk

 

[teqniq]

Bid to save leaseholders from huge bills to remove cladding defeated by government

 

[Lurdan]

This weeks Inside Housing Grenfell Diary is up (archived) :
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 29: ‘Is it true that Kingspan’s position… was to do its best to ensure that science was secretly perverted for financial gain?’

All the links (and most of the sub-links) from it should be working with one exception. Towards the bottom of the page is a link to an interesting summary of this module of the Inquiry which Inside Housing put up yesterday. It's another multi-paywalled-link extravaganza which will require some work. The main page for it will probably load but few, if any, of the links on it will. I've marked it as PAYWALLED.

The hearings for Module 2 concluded this week. However my guess above about the Inquiry's Easter break was wrong. The Inquiry will be sitting on Monday and Tuesday next week when it will hear opening submissions for Module 3 (and then presumably will take its break).

As with Module 2, the first submissions on Monday will be from the Inquiry team followed by two of the legal teams for Bereaved Survivors and Residents. Given what is covered in Module 3 (see above) I imagine they will have plenty to say. They are followed in the afternoon by submissions on behalf of the Council and the 'TMO'.

 

[Lurdan]

Transcript of this weeks BBC podcast here. (Previous transcripts here).

When giving evidence back in December Kingspan were questioned about their ultimately unsuccessful efforts, after the Grenfell fire, to influence the Government not to introduce a ban on combustible materials on high-rise buildings. Amongst other things this had involved carrying out a large-scale fire test involving non-combustible mineral wool which was intended to fail. Their intention was to use the result to demonstrate that even non-combustible insulation could fail a test, and that rather than banning combustible materials there should instead be a requirement that all proposed cladding systems should undergo large-scale fire tests. Which would keep the door open for their combustible insulation

In December Kingspan's head of technical and marketing, Adrian Pargeter, was confronted with emails discussing 'engineering' a fire test rig to ensure it failed. It was put to him that in using the 'evidence' of this failure to make their argument Kingspan had sought to mislead a parliamentary sub-committee.

After that Inquiry hearing Kingspan contacted the sub-committee to 'correct the record'. They said the emails discussing 'engineering' a test rig to fail had not related to the test Kingspan had told MPs about but a previous one. One they had not previously disclosed.

Adrian Pargeter duly came back this week to 'correct the record'. This didn't exactly go to plan. He and his former colleague Richard Burnley were taken through these fire tests, and their efforts to influence the Government, in even greater detail than before. A catalogue of one 'cunning plan' after another culminating in Kingspan's self-defeating attempt to 'correct things'.

Richard Millett: Do you accept that your attempts following your evidence on the 9th of December 2020 to set the record straight have simply been to create a further record of dissembling and mendacity, Mr Pargeter?

Adrian Pargeter: No.

Part of Kingspan's 2018 schmooze offensive had been a dinner and presentation at the Houses of Parliament. Giving evidence in December Adrian Pargeter had been unable to recall whether any MPs had been present. This week confronted with a Kingspan email to DUP MP Jim Shannon headed 'Kevin Hollinrake Dinner', former Kingspan Insulation CEO Richard Burnley 'recalled' both had indeed been present although he couldn't recall who else had been.

Mentions of the 'Kevin Hollinrake Dinner' during that days evidence were reported. So Hollinrake himself decided to 'correct the record' on twitter.

 

[MrSki]

Fucking hell. It just gets worse.

 

[Lurdan]

Fucking hell. It just gets worse.

"Surprisingly" his company website went offline in January. He will be giving evidence.

There is an interesting clash of Inquiry Expert Witnesses regarding him. Colin Todd who helped write the Local Government Association advice, which the Council and the TMO have cited in their explanations for their actions, is an Expert Witness. Todd apparently thinks Stokes was appropriately qualified, and produced acceptable Fire Risk Assessments. Other Expert Witnesses, including Barbara Lane, do not agree. Todd is lambasted in several of the opening statements on behalf of the Bereaved Survivors and Relatives, and his views opposed by Counsel for the Fire Brigades Union. The Council and the TMO support Todd, and the TMO supports Stokes.

Opening Statements yesterday and today for Module 3. That by the Counsel to the Inquiry sets out the three main topics this Module deals with.

The oral Opening Statements on behalf of the BSRs forcefully set out the criticisms of the Council, the 'TMO' and their contractors, which this Module will be looking at.

For BSR team 1 Stephanie Barwise and Danny Friedman.

TMO briefed councillors against residents, making clear complaints had been rejected, were without foundation, and suggesting residents had acted unreasonably. This concerted effort to manage councillors ’ perceptions of TMO came from the top. It was led by Black, who cultivated a relationship with RBKC’s Laura Johnson, which gave him advice and influence over councillors (Barwise)

The investment needed to be sold to those who saw these units not as homes but as assets in the context of an identified £30 million funding shortfall in the ringfenced housing revenue account. Grenfell was considered one of RBKC’s worst performing assets, presumptively to be knocked down, not refurbished. Lucrative mixed housing regeneration was identified by RBKC as the solution to the funding shortfall. The TMO believed, with a degree of existential anxiety, that it had to prove itself to RBKC as able to deliver on such ambitious regeneration projects for fear of being replaced by someone else. The TMO’s desperation or, in Peter Maddison’s words, a seat at the table on such future projects, made it hypersensitive to the preferences of its single client. Meanwhile, RBKC left the TMO in no doubt that its priorities were delivery on time and in budget, and not resident satisfaction and safety. (Friedman)

For BSR Team 2 Michael Mansfield and Adrian Williamson.

And, of course, Modules 1 and 2 did not include the voices of the families, although they have plenty to say about the issues in Modules 1 and 2. Instead, they had to sit at home, usually, and watch — and I hope this is not an understatement, or even an overstatement — a parade of arrogance. There may be one pandemic outside the hearing; there’s another inside it, and it’s the pandemic of lies, of manipulation, of deceit, of jocularity, of pride in what they’re joking about. And one has to ask, obviously, how that has come about. (Mansfield)

In conclusion as to maintenance, what is noticeable, as with so many other aspects of the TMO’s performance, is its inability to get to grips with maintenance problems. The tower needed a systematic plan, the planned preventative maintenance and reactive maintenance put in place by the TMO. The TMO then needed to follow up assiduously to ensure that what was planned and agreed was put into practice. None of this happened. At best, various organisations responded ad hoc as problems arose. Often this response consisted of little more than the assertion that some other body needed to deal with the issue. All of this contributed to the poor state of the building on the night of 14 June 2017. (Williamson)

And much more.

Both teams have also produced written opening statements PDF links - Team 1 here and here. Team 2 here

 

[MrSki]

Thank you for your coverage of this Lurdan You are doing a sterling job.

 

[two sheds]

Echoed ^^

 

[Lurdan]

The BBC were up first this week with their podcast. Transcript of it here.

Inside Housing's Grenfell Diary (archived)
Grenfell Tower Inquiry diary week 30: ‘There is certainly a high probability that in the event of another fire the whole building can become an inferno’

This Module of the Inquiry will be looking at the role of the Council and its 'TMO' as social housing landlord and agent. Just as previous Modules raised broader questions about the wider design and construction sectors and Building Control bodies; and about product manufacturers, product sellers and certification bodies,;this module will be raising broader questions about the social housing management sector. Questions which will be uncomfortable ones for the sector generally.

Those 'uncomfortable' questions will very likely lead to 'answers' that in turn prove uncomfortable for social housing tenants, as the Government develops frameworks of reform, and social housing managers find ways of 'adapting to' and 'working within' them. That process is already underway.

The history of social housing 'reform' in the past illustrates that 'reforms' and ''restructuring' and 'adaptations' will only be driven by managerial considerations, and by the class interests of those designing and implementing them. They will not be centered on the interests of tenants in anything other than a rhetorical sense.