And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

CENTCOM now issuing Apoisms??? Surely a sign of the End Times.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Heller thread on ISW's Abu Kamal Dreaming.

 

[Idris2002]

CENTCOM now issuing Apoisms??? Surely a sign of the End Times.

Soon.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On FP Al Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition

...
One paragraph in particular grabbed Syrians’ attention:

“With every new façade, al Qaeda has become less dependent on the revolution that it seeks to destroy and now directs its attacks against the revolution’s symbols. We have seen this repeatedly, as demonstrated by their destructive actions against Ahrar al-Sham and other loyal defenders of the Syrian revolution.”​

By suggesting that Ahrar al-Sham, a group that was once considered for U.S. designation as an international terrorist organization, was a “loyal defender of the Syrian revolution,” Ratney could only have been seeking to rub salt into an open wound. The tensions between HTS and Ahrar al-Sham in recent months have been in part due to HTS’s accusation that Ahrar al-Sham is loyal to external (specifically Turkish) instruction and that as long as that allegiance remained, Ahrar al-Sham would refuse to wholeheartedly pursue the revolution’s ultimate objective: the overthrow of the regime. Now, the United States was publicly telling al Qaeda in Syria that its longtime Salafist military ally was a “loyal defender” of the revolution, while HTS sought to “destroy” that revolution.

Speaking shortly after the statement’s release, an official in the U.S. special envoy’s office at the State Department confirmed that the text was indeed intended to stir the pot:

“We wanted to get the attention of the armed actors on the ground, stoke debate and commentary, show them that we follow what they write, understand their arguments, but also know when they are twisting the truth.”

Faced with this unprecedented new dynamic, HTS responded with a worryingly effective rejoinder. After several weeks of internal disagreement, HTS established a political office (the “Administration of Political Affairs”) and issued its first statement “clarifying” several points to Ratney.

“Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has clearly defined itself from the day of its inception. We have reaffirmed our commitment to the goals of our revolution, which are represented in the toppling of al-Assad’s criminal regime. We have stated that we are fully independent and do not represent any foreign body or organization. Further, we have clarified that the establishment of HTS symbolizes a new phase of the Syrian revolution. The members of HTS are members of this revolutionary nation.”​

As the United States shifted toward revolutionary parlance, HTS’s response shifted to non-religious political rhetoric. It did away with an opening prayer from the Quran and delved solely into political language, emphasizing the Syrian nature of its identity and cause. HTS then laid out four accusations against the United States — relating to the Assad regime, Iran, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and Russia — and accused Washington of “ending the revolution.” No Syrian activist in Syria, Europe, or America would have been able to fault any of HTS’s four points.
...

Lister on AQ as champion of the popular anti-Assad cause as the leaders of HTS while the other rebels often end up looking like they are just taking the salt of foreign powers. Syrians may be weary of war but being complicit in a Russian engineered carve up of Syria or US backed anti-IS cannon fodder isn't a revolution it's a day job. Effectively accepting foreign patronage and a hudna with Assad may be prudent but it's unlikely to inspire much support.

And AQ have the tactical know how for taking a terrorist war to regime intelligence nodes and hitting Damascus itself. This may have similar appeal to the Pal struggle as carried out by Hamas. An intifada without much hope of near term strategic success, at great cost to the supporting population but at least spoiling the hated enemies enjoyment of victory.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Why the U.S. Should Team Up with the Kurds & Not Turkey to Take Raqqa and Destroy the Islamic State

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What is more, Iran, Russia, Asad, Iraq, and the Kurds will escalate against it. They will not allow the United States to sponsor a Sunni rebel enclave in the middle of their new “sphere of influence.” They will view it as an irredentist provocation bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and America to fire up Sunni resistance to Asad rule in Syria, Abadi’s rule in Iraq, and Kurdish rule in Rojava. The US would be expected to side with Turkey and the Sunni rebels in a long and escalating war against the Shiites. I think this is a swamp waiting to suck the United States into its malodorous depths.

Russia and Iran want to divide ISIS territory between the Kurds and the Syrian government that is led by Asad. The United States should allow this to happen if it wants an exit strategy. Such a strategy, of course, delivers the Euphrates basin back to Asad’s dictatorial rule and into the hands of authoritarian Kurdish rule. It will not be democratic. Asad will seek vengeance against those who rose up against him. This strategy does not promote the sort of representative democracy or human rights outcome the US is pledged to support. All the same, it will be the fastest way to bring stability, restore government services, and rebuild the region. The Syrian government will police against ISIS and Nusra as the Iraqi government does in Iraq. This is the best way to defeat ISIS and deny its territory to some Salafist redux.

To get Turkey to accept the Russian plan, Turkey will have to be reassured that Syrian Kurdistan will not be used as a staging ground for PKK terrorist forces to attack Turkey. Erdogan will need guarantees that Turkey’s Kurds will not be incited to break away and take eastern Anatolia with them. Restraining Syria’s Kurds is in the interest of the US, Russia, and Asad. If Syrian Kurds can be persuaded to limit their ambitions, as Iraqi Kurds were, Turkey’s national integrity will not be threatened. This strategy is a gamble, but gambling on the Kurds to limit their ambitions to Rojava is less risky than gambling on Turkey to spearhead an invasion of Syria through Kurdistan and build a well-governed and peaceable Sunni state in the in the middle of Syria and Iraq.

Landis on why going with Turkey in Eastern Syria is problematic.

His point that Turkey's rebels from the NW are really pretty alien in the East is a good one.

I think after spending a couple of years aiding PKK expansionism in Syria and greatly angering the Turks in the process changing course to have Ankara cut Eastern Rojova in half would probably make things even more complicated. That said while there is war in their SE the Turks are going to attack the PKK where ever they find them.

Landis is overly optimistic about the R+6 being able to hold down an insurgency like the much better prepared Iraqis next door. But the SDF headed by the PKK taking Raqqa at least appears more acceptable to Damascus. Unfortunately this may aid Assad but if he can't be shifted he must be lived with.

It may be foolish to be in a great hurry to take Raqqa and then have trouble holding it as the Turks harry the PKK's rear. IS command and control isn't even thought to be in Raqqa but nearer their core support in Iraq. Cutting Raqqa off while clearing out the back country forward from al Qaim in Iraq towards Deir as ISW suggested while trying to arrange a peace between the PKK and Ankara does have something to recommend it. Just forget the Sunni Arab army part and only raise local holding forces that the Iraqis might view sympathetically. Both Damascus and Baghdad have made noises that such a move mutually securing their borders might be possible. This puts the focus on Iraq which is the main area of US interest here not Syria. The downside are this is probably good for Iran and Trump can't crow about having taken Raqqa.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Syria Situation Report: March 9 - 17, 2017

 

[CrabbedOne]

Flegs!

 

[CrabbedOne]

Long Sowell thread looking at that ISW proposal from an Iraqi perspective. Essential sees it as a recipe for another civil war in Iraq.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Cipher Brief A Very Long and Nasty Fight

...
TCB: What do you have to give the YPG to succeed and remain committed to U.S. goals in Syria? Especially given the PYD’s larger political goal of uniting the Syrian Kurdish cantons of Afrin and Kobane?

AS: I think the PYD’s larger political goal is to reach a modus vivendi in post-conflict Syria with whatever entity emerges from the Assad side and to get political autonomy as they define it in areas they now control. They want to have a linkage over to Afrin [northwestern Syria], and the regime now has pressure points on them, because they now control the overland route to Afrin, there’s a secondary route that bypasses the city of Al Bab and so in a sense undercuts the Euphrates Shield [Turkish-backed] rebels.

History shows that the PYD and the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad do not like each other. The regime has been hostile to Kurds basically since it’s been around, and there has been forced Arabization in many of these places. In fact, Syria only granted Syrian Kurds citizenship very recently. So, the Kurds don’t trust the regime, but nevertheless, they know that they have to keep the regime from bombing them, because from the outset of this conflict, the Kurds have been very clear that they can’t fight a standing army. And they’ve cut deals to prevent that from happening.

Their main goal is to consolidate control over the territories they take, and Raqqa is important for that because victory there will win them international legitimacy as we begin to move into the post-conflict phases in Syria. All this is obviously upsetting to Turkey, because they view this as empowering a terrorist group that they have worked for decades to isolate.

TCB: What are the goals of the Syrian government in relation to Raqqa and the Kurdish PYD? Government forces have made some advances towards Raqqa recently, is there a race for Raqqa in your mind, or is this primarily strategic positioning?

AS: If it’s a race, the PYD is in light speed while everybody else is driving 50 miles per hour. The regime is still 150 kilometers away. They have consolidated south of Al Bab [a city north of Aleppo] but they still have some pretty big hurdles to get over. Now they can move quickly, but the regime throughout this conflict has shown an inability to fight and hold territory on multiple axes. So this is still an open question.

What is not an open question is that the regime will eventually consolidate along the Euphrates river, there’s just nobody else who can do it or could stop them at this point. The rebels are all bottled up, and I don’t think the Kurds are going to want to cross the river, so we’re stuck in the de facto reality that the regime is going to consolidate basically throughout the entire central part of Syria.

This leads us to think, not necessarily of peace, but perhaps of tacit de-escalation by the Syrian regime on multiple fronts. Then you can consolidate what is essentially the status quo. You see this already in two different places, where the Turks and the regime came together around Al Bab and on the outskirts of Manbij, where the regime cut a deal with the SDF and YPG, along with Russia, to occupy positions along the west of Manbij and prevent a full-on assault by Turkish forces into that city.
...

Sharp interview with Stein.

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TCB: Last thoughts?

AS: The situation is so inherently complex because the U.S. is conducting an unconventional warfare campaign against an illegitimate government, which is parasitic to the accepted government in Damascus that has killed hundreds of thousands of its own people. The whole situation is insane. Nobody has a strategy: The Turks, the Iranians, the U.S., the opposition, the government, even the Kurds. Nobody has a viable strategy that could outlast the next five years.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Which is a fair assessment. It's a matter of least worst choices and some realism.

Rojava may not be the big Girl Scout's camp of PKK PR but it compares very favourably with rebel Idlib or East Ghouta. And Rojava may be essential an authoritarian one party state but the Syrian Baath are in a whole different league on that one. The PKK may close down other party offices but are not disappearing tens of thousands of people into a vast torture gulag. In that way Rojava has some similarities to the nascent democracies of Shia Iraq or the Kurdish KRG. It being somewhat inclusive identity centred state with a credible military. At least it has a flawed basis for improvement that given peace might improve.

The big problem is the PKK's war with Turkey that's even alienated Irbil. Second to that and partly as a consequence of the endless war with Ankara a likely future dependence on the insidious regime in Damascus.

 

[CrabbedOne]

A Lister thread commenting on Landis's Raqqa piece.

From what I've read the PKK would like IS out of Raqqa but without the Americans pressing them to act they'd have other priorities especially with the TSK growling at their rear. They clearly wanted to unify their Syrian cantons but Euphrates Shield pressed the GLOC to Afrin into Assad's hands. Taking Raqqa is more about securing their borders. The KRG's attitude to the fall of Mosul and eagerness to grab some territory on its periphery might be compared. There's only really one incentive for rushing towards Raqqa and that comes from the impatient Whitehouse.

The other thing is IS is rather good at a dug in defence of an urban space. Manbij, al Bab and Mosul have all been costly fights for the attackers. Taking Raqqa will likely be worse than Manbij and that is now a somewhat compromised victory. The PKK are inevitably going to lose hundreds of their best men taking Raqqa. And when they take it will US support diminish as DC looks to repair its strategic relationship with Ankara. The Americans have something of a habit of declaring victory and leaving local auxiliaries to twist in the wind.

IS are also good at re-infiltrating held territory that contains folk sympathetic to them. IS may not be loved there but there appears to be a not a little hostility in Raqqa to the PKK and the local Arab forces raised so far appear too small. Like Mosul it may be no picnic to hold. This all argues for strategic patience and a protracted siege while holding forces are built up not a quick assault.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Mind ISW also have problems with the Salafist and Baathist alternatives. That leaves them hoping for another probably religiously conservative SE Sunni Arab force but not one radical enough to frighten the horses. It's a very Jordanian view.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC Wasta Rule

...
According to other residents, in certain Syrian regions under the Islamic State, hearing an Iraqi accent commands the same fear that a Qordaha accent would in Baathist Syria. A journalist who lived in Raqqa until late 2015 witnessed an incident involving a Tunisian working for the Islamic State’s morality police—the Haya al-Shariyya, a branch of Diwan al-Hisbah, the department dealing with Islamic laws—and a Syrian female:

In February 2015, I was in Al-Wadi neighborhood. A Hisba car stopped a woman for not wearing a full niqab [a veil that completely covers the face]. As the Tunisian was trying to force the woman into the Hisbah car, another car with tinted windows and [Nineveh, Iraq] license plates, pulled up. To the delight of onlookers, a man came out and had a conversation with the Tunisian to restrain him and let the local woman go. When the Tunisian refused strongly to give up on the matter, the man slapped him, ending the episode abruptly and humiliating the muhajer [foreign fighter].​

The locals reacted positively to this particular instance of Iraqi hegemony within the organization’s transnational structure, given the unpopularity of the Tunisian fighters. However, according to the same source, fear of Iraqis is more prevalent than respect: “If a military vehicle with Iraqi license plates passes on a Raqqa street, people deal with it as if Azrael [the angel of death] himself is driving.” A Deir Ezzor activist says that in 2015, to control a wave of local complaints and resentment, the Islamic State imposed a punishment of 100 lashes on anyone who criticized or insulted Iraqis.

The Islamic State’s experience of local governance in Syria appears to be creating the precise opposite of what the organization had intended. Rather than representing an alternative to the Assad regime, the Islamic State has reinstated similar practices of nepotism and favoritism, weakening its own institutions. Instead of a revolutionary break with the past, the Islamic State’s has borrowed the worst elements of that past.

IS in Syria has often looked like a colonial player led by Iraqi's. In oily Eastern Syria the way the alien Alawite led regime rules via power brokers has been compared to the days of French colonialism.

Every player in Syria gets accused of mimicking corrupt Baath ways of ruling. Rebel Idlib has its wasta systems as well as competing Sharia courts. People joke about the PKK just swapping Bashar's picture for Apo's and proceeding as usual which is probably a little unfair. Revolutionary programs are all fine and dandy but some practices are deeply embedded in the culture. And IS's ruling Iraq's may be Salafi-Jihadis but they bring their own society's baggage of wasta ladened practices and a background of nepotistic Baathist rule as well.

 

[teqniq]

Oh dearie me

Israel threatens to destroy Syria's air defence systems 'without the slightest hesitation'

Israel's defence minister has threatened to destroy Syria's air defence systems if they are used to target Israeli fighter jets again.

The Israeli military said it shot down one of several anti-aircraft rockets fired at its warplanes by Syria last week in the most serious military exchange between the two hostile neighbours.

Air force officials said four Israeli jets on a mission to destroy a weapons convoy destined for Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group Hezbollah were attacked by three Syrian surface-to-air missiles, one of which was intercepted by the Israeli Aerial Defence System known as "Arrow."...

 

[CrabbedOne]

And a thread from Heller on Turkish Raqqa options. He points out here kinship ties make the FSA uniquely vulnerable to subtle penetration by AQ types. These things have a momentum.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Heras on the success of Jaish al Fateh. The big Salafist coalition whose success in Idlib probably triggered the Russian intervention. It also foreshadowed how things would go with the rebels in Idlib with radical elements being increasingly dominant.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On POMEPS Syria’s International Politics: A Conversation Chris Phillips

A Podcast interview with Chris Phillips about his book The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East.

Sees the civil war in Syria as becoming a proxy conflict very quickly. Iran already having made considerable advances as the beneficiary of the fall of Sunni Baghdad. The US under Obama stepping back after failure in Iraq. US allies stepping forward as was desired by DC but proving incoherent and uncontrollable. The Saudis alarmed by that but wary of any kind of political Islam at least initially backing defected officers who could not deliver and then eventually Salafists. The Turks and Qataris seeing an opportunity for their Muslim Brotherhood chums only to see them fail in Syria once more. And the non-state actors all piling in from across the region.

Interestingly he sees disclosed UK diplomatic assessments predicting from very early on that Assad was well entrenched in a coup proofed position and failing a major split in the military unlikely to fall. By the time the revolt had militarised an overt US military intervention would probably have been needed to topple him. Obama was always reluctant to do that and his hand being forced on the Libyan intervention by European allies crushed that chance.

I do wonder what would have happened if the Syrian risings had happened in 06 with Bush in office? Democracy in Iraq was after all intended to create just such a domino effect. Damascus was marked as part of the axis of evil. It has since really lived up to that one! Syrian intelligence were aiding the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. It would have cut of Iranian support to HA and pleased the Israelis. I imagine Bush would have taken it the birth pangs of freedom and democracy in Syria as a sign from God. He'd have intervened with massive force and toppled Assad installing a Sunni Arab regime in Damascus. We'd have all been outraged no doubt and it would also be a mess with unknowable consequences. However with half a million or so dead in Syria, Assad still in charge of his vast torture gulag and the place liable to produce endless warfare might that not be a less awful outcome?

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

In Haaretz Syrian UN Envoy: Putin Sent Message to Israel That Its Freedom to Act in Syria Is Over

Russia has sent a clear message to Israel that the rules of the game have changed in Syria and its freedom to act in Syrian skies is over, Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations said on Sunday night.

“Putin sent a clear message,” said Bashar Jaafari, speaking on Syrian television. “The fact is that the Israeli ambassador [to Russia] was summoned for a conversation only a day after he submitted his credentials [to the Russian Foreign Ministry last Thursday], and was told categorically that this game is over.”

Syria’s use of anti-aircraft fire against Israel last Thursday night has changed the rules of the game, too, Jaafari said, adding that Syria will not stand idly by in the face of an Israeli threat.
...

In the 21st century Syrian willy waving at the Israelis doesn't usually amount to much.

 

[teqniq]

Except that I think it is actually now the Russians who are becoming somewhat irritated.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On LWJ Leader of al Qaeda’s joint venture in Syria promises to ‘escalate’ operations

...
“We will escalate our operations in the coming days,” Abu Jaber promises, according to a translation obtained by FDD’s Long War Journal. “Our troops will reach the very heart of their fortifications. Let them not forget the recent operations in Homs and Damascus.”

In late February, an elite HTS team infiltrated the Assad regime’s defenses in the city of Homs and killed one of Assad’s most senior military intelligence officials. Earlier this month, HTS launched twin suicide bombings in Damascus, killing a number of civilians at Shiite shrines. (HTS denied responsibility for another recent suicide attack in the Syrian capital, but its denial may be a self-serving fiction.)

Along with its allies, HTS launched a new offensive in the Jobar district of Damascus just hours after Abu Jaber’s speech was released. Earlier today, the group quickly claimed credit for two “martyrdom” operations in the area. This is undoubtedly part of what Abu Jaber meant when he said they would “escalate” their operations.

Abu Jaber uses the war crimes of Bashar al Assad’s government as part of his appeal for popular support. He refers to Assad’s “criminal machine” and the trail of devastation it has left behind. Abu Jaber specifically mentions the homeless, widows, orphans and prisoners in Syria, saying many nations have turned a “blind eye” to their plight.

The Syrian “revolution” has now “entered its seventh year,” Abu Jaber notes, despite encountering many problems along the way. He underscores the fact that the Syrian people face overwhelming odds, especially in the face of the Assad regime, Russia and Iran. He uses the extensive Iranian presence in Syria as part of his appeal for more Sunni support for the jihadists’ cause.
...

A good cause against a terrible "Near Enemy", the "Far Enemy " casting itself as the betrayer under an Islamophobe leader, a sizeable army, rather a lot of popular support. This is the stuff of OBL's dreams.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Deeply Analysis: Politics of Class and Identity Dividing Aleppo – and Syria

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Bassel Kaghadou, lead consultant at the NAFS project, notes that there is now heavy “identity polarization” stoked by the warring parties and their proxies. The “identities and micro-identities” of different cities that have hardened over the conflict years should be taken into account by the U.N.’s political and humanitarian branches, says Kaghadou.

“The conflict in the Damascus area, for example, has more of a financial and a rural/urban dimension, whereas in areas like Homs it’s more of a sectarian dimension. In areas like Aleppo, it’s more of a poor/rich divide – those who have, those who don’t have.”

Understanding the nature of conflicts in the different urban centres is vital for assessing the feasibility and nature of returns, Kaghadou adds.
...
In the light of rapidly changing demographic realities in Syrian cities, media outlets have voiced concerns that a majority of the refugees and IDPs, who are Sunni Muslims, might not be able to return to their homes.This is particularly true in Aleppo, where the western side is currently dominated by minorities – Alawites, Christians, Armenians, Druze – and the eastern neighborhoods are mainly Sunni.

“One has to be very careful when making such claims,” said al-Saadi, adding that the Syrian government is unlikely to assess civilian returns based on a “black and white” assessment of sectarian identity. “It is not a case of ‘you are Sunni, so you cannot come back.’ It is about whether you are with ‘us’ [the Syrian regime] or not.”

Mansel says the divisions of identity among the people of Aleppo, especially over the conflict years, go beyond religious affiliations. The city “has been drawn into wars between Sunni and Shiite; Salafis and other Muslims; secularists and clericalists; dictators and liberals; armies and civilians; the city and the country.”

The rural/urban identities added yet another dimension to the divides, whereby a vast majority of the “bourgeoisie in the city were afraid of this uprising, and perceived it as coming from rural areas and seeking more social justice,” said Joseph Daher, a Swiss-Syrian academic, originally from Aleppo, speaking from Geneva.

Daher and al-Saadi point to “class divisions” as the most important dynamics in Aleppo’s case.
...

My bold, the different characters of local risings.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Long Stein thread. Suggests R+6 might be after consolidation in central Syria along with PKK. Might just let AQ stew in Idlib. Rates the situation with the PKK as the greatest threat to Turkey since WWII but reckons obvious course is return to peace process with the PKK. That's a realist argument but I don't know.

Turkey would have cut its losses and abandoned it's anti-Assad policy three years earlier if it was led by a simple strategist. The PKK would not have restarted its war in SE Turkey if it had a whit of sense. The logic of this is Erdogan consolidating power and the PKK is a very useful enemy to unite the Islamist and secular right in Turkey behind him. The PKK is also relatively weak despite gains. In Syria it has lots of enemies and no trustworthy friends. It's reliant on US support that isn't likely to last as there is a far bigger geopolitical game with Russia underway.

Russia's Syria policy also looks overly complicated and fundamental fragile as it relies on there being no trouble with Israel while its essential allies HA and Iran can be relied on to make trouble with Israel and Israel will bite back hard knowing unlike Turkey it really can rely on US backing.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

From Atlantic Council Turkey Is in a Bind as Syria’s War Approaches its Final Chapter

...
The outcome of these Russian and American moves have profound consequences for Turkey. First, Ankara is overseeing a training program for forces in territory it controls in Syria. The program, now, will be feeding men into an area that is blocked from further expansion. With Turkish protection, northern Aleppo will continue to develop independent governing structures, strengthening the case for the devolution of power to regions in post-conflict Syria. This outcome, however, is at odds with stated Turkish policy, which is concerned about the Kurds gaining autonomy in northern Syria—and thus, Turkey has divergent military and political goals in Syria.

Second, after the fall of Raqqa, US attention will turn to the Euphrates River valley and stabilization options. The debate about how to stabilize Raqqa continues in Washington, but there is little doubt that PYD, as the dominant force in the area, will control key patronage networks. This will result in the deepening of PKK linked structures in northeastern Syria, an outcome at odds with Turkish interests.

Third, the regime, with Russian assistance, will continue its push east to Deir Ezzor, and will hit the Euphrates. The SDF, then, should be expected to negotiate with the regime, playing hardball with its broader goal of decentralization. Russia and the US, though holding opposing positions in Syria, have both signaled some willingness to decentralize the Syrian state to help stabilize the country. Any move to recognize what is already reality in northeastern Syria—PYD governance—is at odds with Turkish interests.

Fourth, the culmination of this outcome will be to legitimize the PYD as a recognized actor in Syria, which will allow for the group to win broader acceptance internationally. This will de facto result in a more overt PKK presence, particularly in Europe, where the group raises money from the Kurdish diaspora to help sustain its organization.

These four interlinked outcomes pose the greatest security crisis for Turkish policy makers since World War II. The threat, from a Turkish perspective, far exceeds that of the first and second Iraq wars, which helped to mid-wife the Kurdistan Regional Government. Russia is not a Turkish ally, but has been spared from public attack in Turkey because policymakers want to signal to Washington that it has options. Recent events in Syria clearly show the limits of this argument, and the effectiveness of coercive pressure to force Ankara to acquiesce to outcomes at odds with its own interests in Syria. There is a pathway to reconcile US-Turkish relations, but it requires swinging big on a messy policy involving Washington in Turkish-PKK peace talks. At the very least, Washington should consider offering support to Turkey for border security, up to including joint manned and unmanned surveillance flights along the border, to deter cross border skirmishes.
...

Stein fleshes out that thread of tweets from yesterday.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In Military Times The Pentagon's 'reassure and deter' mission in Syria looks a lot like mission creep

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There are no Islamic State extremists in rubble-strewn Manbij. ISIS fled in defeat many months ago. Instead, the city is occupied by a council of Kurdish militia fighters whom the U.S. has supported for many years. And all around the city are forces backed by the Turkish military, a fellow NATO member that's played a significant role in eradicating ISIS strongholds in Syria.

The problem is that even though both groups are U.S. allies, the Turks and the Kurds despise each other. Like so many other groups in the Middle East, it’s an ethnic rivalry that dates back centuries. And so, when Turkey's outspoken president recently called for Manbij to be liberated from the Kurds, the Rangers were sent in to "make sure the parties on the ground aren't shooting at each other," says the Pentagon’s top spokesman, Navy Capt. Jeff Davis.
...

Oh dear, the ancient ethnic hatreds again.

Funny that, to the East Kurdish Irbil is solidly allied with Ankara and the Turkish. The Syrian Kurds of the Rojava Pesh are clashing with PKK backed Kurdish speaking Yezidis around Sinjar. PKK also has ethnic Turks high in its ranks who share its hard left positions. It's more a few bloody decades old political matter of the mostly Kurdish PKK hating the Turkish state (that's supported by rather a lot of conservative Kurds) and the Turkish state hating the PKK right back. It would be nice if folk stopped confusing the PKK with "the Kurds" that's like calling the PLO "the Arabs". Ankara's problem with the PKK is they are a revolutionary threat to the integrity of Turkey fighting a hot terrorist war with them in the SE of Turkey that in the past two years has led to deaths of 2.6K people and made IDPs out of hundreds of thousands.

And now US and Russian troops have to stand between the PKK and TSK in Syria as peacekeepers so the push to take Raqqa from IS can continue. And yes that may foreshadow what a lot of US troops could be doing because the PKK has a surplus of enemies in Syria, Iraq and Turkey.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Exclusive: Syrian Kurdish YPG aims to expand force to over 100,000

Well if they are going to hold all the territory they've taken that's getting nearer to sensible numbers.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEI Anti-ISIS Summit in D.C. | Monday Briefing

...
In Syria, the flawed design of coalition strategy is now showing its consequences. Across a 200km stretch of territory (from Afrin in the west to Raqqa in the east), at least six state-level militaries and 30 sub-state militias are involved in multiple mutually hostile battle-fronts. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (S.D.F.) is now operating in direct conflict with the largely U.S.-vetted, Turkish-backed anti-ISIS Euphrates Shield coalition. Turkey has continued training Syrian opposition forces for a threatened invasion of the S.D.F.-controlled border town of Tel Abyad, while the S.D.F. has begun sharing key strategic territories with Russia and the Syrian government, first in Manbij and now in Afrin.

As such, it now appears highly likely that an S.D.F. victory against ISIS in Raqqa would eventually result in a power-sharing agreement with Russia and the Assad regime. This may appear to many as an acceptable conclusion, offering a safe exit point for U.S. troops. In reality however, it would resemble a tactical victory and a strategic defeat. Terrorism in Syria is a symptom of the broader crisis, not the cause. Treating the symptom while sustaining or strengthening its causal roots will guarantee a subsequent return of more potent forms of extremism.
...

Lister may be right about that but even in democratic Iraq the same is true. There probably will be an IS 2.0 even with an inclusive democratic government in place. There will still be much cause for Sunni Arab grievance. They are a fragmented people, led by corrupt politicians unable to seek redress or resist IS rising again.

In Syria the reasons for conservative Sunni Arab discontent are worse as Assad is going nowhere as too many Sunni Arabs fear what would come after him. The state is actually more corrupt and impoverished than before the revolt. The population is now exploited not just by the Baath but by powerful loyalist sub-state actors. Much of useful Syria is under a provocative Iranian occupation which is under Russian air cover. The NE will be another affront ruled by Apoists who must look to the regime for commerce and will be assailed by Turkey and rebels as well as Salafi-Jihadis. As IS fades AQ grows stronger and promises a terrorist war and Syria is ripe for such a thing.

I'd not be sure there's any clean exit for the US as Syria is going to be more a matter of mowing the grass as new terrorist threats emerge. The US may be stuck with propping up Rojava for a long time.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Putin’s Real Syria Agenda

...
Limitations of Russian Capabilities

Putin faces a number of economic and military constraints that limit the resources Russia can bring to bear in Syria. Russia’s economic crisis has forced Russia to balance limited resources across key theaters like Ukraine, the Baltics, the Middle East, and domestically in Russia. Putin has opted to pursue multiple, mutually reinforcing lines of effort using a diverse set of naval, air, missile, and ground capabilities in Syria. The overlap allows Russia to extract significant benefits with minimal cost. The Russian military has demonstrated its many shortcomings during its deployment to Syria, including frequent friendly fire incidents, losses of Russian aircraft, a poor performance by Russia’s aging aircraft carrier the Admiral Kuznetsov, and reports of mechanical failure of Russian equipment.15

The Russian deployment, at current levels, will be insufficient to grant Assad victory over the opposition, al Qaeda, or ISIS. Russia, Iran, and the regime have been unable to sustain significant simultaneous operations against ISIS and the Syrian opposition, despite Russia’s considerable airframe deployments. Russian airframes were unable to prevent ISIS’s recapture of Palmyra in December 2016 alongside a final pro-regime push to defeat the opposition in Aleppo, for example.16 Russia has instead used ‘cessation of hostilities’ agreements to drawdown its airstrikes against the opposition and surge its air campaign against ISIS for limited periods of time.17 Salafi-Jihadi groups have meanwhile begun to consolidate the opposition under more effective command-and control structures, increasing rebels’ capabilities and resiliency.18 This dynamic will not only lead to a protracted and bloody civil war for the foreseeable future, but it ultimately raises the requirements for the U.S. to deal with the conflict.
...

You do have to remember both Russian and Iranian commitments in Syria are relatively slight. Compare it to the Muhj war where at peak the USSR had 100K+ troops deployed. Iran certainly could mount a surge of ground forces. In fact they did last year but just enough to take East Aleppo.

They do have terrorist concerns but the R+6 is more aimed at keeping Assad standing than any total victory. And they'll do this on the cheap with just enough force deployed so they can sustain a long war. The primary goal has always been the reduction of the greatest threat to Assad i.e. the less radical rebels who could sustain regional and US backing. Their end state probably falls far short of a completely pacified Syria. The background level of violence they'll accept is probably much higher than the US would in Iraq in 2010.

The Russians in particular are prepared to compromise with regional powers and even with radical Salafi. The Iranians have somewhat closer goals to Assad's reconquista but fairly obviously have revolutionary aims centred around their game of deterrence with Israel. Both powers are now involved with the Taliban in Afghanistan showing they really are not involved in a daft ideological war with radical islam. There's is the way of the fox not the lion: a delicate geopolitical game.

Assad is really not in a great hurry to reclaim his family's estates and will likely co-exist with powerful sub-state actors like Ahar or even AQ as he has with the PKK. He will attack them if threatened by them but he may deconflict and seek to undermine in interim. If AQ were to project attacks against the US out of Syrian territory it likely only makes him an likely ally in the GWOT like Qaddafi, Saleh or Musharraf were.

This does not fit with US goals in Syria but they have been unrealistic and remain so. Like Afghanistan or FATA it'll be very hard to stop Syria being a lasting source of terrorist refuge and threats. It's not the geography it's what has happened with the human terrain. Like rubble a broken society is good ground to fight on.