And next, Syria?

[teqniq]

Apparently not

 

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...
Syria's U.N. envoy Bashar Ja'afari said the opposition delegation represented "terrorist armed groups," and denounced the opening address delivered by the chief rebel negotiator, calling it "provocative" and "insolent."

The head of the rebel delegation, Mohammad Alloush, had described Syrian President Bashar Assad's government as a "terrorist" entity. He called for armed groups fighting alongside it, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, to be placed on a global list of terrorist organizations, according to a video leaked by opposition delegates.

"The presence of foreign militias invited by the regime, most notably the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Hezbollah ... contributes to the continuation of bloodshed and obstructs any opportunity for a cease-fire," Alloush said.
...

Off to a good start. No regime demand he shave his beard off just yet.

HA is already listed as a terrorist group a lot of countries. The Russians, Chinese and naturally Iranians disagree. The UK and EU make a fussy distinction for its political wing in the traditional "we don't talk to terrorists" but actually do kinda way.

 

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And I suspect the Russians are still just as in the dark about the Assad clans intentions.

 

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The often unnoticed revolution sparked by the escalation of the Syrian rising.

 

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HH on the trajectory of a rebel group:

Just underlines how unpredictable this is. Leadership changes are frequent and can move a groups orientation considerably. Groups also merge and change character from below. And few men are constants in a war zone.

 

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Don't knock it. He's actually using the sights and firing careful. Next lesson: doing that while being shot at.

 

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On MEE Syrian rebels threaten to 'annihilate' rivals as Idlib infighting rages

That's really going to put them in a strong position in Astana.

 

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On The Arabist IN TRANSLATION: RUSSIA'S ARMY OF THE LEVANT

...
Experts have linked the latest changes in the Syrian army to the new formation’s prominent forthcoming role and to Moscow’s eagerness to expand and transform the Tartus base into something resembling the one at Khmeimim. Experts in Western institutes and specialist publications, including Stratfor, have noted that one of the reasons for the creation of the Fifth Corps is to counterbalance the influence of Iran, especially since Moscow, having reached agreements with Ankara after the ceasefire in some parts of Syria, will provide most of the support. This will include arms, training, and a monthly salary amounting to $750 for members of “its corps.”

Syrian historians liken this force to the Army of the Levant formed by France after its assumption of the Mandate over Syria in 1920. As one said, “After the idea of dividing Syria into statelets, France recruited the minorities of Syria and some fighters from colonized countries like Senegal to form the Army of the Levant in order to crush Syrian nationalist movements, including that of 1925-1927. The leaders of this army were Frenchmen, while its members were the poor and marginalized of Syria.”
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Well we'll see if this works out any better than US attempts to create an anti-IS army out of the very crooked timber of the rebellion. It's probably an echo of the Russian policy of coercive cooption of Jihadis in Chechnya combined with the regime's attempt to deal with chronic manpower shortages and draft dodging.

Article points to the Iranian hand in raising the Basij like NDF in 2012 to fend of the revolt as it militarised. Though NDF units more often have a connection to the SAA or regime intelligence rather than the IRGC or HA. Some like many rebels groups are simply bandits on the make. The hollowing out of the state military apparatus serves the Iranians anyway.

As in Iraq and Lebanon Iran's strategic preference historically has been to work within a weak state apparatus often via sub-state actors working up from the grassroots. It's a patient process of revolutionary subversion over decades. This is a problem for Russia as their main instrument of political access in Damascus is via the SAA.

It's interesting to consider Iran's role in Iraq here. This is just as the Americans in Baghdad saw the US trained ISF and particularly the elite CTS that forms a Praetorian Guard directly reporting to the Iraqi PM as engines of influence. The US certainly intended the ISF to be a core nation building institution but lacking much airpower and too weak to be the regional menace Saddam was also somewhat dependant. When the huge but flabby ISF collapsed in the face of IS Shia Hashd popped up thick with 60K Iranian assets some of whom the IRGC had been cultivating since the 80s. They've been a big fly in the ointment for US influence in Iraq ever since. Iran also was very busy strengthening economic and cultural ties with Iraqi society a pattern repeated in Syria.

 

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...
The opposition’s “revolutionaries” should thus be clear: continuing to tie their fates to that of Fath al-Sham will transform their role in the conflict. It will reduce the scope of territory they control and push their rebellion, by choice or default, into a strategy of long-term asymmetric insurgency. That would suit Fath al-Sham’s leadership and other Salafi-jihadists just fine – the tactics required play to their comparative advantages, and they appear to prefer continued war in pursuit of ideological objectives over compromise aimed at preserving what remains of the rebels’ territorial gains and protecting the social fabric of local communities. The radicals’ profit, however, would be the “revolutionary” factions’ loss. More dependent on external state support and less proficient in insurgent tactics than their jihadist counterparts, they would lose relative weight within the rebellion alongside their continued territorial losses, and thus forfeit political relevance.
...

But:

...
The juxtaposition in December of the regime’s Aleppo victory and its rapid loss of Palmyra to the Islamic State are instructive: while a combination of brutal collective punishment, Russian air support, and Iran-backed foreign militiamen can result in regime gains even in opposition strongholds, the regime lacks sufficient resources to effectively protect lower-priority territory in the meantime. The Syrian security forces have a serious manpower problem, and efforts to gradually expand conscription over the course of the conflict have failed to solve it.

This presents a major challenge to Moscow and Tehran, which bear the burden of compensating for the regime’s weaknesses. Even with all their help, the regime lacks the means to defeat its armed opponents outright. What it can do, if Iran and Russia provide the requisite men and firepower, is continue to reduce the scope of territory controlled by the opposition. If Damascus prioritises areas held by non-jihadist factions, as it has often done before, this will further reduce their collective political weight. In the process, however, the regime and its allies will be expanding the zone of territory to which they must dedicate precious fighters to control, leaving themselves vulnerable to a strategy of asymmetric insurgency aimed at gradually grinding away at their will and capacity.
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Which with the "moderate" rebels in Idlib splintering and at war with AQ does suggest a COIN policy of cooption. Exploiting divisions in the opposition to make significant elements essentially turncoat to Damascus; a Syrian version of the Iraqi Sahwa.

What's very unstable here is the differing objectives of the main players in Syria. In rough order of current importance:

• Russia, break out of NATO containment, secure strategic depth in Syria, reassure regional powers, sustain dream of lost imperial glory
• Iran, exclude imperialist powers, onwards to al Quds, sustain the revolutionary struggle. Death to [fill in as applicable]!
• The Assad clan, keep palace safe, full reconquista, freedom from over bearing allies
  
• Turkey, make Erdogan Sultan, crush the PKK and Rojava, secure strategic depth in Syria, no enemies on any borders (again)
  
• PKK secure Rojava, onwards for Apoism in other quarters of the compass, sustain the revolutionary struggle
  
• Gulfies, keep palace safe, head off Persian Shia Crescent, sustain Sunni hegemony
• IS & AQ destroy the "Near Enemy" harass "The Far Enemy", root out kufr, sustain the revolutionary struggle
• Regime warlords, expand war economy revenue stream, freedom from over bearing allies
• Rebel warlords, maintain war economy revenue stream, seek autonomy, conclude revolutionary struggle (maybe), survive
• US, bomb the shit outta IS, make The Donald look fantastic, much bigly, you are going to love it...

 

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No shit Sherlock.

 

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Some analysis pf IS vids in French with lots of pictures, this via Google Translate:

...
Specific comments: The IE has already devoted two videos to the front of al-Bab for a month. It must be said that the stakes are high and that the group can show success against the Turkish army and its Syrian rebel allies. Among the combatants, one can see a teenager, who sounds a nasheed: it must be observed that the latest videos of the EI (in Mosul, but not only) show more and more teenagers among the fighters. As the first video, it focuses on the firing of anti-tank missiles (almost 10) with a first: two shots of simultaneous anti-tank missiles. The materials seen in the first video and which can be guessed in this one suggest the presence of an "anti-tank katiba" called by the EI and seen in action for the defense south of Mosul, Summer 2016. If that of Iraq did not migrate to Syria, this means that the EI constituted at least 2 mobile anti-tank katibas equipped with a varied range of launchers (Konkurs / Fagot, TOW, Kornet, Metis -M). Here again, the EI deploys, in bad weather, at least one T-55 tank, a T-72 tank and a BMP-1. The Land Cruiser with BMP-1 turret mounted at the rear is identical to the one seen on the Deir-es-Zor front last September; Another similar vehicle was seen in December in action west of Mosul (turret on F350). This means that EI is probably standardizing the manufacture of improvised vehicles. The Turkish army and the rebels have not yet found effective countermeasures against the VBIED (the EI employs here at least one detoured BMP-1 better shielded, probably deliberately). The number of Turkish tanks and armored vehicles destroyed is significant, and the EI even seizes a few vehicles.

 

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You could see that as an IS salient or a TSK one.

 

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Consider these two maps in the context of the talks at Astana.

 

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On CMEC Back to Square One?

...
In the Syrian regime’s mind, “useful Syria” is the platform from which it can launch operations to regain more land. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad seeks to ensure that his survival is a part of any Putin-Trump agreement. He seeks the rehabilitation of his regime, and wants to be recognized internationally as an unavoidable player in the Syrian endgame. This is something Assad can realistically expect given the new climate in the West and a mindset there and elsewhere that tends to accept him as a lesser evil.

Russia takes a somewhat different view of the Syrian landscape. To Putin, regime areas can serve as a strong card in negotiations with the United States over a political package for Syria and Russia’s future in it. Now that the small parts of eastern Syria that were still under regime control and Russian protection, namely Palmyra and Deir Ezzor, have either fallen again to the Islamic State, or risk doing so, Putin hopes to use talks with Trump to gain approval for Russia to recapture Syria’s majority Sunni areas, defeat the remaining opposition groups, and then introduce some form of decentralization, which the Russians realize is the only way for Syria to remain one, and for Russian interests to be preserved.

A second part of this bargain would center on “useful Syria” itself—its shape and governance, its protectors, and the role that Bashar al-Assad would play in it. There, Russia needs U.S. acquiescence to better deal with a constrained regime and its equally constrained Iranian and Shia backers, as well as Turkey and the Gulf states. In other words, as Russia maneuvers between the myriad political actors involved in Syria, an understanding with the Americans would provide it with much greater leeway to pursue its political preferences.
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Bit lacking in dimensions. Trump perhaps as the de-de-legitimiser of Assad.

 

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In Al Monitor IS reinforces positions in Syria's al-Bab

...
During Al-Monitor’s field visit to Operation Euphrates Shield battlefronts near al-Bab, FSA leader Mohammed Haj Ali told Al-Monitor, “Despite our repeated attempts to raid al-Bab city and open new battlefronts against IS, we have failed so far in breaking the organization’s defenses and its front lines surrounding the city from the north and west. We changed our military tactics several times by attacking Qabasin, Suflania and Bizaah towns in the east and northeast of al-Bab. The battles are ongoing on these axes to pave the way for besieging al-Bab and threatening it from the east, at the same time as the land attacks in the west and north.”

He said, “Turkish air raids against IS locations, ammunition warehouses and military headquarters in al-Bab and its surroundings have increased lately. The Turkish tanks have also been increasingly targeting IS locations, but the shelling did not really weaken the organization, which is maintaining its fierce defense. IS has large amounts of weapons and ammunition, including anti-tank missiles.”

Ali added, “IS has many local fighters in al-Bab and its surroundings, in addition to hundreds of foreign members who came to the aid of their fellows in the battles to deter Operation Euphrates Shield. IS has a remarkable amount of heavy weapons and ammunition and is using them in al-Bab battle. Perhaps those are part of its spoils of war in Palmyra city.”

Operation Euphrates Shield forces failed to gain control of nearby Jabal al-Sheikh Akil and Al-Farouq Hospital — two strategic locations where IS members are positioned. Jabal al-Sheikh Akil is a key passage for controlling al-Bab. For that reason, IS increased its reinforcements there to protect the area from any land attack from Euphrates Shield forces. The forces also failed to take the town of Qabasin, located just northeast of al-Bab, despite violent battles with IS on Nov. 15, which resulted in the Euphrates Shield forces’ controlling the town for a few days.

In an interview with Al-Monitor, Mustafa Sejari, the head of the political bureau of Al-Mu’tasim Brigade, which is affiliated with the FSA, said, “The battles on the outskirts of al-Bab are ongoing, and the FSA factions are trying to weaken IS by striking its defense lines and burdening it with losses. Operation Euphrates Shield forces are expanding the battlefronts against IS to catch the organization off guard in several locations and disperse its military efforts. But the weather in al-Bab was rainy and cloudy almost all the time a month ago, thus impeding the forces’ advance and gains.”
...

My bold, not that unlikely the R+6 left an awful lot of kit behind when they fled Palmyra. IS still able to resupply. Not the local support, Balanche predicted that as al Bab is something of a Salafi-Jihadi center.

 

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On TAC Trump and Syrian Safe Zones

...
Trump’s support for safe zones in Syria dates back many months. It has never been clear that he understands what establishing safe zones entails, but that hasn’t stopped him from repeatedly endorsing the idea. Creating safe zones would require a large deployment of ground forces that would be prepared to defend it against anyone that might attack, and the mission would be an open-ended one. The U.S. would almost certainly end up providing the bulk of the forces committed to the defense of these areas, and they would immediately become targets of jihadists and would likely end up clashing with Syrian regime forces. Whatever Trump voters thought they were getting by supporting him, I’m reasonably sure sending tens of thousands of Americans to occupy parts of Syria for years to come wasn’t it.
...

This idea was really an early pretext for invasion but the carve up is already underway and you do have to think about in crude Trumpian real estate developer terms. It's quite likely he hasn't thought it through but what will his defence team do with thisorder?

The only way I can see this happening is in collaboration with a regional power. The PKK already run refugee camps that are reasonably secure. The Turks have invaded a hunk of Syria to thwart the PKK and push back IS. The Russians have basing in IDP filled Latakia already and might agree to something symbolic. Jordan already has a rebel held security zone in the South partly aimed at thwarting the Iranians. The much favoured Israelis are covetously looking at hydro-carbons on the Golan and also have reason to worry about Iran's growing grip on Syria. These all have complications escalating in that order.

Trump might build camps and throw in US lily pad basing (quickly reinforced air heads) and air defences to protect them. This might not entail a large US force in country. I'd still see the refugee thing as a pretext. The US can probably deny Assad his wish for a reconquista of all of Syria. Such a move by Trump might align with Russian policy somewhat or not.

By slapping such constructions down and putting in a trigger force you could for instance be seen as deterring further Turkish incursions into Rojava. The Turks are buggering up US anti-IS strategy which is fundamentally flawed as it's based on their enemy the PKK. The smart thing would be to work for a Turkish-PKK peace deal but that would be slow and Trump is all about short term goals and bugger the consequences. Trump has no real alternative but to continue to collaborate with the PKK in NE Syria if he wants to show results quickly. Turkey's main value to the US is as a NATO ally containing a Russia Trump isn't wary of. Gen Mattis and the DoD probably are but they'll see US basing as a counter-move to expanding Russian basing in Syria. Mattis favours escalation in Syria to accelerate the war against IS probably including boots on the ground. So a tilt towards the PKK seems likely. Trump can always betray them later. The Turks are not likely to take that lying down. The US dependance on the use of Incirlik airbase might have to be be reduced. The US already has basing in Kurdish territory and there was talk of expansion in the Western KRG.

 

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That's just the Idlib wing of JaI it seems.

 

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ISW has Ahar al Sham as "irreconcilable" i.e. too Salafi-Jihadi for the US to deal with. They've been compared to the Taliban who some of their leaders openly admire. Lister has leaned towards making an accommodation with them as the Turks have. The Russians recently classed them as a group they could work with in their peace process.

It's important to understand that these large Salafi groups often are not ideologically homogenous in the way IS aspires to be but a big tent of shifting identities. Islamist movements like the Egyptian MB also have this character.

In Chechnya who got coopted had little to do with their ideological inclination or choppy choppy behaviours. Very extreme Jihadis who swapped sides were welcomed into state forces.

Though Ahar does not look ready to compromise to me in that way if you are thinking in terms of who might warlord it over a Turkish back security zone in Northern Idlib that declares a long hudna with Assad they're an obvious candidate.

 

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A criticism of Trump's emerging Syria policy but not many refugees flee US bombs in Syria. The big flows from Iraq and Afghanistan were largely ignored and those are only partly a result of US actions.

The heavily bombed chaos of the Syrian rebel zones more often produce IDPs. From a Russian point of view Syrian refugees, especially those few who head to the EU to energise the far right, are just gravy.

British policy also has been to try and contain refugee flows within the region. Even to the extent of criticising the Italians rescuing folk in flight drowning in the Med. And consider Yemen: there is no escape from geographically isolated Yemen tottering on the edge of famine and no one appears to give a toss.

 

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On Syria Comment The Arabs in Afghanistan: From the Cradle of the Jalalabad School of Jihad to Syria and Iraq

...
Hamid argues that many fighters who became known as the ‘Afghan’ Arabs went to fight in Afghanistan because they were despondent about the tyrannical rulers in the Middle East. Their experiences was one of humiliation; Israel had administered several bloody noses in Egypt 1973, in Lebanon with the PLO being expelled in 1978 and 82, in Yemen the Soviet Union was controlling the South and in Syria, Hafez al-Assad ruled with an iron fist culminating in the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982. Change in short, would not occur and so many Arabs headed to Afghanistan with the invasion of the Soviet Union. If what Hamid says is true, then with the fall of Aleppo, eventually Mosul and the presence of repressive dictatorships in spite of the Arab Spring, will see the emergence of ‘forever-Jihadis’ – grizzled experts in asymmetric warfare who will no doubt seek out new frontiers to carry out their Jihad. In fact, Abu Qatada, the Salafi-Jihadi cleric has already noted this as he commented on the fall of Aleppo:

“I understood that victory would not come without a turning point …But I am convinced that there are major turning points ahead. Among them the expansion of Jihad to other countries, the changing characteristics of leadership and groups, the invasion of the original disbelievers more openly and clearly…”​

Another important point that Hamid makes is that often fighting men, and here the focus is on Arabs, follow men not ideas. And he explains why the Afghan Arabs followed leaders that made catastrophic errors. According to Hamid, Osama bin Laden or Abu Abdullah did not have a clear vision or a strategy at the battle of Jaji, Jalalabad or 9/11 for that matter. And though his far more able commanders like Abu Hafs al-Masri, Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri knew it, none disavowed him. Only Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, their in-house jurist resigned in protest when the idea of 9/11 was floated because it contravened Islamic law. Similarly, Khattab, the Saudi commander fighting Russians in Chechnya and often wrongly associated with al-Qaeda, entered into Dagestan provoking a lethal Russian response that resulted in the loss of thousands of innocent civilians. Hamid suggests that both men suffered from same problem that Tony Blair suffered from, they only wanted to hear what they wanted to hear.
...

Bin Laden as a bit of a hapless twit is not a new interpretation of him but this comes from an Afghani Arab close to the Haqqanis and Mullah Omar leader of the Taliban.

The review goes on to explain the rise of the 'Jalalabad School of Jihad'. Undisciplined Arab fighters devoid of religious training morally adrift and issuing wrong headed Fatwas. Yes... they'd had enough of experts. They'd go on to found the GIA in Algeria and what became IS in Iraq.

I've just ordered this book.

 

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On ISW Syria Situation Report: January 19 - 26, 2017

...
Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda continued to consolidate control over Idlib and Western Aleppo Provinces in preparation for the next phase of its campaign against the regime. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham - the successor of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra - launched an assault against a number of opposition groups backed by the U.S. in Northern Syria starting on January 23. The operation likely represents an attempt to cohere the remaining independent opposition in Northern Syria under structures that align with the vision of Al-Qaeda for Syria. Prominent Salafi-Jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham has facilitated this objective - directly or indirectly - by positioning itself to absorb the bulk of the opposition groups in conflict with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. These mergers shift the character of the opposition further towards Salafi-Jihadism - thereby reducing the options for potential partners of the U.S. in Syria.
...

ISW agreeing with Ehsani there.

 

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On SST "Russian choppers transport Syrian paratroopers to besieged Deir Ezzor" - TTG

Points to a hairy situation in Deir believed to be improving.

What's notable to me here is IS is mounting a stout defence of al Bab against overwhelming forces while defending Tabqa dam and being able to seriously threaten Deir and even menace the T4 Airbase West of regained Palmyra. And that's with a Brigade trapped in Mosul and having to control a population of millions in what's still a fairly large area. This is a lot to do with just 20K Beards that the CIA optimistically estimates IS is reduced to. Just for comparison that's smaller than the estimated size of the Iranian's rainbow nation Shia army of occupation in Useful Syria.

 

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All Jihadi politics is local.

 

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Oh but Bashar said he would stand down in 21... the big fibber.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Russian Airstrikes in Syria: December 20, 2016 – January 25, 2017

...
The ISIS offensive in Deir ez-Zour City coincided with an announcement by the Russian Ministry of Defense that Russia and Turkey conducted their first “joint air operation” against ISIS in the suburbs of Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province on January 18. Nonetheless, Russia will not make a long-term investment in the defeat of ISIS in Northern Syria. Russian warplanes actually began targeting Al-Bab and its environs as early as January 13 with airstrikes against the neighboring town of Tadef as well as Al-Bab itself. At the same time, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition began airstrikes against ISIS in Al-Bab in support of opposition groups backed by Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield, conducting no fewer than four strikes near the city from January 16 – 17. The failure of Turkey to make significant gains near Al-Bab during this period, however, suggests that Russia will not allocate the air assets necessary to confer a decisive military advantage to Operation Euphrates Shield. Russia likely aims to use its token strikes against Al-Bab in order to exploit the rising condemnation of the U.S. by Turkey for its failure to provide more timely support to Operation Euphrates Shield, thereby exacerbating the rift between two key NATO member-states with a minimal investment of military assets. Russia likely also intends to use the shifts in its air campaign – including the sorties of strategic bombers against ISIS in Deir ez-Zour Province as well as false claims of coordinated airstrikes with the U.S. against ISIS in Al-Bab on January 22 - to highlight its ostensible value to the fight against ISIS to the incoming administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Regardless of the effectiveness of its air operations in the short-term, Russia’s reactionary and opportunistic targeting of ISIS in Syria demonstrates that Russia will continue to prioritize its own strategic objectives over the lasting defeat of Salafi-Jihadist Groups.
...

US air finally supporting the TSK assault on al Bab appeared rather reluctant and driven by the Russians doing it first. Looks to be more about both superpowers relationship with Turkey than fighting IS.

No quick move by Trump administration to collaborate militarily with Russia in Syria. The Pentagon issued stout denials of anything but deconfliction going on at al Bab.

ISW is probably right that there's little military value in collaboration with the Russians in Syria. Russian airpower dropping mostly dumb bombs is pretty redundant besides a big precision US air operation. It's the regime and Iranians who provide the holding force on the ground that the US lacks.

Even if Trump was minded to work with these parties it's probably a non-starter. The Iranians have fought a parallel war against IS in Iraq. They usually shunned any visible collaboration with the Great Satan regularly alleging the US backed IS. ISW predicts when Mosul falls their tolerance of the US presence will diminish and they'll tilt hard against it. This makes sense to me; the Iranians are fundamentally opposed to any outsiders meddling in the ME. They'll work against a US presence in Syria and to reduce Russian regional influence. It's the regime that has the human intelligence structures embedded in the population. Bashar in his last interview was also very anti any US presence in Syria. He contends the US backs not just rebels he regards as terrorists but AQ and IS. As he clearly assumes an eventual reconquista of every corner of Syria it would be odd if he took a different position.

Trumps first move here was to issue a vague order to investigate creating safe zones he puffed about on the campaign trail. The Russians appeared leery. The Turks skeptical pointing to Jarablus as an existing example they'd created. The rebels basically said it was too late and would only aid Iranian/regime ethnic cleansing.

The Russians and Americans may find some common cause in carving Syria into security zones in collaboration with the neighbours. Both countries seem to see this as useful idea. The Devil however is in the details of that. The Russians finally will want to edge the US out as well.

 

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On TDS Trump safe zones may force risky decisions

...
Anthony Cordesman, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank, cautioned that a safe zone inside Syria could become a diplomatic albatross that would force a Trump administration to juggle a host of ethnic and political tensions in Syria indefinitely.

Other experts said militants could be attracted to the zone, either to carry out attacks that would embarrass the United States or to use the zone as a safe haven where militants could regroup.

Such a zone also would be expensive, given the need to house, feed, educate and provide medical care to the refugees.

“I think these people really have no idea what it takes to support 25,000 people, which is really a small number, in terms of the [internally displaced] and refugees” in Syria, Cordesman said.

The draft document gave no details on what would constitute a safe zone, where one might be set up and who would defend it.

Jordan, Turkey and other neighboring countries already host millions of Syrian refugees.

The Turkish government pressed Obama, without success, to create a no-fly zone on Syria’s border with Turkey but now is at odds with Washington over its support for Kurdish fighters in Syria.

There's a basic requirement to be willing to defend a safe zone both on the ground and in the air space above it. This would also probably require policing it to assure it doesn't become rear basing for folk the R+6 would actually want to kill. Otherwise you've got a Srebrenica style death trap.

Clinton also talked of setting up safe zones in Syria. Really its a legacy idea from the period when the US was keeping a military intervention behind the revolt as an option on the table. R2P is how we snuck towards regime decapitation in Libya. Creating a No Fly Zone to save Benghazi had a UN resolution behind it making it legal even if one obtained on false pretences largely by the weaselly British much to Russian and Chinese annoyance.

Creating a safe zone without the permission of the sovereign state is essentially an aggressive move like the Turkish incursion. That had Russian permission and now even air support. This didn't stop the IRGC staging a drone strike on Turkish forces near al Bab killing a few of them. It was not welcomed by the regime. The SAA is also shouldering up to al Bab from the SW. The PKK has forces on both the East and West of the TSK assault and has clashed heavily with the Turks. Russian guarantees clearly don't run deep.

I doubt Trump really understood the implications the way Clinton or Putin would. It's just one of those things that sounds like a nice idea and it twins with Trump's exclusionary response to refugees.

 

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In TDS Turkey’s Syria offensive stalls at flashpoint town

...
“Euphrates Shield is under-resourced,” said Aaron Stein, resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

“The rebels Turkey is fighting with are poorly trained and have, for years, proved incapable of taking and holding territory.”

Whereas Jarablus is practically on the border, Al-Bab is 25 kilometers south of the frontier and a far tougher logistical proposition.

Faruk Logoglu, a former Turkish ambassador to the United States and ex-opposition MP, said the Turkish-led campaign “is lacking final objectives and an exit strategy.”

“The target given is well beyond what’s achievable. That’s the problem,” he told AFP.

“Turkey risks being drawn further into the Syria quagmire.”

Daesh in December claimed to have burned to death two Turkish soldiers – although this was never confirmed by Ankara – while the corpses of two kidnapped soldiers were returned this month.

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, said Turkey had suffered from the lack of support for the operation from the United States.

“Because Ankara launched its move to take Al-Bab from [Daesh] without securing concrete cooperation with the U.S., Turkey had to move forward alone.”

“This naturally slowed down the operation. This is why Ankara has moved to secure Russian air support,” he told AFP.
...

Retired TSK Generals warned about this from the start.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TDS Trump says Syrian Christian refugees will be given priority

...
"If you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but more so the Christians," Trump said in an excerpt of an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network.

Pew Research Center said last October 38,901 Muslim refugees entered the United States in fiscal year 2016 from all countries - almost the same number of Christian refugees, 37,521.
...

Pew did say:

...
The administration set the goal of resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees in the U.S. in the fiscal year. This goal was exceeded, and refugee status was given to 12,587 Syrians. Nearly all of them (99%) were Muslim and less than 1% were Christian. As a point of comparison, Pew Research Center estimated Syria’s religious composition to be 93% Muslim and 5% Christian in 2010.

Christians are over represented in Syrian refugee flows. It's not clear to me why Syrian Christians form such a low proportion of Syrian refugees admitted to the US. It's a very tough and long vetting process. Trump isn't the first to allege sectarian discrimination in the process.
I have read the reverse about Iraqi refugees in the past.

Note the small numbers and that Iraq and Afghanistan together rival the number of Syrian refugees admitted. Very large Iraqi and Afghan refugee flows were always largely ignored by the MSM. US refugee applications from those two countries include a lot of folk who worked with the US military. Often at very serious risk to themselves and kin. They're processed shamefully slowly; over three years is typical apparently.