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And next, Syria?

In The National How ISIL tricked Syria’s rebels into self-betrayal and defeat
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A clever piece of deception lay at the heart of the capture of Tal Jamoa’a. The Khaled Bin Waleed Army hacked into moderate rebel communications and, posing as moderate commanders, announced that rebel lines had been breached in Heit, Sahem Al Joulan and Tseel, rebel-held villages abutting the Yarmouk basin, where the Khaled Bin Waleed Army has its stronghold.

They told rebel units to retreat because ISIL had already overrun the villages. In fact, they had not.

Simultaneously, ISIL sympathisers in rebel-held territory took control of the public address systems on village mosques and announced that ISIL was in control.

Moderate rebel units fled their positions, believing ISIL had outflanked them and was ready to attack them from behind.

The Khaled Bin Waleed Army had managed to get a handful of fighters behind rebel lines which, in the chaos of the moment, convinced moderates that the breach had, indeed, happened.

The fighters behind them were actually members of ISIL sleeper cells, units that had been secretly formed in rebel-held territory in advance of the attack.
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Such trickery is very typical of IS.
 

Assad's head not being on a spike is pretty good recruitment material as it is. It's not like Raqqa being turned into an Apoist nest of kufr like Manbij won't get the Takfiri's goat as well. Assad may be the very worst case but the PKK are widely seen as his allies by the opposition anyway. The non PKK SDF holding forces put together so far look pretty weak and would need PKK support even if they aren't interested in Raqqa. Meanwhile the Syrian PKK have an aggressive Turkey behind them and will be overstretched. It's likely that the formally loyalist area of Raqqa might eventually be a bargaining chip between the Syrian PKK and Damascus. It's the only Divisional HQ Assad has lost and he'll want a Syrian flag over it even if what is under it is more autonomous and cooperative than he'd like. He also has a problem holding anything in the East to which a deeper hudna with the PKK offers a solution.
 
On TDS Twin Damascus bombs targeting Shiite pilgrims kill 46
BEIRUT: Twin bombs targeting Shiite pilgrims Saturday killed 46 people in Damascus, most of them Iraqis, activists said, in one of the bloodiest attacks in the Syrian capital.

There have been periodic bomb attacks in Damascus, but the stronghold of the government of President Bashar Assad has been largely spared the destruction faced by other major cities in six years of civil war.

A roadside bomb detonated as a bus passed and a suicide bomber blew himself up in the Bab al-Saghir area, which houses several Shiite mausoleums that draw pilgrims from around the world, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said.

"There are also dozens of people wounded, some of them in a serious condition," Observatory chief Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

State television said there were 40 dead and 120 wounded after "terrorists detonated two bombs."
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A style of attacks more typical of Baghdad.
 

Well the big Idlib coalition HTS does appear to be led by AQ. State fawning over the other one Ahar I think is new. They'd been a bit too Taliban like and close to AQ for the Obama administration. That has been diluted by defections and less radical rebels clustering with them and the Turks for protection. Russia classed Ahar as an acceptable party to negotiate with recently as well. Part of their arrangement with Ankara.
 

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“There really are no other options other than let ISIS manage that area. And so that’s the dilemma,” says Nicholas Heras, an analyst at the Center for a New American Security. “If you don’t want to let ISIS manage a shrunken would-be caliphate, you either let Assad and IRGC militias control it, or you have a U.S.-backed force that has a U.S. and or partner presence.”

Regardless, the increase in the U.S. military deployment in Syria is raising concerns that the Trump Administration’s aggressive new approach will lead to a quagmire.

“Once you escalate like this, once you commit further and further, then I think it becomes incumbent on you to actually figure out where this is headed,” says Sam Heller, a Beirut-based Syria analyst with the Century Foundation. “There are limited aims that the U.S. can realistically achieve in Syria in the fight against ISIS, and they justify limited means. They do not justify an unlimited commitment.”
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In The National Syrian regime reaps the benefits of ‘third forces’
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The second factor that favours Al Qaeda’s continued consolidation is that Turkey, the most capable country to confront the group due to border proximity and its relationship with the rebels, cannot afford to divert its attention from a far more important fight. Any support for a fight between the rebels and Al Qaeda in Idlib will distract from its attempts to check the rising influence of the YPG. Indeed, pressure against the rebels in Idlib could push them to join the Turkish-backed Euphrates Shield against ISIL and the Kurds.

Third, the regime does not have the resources to launch a campaign to retake Idlib. The regime needed significant support from Hizbollah and Iran, with Russian and American air power, to retake Palmyra a week ago.

Deraa faces a unique fate. The rebels continue to control two thirds of the province, with relatively quiet frontiers except against a resurgent ISIL in the south-west. Al Qaeda is a capable force and proved able to mobilise forces against the regime in the province. Neither ISIL nor Al Qaeda is projected to become dominant players in Deraa. Instead, the military status quo in Deraa will either persist or the regime retakes key areas to secure the city centre and the border crossings near Jordan.

In either scenario, Deraa will cease to be a viable stronghold for challenging the regime. Which brings us to how the regime will benefit, more than how the opposition suffers, as the rebels lose control of major strongholds. This year might be when the regime reaps the benefit of the rise of the "third forces" in the war.

In 2014, ISIL cleared the rebels from nearly 50 per cent of the country. Unless the rebels liberate those areas from ISIL, the regime stands to benefit. In much of this terrain, pragmatic forces friendly to the regime have a growing influence. Those forces are not restricted to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. They also include tribal militias from eastern and northern Syria that were once part of the Syrian opposition.

In other words, some of the areas seized by ISIL were subtracted from the opposition in 2014 and are now added to the regime in one form or another. The so-called third forces have indirectly done the bidding of the regime, either by dislodging the rebels or by being pragmatic forces willing to cooperate with the regime or at least to not fight it.

Examples of the shifting game abound. The SDF in Manbij, for example, ceded villages west of Manbij to create a buffer zone between them and the Turkish-backed rebels. The Turkish prime minister, Binali Yildirim, stated that Turkey would prefer the Assad regime control Manbij rather than the Kurds. The US air force helped the regime expel ISIL from Palmyra.

Some rebel groups have also stated they are willing to cooperate with the Russians if Moscow proved a fair interlocutor in the conflict. There is also an initiative by opposition members from Deraa to reach a deal with the regime in exchange for local powers, akin to the Kurds in the north. Jordan’s chief of staff told the BBC in December that Amman was prepared to re-open the border only if the regime controlled the border areas.

The opposition’s backers, such as Turkey and most of the Gulf states, have changed their priorities in the conflict. Countries such as Qatar have little room to back groups they previously backed in the same way since such support will have to go through countries such as Jordan and Turkey. With backers either changing priorities, exiting the conflict or being locked out of it, the rebels will find themselves in the most critical situation they have faced since the beginning of the uprising if, or when, they lose hold of their major strongholds.
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My bold, so Turkey's focus on the PKK isn't just hampering the US attempt to take Raqqa it's distracting from containing AQ's dominance in Idlib. Or you could say the US anti-IS strategy is letting the AQ cat out of the bag. There are rumours that the R+6 might thrust into Idlib but they almost always focus on destroying the less radical forces to AQ's advantage.

Hassan Hassan has a point here. You do have to look at the wider picture.
 
On Syria Direct After kidnapping in pro-Assad heartland, survivor says 'it’s the law of the jungle here’
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Q: How have you seen the overall safety situation across Latakia evolve over the course of the war?

This city is not safe, and it’s been like that even before I was kidnapped. Maybe it’s because I never went through an incident like this one, but those fears and daily apprehensions never really affected me before I was kidnapped.

In the end, no one can feel what you’ve felt. There’s nothing anyone can say unless they’ve lived through the same experience.

I’ve been thinking about this a lot recently, and I’ve said to myself that we really are living now by the law of the jungle here. The strong eat the weak, and there’s no law—much less any security apparatus—to do anything about it. The ones who have the power and the influence here are the ones who kidnap and steal.

Things get worse and worse in the city each and every day. The criminals exploit the whole situation, and no one is ever held accountable. The city is constantly without electricity, and by nightfall, there’s total darkness. Mobile phone service and the internet are both incredibly weak and obscenely expensive, all of which increases the opportunities for crime.

Every day I hear another story—somebody kidnapped or disappearing, someone robbed, even murder. There’s no denying, we’re living a game of luck and chance over here.
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The reality of militia rule and this is meant to be one of the safe spots in Syria.
 
On Al Monitor US puts off announcing decision on Raqqa until after Turkey referendum
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Heras: Turkey has a weak hand because the SDF has demonstrated that it can cut a deal with Assad to connect the cantons of Rojava. Turkey would also have to invest in a large military occupation of Syria to be the hold force for Raqqa, which would be expensive as it fights a civil war with the PKK in eastern Turkey.

Al-Monitor: So are you saying that Turkey’s role will be very limited?

Heras: Turkey has to ask itself whether it wants to have an indefinite Turkish military mandate over suspicious Arab tribes in eastern Syria far from its southern border. In essence, that is what the United States is asking Turkey to commit to if Erdogan wants to be the force that has the prestige of conquering Raqqa.

Al-Monitor: What about Iran? How can you plan an endgame for Syria without taking Iranian influence into account?

Heras: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp [IRGC] is willing to play the long game in Syria, even if that long game is measured in a decade or more of a counterinsurgency war. From the Iranian perspective, Iran is engaged in a sacred defense of the homeland by fighting Salafist extremist groups in Syria.

Both Assad and Iran have an ultimate non-negotiable objective [of] reconquering all of Syria.

Al-Monitor: So how does the Trump administration address Israel’s security concerns over Iran?

Heras: Israel does not want the Iranians to use the Golan Heights region of Syria to open another front against it through the IRGC's Shiite proxy militias. The Southern Front, a coalition of rebel groups, many of whom have been trained and equipped by the CIA — and who control a significant amount of territory near the Jordanian border — would be empowered to push back on Iran in the Golan Heights and against the ISIS affiliates in southern Syria. The Southern Front would be supported by Israel, Jordan, the UAE and the United States. The Southern Front is an Israel-Jordanian effort, separate from Turkey, Assad and Russia.

The Trump administration could delegate support for the Southern Front to Israel and Jordan, while simultaneously relinquishing control of a conquered Raqqa to Assad.

The Trump team could take a region-by-region approach to Syria, which would allow close partners to pursue counter-Iran strategies in one region, such as in the south, and relinquish control of areas conquered from ISIS in eastern Syria to Assad.
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Given Trump's very pro-Israeli stance this focus on the Golan is not unlikely.
 
On Al Monitor Extremist expansion in southern Syria puts Jordan on guard
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Sabayla said, “Jordan has a realistic and practical choice to ensure the protection of its borders. It can coordinate with a real partner on the Syrian territories — hence Russia or the Syrian regime — especially since the international coalition does not have a vision for the post-airstrikes phase.”

In a step showing Jordan’s inclination toward Russia in terms of the Syrian situation, Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Moscow in January to discuss Syria and the war on terrorism.

Hassan Abu Haniyeh, an independent Jordanian researcher on Islamic groups’ affairs, told Al-Monitor, “The problem is that the international strategy — specifically that of the United States — in dealing with the Syrian situation has gone downhill. Western support for moderate factions in southern Syria that relied on armament by the West has declined. The Jordanian supervision of the Syrian opposition in south Syria through the MOC is weak now.”

Haniyeh said the declining support “pushed the moderate factions to join the ranks of al-Qaeda, represented by Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham or the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army.” In addition, he expects “the moderate opposition factions in southern Syria to grow weaker in the medium-term.”

In regard to military operations, retired Maj. Gen. Fayez al-Duwairi told Al-Monitor, “The expansion of the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army in Syria was not along the Jordanian border as much as it was in the Syrian interior. The demarcation line between this army and Jordan thus stretched from the Yarmouk Basin area toward the northern towns.”

He said, “This expansion is dangerous for Jordan due to the increasing influence of the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army and its far-reaching fire strength into Jordan due to machine guns, mortars and cannons.”

Haniyeh expects “any clash between Jordan and this army to trigger a reaction from the kingdom by using fire and air weapons.” He ruled out the use of ground troops and the entry of Jordanian forces into Syria.

FSA sources in the south told Al-Monitor that the Khalid Ibn al-Walid Army consists of around 1,500 fighters, 300 of whom are so-called Sharia qadis (judges). Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian, spearheads the army, which mobilizes people in villages under its control by offering financial remuneration and giving them religious jihad training.

There are 120 factions under the FSA in the south, and they receive funding from the US-funded MOC. Those factions include the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, Ahrar Nawa Division, Liwa Tawhid al-Janoub, Harakat Fajr al-Sham, 46th Division, Alwiya al-Furqan, the military council in Quneitra and the Army of Free Tribes.
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Another party wanting a Southern focus.
 
On MEE Hezbollah facing loss of morale over Syrian quagmire: Report
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The sectarian rhetoric employed during the war so far, the report finds, has severely damaged the group's credibility and reputation.

"From a 'party of the oppressed' and a Lebanon-based and centred 'resistance' movement standing up to Israel, it has projected itself across the border and morphed into a powerful regional force.

"Once acclaimed by Arabs for struggle against a common enemy, most recently in the 2006 Lebanon war, it is [now] widely viewed as a sectarian Shia militia and, in parts of Syria, a ruthless occupier."

It has also, the ICG writes, left discipline and morale among frontline fighters under threat.

"Of course I wish we were fighting Israel and not in a conflict that is dividing the Arab world," one fighter told ICG researchers.

A former fighter who had engaged in battles with Israel told researchers that fighters in the current battle were less committed, and less religiously disciplined.

"Our generation used to pray the entire night before going into battle. Now, you see some of these guys spending their days in cafes smoking shisha before they go off to Syria."

An Iraqi cleric with close ties to Hezbollah told researchers that the lack of discipline among Hezbollah fighters in Syria was down to the fact that only sectarian, rather than political, rhetoric was being used to encourage young men to join the battle.

"What would push young [Lebanese] Shias to fight in Syria? Very few would go for Bashar's sake, or even Iran's.

"It's a single stone of the [Shia] Sayyida Zeinab shrine [in Damascus] that mobilises them."

The cleric also warned that, if the group continues to focus on purely sectarian rhetoric to swell support for its military engagement in Syria, it could have "dangerous" consequences for the region.

"This could be very dangerous in the long run. One day, leaders may sit around the negotiating table, but it will be very difficult to heal broken spirits from this sectarian rift."
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Funny? I could have sworn I noticed a tiny bit of sectarian rhetoric when HA were happily fighting the Joos or perhaps that just ordinary decent racism? Fighting endlessly to keep Bashar in his palace obviously doesn't sit well with HA foot soldiers.

Of course HA's war here is really about its supply lines from Iran and it's missile arsenal held in Syria. Both part of their war to eventually take back al Quds but it's not the sort of Jihad to get a Beard excited. Increasingly they are talking about the next war with Israel.
 
In The WSJ A New Strategy Against ISIS and al Qaeda
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What’s needed is a new approach—and we have one. The Institute for the Study of War joined with the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute for an intensive planning exercise beginning in November 2015. Our analysts tested more than 15 different courses of action before arriving at the one that offers the best chance of changing the momentum in Syria.

The key is finding new Sunni partners and taking the fight to new terrain, specifically, southeastern Syria, where ISIS leaders have refuge. American military forces will be necessary. But the U.S. can recruit new Sunni Arab partners by fighting alongside them in their land. The goal in the beginning must be against ISIS because it controls the last areas in Syria where the U.S. can reasonably hope to find Sunni allies not yet under the influence of al Qaeda. But the aim after evicting ISIS must be to raise a Sunni Arab army that can ultimately defeat al Qaeda and help negotiate a settlement to the war.

The U.S. will have to pressure the Assad regime, Iran and Russia to end the conflict on terms that the Sunni Arabs will accept. That will be easier to do with the independence and leverage of a secure base inside Syria. America should also liberate itself from the troublesome reliance on Turkey by shifting its base of operations south, where a reliable ally, Jordan, is fully committed to fighting Salafi jihadism. Both these moves would give Washington access to Sunni partners not heavily infiltrated by al Qaeda.
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Hardly a new idea. Since the Iraqi Sahwa collapsed there's been a great deal of wishful thinking about raising Sunni Arab armies to fight Salafi-Jihadis. They were more willing to fight Assad with Salafi-Jihadis. Many actually were not attracted by what the rebellion became: religiously conservative in character sectarian and hopelessly fragmented. Assad proved resilient and the Salafi-Jihadis exploited the conflict to advance themselves.

The Jordanians some time ago subverted much of the Southern revolt into an unhappy border security force. Something similar has happened in the North. Meanwhile the Assad regime has been greatly weakened while Iranians practically occupy a Useful Syria that is a Russian protectorate. In the NE we have a PKK statelet carved out by US airpower that the Turks and much of the rebellion would destroy. That is probably going to end up as a vassal of Baathist Damascus.

The basic problem is societal fragmentation. This particularly effects Sunni Arabs but also Kurds. Syria is often a patchwork of groups living in proximity to each other rather than great blocks being monolithic in character. Powerful Salafi-Jihadi groups thrive where they can divide and rule Sunni Arabs. There's a lunacy to divisive policies: backing Kurd against Arab or Turk or Persian, Sunni against Shia, tribe against tribe. This is how the Baath rules.

Iraqi Shia Arabs have shown greater cohesion and a willingness to reach out to the shattered Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The new Baghdad is Shia in character but relatively inclusive. It's a powerful new nationalism embodied in the often sectarian Hashd but the savage predation of Shia militias has been slight compared to the last rising. The Hashd includes Sunni groups and has often worked with tribes. The ISF is largely Shia but also recruit Sunni. The KRG has always been prone to split along KDP-PUK lines but it has been fairly successful as part of Iraq. Iraq has many problems not least that Baghdad is too close to Teheran but it appears headed in a better direction than Syria being carved up by foreign meddlers. Does it make any sense to attempt stand up another Sunni Arab army led by the Hashemite Crown next to this?

The PKK at least makes some effort to accommodate differences. Any US Syria policy should probably focus on Turkish-PKK relations and making Rojova less of a one party state. Rojova will fail if its hostile to its neighbours and the Baath will seek to subvert it. The pursuit of terrorists at the expense of regional stability is foolishly self defeating. Thwarting the restoration of Iran's GLOC to HA on behalf of Israel isn't as important as seeking some measure of Syrian stability.
 
From ICG Hizbollah’s Syria Conundrum
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V.Conclusion

Hizbollah’s intervention in Syria has had a contradictory effect on the party. While it has helped increase its fighting capacity, allowed it to consolidate ties with allies and raised its regional profile as a military force, it has also drained its resources, exposed it to new enemies, left it more thinly spread on its front with Israel and transformed it in ways that may yet come back to haunt it.

Its leaders appear to believe they have no option but to pursue a decisive military victory. To celebrate its annual “Martyrs’ Day” in November 2016, Hizbollah staged a military parade in Qusayr, the town that marked its May 2013 full-fledged entry into the war and first victory. By showcasing its heavy weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft missiles and armoured vehicles, it sent an unambiguous reminder to its enemies of its military strength. A Lebanese newspaper quoted Nasrallah’s deputy as saying, “we now have a trained army”.

Hizbollah’s leaders need a reality check. More than five years of war have shown that military power does not automatically translate into military victory, and demonstrations of strength, instead of impressing enemies, may merely harden their resolve. For all its prowess, Hizbollah remains an external actor in Syria – in a region where history has shown that those seen as liberators and protectors one day can quickly be perceived as invaders and occupiers the next. In addition, Iran now faces an unpredictable U.S. administration determined to curtail its role in the region. Rather than feeding extremism, Hizbollah and Iran would be better served by lowering the sectarian flames, opening dialogue with non-jihadist rebel groups and paving the way for a negotiated settlement that would guarantee their vital interests and encourage Hizbollah, at last, to return to Lebanon.
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HA in a position rather too close to that of the IDF in its occupation of Lebanon. That lasted a decade and a half. HA has managed to get some Syrians to hate it more than Israel which is saying something. Mind once the revolt is tamped down HA being HA it may see another war with Israel as a way of fixing its PR problem. That's if the Israelis don't start it first.
 
In AT Why has Iran wrecked its economy to fund war in Syria?
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In several visits to Beijing during 2014 and 2015, I spoke to senior Chinese strategists who expressed extreme concern about the dangers of returning Uyghur fighters and the spread of Islamism to China’s periphery in Southeast Asia. A Russian-Chinese axis is emerging in the Asia stretching from Thailand to Turkey. As a counterweight to the Sunni jihad, Russia and China have encouraged the militarization of the Shi’ite belt that stretches from Lebanon through Syria and Iran to Afghanistan. Virtually all of China’s Muslims and 90% of Russia’s Muslims are Sunnis. Iran well may be the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, as both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration claim, but it is not a sponsor of the specific sort of terrorism that Russia and China fear.

That helps explain Iran’s seemingly irrational decision to divert desperately-needed resources to the Revolutionary Guards. The IRGC is not merely the dominant political and economic force in Iran. It is Iran’s main bargaining chip with its arms suppliers and oil buyers in Moscow and Beijing. China’s economic influence in Asia is a geopolitical Death Star, a magnet for political influence unlike anything we have seen since America’s economic dominance in Europe during the 1950s. Iran and its Shi’ite surrogates in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan have a nearly inexhaustible supply of cannon fodder to advance Russian and Chinese interests on the ground in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. With Chinese economic support, Iran can sustain its military campaigns far longer than its neglected, bankrupt and dehydrated internal economy might suggest.

This leaves American policy in a quandary. The Obama administration— as Lieutenant General Michael Flynn warned in this and numerous other statements — inadvertently stood godfather to the birth of ISIS by blundering into the milieu of Syrian Sunni rebels. It is discouraging that the Trump administration lost the services of Gen. Flynn less than a month into his tenure at National Security Council. More broadly, Sunni radicalism in the region is the result of the George W Bush administration’s insistence on majority (that is, Shi’ite) rule in Iraq. As Lieutenant General Daniel P Bolger observed in his superb 2014 book Why We Lost: “The stark facts on the ground still sat there, oozing pus and bile. With Saddam gone, any voting would install a Shi’ite majority. The Sunni wouldn’t run Iraq again. That, at the bottom, caused the insurgency. Absent the genocide of Sunni Arabs, it would keep it going.”
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I'd say Iran busting itself to keep Assad's head on has got more to do with old alliances and revolutionary imperatives but it's an interesting angle. A much bigger role for China in MENA may well be on the way. The region is going to need an awful lot of reconstruction and I don't see Trump's US picking that up.
 

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However, even when combined, these facts do not definitively illustrate a plan of demographic change. The sectarian cleansing has mostly taken place along Alawite–Sunni lines. The Alawites are the minority sect from which Assad comes, but contrary to popular perception, they are distinct from the Shiites. Alawite militiamen have engaged in sectarian cleansing, in places such as Homs and Baniyas. But this was more because they saw rebellious Sunni populations as a security threat to key Alawite areas, rather than to engineer a broader Iranian-backed demographic shift.

The development of “Syrian Hezbollah” and the integration of foreign militias do reflect Iranian aims in Syria – but do not necessarily point to demographic change. Both developments give Iran lasting leverage in Syria’s security affairs, thus reducing the risk that Syrians will resent what they perceive as an occupation by unintegrated foreign forces. Logically, Iran will want to establish a long-term or permanent presence in Syria – particularly for the estimated several thousand personnel in the Afghan Shiite units of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, the majority of whom were refugees living in harsh conditions in Iran before the IRGC recruited them. At least four contingents of the Fatemiyoun Brigade were manning the front line in the area around Palmyra when ISIS retook it last December; it’s possible Iran may even plan to establish large bases there, integrated with Syria’s armed forces, that will amount to settlements for these fighters.

The rise of Syrian Hezbollah among existing Syrian Shiite communities and the resultant affinities with Iran undoubtedly fit in with Tehran’s desire to promote its ideology among Shiite communities and position itself as their protector and guarantor of their interests. However, the clearest example of Shiification, in the case of Liwa al-Baqir, is actually not a wartime phenomenon: Conversions among Bekara tribesmen, driven by Iranian-backed proselytization, were already occurring before the war. These conversion initiatives were successful partly because of the connection drawn between the tribe’s origins and the fifth Shiite imam, Imam Muhammad al-Baqir.
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Excellent piece describing demographic changes in regime areas that don't really fit some rebel narratives of grand Iranian schemes to do down Sunni Arabs. Balanche has pointed out many rebel held areas have also been cleansed of out groups. This kind of sorting out often happens in civil wars. Baghdad for instance became a far less mixed city during the first rising with Shia Militias expelling Sunni.
 
On Reuters After six years, Assad now secure but his country carved up as war thunders on
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Syria watchers say a patchy ceasefire in place now - brokered by Russia and Turkey - could be consolidated. But they believe Assad will eventually try to annihilate the rebel forces pushed into rural Idlib, one village at a time.

Yet Assad and his patrons will always face the constraint of limited manpower, which stretches his forces ever thinner the more territory he regains and makes his troops more exposed to attacks by opposition groups and jihadis of Islamic State.

Recent deadly attacks inside government-held cities, on a military intelligence headquarters in Homs and on Iraqi Shi’ite pilgrims in Damascus, underline the threat, which Assad's refusal to compromise could magnify.

“If you’re Iran and Russia and you know Assad's manpower limitations and political rigidity you have a problem," says Tabler. “You have to cut a deal so that Iran and Russia don’t have to surge troops into Syria, which is their dilemma."

Ford, after informal recent discussions with Russian experts familiar with Moscow's policy, says the Russians believe the Syrian army is exhausted and that it would be difficult for Assad to recapture all of the country.

Since Assad cannot hope to run Syria with the iron centralized control he once exercised, there needs to be decentralization, Ford said, noting that Moscow had proposed a less-centralized constitution but Assad had rejected it.

That leaves the likely outcome continued de facto partition of Syria, even if Assad continues to make incremental gains.

“The only way to avoid partition, without a peace agreement, is for the Syrian government to recapture the whole country and that could take years," says Ford.
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My bold, that's former US Ambassador Ford.

I think Bashar is quite prepared for it to take decades for his clan to recapture the country. There'll be no peace agreement in the near term. The rebels don't accept Bashar staying on and he's going nowhere. There may be hudna style agreements to deconflict as the regime has made with the PKK but those will be made to be broken.

Bashar might be assassinated as Tabler suggests as he's a obstacle to any settlement. That would be a very Russian move but I doubt that would lead to the rise of a conciliatory figure. Just regime instability and the Assad clan are quite capable of promoting somebody worse.

Article suggest he'll be economically isolated like Saddam was. The EU for instance has said it will await political transition in Syria before considering aid. They'll have a long wait. The economy is Bashar's soft spot but I suspect that would keep him dependent on Iran and make it impossible to reconstruct the country. Attempting to weaken Assad has only empowered Iran and Russia.
 

Arab tribe leaders, whose lands were invaded by the PYD/PKK and Daesh terror organizations, gathered in Turkey's southeastern province of Şanlıurfa to discuss military and political cooperation between the tribes.

The meeting was held at Harran Hotel, and a total of 50 tribe leaders coming from Syria's Raqqa, Al-Hasakah and Deir Ezzor regions agreed to form "The Army of Al Jazira and Euphrates tribes" to put an end to the invasion of their lands by Daesh and the PYD.

Mudar Hamad Al-Essaad, spokesperson for the High Council of Syrian Tribes, signed a written statement expressing the purpose of the tribal army to clear the area from terror organizations.

The army is planned to be led by former regime officers or Free Syrian Army (FSA) commanders, the statement elaborated.
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Well that's only liable to detract from building up the SDF coalition.
 
On Al Monitor Is Israel prepared for Hezbollah's rearming?
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In the second Lebanon War, the IDF ran out of targets to attack within just a few days, because Hezbollah fighters avoided direct contact with Israeli forces. This time, however, the entire country of Lebanon will be a strategic target. Bombing runs will target power stations, airports, important factories, and major roads and intersections. All Lebanese army bases will be destroyed as will the army's armored vehicles, and so on. Given these circumstances, the IDF estimates that the next campaign will be shorter but much more destructive.

Over the past few years, Israel boosted its special forces and created specialized commando brigades. In the next round, it will try not to avoid various land maneuvers, even though the operations on land in the last Lebanon conflict turned out to be a dismal failure. In this era, in any case, it makes no sense to talk about "victory." All that is left is to try to create a deterrent and ensure that it is etched deeply in Lebanon's consciousness. That is what Israel will try to achieve in the next war.

When would this war break out? The Israeli assessment is that Nasrallah has no reason to get into a conflict with Israel in the foreseeable future. The IDF claims that as long as a significant part of his forces is over-extended and exhausted in Syria, Nasrallah will try to avoid a clash with Israel. At the same time, however, signals from Beirut over the past few months indicate that Nasrallah's patience is starting to wear thin. According to foreign sources, the rules of the new game that Israel has imposed over the past few years, in which it feels free to attack arms convoys making their way to him from Syria, are unacceptable to Nasrallah.

According to recent intelligence from the West, the Iranians have established rocket-manufacturing facilities in Lebanon in order to "circumvent" the wall of intelligence and Israeli bombings, which prevent the unhindered supply of rockets to Hezbollah. In any event, Nasrallah's armories are full. There is very little chance that "these missiles will get rusty," as former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon once predicted. Israel knows that if there is a missile on the table in the first act, it will be fired in the third act. At some time or other that is going to happen.
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Well the Turks are not the only ones that cock up a COIN campaign conducted with terrorist allies.

As the Syrian war has the regime ascendant Israel is now planning out a "No more Mr Nice Guy!" campaign on Lebanon. Must establish deterrence, the gloves are off yada yada. Well its over a decade since the last try and a little grass mowing is overdue up in Lebanon. The old reliable gambit that bombing Arab populations into submission will make them reject the terrorists that Assad has stubbornly been working on for six years. This is on the basis that far right Defence Minister Liberman says HA are now is the Lebanese state and besides pesky HA and their big missile arsenal are pretty hard to target. Trashing Lebanon in general may have the benefit of not annoying Liberman's Russian chums by actually wiping out their best light infantry in Syria. No date on this operation yet but any little clash can trigger it. If I was the IDF I would not wait for HA and all their tens of thousands of new auxiliaries to be at a loose end in Syria and itching to take the Golan.

Well like 06 it would probably be great PR for HA and the Ayatollahs are getting all moist at the prospect.
 
In Al Monitor Congress wants answers from Turkey on shutdown of US aid pipeline to Syria
...
Mercy Corps had been reluctant to speak out publicly about the incident to avoid antagonizing Turkey, but it may have felt compelled to as its last reserves inside Turkey dwindle and it is barred from bringing any more inside the country. Instead, the nongovernmental organization is working with the US Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration to try to fill any gaps.

In his testimony to the committee, Keny-Guyer called Turkey's actions "deeply disturbing." But he also went out of his way to praise Ankara's response to the refugee crisis, which has seen Turkey host more than 3 million Syrians.

"Turkey has been a generous global leader in humanitarian action," he said, adding that Turkey "boasts one of the world’s most progressive policies on refugees, allowing them to earn a living for their families and offering them a clear path to citizenship."

Still, he made clear that Mercy Corps would continue to treat all Syrians the same. Turkish authorities appear to be particularly incensed at aid going to Kurdish-controlled Afrin in Syria, which has been overrun with Syrian Arabs displaced by the war.

"If we were to appear to take sides, our credibility and our ability to reach the people in greatest need, as well as the safety of our staff, would be in grave jeopardy," Keny-Guyer said in written testimony. "Our situation raises the very real specter that principled humanitarianism is imperiled."
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My bold, Ankara tightening the screws.
 

Interesting thread, points out deploying a couple of combat Battalions translates to about 6K people once you add all the necessary support people.
 
Further to that Kaganesque WSJ piece above.


Not all daft, the current strategy US Syria strategy is myopic too IS focused and has obvious flaws. Focusing on Counter Terrorism and what they call the "External Threat Node" rather than stability is self defeating. AQ may well be a greater threat than IS but again the focus should be stability.

The Russo-Iranian alliance in Syria is unlikely to lead to much more than a weak Useful Syria suffering a recurring terrorist insurgency like Iraq. Partition schemes are something the Iranians will resist (as will most Syrians) but may also empower them. Useful Syria is effectively an Iranian dependency protected by Russian Air Defences. However ISW's ambition to expel Iran from Syria is a very unrealistic stretch goal for just that reason and what they suggest doing in the SE is a soft partition scheme. And Iran will probably bite down hard on the US forces in Iraq and exploit its strong grip on Syria to harry Israel. It is what it is. I'm afraid Useful Syria is pretty much a dead loss to Iran.

The grab for Raqqa is hasty. Rojava has very low chances of survival if the PKK remains at war with Turkey. This must urgently be deescalated. The Syrian PKK is being forced into Assad's treacherous embrace and will be no less a Jihadi target than the regime itself.

The magicking into existence of a Sunni Arab army in SE Syria willing to fight powerful Salafi-Jihadi groups is the usual nonsense. This has been tried in SE Syria. It was called the New Syrian Army. IS tore them a hole and the tribes failed to support them. Such a force would also face Iran and Assad. A collision with the Russians would be likely. I'm not seeing Baghdad buying this either. Major US basing around Abu Kamal is unlikely to fly with Trump and would be another Takfiri magnet. The US voter is tired of heavy endless ground commitments.

The US needs to work where it has leverage or lose even that leverage. That is mainly in Baghdad, Irbil, Ankara and Qamishli.
 
On Syria Direct String of bombings in less than one week leave some Damascenes fearing 'another Iraq'
...
Q: How have these bombing affected people? Have you felt them impact your life?

They’ve really impacted people’s movement. People are mentally exhausted, struggling with the scrutiny and searches [of security forces]. Reserves are now being called up to shore up checkpoints. There’s much more traffic, and the security forces are exercising their power over the people.

You can see fear and terror in people’s eyes. There were bombings in places like the court house and a restaurant, which means it could happen anytime, anywhere.

People are afraid that it will happen again, that we will see Damascus become another Iraq.
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Conflict morphing predictably towards terrorist insurgency. Damascus starting to resemble bomb scared Baghdad.
 
On Syria Direct After enlisting with Kurdish forces, soldier realizes he’s not cut out for a life of battle
...
Q: What pushed you to defect from the Syrian Democratic Forces? How did you know it was time to go?

There were a number of reasons why I fled. I lost of a lot of friends and comrades. They were killed right before my eyes. This in itself was debilitating. I grew to hate weapons, fighting and killing, even if it’s to defend oneself and one’s homeland. Part of it was that my parents pressured me to leave Syria, fearing that I would be killed.

I decided I should resign and return to my friends and family. I had a university degree, and I could go back to my studies and my old job.

The problem was that my multiple requests for a discharge were denied. I began to think about leaving the country because staying would mean giving up my life.

At the end of my time [with the SDF], I went through a difficult period of psychological stress. I was living in a state of fear and panic.

At one point, I was injured, and I had to take sick leave. I didn’t think I would survive. It was then that the idea of fleeing grew stronger.
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Ended up in Germany. I imagine this collapse into despair and flight is a pretty common trajectory on all sides.
 
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