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And next, Syria?

In TDS Syrian army advances on ISIS-held water supplies for Aleppo: activists. military source
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The army and its allies moved closer to the al-Khafsa area on the western bank of the Euphrates River, where the water treatment and pumping plants are located, and to the al-Jarrah military airport, the Observatory said

A Syrian military source said the army had advanced to areas "very close" to both.

Aleppo's main water supply has been cut off for nearly two months, and the city's residents now rely mainly on ground wells or water purchased from private vendors.

A military media unit run by Hezbollah, which is fighting alongside President Bashar Assad's government forces, said the army was within 3 km (2 miles) of the water facility.
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Here about 40kms South of Manbij and the same North of Maskanah.
 
On TDS 2,100 Iran fighters killed in Iraq, Syria: official
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The figure was more than double the number he gave in November, which referred only to Syria.

Iran is, with Russia, the main military backer of Syrian President Bashar Assad, and also organises militias fighting ISIS in Iraq.

Shahidi did not provide details on the nationalities of those killed.

Iran oversees "volunteer" fighters recruited from among its own nationals as well as Shiite communities in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The families of those killed in battle are given Iranian citizenship under a law passed last May.


Tehran refers to the fighters as "defenders of the shrines" -- a reference to Shiite holy sites in Iraq and Syria that have been targeted by Sunni extremists.
My bold.

Newsreel announcer
: We need you all. Service guarantees citizenship.
 
On TSG IntelBrief: The Lingering Untruths of Guantanamo
Bottom Line Up Front:

• On March 8, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted out a demonstrable untruth concerning recidivism of released detainees from the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba detention facility.

• The perception that a very high number of detainees released from Guantanamo have reengaged in violent extremist activity is false.

• Despite the hysteria, Guantanamo Bay has a far lower recidivism rate—an overall rate of 29 percent including all confirmed and suspected cases—than the U.S. civilian federal prison system.

• The deliberate mythology of Guantanamo serving as the best chance against ‘the worst of the worst’ in terror cases has proven remarkably resistant to over 15 years of factual evidence proving otherwise.
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Another line of Trump porkies. He's a big fan of Gitmo and the capture and torture Bush era approach. Just brags it didn't go far enough and he'd be more medieval on the bad guys. Well it pumps up his base.

Obama being a Constitutional law guy didn't like the optics or legal complexities of Gitmo. He went over to a constitutionally tidier hunt and kill model mainly via political convenient drones. Obama simultaneously failed to close Gitmo and actually released a fraction of the inmates Bush did. By 2013 Obama was pronouncing AQ destroyed but a lot of CT folk like Trump's mate Gen Flynn disagreed. Neither GWOT model in retrospect seems to have made much of a dent in Salafi-Jihadi movements. AQ in particular is now stronger than it's ever been. It's even a presence in Afghanistan after all this time and trillions of dollars spent.

On the other hand there is something to be said for kill over capture. Another (once) US run facility Camp Bucca in Iraq and the whole insurgent detention system there really could be accused of being the incubator that produced a rested and recreated IS leadership cadre. Camp Bucca had Baathist officers teaching military science to IS recruits. IS even had officers dedicated to managing the prison population. Baghdad hoping to calm things released some inmates to calm Arab Spring protests. The US in the enhanced interrogation period left no admissible evidence in a lot of cases so men often could not be tried. It culminated in the Breaking The Walls campaign, a long series of IS mass prison breaks that released a strategic reserve of fighters in the run up to the fal of Mosul.

Much of the leadership of Salafi groups in Syria also had been in Assad's tender care during the Arab Spring. It's been argued that Assad did it to pollute the revolt with Jihadists. I reckon he probably really regretted releasing men like Zahran Alloush when protesters demanded it rather than executing them. Alloush proved to be very dangerous at the head of the powerful Jaish al Islam which thanks mainly to Saudi links tended to pass a pro-Western smell test.

But Trump would not know that. It's all about the performative appearance of toughness with out groups for Trump.
 
On ISW Iran's Assad Regime
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Implications

The U.S. will not find a partner willing or capable of advancing its national security interests within the pro-regime coalition. Pro-regime forces are not capable of independently expelling ISIS and al-Qaeda from Syria. Iran currently provides the high-end combat units that lead pro-regime offensives on the ground. Any policy that leverages Russia and Assad against Salafi-Jihadist groups will thus empower Iran in Syria by default. Conversely, any effort to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran in Syria in the near-term will also fail due to the critical role of Iran in supporting both parties. Russia has no proxy in Syria without Iran. Russia and Assad cannot afford to divorce themselves from Iran even if they intended to do so. Neither Russia nor Iran requires an end to the Syrian Civil War or the defeat of ISIS in Syria. Rather, Russia and Iran have consistently intervened in the conflict in order to suppress the opponents of the regime, enhance their own regional freedom of action, and oust the U.S. from the Middle East. Their public appeals for political and military cooperation with the U.S. are disingenuous and unconstructive. The U.S. must focus on regaining leverage and extracting meaningful concessions from the pro-regime coalition rather than surrendering to the interests of strategic adversaries for unsustainable gains against ISIS and al-Qaeda.
With regime forces having reached the Euphrates what's not apparent is what alternative there is to some level of collaboration with the R+6. The only significant card the US has in Syria is the PKK and that's one it's likely to eventually discard.

It's evident Iran and Russia have gained a great deal of influence in Syria due to the civil war. Assad appears closer to the Iranians and they are more deeply embedded in the country than the Russians. They have more forces on the ground and more grassroots connections. HA is finally a local actor and perceived as such. The Russians are trying build a top down engine of influence in the SAA just as the US does with the ISF in Iraq with even less success.

What you have to ask is what do these actors want in Syria? It's certainly not the same as US ambitions which centre (stupidly) around domestic terrorist threats and (sensibly) on stabilising Iraq.

Assad wants the entire country under his family's control again. ISW is right the ruling palace's sovereignty has been traded for resilience. But this was always how the Assad's worked. Not usually with an iron fist but via coopted local power brokers that are kept weak and set against each other. The Assad's insidious writ is more pervasive than it seems on first inspection with the tendrils of state power being weak but not extinguished. Bashar does not anticipate his reconquista happening quickly. It's a generational business of slow corruption and state terror. He clearly wants the US out of Syria ASAP. He'll probably tolerate a PKK run vassal domain in the oily NE if it sheds its alliance with the US. Similarly probably he's willing to live with a fairly high level of Salafi-Jihadi insurgency remaining in pockets away from Useful Syria. Restoring the family's international legitimacy rests on being strong men suppressing transnational terrorists but as often in the GWOT that would make it foolish to eliminate them entirely and they have other uses. After all the Baath have coopted terrorists in the past as tactical instruments.

Iran is a patient revolutionary actor that is undeniably a prolific sponsor of terrorism. They want the Takfiri threat reduced but again it has its uses. Salafi-Jihadis are a perfect ideological enemy to mobilise minority militia men and legitimise Iran's presences but Iran in the past has been quite willing to work with them when it was expedient. Iran's committed to Syria primarily because of Israel. HA provides it with the deterrence it needs to stop Israel attacking Iran directly. Syria provides a future attack platform. Iran has no interest in cooperation with the Great Satan. wants US influence out of the ME. It's quite likely to start attacking the remaining US forces in Iraq once IS has been suppressed sufficiently. It will take the same view in Syria. That this may put the Russians and Trumpski in an awkward spot is a bonus.

Russia has a limited interest in terrorist threats to itself but it's goals are more geopolitical. Finally it's about restoring Russian status as a feared superpower within an altered but not broken international order. Europeans bugging out over dusky refugee flow and being easily scared into the arms of the Russophile Far Right by the likes of IS is really gravy. Syria is the centre of The Kremlin's ME policy in the way the US once hoped Iraq might be. It's interested in edging Turkey out of NATO, expanded Med basing and leverage with the oily GCC. This is all useful positioning and Russia is an opportunist hoping to pick off low hanging fruit as it seeks a US decline by inches. Russia of the three is probably the most interested quickly ending the war. It's willing to carve up Syria with the neighbours in the process. It wants no trouble with Israel in fact it hopes for closer ties with what's become partly a rather Russian minded colony.
 
On Syria Comment Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi: Syrian IRGC Militia
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Overall, Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi is a rather small formation, but the group is an interesting case of a Syrian militia presenting itself as directly affiliated with the IRGC, rather than simply ‘Hezbollah in Syria’ or ‘Syrian Hezbollah’. It will be interesting to see if other militias along these lines emerge in the future.
HA appear to be much better liked than the IRGC among loyalists so this is rather brazen branding.
 
On Syria Direct Syrian army builds on advances in east Aleppo countryside after securing main water-pumping station
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Jirah Air Base was reported taken as well.
 
On ISW Syria Situation Report: March 2 - 9, 2017
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Operation Inherent Resolve Spokesperson Col. John Dorrian stated that the U.S. deployed roughly four hundred soldiers drawn from the 75th U.S. Army Ranger Regiment and 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to Northern Syria. These forces come in addition to an estimated three hundred to five hundred U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northern Syria. The Marines reportedly deployed to Northern Ar-Raqqa Province in order to provide "all-weather" artillery support to the SDF in operations against ISIS in Ar-Raqqa City while the Rangers deployed to Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province in order to "deter" an open confrontation between the SDF and Turkey. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford also held an unprecedented trilateral meeting with Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar and Russian Chief of the General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov in Turkey on March 7 to deconflict ongoing operations near Manbij in Aleppo Province. Turkey will likely retaliate against these efforts to contain its operations in Northern Syria.
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The locations of the JFS attacks against rebel groups are well planned and target fertile farming areas such as the ones in Atmeh and Jabal al-Zawieh. JFS avoided the main border crossings into Syria from Turkey, which previously triggered Turkish authorities to close the borders. Instead JFS focused on seizing access routes and towns nearby. The group now controls border cities with Turkey, such Danna and Sarmada, and trading corridors for food and fuel with the Kurdish areas such as Daret Azza. Other attacks focused on capturing ammunition stores among which are Jaish al-Islam’s warehouses in Baskaba village and Jaish al-Mujahideen’s in Hallazoun village, Idlib province.

Some people questioned the whole offensive as a pretext to confiscate weapons and resources. “If the real reason behind the attack is to eliminate those who conspire against JFS then why was the group focusing on capturing the weapons and ammunition of the targeted groups rather than on eliminating their threat,” wrote Akil Hussien, a Syrian citizen journalist. “Some people only see the offensive as a looting operation, which is much needed for the newly formed alliance. They needed it to secure the weaponry and ammunition shortage they have. They also need to secure enough stockpile for any future restrictions on the group,” he added.

On March 2, HTS launched a new wave of attacks against Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib province including Marat Misrin, al-Mastoumeh, al-Ghazal, and Zardana. HTS justified its aggression by accusing Ahrar al-Sham of plotting against the group. But the locations attacked by HTS further confirm that the attacks were aiming, among other reasons, to capture weapons and ammunitions. Furthermore, a statement released by Ahrar al-Sham stated the main aim of the JFS attacks is to weaken the group and to capture its resources, occurrences that happen on a regular basis.
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Conflict between rebel groups often comes down to competition over resources, particularly smuggling roots.

AQ also has a problem: it's new HTS alliance probably has funding from Gulf donors but it doesn't have a big armaments supplier. Like IS it will trade with hostile neighbours but it will likely be driven to loot to maintain its combat capabilities.
 

OTTAWA, CANADA – On February 3, Lebanese president Michel Aoun called onthe international community to establish a safe zone on the Syria-Lebanon border. A political ally of Hezbollah, Aoun said world powers must work with President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to set up the proposed zone and facilitate the return of more than 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

Just over a week later, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah urged the Lebanese government to coordinate refugee returns now that recent advances of pro-regime forces had made “large areas” in Syria “safe.” Like Aoun, Nasrallah is pressuring the government in Beirut, headed by rival prime minister Saad al-Hariri, to work with Damascus on this matter.
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What a carve up.

While the Russians are asserting HA will retreat from Syria.
 
On Atlantic Council The Manbij Saga: An End-Game in Syria?
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The current Turkish policy points to an inherent contradiction in near term military and political goals. The establishment of civil institutions, independent of the central government (presumably with Assad or a trusted adviser taking control of post-conflict Syria) strengthens the case for a decentralized Syrian state, which will also strengthen the case for some semblance of Kurdish self-rule north and east of the Euphrates. Moreover, should the United States decide to leave behind a small contingent of Special Operators to conduct high value strikes against ISIS targets in Syria, the de-facto reality will be to de-escalate along regime-Kurdish contact points, creating the way towards negotiations around lines on a map. The same is true if the US military pushes the US State Department to help with stabilization (an outcome that, at the moment, would be problematic because of the Democratic Union Party, or PYD). This scenario bodes poorly for US-Turkish relations, in that Turkey will see the United States as having created a Kurdish entity in eastern Syria. Russia, too, will be blamed. However, for the vast majority of Turkish policy makers, Russia is not treated as an ally, and therefore its “betrayal” is to be expected. The United States, on the other hand, is Turkey’s most important ally, despite the tensions now dominating the relationship—making the “betrayal” far more impactful.

The Syrian conflict appears to have entered a new phase, with the regime moving south of al-Bab, and the start of the SDF push in and around Raqqa. The trajectory of the war is at odds with Turkish interests, despite the tactical successes Ankara achieved with Euphrates Shield. The United States could seek to provide additional guarantees to Turkey about the future of the Syrian state and the PYD’s place inside of it, but this issue is certain to dominate American-Turkish relations for the foreseeable future. Turkey, in contrast, should be expected to remain intransigent about the Syrian Kurdish issue, holding out the option to attack SDF position in Manbij or Tel Abyad, both of which could slow a future Raqqa campaign, one would logically presume will start in the next few months. The Syrian conflict remains bloody, with war crimes committed on a routine basis. However, the regime’s moves and concurrent actions in Raqqa and, potentially, the Euphrates River Valley, are creating territorial facts on the ground – and therefore challenging elements for US diplomats and policymakers that must continue to walk a fine line between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, a non-state actor. The conflict will continue, but the realities that could define future peace talks are being created through the use of force. This trajectory is now detrimental to Ankara’s interest, ensuring continued US-Turkish tensions.
Stein points out that the regime staked a claim in Manbij without the SAA firing a shot. Though it may be an Afrin like arrangement where what's under the Syrian flags and NDF uniforms is SDF fighters.

He's a bit sceptical that the R+6 can pull off a multi-axis assault on the Caliphate. One aimed at Maskana and the other at Deir via Palmyra. I'd be as well, the last time the R+6 tried to push forward from Palmyra was an absolute shambles with a small IS force routing their much larger numbers. But IS will be distracted by the PKK's assault from the North of Raqqa and their supply lines South to the siege of Deir are already cut. Rebel infighting in Idlib also provides a window of opportunity for Assad but he may find he's badly overstretched if they get their act together.
 

Heller is real sceptical about the US incrementally adding ground troops.

The US seems to be trying to maintain ambiguity with the Turks about taking Raqqa with the PKK judging by Turkish reactions but it's pretty clear that's going to happen.

I'd say US troops may be less antagonising to Ankara than openly giving the PKK heavy kit. Resort to ground troops may be partly a consequence of Turkey now being rather likely to attack Rojava east of the Euphrates which will bugger the PKK reliant Raqqa operation. You can't effectively stand between squabbling allies with airpower at least not without killing them. There's talk of having a reserve force on stand by in Kuwait. Call it operational flexibility.

The Coalition's also gradually put more and more men into Iraq with them now acknowledged to be in frontline combat roles in Mosul.
 
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All I can predict is Trump will say: it's a fantastic plan the best plan and everything is Obama's fault. Really such a bad hombre.
 
On Foreign Brief How the US lost to al-Qaeda in Syria
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While the West’s next objective in Syria will be the recapture of the ISIS-controlled city of Raqqa, the Assad regime will be looking towards HTS’ stronghold in Idlib province. HTS would not be able to defeat a Russian-backed Assad attack. While weapons such as US-made TOW missiles pose a threat to Russia and Assad’s air force, the interplay between ground troops and air support has seen success for Assad in the past, most notably in Aleppo. HTS would not be able to match the regime in this form of conventional warfare.

However, if Assad takes Idlib, HTS may devolve into an insurgent force. Such an environment would favour al-Qaeda, who have a long experience of waging irregular warfare. They will also benefit from continual support from the Gulf Arab states and Turkey, the latter of which has drastically increased funding to jihadist militias in northern Syria as part of their own operations. The dominance of HTS also makes it an attractive organisation for jihadists leaving ISIS and smaller militias.

Al-Qaeda now has access to a network of international support, a stockpile of weapons and a source of battle hardened soldiers. An emboldened al-Qaeda is not just a Syrian issue, but a global one.
There's a bit of an odd assumption behind that headline: what did the US ever really own in Syria? The US has never even been the principle backer of the revolt. Those were regional actors which the US facilitated for. The Turks, Saudis, Jordanians and Qataris. It can be argued these often made poor choices with US support but the US never looked in charge or even at the front. That the CIA TOW's became fire support for offensives AQ was prominent in. But others would argue the same offensives being supported by US airpower would have marginalised AQ and perhaps toppled IS.

The US has perhaps been rather blinkered about the rise of AQ within the revolt but that's a result of the bigger mistake Obama made in ignoring IS's revival in Iraq from 2012 on where the US really had been responsible. The other US sin of omission was not seeing that a prolonged revolt mostly made up of religiously conservative Sunni Arabs in Syria would inevitably radicalise and Assad led a far more robust regime than Qaddafi. The US should have been persuading its allies to deescalate long before the Russians decided to bully them into that. Instead Obama continued to go through the motions of supporting the revolt while most US energy lately here has gone into a damage limitation strategy: supporting the Syrian PKK's rival revolt and their allies who were fighting off an IS invasion.

But it's a very US-centric idea that AQ's rise in Idlib is mainly Obama's fault. That half the Northern revolt has ended up under AQ command might be better blamed on tribal actors and the rebels themselves choosing to use Salafi-Jihadis as muscle from very early on in the armed revolt. The regime tending to target less radical elements that received the most external support first also empowered AQ.
 
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For anyone who feels like following the money:



(this is the first of several links I've been meaning to post for a while)
 
Class analysis beats conspiraloonery, my camouflage wearing friend:

Yeh- you still haven't done any homework have you. But what you say is true... please explain that over on the Trump thread where they're still banging on about Russian conspiracy theories rather than face up to the grim inescapable fact of US politics and it's various class failures (or successes) resulting in Trump the POTUS.
 
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