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And next, Syria?

I am not talking about conspiracy theories thankyou. I am talking about assistance directly provided by the state reported on by actual reporters on the ground rather than some bunch of wingnuts somwhere out there on the net. The articles are on this thread somewhere, I may have posted at least one of them.
Yes there were well documented minor incidents that I can recall as well but the idea of active IS-Turkish collusion has been vastly overblown. That is a conspiracy theory. IS did have the Turks over a barrel at one point as they'd taken hostage their entire Mosul consulate.

The Turks mainly backed the same rebels we did out of the same CIA run MOC. We also diligently looked away when our rebels were in cahoots with AQ or IS as they often were. The Turks were willing to work with groups like Ahar al Sham as well that were too AQ linked and Taliban like for the CIA's comfort.

The main difference was the PKK was Ankara's priority because of their very evident capability to cause domestic mayhem in Turkey on a far greater scale than any of these Salafi-Jihadis. It's similar to Israel's attitude to their implacable enemy HA besides which IS and AQ are distant threats.

We now have an odd situation in which AQ is pretty much the standard bearer of the rebels' rather just but probably hopeless cause of regime change. The Turks have gathered the rest of the Northern rebels under Ahar's banner and are directing then against the rival PKK and IS revolutionary projects rather than Assad. The utterly repugnant Assad regime pulls our cannon fodder providing ally the PKK into ever closer alignment even shielding Manbij. That may mean the hasty US plan to take Raqqa with the SDF can proceed. The SDF looks ill prepared to hold it.

The unfussy Russians in their GWOT it seems now regard the PKK, HA, Ahar and even the Afghan Taliban all as viable partners. But then they are in bed with the sneaky Iranians and the detestable Syrian Baath making come hither eyes at Trump to join them.

The results of all this are probably really unstable with a great deal of weakly held territory in a highly fragmented society especially out in the wild East. Iraq with its flawed political institutions looks relatively hopeful in comparison.
 
i still think you underestimate Turkish state alliance/sponsorship of extremist types. I posted this on the Turkey, ISIS, Kurds and Syria thread late last year now maybe it's down to leverage or whatever but more likely imo it's because ever since the attempted coup and even before that Turkey has been moving towards an much stricter interpretation of Islam. That coupled with Erdogan's desire for an increase and continuation of his grip on power make for alliances such as this. Also there were the Gezi park protests which were eventually brutally put down by the government and whilst there may have been PKK people involved in that it certainly wasn't about them, rather the destruction of a park to make way for developments linked people in the AKP. Corruption and cronyism is rife and these people will brook no dissent whatsoever.

 
i still think you underestimate Turkish state alliance/sponsorship of extremist types. I posted this on the Turkey, ISIS, Kurds and Syria thread late last year now maybe it's down to leverage or whatever but more likely imo it's because ever since the attempted coup and even before that Turkey has been moving towards an much stricter interpretation of Islam. That coupled with Erdogan's desire for an increase and continuation of his grip on power make for alliances such as this. Also there were the Gezi park protests which were eventually brutally put down by the government and whilst there may have been PKK people involved in that it certainly wasn't about them, rather the destruction of a park to make way for developments linked people in the AKP. Corruption and cronyism is rife and these people will brook no dissent whatsoever.

Radical Turkish Salafi have always hated Gulenists. Very much the wrong kind of kufr dripping Islamist.

But I don't disagree that Turkey is moving to the religious right and has had a fair dose of crazy. Trump and Erdogan have a lot of parallels. Erratic, impetuous, petty, paranoid, attacking press freedom, intolerant of opposition and in Erdogan's case about to rejig the constitution to make himself Sultan. But Erdogan is also ruthless, politically agile and very popular (high 60s last I looked). He's done that by courting the militaristic far right who have always obsessed on the PKK and hated the peace process with Apo. The PKK helped by restarting their war in the SE as the far right predicted they were planning to. That war also appears to have precipitated the TuAF centred mutiny that further enabled Euphrates Shield.

But there's a very big difference between hardline Salafists and typical AKP people a lot of whom are impoverished, conservative Kurds who the party diligently courted some years back. There's very little ideological sympathy with the Taliban like ambitions of Ahar high up in the AKP. Supporting them is more a practical matter as they are reasonably effective, popular and Syria focused. The AKP leadership would rather have the lightweight MB types that populated the SNC but they've little support in Syria. The MB had to buy support from the new generation of Salafists who largely took their place when the Brotherhood was exiled. IS have for a year or so been very explicitly anti-AKP in their propaganda and AQ issued a Fatwa recently against participation in Euphrates Shield.

The really annoying thing here is the daft war with the PKK looked like it might finally end and we could have had a situation where Syrian Kurds were developing a symbiotic relationship with Ankara like their Iraqi brethren. The Turks have the water and oil refining capacity that arid, oil rich Rojava needs if its not to have a vassal relationship with the treacherous Baath. Erdogan may be breaking bad but he's not a atrocity tainted monster like Assad. Instead we have Rojava locked in a probable death spiral with an increasingly hostile Turkey and their allied rebels.
 
On ISW Al Qaeda Resumes Offensive Operations in Syria
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HTS resumed offensive operations against pro-Assad forces in late February 2017. HTS launched a complex, coordinated attack against two regime military installations in Homs City on February 25. Five HTS sleeper cell members detonated Suicide Vests (SVESTs) outside the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in the al-Mahatta and al-Ghouta Districts of Homs City. The attack killed dozens of regime soldiers including two high-ranking generals. It set conditions for follow-on military operations by disrupting the regime’s command and control and possibly fixing pro-regime forces in Homs City. HTS’ most likely operational objective is to attack Hama City, which has symbolic resonance for the Salafi Jihadi movement because of the 1982 massacre conducted by former Syrian president Hafez Al Assad against the Muslim Brotherhood and its alleged supporters. HTS may alternately launch an offensive against the regime’s coastal stronghold in order to shake the regime’s confidence and possibly to threaten Russia’s military bases in Latakia and Tartous.

A major HTS-led campaign against pro-Assad forces would require Assad and his external backers to dedicate significant resources to defense. It would likely deny them the ability to launch clearing operations in Idlib Province after consolidating in Aleppo City. It may force Russia and Iran to dedicate more resources to the Syrian theater in order to defend key regime-held terrain. HTS could degrade the regime’s defenses enough to create opportunities for ISIS to advance after the regime’s recapture of Palmyra. ISIS has conducted regular attacks deep into Homs City, indicating that it is positioned to exploit regime vulnerabilities that HTS may inflict and vice versa. It is also possible, although less likely, that HTS and ISIS will coordinate tactically against the regime in the Homs-Hama corridor. Most dangerous possibilities include simultaneous and possibly coordinated al Qaeda and ISIS offensives that overmatch the Syrian regime’s defenses north of Damascus. Russia and Iran are taking steps to bolster the regime’s ability to defend terrain against major offensives, but it is unclear how rapidly they can respond or how many positions they can defend at once.

President Trump will face a decision point on how to respond to the resumption of large-scale violence in western Syria. Russia will attempt to draw the U.S. into a counterterrorism partnership in Syria in reaction to HTS’ upcoming offensive. President Trump must avoid ceding more power to Russia in Syria in return for a counterterrorism partnership that would only radicalize Syria’s population further. Al Qaeda’s continued rise demonstrates that a counterterrorism strategy is inappropriate, furthermore. The U.S. will not destroy al Qaeda’s army in Syria through precision airstrikes against individual high profile al Qaeda operatives. President Trump must instead adopt a new long-term strategy that integrates American efforts against Al Qaeda and ISIS to destroy both armies while depriving them of local support.
ISW sees the fall of East Aleppo as a decisive tipping point. But for AQ in Syria rather than the regime. This is one way of looking at it if slightly perverse. AQ certainly capitalised on the siege successfully. Of course it also stands to benefit from the contraction of the Caliphate down to an insurgency which is an outcome ISW has also predicted. This will leave another revolutionary space for it to flow into just like the defeat of the less radical elements of the opposition that are now mostly huddled for protection next to Turkey and Jordan. The last real redoubt being the Jaish al Islam stronghold of East Ghouta even if that not exactly a beacon of moderation.

The significant thing is what may be a flip to an Iraq style insurgency that's less fixed on holding territory than disrupting the Syrian state apparatus. Syrian's appear to lack the appetite for a bloody AQI style war on market places but gutting nodes of the brutal Baathist intelligence bureaucracy is a very good choice of target. Hit the power brokers the regime coopts to rule. Target the Iranian occupiers. Making Useful Syria increasingly useless. Perhaps not defeating the regime but forcing it into a defensive crouch that makes authoritarian consolidation impossible. Finally the sort of network centric terrorist war that AQ has deep expertise in and legitimated by the banner of resistance.

IS meanwhile inevitably will go into the shadows and starting picking off elements of Sunni Arab resistance to it. Waiting until likely state failures provoke another rising. Baghdad, Irbil and Qamishli may not be Damascus but all have major flaws as capitals and also rule too many angry conservative Sunni. For IS it's a process of grinding down the will to resist its vengeful return.
 
On ISW Russian Airstrikes in Syria: January 26 – February 28, 2017
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The Russian air campaign in southern and northern Syria also rendered acceptable opposition groups increasingly vulnerable to Salafi-jihadist attacks. Russian airstrikes in and around Dera’a City enabled ISIS affiliate Jaysh Khalid ibn al Walid to seize several towns from opposition forces in the vicinity of the nearby Yarmuk Basin, an area dominated by the Southern Front. Russian warplanes also targeted a headquarters of former U.S.-backed TOW anti-tank missile recipient Jaysh Idlib al Hur in southern Idlib Province on February 15, likely emboldening al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate to threaten the weakened group ten days later. Although Russian airstrikes facilitated pro-regime gains against ISIS in eastern Homs Province from February 8 – 11 and 26 – 28, the ambit of Russia’s anti-ISIS effort extends only so far as it aligns with its goal to preserve the Syrian regime. In contrast, Russia will continue to invest heavily in the targeting of acceptable opposition groups, so as to make them more susceptible to recruitment and attack by ISIS and al Qaeda. As Russia continues to both violate international legal norms and accelerate the radicalization of the armed opposition, it all but disqualifies itself as a viable partner for the U.S. counter-terrorism coalition.
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ISW clearly not happy with Trumpski's upcoming attempt to work with the Russkis in Syria. That is sort of unavoidable though with AQ having taken over half of the Northern revolt while the US fixated on IS. There'll at least have to be deconfliction as The Donald will probably want to "bomb the shit out of" AQ Syria.
 
On Al Monitor Syrian Kurds cede buffer as Turkish-backed FSA advances on Manbij
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Nicholas Heras, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, believes the United States will stay out of the Turkish-Kurdish tussle over Manbij. This is because “the United States is not invested in a permanent SDF presence in Manbij and it will not want Manbij to be the cause of a war between the SDF and Turkey that would prevent the counter-IS campaign of achieving its true objective: the defeat of IS in Raqqa and throughout eastern Syria,” he told Al-Monitor in an interview.

The deal between the regime and the SDF will surely reinforce critics' long-running claims that the YPG is colluding with the regime, but it gets Washington off the hook. Indeed, the pact may even serve as something of a template for Raqqa. A nagging problem in plans to overrun the jihadis’ so-called capital is the lack of adequate manpower.

Turkey’s offer to take Raqqa with the FSA is likely to be ignored because the US military planners remain unimpressed.

While the United States would never want to cooperate directly with the regime, any help it can get on Raqqa would clearly not be unwelcome. And as recent developments in Manbij have shown, with Russia pulling the strings, the SDF and the regime are capable of working together when need be. It may not be all that bad an outcome for Turkey, either, for the alternative, a deeper US footprint in alliance with the Kurds, is viewed by Ankara as the biggest threat of all.
My bold, this piece puts great store in Russian cleverness. Seems to me stubborn Bashar leveraged a pretty big consolation prize for the Russians acquiescing in the Turks taking al Bab. The situation is at the very least promising in the East.

Consider this:
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Given their similar orientations to both the Syrian regime and radical opposition groups and their shared Sunni identity, it is curious that these two cities are not coordinating their activities and are not ruled by a unified government. When one scratches the surface of the Aleppo countryside’s Sunni, anti-regime veneer, however, the political separation of Manbij and al-Bab is far less surprising. The residents of Manbij are ethnically diverse, including Kurds, Arabs and Circassians, and many practice Naqshbandi Sufism. Historically, political and social life in Manbij was organized along tribal lines. Sheikhs of the largest Manbij tribes served, until the past decade, as intermediaries between average citizens and the state. Security forces were nearly absent from the street and, though police would deal with petty crime, serious grievances were left for tribal leaders to resolve. Owing to the tribal and ethnically mixed population and social structure, the milieu in which Manbijis grow up is substantially more diverse and open than one might expect in a peripheral Sunni city. In al-Bab, by contrast, a more homogeneous Arab population practices mainline Sunni Islam, with Sufi groups far less prominent. Social life was historically organized around several important extended families, but central state police handled both petty and major crime and state security maintained a much stronger presence in the town. Cultural homogeneity contributed to a closed, overtly religious milieu in al-Bab.
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Al Bab is a very conservative town that sent Jihadis to fight with AQI in Iraq. IS fought surprisingly hard to hold it and probably had significant support there. The SDF would probably have found it a very bitter pill. A Salafi group like Ahar al Sham might put down roots there more easily. The TSK took it at considerable cost and now have to hold it while the SAA looks on from the South blocking the way. The gate to Aleppo's water supplies is barred.

There's a piece on Manbij under the rebels up thread. Had its Revolution Military Council as chaotic but moderate and a pretty successful experiment. The remnants of that RMC are now with the Turks. Erdogan is probably correct it would be a more legitimate government than the Apoist council imposed by the PKK in what should be friendlier territory than heavily Bearded al Bab. Though the SAA will be in the way and that piece also mentioned significant elite elements that seemed to continued to covertly support the regime in Manbij.

The US doesn't really support that occupation and it will be a source of Turkish enmity. The Turks have already directed the Rojova Peshmerga against the Syrian PKK on their Eastern border. The regime meanwhile controls Rojava's a new vital GLOC to their vulnerable comrades in Afrin who lack US support. Assad may have the Syrian PKK just where he wants them. His oily NE powerbroker. Salih Muslim can end up as a mirror image of the economically dependent Turkish vassal Barzani in the KRG. It's not a great leap to imagine the old regime being restored in Manbij and the PKK writing off its own considerable losses there to consolidate East of the Euphrates.

The only Divisional HQ the regime has ever lost Raqqa ending up being a loyalist centre again allied with the PKK rather than it being reluctantly occupied by them and a thin screen of Arab allies may have got a bit closer. Because it's manpower on the ground that's everybody's problem in Syria and only a tiny fraction of that is Russian.
 
On FP Trump’s Promises to Defeat ISIS ‘Quickly’ Run Into Syria Buzzsaw
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Now, the Trump White House — led by new national security advisor H.R. McMaster — is reviewing the whole issue, amid public warnings from Turkey against Syrian Kurds playing any role in the liberation of Raqqa.

“The view is — taking it right is more important than taking it quickly,” said one Republican congressional staffer. “This judgment is bubbling up that it might be better to pause.”

The SDF includes Syrian Kurdish and Arab components, but U.S. military advisors and top Pentagon leadership consider the Kurdish troops to be more effective and more experienced. For the Raqqa offensive to proceed, the Trump administration would need to formally authorize logistical and other support for the Syrian Kurdish forces — a move that would infuriate America’s NATO ally, Turkey.
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As Turkey is seen as a really important bulwark against Iran according to this article. A concept perhaps easier to sell to Trump than Turkey's more important role in containing Russia.

Turkey is certainly an historic rival to the Persians but this is a bit Ironic really because dealing with the regional threat of Kurdish separatism and the PKK are areas in which Teheran and Ankara have often collaborated.
 
There are an number of reports on Twitter of US armour in the Manbij area:





This is being construed as a message to Turkey that the US will not allow the Turkish backed forces any further incursion into the area.
 
From The Atlantic Council LISTEN: Aaron Stein on the SDF-Syrian Regime Agreement

See's Euphrates Shield as stuck as the Turks would risk a major escalation with the Russians if they went through the SAA. Even if they do it probably goes no farther than Manbij. And there's pissing off the Americans set on taking Raqqa ASAP to be considered. So the TSK have headed off a unified Rojava, pushed IS back from their border and created a safe zone their Idlib rebels might migrate too. Stein reckons they haven't decided what to do about Assad but PKK issues took priority.

I'd mind the other side of the Euphrates if I was the PKK. Turkey probably has intent in the East as well.
 
This is all getting rather complicated but it would appear that Turkey's ambitions to take Manbij may be thwarted

 
On Syria Comment Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Civil Society in Jabal al-Summaq
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So far in Jabal al-Summaq, according to Sharif, HTS has only set up its own local services administration in the village of Qalb Lawze, which has seen more than half of its original population displaced as well as settlement of Uyghurs, in addition to being the site of an infamous massacre in June 2015. In response, some members of the local council in Qalb Lawze withdrew, while others have remained and overhauled the local council, thus choosing to work under HTS’ services administration. Sharif said that in Kaftin, the ultimatum had not yet come, but he indicated that he does not see an interest in working with an HTS services administration. As Sharif also put it, “I prefer that we administer our affairs ourselves.”

In short, these developments reflect how the declaration of HTS represents an ever bolder assertion of jihadist influence and power, not only in terms of relations with the more ‘mainstream’ insurgency but also wider civil society. The options for these non-jihadist actors in Idlib province in particular in the face of HTS’ ascendancy seem ever more constrained. Undoubtedly, a significant reason for this quagmire is that the growth of HTS’ main predecessors in the northwest and Syria more generally was allowed to fester for too long. Now the broader insurgency and opposition must live with the consequences of that.
Originally a Druze area.
 

While Turkey has supported rebel forces fighting against Assad, it has never come into direct conflict with the Syrian military, and U.S. officials believe it would far rather have the Syrian government in charge of Manbij than the Kurds. There are hopes that Moscow, which has been simultaneously working to improve relations with Turkey, can help persuade Erdogan to back off.

What the Americans manifestly do not want to see happen is the creation of a new military front and potential conflagration around Manbij that would drain both attention and resources away from plans for Raqqa. With the city believed to be the center of Islamic State planning for overseas attacks, the offensive is seen as urgent and has already been delayed from original plans to begin in February.
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The Turks have a mess in Syria but the US decision to support the Syrian PKK crossing West of the Euphrates isn't working out so well. The Obama administration was always prone to be led by the nose by allies. Into Libya, Yemen and here across Turkish red lines.
 

That's with large numbers of Syrian fleeing Manbij some no doubt spooked at the thought of the torture happy Mukhabarat's return.

Ankara's plainly signalling to DC that an Assad reconquista displacing PKK control is an acceptable compromise. Bashar will be delighted.
 

What that depicts may be real or not but might worry the Turks a little more: the regime supporting a lingering PKK presence. Actually with trigger forces of Russian SF and US SF amongst the SDF front they are facing.
 
On ARANews Russian general confirms a Kurdish-Russian deal against Turkey
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Furthermore, the Russian Army confirmed the entry of Syrian army forces to the Syrian Democratic Forces-held areas.

“In addition, since March 3 the Syrian Armed Forces enter the territory occupied by Kurdish militia groups [in reference to SDF] according to the agreements reached with the participation of the command of the Russian grouping of forces in Syria,” General Sergei Rudskoy said.

The general added that the Syrian government is taking measures to resume the work of state authorities in Menbij and surrounding areas.

The SDF-linked Manbij Military Council announced on Thursday that they have reached an agreement with Russia for the protection of the western villages of Manbij from the Turkish army and Turkey-backed rebels, handing over villages in Western Manbij to the Syrian government.

“Defending the civilians and protecting them from the adverse impact of the war, ensuring the security of Manbij and frustrating the invasion plans of the Turkish army against Syrian soil are the goals we have taken for all the peoples living on the lands of Syria,” the Manbij Military Council (MMC) said in a statement.

“In order to realize these goals of ours, we as Manbij Military Council confirm that we have handed over the defense of the line – where villages between the positions of our forces in western Manbij and Turkish-affiliated gangs are located – to Syrian state forces as part of the alliance we have made with Russian officials,” the council said.

“The SDF ceded this territory west of Manbij because it is clear that there are limits to the extent that the United States will intervene on behalf of the SDF’s interests west of the Euphrates,” the statement added.


However, despite of the alleged handover of some villages to the Syrian army, heavy clashes continued on Saturday between the Turkish-led Euphrates Shield rebels and the SDF forces west of Manbij. This makes it unclear whether these areas are handed over to the Syrian government, since clashes are ongoing since Thursday.
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My bold, effectively Manbij now has a similar orientation to Afrin.
 
Yes there were well documented minor incidents that I can recall as well but the idea of active IS-Turkish collusion has been vastly overblown. That is a conspiracy theory. IS did have the Turks over a barrel at one point as they'd taken hostage their entire Mosul consulate.

The Turks mainly backed the same rebels we did out of the same CIA run MOC. We also diligently looked away when our rebels were in cahoots with AQ or IS as they often were. The Turks were willing to work with groups like Ahar al Sham as well that were too AQ linked and Taliban like for the CIA's comfort.

The main difference was the PKK was Ankara's priority because of their very evident capability to cause domestic mayhem in Turkey on a far greater scale than any of these Salafi-Jihadis. It's similar to Israel's attitude to their implacable enemy HA besides which IS and AQ are distant threats.

We now have an odd situation in which AQ is pretty much the standard bearer of the rebels' rather just but probably hopeless cause of regime change. The Turks have gathered the rest of the Northern rebels under Ahar's banner and are directing then against the rival PKK and IS revolutionary projects rather than Assad. The utterly repugnant Assad regime pulls our cannon fodder providing ally the PKK into ever closer alignment even shielding Manbij. That may mean the hasty US plan to take Raqqa with the SDF can proceed. The SDF looks ill prepared to hold it.

The unfussy Russians in their GWOT it seems now regard the PKK, HA, Ahar and even the Afghan Taliban all as viable partners. But then they are in bed with the sneaky Iranians and the detestable Syrian Baath making come hither eyes at Trump to join them.

The results of all this are probably really unstable with a great deal of weakly held territory in a highly fragmented society especially out in the wild East. Iraq with its flawed political institutions looks relatively hopeful in comparison.

Conspiracy theory my arse . No group gets that big and that powerful without state support . And they were fucking tiny before Turkey embarked on its Syrian project . Just look at the borders of IS territory

TurkeySyria.png
 
On Salon Vladimir Putin has a plan to upend the political order of the Middle East. Spoiler alert: It’s working
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Much of the shift in regional power dynamics stems from the Russian intervention in Syria, which began in late September 2015 — an operation that a fair number of Western analysts (including this one) thought would be short-lived, ineffective and damaging to the Russian military. As odious as it has proven to be, Moscow has achieved a number of important objectives. The Russians have signaled that they will stand by their allies, drawing a distinction between Moscow and Washington, which many in the region believe to be feckless. They have also forced important American allies like Turkey and Israel to turn to Russia as they seek to achieve their objectives in Syria. Putin has also made common cause with the Iranians who, like the Russians, chafe at the regional political order established by the United States.

The Egyptians, who have benefitted from copious American economic and military assistance over many years, clearly regard Russia as an alternative to the United States. So much so that Egyptian government opposed possible U.S. intervention in Syria late in the summer of 2013 but has supported Russian military operations there.

To be fair, the U.S. has given the Egyptians reason to seek support elsewhere. Egyptian diplomats and military attachés in Washington are keen observers of American politics. In recent years they have begun to worry about the dysfunction on Capitol Hill and the creeping isolationism found within the Republican and Democratic Parties. The Egyptians reason that these developments may adversely affect their annual $1.3 billion allotment in American military aid.

There is also the erroneous Egyptian charge that the United States has supported the Muslim Brotherhood. As fact-free as that may be, it nevertheless provides an opportunity for the Russian leadership, whose views on Islamism are notable for their lack of nuance and thus align closely with those of Egypt’s leaders.

Then there is Libya, where the Russians have met with Gen. Khalifa Haftar, the self-declared leader of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army. Haftar is as uncompromising to Islamists as his primary patrons, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and United Arab Emirates Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, but there is more going on in Libya than the fight against extremism. The country has the largest proven reserves of high-quality light sweet crude oil in the world. It also has a lot of natural gas. Both make Libya important to Europe. The Russians are clearly thinking ahead. Haftar may end up being Libya’s new strongman, but even if he does not, he is the power in the country’s east, where there is a lot of oil. While the Europeans are looking for ways to diminish their reliance on Russian energy resources, Moscow is looking for ways to keep them locked in and thus vulnerable.

The United States and the West more generally are only now coming to the realization that the Russians are not only back but that they have clear objectives, an understanding of the way to achieve those goals and the national resources to expend in the process. In other words, the Russians have been thinking strategically. The question is, What should Washington and its allies do about it? At one time, the Russian challenge would have been a clarion call for the Western alliance to respond, but the Trump presidency has thrown the very idea of a Russian threat into question.

Trump and his advisers seem so absorbed with the idea of destroying “radical Islamic terrorism” that they are more than willing to partner with the Kremlin. What they fail to see is that while there may be a confluence of interests in fighting extremism, Russia’s strategy goes well beyond this immediate objective. Rather, Putin wants to rewrite the rules of the Middle East and upend the regional political order that has made it easier and relatively less expensive for Washington to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the region, guarantee Israeli security, fight terrorists and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That’s the Russian plan — plain and simple.
My bold, Gen Flynn came to embody a narrow minded obsession with Radical Islamic Terrorism. The GWOT had been his world for too long and after being sacked by Obama he developed iconoclastic ideas. Flynn saw this war as the next big challenge in a world of evolving threats. He talks about that on podcast here FROM THE VAULT: THE SPYCAST INTERVIEW WITH MICHAEL FLYNN. He sees China as trouble but is silent on Russia except as an arms supplier to China's enemy India.

This view meshed partially with the Bannonites in the Trump team anticipating a great civilisational clash in which immigrants could usefuily be demonised as an invading often Muslim horde set on destroying the white Judea-Christian world. The Russians here were admirably manly potential fellow Crusaders with similar authoritarian views against the dark apocalypse who might share this insular version of the White Man's burden.

This mix really suited the Russians who have much bigger geopolitical fish to fry than terrorists or the pursuit of dreams faux-ethnic solidarity.

Moscow has been obviously disappointed by the Fall of Flynn and the arrival of McMasters who like Mattis thinks the Russians are a rather large evolving threat along with China. Near Peer competitors as the Pentagon calls them. Graduates of Desert Storm perhaps a little hungry for a proper stand up fight in a target rich environment rather than grubby Counter Terrorism missions or at least the procurement required to deter powerful state actors. For the Russians are plainly on the make and breaking out of containment using means short of direct conflict with the US but very much other than diplomacy. And MENA with its large but exhausted US presence has become an area of opportunity.

Still their hopes probably were never high with the obviously untrustworthy Trump. It's not all bad but it may be more of burglary than . Out from Sevastopol in the Crimea via the Dardanelles to Tartus on Syria's Med coast. A tactical alignment with Iran in backing their old allies the Assad clan. Facing down NATO member Turkey and gaining clout with the oil rich GCC states. Talking to Egypt about a deeper relationship and perhaps basing near Suez. While the Pentagon frets over Iran's influence in Yemen at the other end of the Red Sea by the Bab el Mandeb, Iraq, Lebanon and a closure of the Hormuz strait. The possibility in Eastern Libya under Strongman Haftar of another Med port opportunity.

As with the US strategy a lot of this has to do with levers of influence over Europe's and Asia's hydro-carbon supply the basis of Russia's petro-state. The sweet smell of extractive easy profits and domestic security for the elite while the serfs dream of lost glories.
 
Conspiracy theory my arse . No group gets that big and that powerful without state support . And they were fucking tiny before Turkey embarked on its Syrian project . Just look at the borders of IS territory

TurkeySyria.png
Odd choice of map. That seems to border rather a lot of Useful Syria and Iraq.

It's pretty well documented that IS are Iraqi led group funded mostly by extortion since about 2006. The Syrian regime was of some assistance to them in that period if you believe Iraqi sources right out to about 2010. During the Syrian risings the SAA often stood back as IS chewed through rebels just as the Turks were happy to see the PKK getting trashed. That's about the extent of Ankara's now clearly hostile relationship with IS. The Russians have also mostly ignored IS and concentrated their air power on rebels who might have opposed radical forces and any civilians in proximity. The Iranians who went after them hard in Iraq also haven't seen IS as a priority in Syria. What distracts the Great Satan is a good thing seen from Qom.

IS sent al Nusra into Syria opportunistically in 2012 and later failed to reintegrate them entirely. They were already building up in Iraq. By mid 2013 Breaking The Walls was in full progress as they liberated their strategic reserve from Iraqi prisons. Syria has been in practice an IS rear area for training and recruitment most of the fight has been in Iraq against the ISF and Shia Hashd. IS document this themselves in regular reports. When IS turned on them in the East the SAA mostly ran away from IS sensibly as without Iranian and Russian support their helpless conscripts were getting slaughtered like goats. The only thing that's really stood in the way of IS in Syria is US air power and with the PKK as force that pins them to be bombed while grabbing turf. What Turkey can mainly be accused of is having to little to do with this and they are not even at the front of that queue.
 
In The National What Palmyra tells us about US policy in Syria
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Another example of the disconnect is the move by the US-backed forces in Manbij on Thursday to hand over some areas under their control to the Syrian regime as a way to create a buffer zone between them and the Turkish-backed rebel forces fighting ISIL in eastern Aleppo. If the prospective role of the Kurdish-led militias in Raqqa was a bad idea, this move made it even worse. It has ensured that many more will see these forces as regime allies. Worse, the same US-backed forces allowed "humanitarian" convoys to enter the city of Manbij, which was liberated from ISIL in August. According to Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis, the convoys included "some armoured equipment".

For any Syrian opposed to the regime, these developments in Palmyra, Manbij and Raqqa point to an unsavoury US policy. After nearly two and a half years in Syria, American officials may have lost sight of such sensitivities but they should not.

The regime’s ability to secure even the 35 per cent of territory under its control is limited. It is incapable of fighting on several fronts without risking the loss of territory, as happened in December in Palmyra. It is also incapable of securing its supposedly safe areas, as demonstrated by the sophisticated operation that Al Qaeda carried out in Homs last Saturday, in which five militants infiltrated two well-guarded neighbourhoods, stormed intelligence compounds and shot dead a high-ranking official and around 40 other security cadres.

The regime’s limitations mean proper investment in other forces to fight extremism elsewhere inSyria should be a priority for the US, if it wants to defeat extremists and keep them defeated. No matter where the US stands on the question of the regime’s legitimacy, it should understand that the regime is incapable of fighting extremism in the whole of Syria. And in order to invest in other forces to fill the vacuum, it has to stay focused on how its policy is perceived.

Unfortunately, the US seems to be developing more dangerous blind spots in Syria. This unawareness, or disregard, of the political context in which it operates will undoubtedly come back to haunt it in the future.
The Pentagon seemed rather unhappy with the SDF collaborating with the SAA around Manbij. I think the Pentagon lacks control over their allies on the ground in Syria as the Kremlin often do as well. The US had insisted on a full PKK withdrawal back East of the Euphrates but that didn't happen. Instead there where Apoist demonstrations in Manbij that where only going to provoke the Turks.

In Palmyra US air did helpfully trash IS positions enabling the over stretched R+6 to grab the city back. That may have more to do with a very large haul of kit the R+6 left behind when they retreated. Parts of this were turning up on IS fronts elsewhere in Syria. Rebels were complaining about this during the siege of al Bab.

The Pentagon has for a long time bombed around IS besieged Deir. Cluster of IS targets attract the CENTCOM's eye. It would be particularly unhelpful to Raqqa and Mosul operations if regime held Deir fell giving IS another bastion to retreat to.

Naturally many rebels would see all this as a very ominous development. But the core of US policy in Syria involves working with a PKK affiliate not them. This auxiliary has anti-Turkish strategic goals the US does not share and is often itself regime aligned tactically as rebels are prone to point out. Current US choices may well prove myopic. They were the least worst available after Mosul fell to IS.

The Russians are also stuck with the Iranians who have very different views on Israel that they are liable to fall out over.

But then the rebels have often chosen to align with forces they had little common cause with and now face a powerful alliance in Idlib of former comrades commanded by AQ while they cluster round the Taliban like Ahar Al Sham for safety. Because the Syrian rebels unlike the PKK lacked unity of revolutionary purpose. No amount of US air support can make up for that. The risings in Manbij and al Bab were very different parochial creatures for instance. Rebel groups lacking political unity were vulnerable to larger predators with very different agendas. Foreign assistance often made this tendency worse. And this isn't going to change the infection has spread widely.

It's a reflection of the fragmentation of Sunni Arab identities all down the Euphrates valley under rulers both weak and oppressive by far the worst of whom are the Assads. And they want their country back. They will patiently squat upon it with their divisive methods of neo-colonial rule via power brokers gradually eroding what social cohesion there is that might resist them. The place is liable to be a lasting nest of parasitic Takfiri like or worse than IS. The US will probably return to it again and again to mow the grass.
 
On War Is Boring Turkey Won, and Lost, the Race to Al Bab
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Ever since the start of the Operation Euphrates Shield, various insurgent commanders and sympathizers have insisted that the ultimate aim of the enterprise should be to lift the siege of eastern Aleppo or to drive all the way to ISIS’s de facto capitol in Ar Raqqa.

Obviously, nothing of these things happened. The cold fact is that Turkey runs the operation for Turkish reasons. While insurgents and Turkey share several common interests, this is by coincidence rather than by design. Ankara isn’t trying to win the Syrian civil war for Syria’s rebels — nor necessarily end the conflict on terms that the United States, Russia, Iran or the Syrian regime would applaud.

While successful in liberating Al Bab from ISIS, the Turkish coalition operation failed in its other, arguably more important goal — to prevent the Kurds from linking their territories in northeastern Syria to regime holdings around Aleppo. Considering the open cooperation between the PYD and YPG and Damascus, this development directly threatens Turkish interests.
What the Turks achieved was stopping the PKK unifying their Syrian cantons independent of the regime, pressing IS back far from rocket range of Turkey and created a safe zone in Syria for their rebels. They did this with a very risky undermanned TSK operation that took pretty heavy casualties at al Bab. Euphrates Shield probably weakened the defence of the East Aleppo pocked and caused greater division amongst Idlib's squabbling rebels. WIBs correct this wasn't about winning the war for the rebels but it was partly about leaving options open for them. It's part of the Russian scheme to carve up Syria with the neighbors.

That's a bitter compromise Assad seems cold towards. Assad is still set on his reconquista even if that's a patient affair which may involve working through hostile warlords that are to be gradually subverted. Crushing the rebels and their supporters in a divided Idlib leaving just an AQ led insurgency there would have been a better outcome for Damascus. The regime was worried enough about it to launch a blocking move and collide with the siege of al Bab taking casualties in clashes with the besiegers. The Turks taking al Bab was an affront and face had to saved. The rather unlikely idea that the TSK would cut it's way through the Caliphate to Raqqa installing rebels there wouldn't be welcome either. I suspect Aleppo's Eastern water supplies being potentially threatened in a future campaign was more of a worry.

It also produced a standoff involving US forces in front of Manbij. But that will play well in a rather anti-American Turkey now jingoistically pumped up ahead of the vote to make Erdogan Sultan. So I'd call ES a qualified success so far.

However what it's also done is give Assad much more leverage over the PKK as he's proprietor of their new GLOC to Afrin.
 
On Oryx Blog Striking from the Dark, Jaish al-Islam fires Iranian Zelzal-2 rockets
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The first deployment of the Zelzal-2 came as a surprise to many as Jaish al-Islam was previously unknown to be in the possession of such sophisticated weaponry. Indeed, the capture of these missiles was not featured in any of the rebel's press releases or videos. Although the exact story on how Jaish al-Islam acquired Iranian Zelzal-2s remains unclear, these artillery rockets were believed to have been captured in Syria's Qalamoun region by elements of the Free Syrian Army in 2013, which subsequently sold the Zelzal-2s (thought to total at least five in number) to Jaish al-Islam. As no launcher was believed to have been captured, Jaish al-Islam subsequently engineered its own launch platform.
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Careless!
35fd.png

Packs a 600kg warhead, range 210kms.

Piece explains Syria's role as holder of HA's vast reserve of rocketry. Lebanon has no real air defences to protect such kit in storage. Notes large long range unguided rockets like this are seen as "punishment weapons".
 

May 2015 and there would have been howls of outrage as this was a point when Assad was seen by many Western commentators (rather over optimistically) as being close to falling. SAA morale was certainly brought very low by this time. Contributed to the Russian intervention.

More significantly JaF had taken Idlib town in March. That was hailed as a great victory at the time but it really led to radicals dominating the Northern revolt. A tipping point before the fall of East Aleppo.
 
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