And next, Syria?

[Casually Red]

There'll be no " safe zones " , a non starter . All mention of them has been excised from the final draft of Trumps executive order . As expected .

A move that was highly unpopular with not just the Syrians and their allies but many within the US military too .

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The Daily Sabah Turkey's take on Trump's plan for Syria safe zones

...
If the administration really wants to stop refugees, the proposed safe zones would have to be created in predominantly Arab parts of Syria, such as the rebel-held northwestern province of Idlib where Washington could work with Turkey. Other opposition-controlled parts of Syria, along with the Jordanian border, could be feasible as well. Judging by the U.S. president's ABC interview and a recent decision by the administration to impose new restrictions on immigration from certain countries, this could indeed be the plan. However, it is important to understand that Moscow, Tehran and Damascus would be concerned about Washington's plans with the cease-fire still in effect. If Syria sets the stage for a military showdown between Russia and the United States, a return to violence could be inevitable. To make matters worse, even the Turks, who have been calling for safe zones since 2012, might distance themselves from Washington's overdue and untimely Syria move.

If Trump wants to reassert U.S. influence in Syria under the pretext of stemming illegal immigration, it is safe to assume that the proposed safe zones would be set up in parts of the country controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK's Syrian franchise. In doing so, the administration could hope to get back in the game without confronting the Russians. The downside of this policy would be to stir unrest among and incite violence against Arabs, other non-Kurds and Kurdish rivals against the PYD.

Provided that the U.S. had been setting up military bases in PYD-controlled parts of northern Syria and arming the PYD's armed People's Protection Units (YPG) militants for some time, Washington's moves could be seen as laying the groundwork for the creation of safe zones in the area to which Russia, Iran and the Assad regime would not object unless their interests are directly threatened by U.S. actions. Unfortunately, it doesn't look like the same goes for Turkey.

Predictable Turkish state press reaction.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Hard Questions
The slow—and then very fast—fall of Aleppo also raises larger questions about the wisdom and morality of fighting a clearly losing battle, and one in which Syrian civilians lose the most. Put bluntly: In rebels’ battle for Aleppo, it’s not clear what the point was, particularly in the last few years.

Rebels originally stormed Aleppo from the surrounding countryside in July 2012, but after they overran the city’s eastern neighborhoods, the offensive stalled. The divided city settled into an extended stalemate, in which civilians on both sides were cut down by snipers and shelling. Then, at the end of 2013, the regime launched its relentless campaign of aerial bombing on the city’s eastern neighborhoods, including the use of improvised, building-flattening “barrel bombs” dropped from helicopters.

Rebels originally justified their entrance to Aleppo city by saying they’d come to protect protesters and civilians from regime security forces and paramilitaries. But by 2014, east Aleppo was being smashed into fragments and its civilians killed in the dozens by weapons against which Aleppo’s rebels had no answer. Russia’s bombing campaign after its September 2015 intervention only accelerated the pace of civilian death.

It has to be asked: Why did rebels hold on inside Aleppo? And at some point, did rebels become partially responsible for the death of their own civilian constituents?
...

You do have to question the rebel decision to invade Aleppo in the Summer of 2012. It wasn't like Homs one of the centres of the revolt. It was a key area of Useful Syria where their support was far more patchy and peripheral than the regime's. Politically it didn't bode well for any further such intrusions even if they'd been backed by US airpower. How could they ever have ruled Damascus?

And then consider Idlib and Raqqa. The latter city was also an area of regime support but isolated. Both of these cities fell to the rebels allied with AQ. Raqqa was then taken by IS. Idlib city is now an AQ bastion and the group is increasingly coming to dominate. Ahar al Sham leaders aspire to a Talibanisation of Idlib that's very far from how the Arab Spring was perceived in the West. Rebels scurry into Ahar's ranks for protection from AQ.

And what's the alternative?

...
But the revolution as it has been waged by Salkhou and others, and the armed opposition as it’s currently directed and organized, seem to have few prospects. Those rebels who persist in fighting the regime—instead of becoming border guard vassals for a neighboring state—can expect the regime and its allies to train east Aleppo-style firepower on one area after another. Zinki’s home base in the west Aleppo countryside is unlikely to be an exception.
...

To like the Southern Front participate as mamluks in the soft-partition of Syria by regional powers into zones of control while the Iranians occupy Useful Syria with the excuse of protecting it. To be a pawn in an imperious game officiated over by Russia and the US. This is not much different than fighting with the PKK at the Americans behest. Something the bulk of rebels see as a traitors game akin to allying with the regime. The one thing most Syrians agree on is it should remain a single state.

To fight the sort of bloody sectarian terrorist insurgency that killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis? A fight that's not concluded in over a decade and appears doomed to future futile cycles.

Sometimes it is time to put the pike in the thatch.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
In the end, Moscow appears to fallen short of securing full Iranian buy-in, without which it remains unable to deliver a recalcitrant Assad set on total victory. Tehran continues to believe that control must, at minimum, be re-established over rebel-held districts in Damascus, the strategic importance of which is self-evident. Ongoing fighting around Wadi Barada and East Ghouta has been a key obstacle to cementing the ceasefire and broader peace process. The continued military operations of Russia’s allies in these regions drew unprecedented criticism from Moscow, laying bear some of the divisions at play.

Until the regime re-establishes control over these areas, which appears increasingly inevitable - there is little reason to believe that Russia will do much to shift Iran’s calculations. The delay in the creation of a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the postponement of new intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, likely reflects this reality.

But if Moscow has any hope of this process meaningfully moving forward, Iran’s support will be paramount. In many ways Tehran faces a coming moment of truth – a choice between the more minimalist interpretation of victory, apparently now pursued by Moscow, and the maximalist ambitions of the regime that would involve taking the fight to Idlib, Daraa, and beyond. The choice it makes will have a significant bearing on the next phase of the conflict.
...

I think Iran will take a third option. Iran's interests really lie in the South of Syria. The Russians coming in with their airpower allowed them to reach for the commercial capital Aleppo. There were clear signs at the time they would have shrunk operations to within a smaller more defensive perimeter otherwise. They don't need to eliminate the revolt entirely. It's presence justifies them lingering in Useful Syria. A little containable Takfiri chaos has served them well in Iraq. I don't think Iran will fully back Assad's reconquista. They'll help him consolidate the security of the big cities and Latakia. They'll keep him weak and dependent and hoping for more territory. Nor will they tolerate a security zone in the South that impedes them much. They're not aiming at a peaceful border with Israel that the Russians hope for either.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Has a distinct whiff of wishful thinking about it.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Saudis eager to oppose Iran in Syria. At a minimum that means Trump has secured funding. Could mean a Saudi-Jordanian-US ground presence in the South. The Saudis have only offered ground troops for Syria in the past if the US puts in a force to shield them. The Iranians would likely fight that. The Russians are leery. It's going to be very tricky to thwart Iran in Syria without having problems with a Kremlin that needs Iranian ground forces. It's tightrope for the Russians as they really don't want trouble with Israel. They have not interfered in IAF missions against HA but ground basing near useful Syria might destabilise the shaky R+6 alliance. DoD folk bluntly told the last administration that a No Fly Zone in Syria risked a clash with Russia. This probably hasn't changed. Under Trump, despite the rhetoric on Russia, a greater appetite for risk in order to get leverage in deals may not be so unlikely.

On Yemen, even Aden isn't really a "safe zone". The south is crawling with Takfiri and rival factions. There are very serious humanitarian problems that AQAP often has seemed better at dealing with than Hadi's collapsed government. The UAE wanted to extract itself from the mess a while back. It's not unlikely that a bigger US SF presence might compensate. It's a foolish war to get sucked into but it lacks the complexity of Syria. I expect the KSA will pony up a huge bribe in the form of arms deals for greater US assistance. Which would fit with Trump's advertised transactional attitude to these things.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Assad also displays, a very sensible, degree of caution with Trump.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TNI Hezbollah Is Winning the War in Syria

...
But even as Hezbollah has prevailed in many ways, likely emerging from the Syrian Civil War as one of the few parties to cement enduring gains, it has also suffered significant losses. In four years of fighting in Syria, Hezbollah lost more fighters than it did during the entire eighteen-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Its Syria tally is approximately two thousand dead and possibly as many as six thousand wounded.

Whether the blood and treasure expended by Hezbollah and Syria will ultimately be worth it depends on two things. First, how much did Hezbollah improve as a fighting force, and will it be able to retain this competence when not actively engaged in hostilities?

Because Hezbollah enjoys sanctuary in Lebanon, it will be able to rebuild its force over time with new recruits and train them in the tactics learned in Syria, all while maintaining ties to the organizations and operatives it worked with in Syria. Although it might not have cause to engage in hostilities in the near term, it will almost certainly have improved its capacity for doing so through its experience in Syria.

Second, will Hezbollah be able to translate its battlefield acumen into domestic political power back home?

On the domestic front, Hezbollah will likely continue to succeed in portraying itself as a “resistance force” and attempt to parlay its sacrifices in Syria into political power in Lebanon. In late October, Michel Aoun, a Maronite Christian, was elected president of Lebanon’s parliament, ending a two-year deadlock that kept the post vacant. He was backed in part by Hezbollah.

Most have been on the losing side of the civil war in Syria. While not unscathed, Hezbollah stands to gain momentum at home and throughout the region. Through its evolution from ragtag militia to global terrorist organization and Lebanese political party, Hezbollah has cemented its status as a power player in the Middle East.

HA paid a pretty high price in terms of popularity amongst Sunni Arabs including back home. It now has a seemingly permanent occupation of Syrian land adjacent to Lebanon. The main thing that drew them in was a risk their Iranian supply lines would be compromised. They are now far more influential in Syria than they were. They boast about being far superior to the SAA not an idle boast. Despite the arrogance they appear less resented by regime supporters than the IRGC.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
An ISIL offensive on Deir-ez-Zor that started on 15 January has effectively cut the besieged enclave in two as of 17 January. This cut resulted in the separation of the Deir-ez-Zor airport and the two eastern neighborhoods (Harabesh and Alrasafa) populated by an estimated 6,000 people from the western neighborhoods, where the bulk of the city’s 93,500 population live.

Fighting between ISIL and Government of Syria (GoS) forces is currently concentrated in the Al-Ommal and Rasafa neighbourhoods, the Al-Baglieh area and west of Deir-ez-Zor airbase, and resulted in the death and injury of scores of civilians. There are unconfirmed reports from local sources that 40 bodies of under 15-year-olds were discovered in the areas where the clashes between ISIL and the GoS took place. If confirmed, this would substantiate allegations that ISIL is recruiting children for active combat.
...

Child fighters not a new thing with IS.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Well that's Idlib nicely divided. I'd expect the R+6 to take out what's left of the "moderate rebels" in those bookends.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Young people today! Beard needs work as well.

 

[teqniq]

Syria Interview: After the Fall of Aleppo - EA WorldView

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
While US military is already opportunistically striking IS targets around Deir Ezzor, it could of course make much more of a difference if it chose to. But it has no way of hurting IS in Deir Ezzor without helping al-Assad, and that was always seen as unacceptable under Barack Obama’s presidency. For years, US policy in Syria has been to isolate the Syrian president and squeeze him out of power, not to provide close air support to his army. Any move to help al-Assad with air strikes would complicate ties to Syrian rebels or regional states, and it could cause a stir in US politics as well.

It would also likely be a thankless task. Despite thousands of US air strikes against IS in Syria, al-Assad and his allies still accuse Washington of secretly conspiring with the group. If the US were to send its air force to support vulnerable regime positions in eastern Syria, a likely outcome would be that al-Assad could use more of his own military to pummel rebels in western Syria – including US-backed groups.

Nevertheless, during the election campaign of 2016, then-candidate Trump indicated that he would change the Syria policy of the United States. While he never produced a clear plan, Trump repeatedly hinted that he wants to scale down the campaign against al-Assad and focus more on IS, possibly in collaboration with Russian President Vladimir Putin. That still seems to be the policy. In his first phone call with Putin, now-president Trump promised to unite their forces against “international terrorism,” which likely refers to IS.

If Trump does indeed wish to order a strategic shift in Syria and the strengthening of al-Assad is no longer viewed as an obstacle to joint action with the Russians, then keep an eye on eastern Syria – Deir Ezzor may well be the place for that collaboration to begin.

The US under Obama did carry out a whole series of air strikes on IS around Deir over a period of months. It makes no sense for the US to allow Deir to fall to IS if they wish to take Raqqa. This ended disastrously when a Coalition strike hit R+6 positions that were thought to have been taken by IS. This did look very like deniable Air Support mediated at distance via the Russians. It's never been admitted to. There's no sign of something more intimate from Trump. He may be too busy with domestic issues.

So far Trump's Syria policy could be mistaken for Clinton's behind a creeping barrage of hot lurve for The Kremlin. He's also continued the Obama era nuclear modernisation and has not pulled US troop deployment to Poland. Assad with a well developed nose for treachery clearly sees Trump as a worrying development. I would remember that Trump is a deceiver who favours sneak attacks. Beware creeps bearing gifts.

 

[CrabbedOne]

I suspect Ahar al Sham aren't really big Muppet fans.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Interesting to consider the traditional policy of many countries with Salafi-Jihadi prone populations has been to rather favour the Angry Beards going on Jihad elsewhere. It's a policy that worked reasonably well but there is a problem of scale with a widely popular Syrian uprising against the awful Assad regime and within that Caliphate/Emirate building projects.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks POLITICAL AIRPOWER, PART III: BOOTS OFF THE GROUND

...
Political Airpower

Today, the apparent ease by which airpower may be ordered into the fray is belied by the very real difficulty of planning an effective campaign that can achieve policy objectives with the tools at hand. Unfortunately, the evolution of strategic thought has not kept pace with the evolution of policy. What this airpower-heavy policy does achieve is largely domestic. It satisfies the need to be seen doing something, even if that something is largely ineffective. It endures that policymakers do not often have to deal with the reality of war’s impact on vulnerable civilian populations. Of course, it limits American casualties.

What it doesn’t do is bring a satisfactory end to conflict over the short term. In fact, the current airpower strategy in Iraq and Syria is highly constrained — accepting a reduction in military effectiveness to likewise reduce the aspects of military employment that politicians find unpalatable. In the end, the willingness to employ military force without the willingness to accept that such force is neither neat nor controllable has a series of impacts: limiting operations tempo, protracting coalition involvement, and testing long-term commitments, all while providing a vehicle for the enemy to continually adapt, thereby prolonging conflict.

You can't fight a war amongst the people from 20,000 feet but it seems that's the only sort of war American and Russians will put up with happily.

Both the Russian and Americans have similar resulting imperfections in their Syria strategy. They are understandably adverse to a large ground commitment and therefore rely on allies to provide the bulk of ground forces. However these allies really differ in their political objectives from their Air Support suppliers.

The Russian have some advantages as they are not fighting a quixotic GWOT that finally requires regional stability but tends to undermine it. Russian goals are more tangibly related to hard interests and a restoration of a semblance of the 2010 status quo in Useful Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

I tend to see the brutal domestic repression of the last Chechen revolt as the model for Russian actions in Syria. There's a post up thread on that war. The key point being it's viewed as great success by Russian COINistas and with professional distaste by their Pentagon peers but actually is just one of a series of attempts to crush the Chechen people that often have looked genocidal.

From The Atlantic Council Putin a Victim of His Own Creation

...
This barrage of threats has been taking place under the Kremlin’s nose. No one in Moscow—not Putin, not Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, not Duma Chairman Sergei Naryshkin, not Federal Assembly Speaker Valentina Matviyenko—has commented publicly on Kadyrov’s behavior. Kadyrov appears to be untouchable in Russia today.

Experts offer several explanations for the harassment of the opposition by Kadyrov and his inner circle. According to one explanation, Chechnya’s economic crisis is driving its leadership to prove its loyalty to the Kremlin. But this argument overlooks Kadyrov’s wild card: a massive personal army that is loyal to Kadyrov alone. In these circumstances, Moscow’s support and influence is increasingly irrelevant in Chechnya. If federal authorities attempt to arrest Kadyrov, a third Chechen War will break out—a conflict that the Kremlin can ill afford. Putin has become a prisoner of his own creation.

Another argument, and one that is closer to the truth, states that Kadyrov is trying to see how much he can get away with. He acts and waits to see what the Kremlin’s reaction will be, or more precisely, whether the Kremlin will react at all. Kadyrov is testing Putin, making sure that his own power is truly uncontested.
...

Of course you could just see Kadyrov as a deniable club that's used to beat the opposition to Putin down just as his turncoat Jihadi army helped destroy nationalist Chechens but it does have the look of Chechnya slipping out of Kremlin control once more.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Sputnik News US-Proposed Syria Safe Zones Not an Attempt to Repeat 'Libyan Scenario' - Lavrov

...
"We understand that Donald Trump's administration is yet to specify its approach. The idea of safe zones was discussed in the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Then they wanted to repeat "the Libyan scenario," announcing the creation of a safe zone, where the anti-government forces were located. I do not see that Washington attempts to follow the same path now," Lavrov said at a press conference in Abu Dhabi.

The minister said Moscow was ready to discuss establishing safe zones in Syria with the new US administration.

"As soon as the State Department leadership is completely formed, I am convinced that we will enter into contact and establish a full-fledged regular dialogue," Lavrov said.
...

Lavrov just brimming up with trust there.

 

[Casually Red]

Of course you could just see Kadyrov as a deniable club that's used to beat the opposition to Putin down just as his turncoat Jihadi army helped destroy nationalist Chechens but it does have the look of Chechnya slipping out of Kremlin control once more.

Yeah ..those redoubtable Chechen nationalists such as Ibn Al Khattib and the host of Saudi, Jordanian, Turkish, Kurdish and bloody all sorts that comprised a major part of their forces . They were another wing of Al Qaeda . And their downfall was their failed attempt to invade neighbouring Dagestan . Which had sweet fa to do with any "Chechen nationalism " and everything to do with exporting the caliphate throughout the caucuses . Yeah...these "nationalists " from the 4 corners of the middle east , salafist to the core were put down by putins jihadists .

Chechen nationalists stating their opposition to putins jihadis

Very good .

And the Atlantic council as well .

Ffs

 

[CrabbedOne]

On e-Amyna A Short Analysis and Some Reflections on Turkey’s Incursion to Syria
An analysis of Operation Euphrates Shield from a perspective of purged NATO officers.

...
Planning domain performance resembles intelligence shortfalls. Planners failed to appreciate the weapons enemy holds and plan accordingly. Strategic planners (if many are left after the massive purge!) at Turkish General Staff should have known that, ISIS had access to sophisticated anti tank guided missiles (ATGM) weapons and had been using them in the field extensively, and should have planned accordingly. Terrain factor also seems to be ignored. Using the relatively permissive flat terrain, ISIS was able to move freely and quickly, which enabled them to hunt tanks and other armored carriers with ease. Just like terrain, timing of the operation is not in concert with the choice of Armor either. Armor needs large logistics support which can be a nightmare in winter. The most shocking detail about planning which explains the failures mentioned thus far is that there is no Joint Strategic Operational Plan (OPLAN). Hence there is no joint understanding of the whole campaign. For an operation of this magnitude an OPLAN at joint level is a must, in order to determine the lines of operation, align the lines of effort, synchronize efforts and execute properly. However, sources state that the closest thing to a plan is just a few power point slides with arrows and rough timings. According to this so called CONOPS (Concept of Operations); 3 months were envisaged for control of Jarablus, likewise 3 months for Al-Bab, another 3 for Mumbic and just another 3 months for Rakka. Considering how many months US-led coalition forces spent in Kirkuk, it is obvious that the timing mentioned is unrealistic.

C2 (command and control) of the operation is a perplexing matter by itself. Official reports indicate that the 3-star head of Special Forces (Lt. Gen. Aksakallı, a staunch supporter of Erdogan) is commanding at operational level from a small HQ in Silopi/Turkey. Considering the amount of armor units used, a Special Forces commander with no experience in armor warfare, is not a smart choice. Destroyed tanks in the battle testify to what should have been common sense. In a recent report sent to Turkish General Staff HQ, Lt. Gen. Aksakallı did not refrain from blaiming the armour and infantry units performance for the failures in an effort to clear up his name and shift the blame towards Land Forces Command for lack of training and preparation. The assertion that Joint Forces Commander is somehow not responsible for the component units under his command is unacceptable by any military doctrine, tradition or ethic, and shows that Aksakallı is more concerned about clearing his name rather than saving lives, or mission success.

The disconcerted planning and execution of the operation has led to appalling results. Credible sources stated that, contrary to public statements by the Turkish General Staff, 54 tanks have been destroyed/damaged so far. Losses are great yet gains are tiny. Despite the overwhelming conventional superiority enjoyed, even the logistics lines of ISIS, used for reinforcements and evacuations, are not cut yet.

Rather than acknowledging the self-evident incompetence, Erdogan’s regime tried to save face by claiming “Lack of US help to Turkish troops”. Prime minister went as far as claiming that “The others are not doing anything, we are the only ones fighting”. So what was the help they were talking about? Forgetting the fact that US neither agreed with the plan nor promised any help regarding Al-Bab, why was Turkey asking for US help in the first place?

It is obvious that mentioned “help” from US would come from the air, whether being strike or intelligence. Turkish Air Force was used to be paraded as the largest in Europe. With more than 250 fighters, it should be easily able to provide any kind of air support needed. In fact, Turkish General Staff claim 1,233 guided munitions strike on 1,141 IS targets, yet fails to show any significant effect on enemy will or ability to fight. Either, Air Force is operating extremely ineffectively, or these numbers are suspicious. So assuming those numbers are right, what is the source of inefficiency? Could it be that, majority of experienced planners, pilots and intel officers are in jail now? Even some who are not in jail are hard pressed, like Pilots in Diyarbakir who report to police everyday and go fly missions on the same day? Morale of whatever good personnel left is down the drain, as they see personnel getting arrested everyday and wondering when is their turn?
...

Sacked Turkish Brass clearly not happy bunnies.

I'd put a lot of this down to the TSK being used to chasing after lightly armed PKK columns. Attacking a well dug in and heavily equipped IS battalion with active resupply from the SE is a whole different ballgame. The Turks unlike the PKK at Manbij or the CTS in Ramadi are not getting masses of US precision CAS. And the author above is probably right that the decapitated post-mutiny TAF is fucked as a military instrument. Not unrelated to Erdogan having to roll over belly up whimpering about Gulenist infiltration before the Russian big dog.

I'd note here reports of hundreds of civilian casualties to Turkish dumb bombs in al Bab but a decided lack of anybody jumping up and down at the UN about "barbarous" siege tactics or hysterically invoking the holocaust as they did over East Aleppo. That's despite the US clearly having more qualms about Erdogan's bid to chop up Rojava than Russia has.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Yeah ..those redoubtable Chechen nationalists such as Ibn Al Khattib and the host of Saudi, Jordanian, Turkish, Kurdish and bloody all sorts that comprised a major part of their forces . They were another wing of Al Qaeda . And their downfall was their failed attempt to invade neighbouring Dagestan . Which had sweet fa to do with any "Chechen nationalism " and everything to do with exporting the caliphate throughout the caucuses . Yeah...these "nationalists " from the 4 corners of the middle east , salafist to the core were put down by putins jihadists .

Chechen nationalists stating their opposition to putins jihadis

Very good .

And the Atlantic council as well .

Ffs

It's a blurry picture but I think that's Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar in Syria in 2012-13 not Chechnya. It was a group with many nationalities, predominantly Arabs. It mostly ended up siding with JaN. The guy in the middle is a Georgian Chechen who was on the fringes of the Second Chechen war.

It's an interesting career trajectory to consider. His father was an Orthodox Christian. His mother was a Muslim Kist. Actually US trained, ex-Georgian SF. A very capable young NCO. Fought at the Battle of Tskhinvali against the Russian invasion of Georgia and was promoted to be an officer but developed TB and was discharged. When recovered he failed in his attempts to reenlist. He became Abu Omar al Shishani. Eventually led a devastatingly effective Russian speaking IS unit. He had embarrassingly bad Arabic and was reportedly sometimes rather less than devout. Killed in Syria a while back. Shishani might just have been a Georgian Colonel with a fierce hatred of Russia and some Salafi-Jihadi sympathies but for the TB.

The Second Chechen War a lot of Russians Putin think started as a self promotion exercise with a Black Flag op blowing up Moscow apartment blocks that they blamed on the likes of Ibn al-Khattab. I've met Russian Putin supporters who are a good deal more cynical about Russian propaganda than you are who think that a move of dark arts genius. The downside was an FSB team got caught planting RDX in another block and lamely had to claim it was an exercise, sloppy. True or not it all helped the cult of Tzar Vlad The Sly.

Only an inveterate authoritarian boot licker would claim the Syrian rising began as a conspiracy by foreign terrorists as Assad does. It's even less true of what was clearly a separatist movement in Chechnya not so different from that in a lot of parts of the old Russian empire. Of course the Salafi-Jihadis came to serve in the Chechen Wars as a brutal regime tried to suppress a rising just as they once did in Afghanistan and would again Syria. These wars of internal repression are great competitive opportunities for the buggers to spread the creed. Like Maoism it's an effective fighting ideology. Chechnya in fact had far fewer Salafists than Syria. It Muslim population was lax, mostly Sufi and damn near primitive Animist in places. Like Syria there were different strands in the revolt with nationalism originally being a far stronger current in Chechnya. As in Syria Takfiri were always there but they were just one faction. You fight a war in Sunni Muslim lands these days and that is what effective resistance looks like. Even some hard as nails Iraqi Baath dead enders turned Salafi-Jihadi. And yes as in Syria there's now a hell of a lot more of the Chechens nodding along with the Takfiri than when the war started.

It's been quite widely reported that the FSB started giving the most worrying Russian Beards plane tickets to Syria in 2012. Well it's a quick fix to growing domestic tensions. Other countries did much the same. If the "migrants" headed to Raqqa soon to be in IS hands they were far more likely to harm the rebels cause than Assad. Dumb luck for the Russians perhaps but it worked.

Kadyrov's 30K strong army was mostly co-opted from the radicalised remains Chechen rising after nearly a decade of butchery. It contains an awful lot of Angry Beards who probably are not greatly different from Shishani. They just changed sides to that of a happy head chopping warlord Moscow picked to be the winner. They then tortured and killed those who held out until the revolt died down. Actually the Russian regulars they replaced had a far worse record of rapey atrocities but lets allow the Beards their scary aura. The FSB watches them rather nervously; it's a ticking time bomb. Some of them are currently deployed with Russian MP units in Syria. Again safely out of the way. What's coming in Syria is the Russian trying the same trick. To co-opt elements of the revolt and they won't be picky. The Taliban admirers of Ahar al Sham are already on their list of possible Idlib besties. And that could be a smart play even if it has flaws.

The Iranians are similarly flexible when it comes to the Takfiri menace. The group that went on to be AQI and then IS was sponsored by them in the KRG in the late 90s. Like Syrian intelligence they sometimes aided AQI later on if helped keep the Americans off balance. AQ and Taliban figures often sought refuge with the Iranians and were hosted despite enmity. They currently aiding some Taliban groups against IS in Afghanistan. Enemies can be useful assets and then enemies again.

The sort of black and white clash of civilisations narrative an effete clot like Bannon pushes isn't one our more powerful enemies buy.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
As far as the government is concerned, the only tolerable end to the Syrian war is to regain all of Syria without much compromise — whether with the opposition or with its external enemies. This is indeed the solution that the regime is attempting to achieve through its own actions on the ground — either through local truces, whose terms the government dictates, or the recent string of military successes that have enabled it to recapture previously lost territory. And in this endeavor to regain all of Syria, Damascus is keen not to lose to either its opponents and its allies.
...

Essentially we've got three levels of talks now:

1. Geneva, an increasingly irrelevant US flaps lips at Russia, superpower posturing
2. Astana, "Honest Broker" Russia flaps lips at regional players, what a carve up
3. Regime negotiated local rebel surrenders, marching along on a road of bones

The last one being the one that really means much to Syrians.

 

[CrabbedOne]

What's most interesting there is who is not in the worst 10.

The Baathist horror show trailing NorK by a fair margin is impressive though.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On SST Wrath of Euphrates, Phase III - TTG

Trump gives the Syrian PKK armoured cars. I imagine that was already OK'd by Obama.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Syrian army dash to al-Bab risks Turkey clash

...
In less than two weeks, Syrian army units have moved to within 6 km (4 miles) of al-Bab, a city that is also being targeted in a campaign waged by the Turkish military and its allies, groups fighting under the Free Syrian Army banner.

A source in the military alliance fighting in support of President Bashar al-Assad told Reuters on Wednesday the Syrian army aimed to reach al-Bab and was ready "to clash with the FSA fighting" alongside the Turkish army if necessary.

However, the source, a non-Syrian, said the main aim was to frustrate Turkey's ambitions and "to acquire a strong hand in the game unfolding on that front", rather than to provoke an all-out confrontation.

If a clash does occur, it would be the first time Syrian government forces have confronted the Turkish army on the ground in northern Syria since Turkey launched its operation in August.

Russia, Assad's most powerful ally, has carried out air strikes targeting Islamic State in the al-Bab area in support of both sides, underlining big shifts in the diplomatic landscape.

The non-Syrian military source spoke on condition of anonymity as he was not an official spokesman for the pro-Assad alliance.

The attack is led by the army's elite Tiger Force, with intelligence support from a command center in Aleppo staffed partly by Iranian advisors, the pro-Assad source said. The army campaign was receiving Russian air cover "when asked for".
...

So Assad's getting in Erdogan's face South of al Bab and the Russians are offering Air Support to both sides. Interesting regime priorities considering long besieged Deir isn't so secure and the rebels in Idlib are at each others throats.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Surely the the world's most glorified Estate Agent wouldn't just be spraying some manky old shit with gold paint and calling it "fabulous"?

Points out the Turks may well be aiming at a sort of safe zone in Idlib where they hope with the help of parts of Ahar al Sham to marginalise AQ. This would fit nicely with a Russian strategy of rebel co-option. I'm not sure if Iran would care but likely that would leave Assad fuming. If I was him I'd be trying to make a point by advancing on the TSK at al Bab. What a carve up!

 

[CrabbedOne]