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And next, Syria?

On The American Interest Donald Trump and the War for Raqqa
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Donald Trump has thus inherited a well-developed war plan, premised on the pairing of Special Operations forces with indigenous forces that are capable of taking and holding territory. President Trump will be soon presented with options to expand the war against the Islamic State, most likely with a menu of options ranging from the status quo to the insertion of regular U.S. ground forces. The President’s most likely course of action will be to continue the partnership with the SDF, while easing the rules of engagement to allow for more airstrikes to support the offensive. He could also choose to provide the SDF with heavier weapons; these are a military necessity to fight in urban areas but would be politically difficult because of the problems this option would cause with Ankara. The Turkish military is unlikely to play a role in taking Raqqa, although it has the means to slow down or complicate a U.S. offensive conducted in league with the SDF. The battle plan was not developed in a vacuum. It is the result of years of U.S. involvement in the Syria conflict and, since October 2015, a military presence on the ground.

Trump, therefore, has little offer Turkey. And Turkey has little to offer Trump. Trump’s decisions in Syria will ultimately reflect his Administration’s prioritization of his self-declared fight against “radical Islam.” Raqqa remains the target, and logic dictates more of the same from the new Administration.
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Of you might call it an utter clusterfuck. Working well enough tactically at pushing IS back across the map but fundamentally flawed. IS and the Syrian PKK don't exist in a political vacuum. Mattis could stop pissing about and just dump a Division of Marines in to take Raqqa but what then?
 
On ISW Syria Situation Report: January 26 - February 2, 2017
The new administration of U.S. President Donald Trump floated initial signals of significant policy changes regarding the Syrian Civil War. President Trump held an hour-long telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 28 that included discussions of “mutual cooperation” against ISIS in Syria. The Kremlin later claimed that the two leaders agreed to “establish real coordination” against “terrorist groups” operating in Syria without providing further details. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to solicit the support of both countries for an unspecified initiative to establish ‘safe zones’ in Syria. The Syrian Foreign Ministry warned that any attempt to establish a ‘safe zone’ on its territory without coordination with the regime would be an “unsafe act” and violation of national sovereignty. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense is preparing a number of options to accelerate the campaign against ISIS in Syria including broader battlefield authorities, an expanded train-and-assist mission for vetted opposition groups, arms deliveries to the Syrian Kurdish YPG, and the deployment of a combat brigade to seize Ar-Raqqa City. Nonetheless, concrete details on the ultimate policy of the new administration towards the conflict remain unclear even as the regime and opposition prepare for new round of Geneva Talks scheduled for February 20.
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My bold, a sizeable US ground deployment in Syria with Mattis at DoD seems likely. After all that's the way things crept in Iraq under Obama.
 
In Al Monitor Why are Syrian rebels stepping up efforts to isolate Iran?
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It seems that the main impetus behind the rebels’ disinclination toward an Iranian role is their hope that more serious US involvement on the Syrian issue under Donald Trump’s administration could prompt Moscow to reconsider its ties with Tehran, which, in the end, could result in a diminished Iranian role in the equation of the future of Syria. In recent weeks, some reports have indicated that the new US administration is trying to test the Iran-Russia partnership and, as a means to increase the pressure on Iran, distance Moscow from Tehran. Such an eventuality could be a gift to the rebels, because Russia has presented itself as more flexible regarding some critical issues, such as the ideological orientation or the level of centralism of the post-war Syrian government.

As an integral part of this strategy, the rebels have persistently insisted that all non-Syrian armed groups leave Syria in order for the political process to move forward. This is because the rebels believe that the presence of armed groups loyal to President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, especially Lebanon’s Hezbollah, is how Tehran guarantees its influence and shapes developments on the ground in its favor. Based on this logic, the rebels believe that at the current stage, Iran has been successful in persuading the other players to accept its role and to consider it as a guarantor of the cease-fire because of its direct influence on some of the groups in the battlefield. Thus, if the rebels could be successful in gradually excluding these groups from the field, ignoring Iran could be much easier.

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Well Trump probably does hope to loosen the Russian-Iranian alignment in Syria. It makes a nonsense of his policy: fawning to Russia while rattling the sabre at Iran.

The Russians also have a problem with Iran due to their aggressive intent towards Israel. The whole Russian policy in Syria requires a good relations with the dangerous Israelis. If parts of the revolt with the support of its backers could be co-opted and say given the job of policing Northern Idlib that would reduce the regimes (and Russia's) dependance on Iranian man power. However the basic reality is Assad wants his reconquista on pretty harsh terms and shows no sign of compromising. He appears far closer to the Iranians in inclination wanting to crush the rebels though like the Russians scared of a clash with Israel.

What do the Russians do if Trump moves to attack Iran directly? They haven't protected HA units from IAF attacks but the Russians probably wish to remove regime change from the US's policy tool kit.

Of course Iran won't sit still. They'll consolidate their interests in Rif Damascus. Take back Jisr ash-Shugur. Push into Idlib from Aleppo. Iran will probably move to diminish the US roles in Iraq and then Syria. The best way to disturb a US-Russia detente process is to poke Trump in the eye and force Putin to show his hand.
 

Probably a good call. It was a bit of an inshallah operation according to this. Lots of division on Team Obama over backing the PKK.
 
In The NYRB How Assad Is Winning
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No one denies that the regime is winning the war. It owes its ascendancy as much to its opponents’ disunity and incompetence as to its own effectiveness. Rebel policy, whichever group was involved, was to seize and hold terrain for as long as possible in violation of every tenet of guerrilla warfare. The local people welcomed the rebels in some places and tolerated them in others.

In both cases, opposition fighters failed to shield people from the regime’s sieges and assaults as well as the misbehavior of their own “rogue elements.” Rather than wage a mobile guerrilla war and build a solid coalition within the population, they occupied land they could not hold. This alienated many Syrians whom the rebels could not govern and risked the lives of those they could not defend. The rebels failed to create effective alliances among their more than a thousand armed bands. Their reliance for arms and other support on rival outside powers—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, with the United States, Britain, and France in the wings—left the rebel groups vulnerable to the antagonistic and variable priorities of their sponsors. In sum, the opposition had no more chance against the Syrian regime than the similarly fractured Palestine Liberation Organization had in the 1970s and 1980s against Israel’s superior military and intelligence apparatus.
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A slow but bloody war of million dollar checkpoints and entrepreneurial warlords.

It's interesting to contrast the Syrian rising with the savage resilience of the first Iraqi insurgency. Never so focused on holding territory but also were very fragmented. The main former Baathist Iraqi insurgency sought to disrupt both the occupation but also the new regime's will to rule. Partly it was a "werewolf" scheme of extended resistance conceived by Baath intelligence. Iraqi insurgents would often melt back into the population. Both risings managed to get a lot of civilians killed; similar numbers in the hundreds of thousands. But in Iraq most of those killed in the violence were non-combatants killed by their own countrymen.

In Syria it's the large number of combatants killed in a slow war of sieges that push the toll higher. With loyalist forces actually coming off worse than the rebels despite having more heavy equipment and an air force. "Syrian" rebel casualties also have over representative levels of foreign Jihadi casualties, ~40%. Because mostly what relatively well equipped Syrian rebels often do is provide fire support to radical Salafist offensives or hold defensive positions that provide an advantage allowing them to whittle down loyalist attackers. They're not really able to protect the civilians from the inevitable bombardment by state forces. And that reflects another reality in Syria the main rebel strategy was of blunt attrition. Which has worked but only to the extent of hollowing out the SAA. Sadly for the rebels making IRGC source replacement man power and strengthening Iran's hand in Syria. The rebels are now faced with the prospect of transitioning to an insurgency more like the first Iraqi one.

As the PKK have found in SE Turkey when they recently moved from being mainly rural insurgents to occupying urban turf it reduced their support base. Turkish Kurds were enthused by the PKK's brave struggle against IS in Syria but they didn't want a full on civil war in their streets. That move up the Maoist level of warfare from the indoctrinating insurgent to manoeuvre warfare and territoriality is often tricky politically. Urban populations facing state bombardment don't always rally to the cause. The cause needs to be clearly understood beforehand and better not come to be rated as entirely futile.

IS's in the second Iraqi rising answer was to rule by something rather like Baathist state terror and determined societal fragmentation. Grow a generation of perfectly indoctrinated youth that will support you. It might have worked if they hadn't deliberately provoked the Americans. But then IS may see this as a process.
 
On Iran Tracker How Iran is Learning from Russia in Syria
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Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime recaptured Aleppo City from the opposition as the result of a three-phased campaign plan to siege and collapse opposition-held districts of the city that demonstrated Russian campaign design. Pro-regime forces supported by Russia and Iran first severed the opposition-held ground line of communication north of Aleppo City on February 3 and subsequently completed the siege by severing the final opposition-held ground line of communication northwest of Aleppo City on July 28. Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime collapsed the opposition-held pocket through an aggressive air and ground campaign in Aleppo City, forcing the surrender and full withdrawal of the opposition on December 13 and 22 respectively. This type of envelopment is a signature of Russian cauldron battles seen in operations in eastern Ukraine, and was not employed at this scale in Syria prior to the Russian intervention in September 2015.

Russia has also introduced Iran to frontal aviation (the use of strike aircraft assigned to ground forces to provide a mix of close air support and battlefield air interdiction operations that are hallmarks of Soviet operational art). Russia regularly conducts airstrikes against multiple opposition frontlines to fix opposition forces along multiple axes and hinder the movement of reinforcements, facilitating advances by pro-regime forces supported by Iran and Iranian proxy forces. Iranian-backed fighters are probably directly engaged in supporting Russian airstrikes by supplying intelligence to Russian forces, possibly in cooperation to Russian Special Forces active on the ground in Syria. Iranian forces enabled pro-regime forces on the ground to exploit Russian airpower over the course of the 15-month campaign to recapture Aleppo, particularly during the February operation to relieve the siege of Nubl and al Zahra north of Aleppo. Iranian forces suffered over 50 casualties during the first half of February, the majority of which likely participated in this operation.
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Certainly has been evidence of much better staff work since the IRGC brought Russia in.

Article points out Iran in Syria may be benefitting hugely from what's a live fire officer training exercise in campaign planning. Buying 30 SU-30s off the Russians and creating air assault units (helicopter-borne infantry). Thinks we'll see these new capabilities showing up in Iraq.

More here Iran's New Way of War in Syria:
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Iran’s continued evolution of its hybrid model of warfare in Syria will strengthen its capacity to project power in the Middle East. The procedures and tactics that Iranian forces have developed in Syria will facilitate Tehran’s efforts to deploy forces alongside similar proxy forces in other theaters, such as Iraq or Lebanon. Allowing Iran to consolidate its influence in Syria enables Tehran to expand and improve the capabilities of its proxies and direct them against U.S. interests and allies if it chooses.

The scope of Iranian combat operations in Syria guarantees that Iran will remain a dominant player on the ground, regardless of any shifts in Russia’s official position on Iranian involvement. Russia has outsourced the ground campaign to Iran and would not be willing to commit the many thousands of Russian troops required to replace Iranian troops or Iranian-backed proxies in the conflict. Most importantly, it signals that Iran’s leaders have decided for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic to focus on developing a conventional force projection capability that can seriously challenge the armed forces of its neighbors. The balance of power in the region may be forever altered by that decision.
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The well researched PDF's an update of a previous report issued last summer. Covers Iran's role in the fall of East Aleppo.

Sees little chance of Iran withdrawing from Syria regardless of who rules Damascus. What they describe is effectively a lightweight permanent occupation well embedded with local proxies. Thinks the aerial supply of this force is a vulnerability. See's no prospect of appeasement of an Iran dependent Russia in Syria doing anything but aiding Iran's grasp on Syria. They think this move in Syria is just a start for Iran and see broader intent in the Levant.
 
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On War On The Rocks AMERICA’S CENTRAL SYRIA STRATEGY PROBLEM
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Meanwhile, Iran continued to exact economic advantage from the Assad regime in exchange for the blood and treasure it has invested in his government’s survival. Tehran has already given Damascus more than $4.5 billion in lines of credit since 2013 and has again extended a line of credit – reported to be around $500 million – for the import of basic foodstuffs. Nothing however, ever comes for free: Tehran is becoming increasingly involved in the Syrian economy, from phosphate mining contracts and leasing of agricultural land to, perhaps most importantly, a licence to operate mobile phone services in Syria.

Conducting a brutal cost-benefit analysis of U.S. interests in Syria, it should be apparent to the Trump administration that Russian and Iranian sunk costs in maintaining the Assad regime are significant, while Washington’s are minimal. It will take a massive investment of resources to change that dynamic and there’s little indication of the requisite willpower. For all the talk of as-yet undefined ‘safe zones’, and cooperating with Russia against Islamic State, there’s little indication that Washington has any inclination to mount a hostile takeover of Russian and Iranian assets in Syria.
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The regional US sunk costs are vastly greater but mainly in Iraq and Israel.

The problem Trump has in Syria is balancing what now is clearly a pro-Likud stance with a very pro-Putin one that probably aids Israel's enemy Iran's growing heft in Syria. As a new status quo solidifies in Syria some point Bibi is going to poke The Donald in the chest about that.
 
They talked the talk about getting rid of Assad for some time, and obviously that's been dropped now. In terms of geopolitics obviously Iran is a much greater threat to American interests than IS, so it seems unfortunate for Trump that an unequivocally anti-IS stance that promises their absolute destruction will benefit Iran on the ground much more than it will benefit America. Is the propaganda victory of the fall of Raqqa (to who, by the way? The Kurds? The regime? Euphrates Shield?) really worth it for Trump? If I was in their position I'd actually be looking to make things as difficult and expensive as possible for Iran.
 
Flavour said:
They talked the talk about getting rid of Assad for some time, and obviously that's been dropped now. In terms of geopolitics obviously Iran is a much greater threat to American interests than IS, so it seems unfortunate for Trump that an unequivocally anti-IS stance that promises their absolute destruction will benefit Iran on the ground much more than it will benefit America. Is the propaganda victory of the fall of Raqqa (to who, by the way? The Kurds? The regime? Euphrates Shield?) really worth it for Trump? If I was in their position I'd actually be looking to make things as difficult and expensive as possible for Iran.
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For Trump it seems it's all about making good on campaign rhetoric, with the exception of swamp draining. What he said at the stump was not based on deep strategic thought. It's more like the ramblings of a drunken uncle at Thanksgiving. Look at the daffy "Muslim Ban", a complete own goal in GWOT terms running directly against security establishment thinking but popular enough with his base.

That means taking Raqqa quickly, by whatever means, probably too quickly. Like Abadi's hasty grab for Mosul. It'll be all about the 2018 midterms. And I suspect that'll be facilitated by a big injection of US troops to back a mainly PKK assault followed by a rapid drawdown maybe around a new US airhead in Rojava that can be easily reinforced. Trump will try to avoid a lasting US ground commitment. He'll then declare victory over IS much as Obama did over AQ.

Trump doesn't seem to get that Russia's whole strategy in Syria relies on Iranian ground forces. He won't be able to do much about Iran in Syria without confronting Russia and it's arguable that is even worth the candle. The Israelis whose interests he'd be representing have trodden very carefully with Moscow while eyeing the situation in Syria nervously. I suspect he'll face a determined, violent IRGC effort to eject US troops from Iraq by the end of this year that'll become more of a focus. Trump's even made that easier by still banging on about "keeping the oil""
 
On TCF Red Line Redux: How Putin Tore Up Obama’s 2013 Syria Deal
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Getting virtually every government in the world to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention was no small feat. It marked the high point of a humanitarian and diplomatic campaign dating back to the nineteenth century, and it codifies a taboo that has—with some exceptions, such as the Iraqi gas attacks in the 1980s—been respected for the better part of a century.64 Indeed, the successful discouragement of chemical warfare through moral advocacy and multilateral diplomacy has been an inspiration to many supporters of international humanitarian law, suggesting that perhaps, one day, similar campaigns may succeed in curtailing other atrocities. But when chemical attacks continue to occur in Syria—in apparent defiance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, of great-power guarantees, and of several unanimous Security Council resolutions—that progress is called into question, challenging decades of diplomatic labor and threatening the renormalization of gas as a weapon of war.

A smattering of small-scale chlorine attacks in rural Syria is obviously not going to top the to-do list of President Donald Trump, who has clearly signaled that he has little interest in the war over Syria. Yet, as his predecessor discovered, this conflict has a way of imposing itself on those who try to escape it—and the undermining of one of the most pivotal U.S.-Russian diplomatic agreements in recent history, and of global norms against poison gas warfare, will be of consequence to whomever sits in the White House. Should chemical attacks continue in the absence of a United Nations mechanism to handle the problem, there will be a showdown in the Security Council sooner or later. How Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin then decide to react will matter much to many—including Americans, Russians, and, most of all, Syrians.
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The "Iraqi gas attacks in the 1980s" on Iranian troops and civilians were a rather large exception featuring a lot of use of nerve agents. I can remember the British government insisting no such thing had happened with rather the same level of plausibility to recent assertions about KSA war crimes. It didn't seem likely at the time the use of the same weapons against PUK Kurds fighting in the same war as Iranian allies would become part of the justification for the great crusade against Saddam. Something to consider when puzzled by dogged Iranian aggression against us.
 

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Northern Syria is one of the most complicated battlefields of the multi-sided Syrian war, with Islamic State now being fought there by the Syrian army, Turkey and its rebel allies, and an alliance of U.S.-backed Syrian militias.

If a clash does occur, it would be the first time Syrian government forces have confronted the Turkish army on the ground in northern Syria since Turkey launched its operation.

Russia, Assad's most powerful ally, has carried out air strikes targeting Islamic State in the al-Bab area in support of both sides, underlining big shifts in the diplomatic landscape.

As relations between Russia and Turkey have improved, the two countries brokered a shaky ceasefire in December between the Syrian government and rebel groups fighting to unseat Assad.

An official from one of the Turkmen rebel brigades backed by Turkey said the presence of Russian forces could help prevent a confrontation.

"There are Russian soldiers along with the regime forces who are leading the way and that is an element that could satisfy Turkey," the rebel official said. "I don’t expect clashes."
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This is the list Stein is complaining about.

This is an interesting point while Trup whines about the media not covering terrorist attacks there is a not much reported fairly large civil war going on with the PKK in Turkey that features the state losing control of large urban areas, rather a lot of mass casualty attacks and even suicide bombings. Some SE Turkish cities look like something out of post-IS al Anbar. Over two thousand people have been killed recently and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Worse this is a pointless continuation of a decades long terrorist war in which over 40K souls have perished. Neither the PKK nor the Turkish state are likely to prevail. The current IS problem in Turkey is plainly rather minor in comparison.

IS's greatest act of terrorism in Turkey in fact was to spark the Turkish PKK back onto a war footing by carrying out mass casualty attacks on Kurdish political gathering that the Apoists instinctively blamed on the Turkish Deep State. And the PKK are the US's principal auxiliaries in Syria fighting IS a war that plainly had radicalising effects in Turkey. It has shifted PKK tactics to a far more lethal form than seen before.

The Turkish state also shares much blame here but you can't really understand their interests or the obvious problems with Obama's anti-IS strategy without paying attention to this. Recent Turkish moves into Syria have cocked that up rather badly. In fact it's an obvious oversight that Obama hadn't been working hard on a Ankara-PKK peace process and other Kurdish issues. This may be the greatest service the US could do the region.

However Team Trump it seems really wishes to see only the problem of Radical Islamic Terrorism. Jared Kushner recently taking to Turkish officials about terrorism hadn't even heard of the PKK. This is going to be a particular problem in already difficult US-Turkey relations.
 
On War Is Boring Iran and Russia Are Apparently Fighting Each Other in Syria
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While Moscow aims to reinforce, to whatever extent is possible, the regime’s conventional military, Iran is forming a Syrian version of Hezbollah and has likewise enlisted Iraqi Shi’a militias — all at great cost to itself. Iran controls some 40,000 fighters in Syria.

The financially-depleted Al Assad regime cannot afford to compensate Tehran in cash, so Damascus has been paying back the IRGC with real estate. The more land the Iranians own in Syria, the more determined they are to steer the war their own way.

It appears that the Russia-Iran rivalry has played out within the Syrian army. The Republican Guards Division remains loyal to Bashar Al Assad and has contributed significantly to the Russian reorganization effort.

Not so the 4th Armored Division, one of the key units defending Damascus — and which Maher Al Assad commands. The 4th Armored Division reportedly went on high alert during the apparent coup attempt in late January.

Previously, the two division, one each answering to a different Al Assad, had reportedly shot at each other.

For now the status quo reigns in Syria. If indeed the IRGC did attempt to replace Bashar Al Assad in late January, it clearly failed. But that doesn’t mean the regime is safe and secure in its current form. Syria still relies on two foreign allies. And those allies still don’t get along with each other.
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I would not read too much into this it's probably a bogus story. Lots of different rumours were floating around the Gulf press. Parts of the Russian press were pushing rumours Bashar was dead. Any failed coup attempt in Syria would have been followed by high level executions.
 
not beyond the realms of possibility though, but russia would be in for a terrible surprise if they thought they could bully iran like their near abroad.
 
Flavour said:
not beyond the realms of possibility though, but russia would be in for a terrible surprise if they thought they could bully iran like their near abroad.
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The Russian's could bully Iran if they felt the urge to. They could bully the UK as well if it lacked allies. Iran's a pretty puny country with a defence budget less than a third the size of Russia's, a poor standing army and no nukes. Iran might respond by terrorist means but the Russians aren't very likely to be impressed by that.

It could be argued Iran is Russia's near abroad and vice versa. Both are on the Caspian like some Stans Russia still feels it has dibs on. The Russians have often intruded and the Persians actually had areas like Chechnya as part of their empire at times. The USSR briefly set up a Persian Socialist Republic in 1920 and tried carving parts off Persia after WWII. Masoud Barzani of the KRG was born in the Republic of Mahabad they set up. The Kremlin basically sided with Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war. It's only a mutual fear and loathing of the Americans that allows them to work together currently and its a very leery relationship.

In Syria there is an increasing level of competition between them as it moves towards an endgame but the Iranians usually work in an insidious indirect way not by coups de main. My money isn't on the Russians prevailing in that one their Syria strategy while simpler than Obama's mare's nest has too many possible points of failure. The experience of the far more powerful Americans in Baghdad is liable to be repeated in Damascus. To be gradual edged away from the levers of power. Though the Assads will look to Russia to balance the Iranian infestation just as Abadi tries to keep the US onboard.
 
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