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And next, Syria?


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The Russian military’s admiration is based in part on Hezbollah’s performance during the Battle of Martyr Abu Omar Saraqib, a failed rebel offensive in late October to break the siege of east Aleppo. Hezbollah and regime forces recaptured areas lost during the initial attack, as well as adjacent rebel positions. Somewhere between 28 and 35 Hezbollah fighters died at the battle, out of a total 143 pro-regime fighters killed. This high number underscores the significant role that Hezbollah played in defending that front. During the initial onslaught, Hezbollah fighters reportedly stood their ground against suicide car and truck bombs, ensuring that the regime line remained intact. “When the Russians see Hezbollah on the battlefield, they stop, talk to us, and show respect for our work. They do not have the same opinion of the Syrian army units,” said the Hezbollah commander.

On November 24 this cooperation was made public. Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese newspaper close to Hezbollah, reported that the organization held its first official and direct meeting with Russian senior military officers to discuss the final battle for Aleppo. According to the article, the Russian officers, who had called the meeting, praised Hezbollah’s performance during the Battle of Martyr Abu Omar Saraqib. Both sides agreed to maintain constant communication “across joint channels in Syria.” Such cooperation led to the swift fall of Aleppo over the following month, with precise Russian airstrikes providing cover for Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies to capture rebel-held areas. “The Russians bring precision to the battlefield. Syrian airstrikes have terrible aim and go off target; the Russians are reliable,” the Hezbollah commander said. As the regime moves its focus to consolidating its gains in Aleppo and expanding its territory, this relationship is likely to continue unfettered, for now.

For Moscow, a strong allied armed force on the ground that is competent both in offense and defense provides numerous benefits to its military campaign. Russian military planners learned the value of this early in the intervention, when regime forces and their allies were unable to take back territory under the cover of Russian airstrikes until the Russians took the lead by dramatically escalating their own attacks. Hezbollah helped the regime take more efficient advantage of these airstrikes, learning much from the Russians along the way. The Lebanese militia proved its ability to save the Assad regime by helping capture strategic areas, notably the towns of Salma in Latakia governorate, Sheikh Miskeen in Daraa, and Nubl and Zahraa in Aleppo. Bashar al-Assad has now taken control almost all of “useful Syria”—what Iran calls the economic and demographic core in the west of the country through which it can funnel aid to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Moving forward, Hezbollah will likely continue to spearhead the campaign, bolstering the regime’s offensive capabilities while providing defense as required. With a trustworthy ally on the ground able to help the regime consolidate its holdings and capture new, strategic territory, Moscow can focus on bringing the conflict to a negotiated end.

Hezbollah has been a useful non-state partner to Russian forces in Syria. The Lebanese Shia militia and Iranian proxy currently fields between 6,000 and 8,000 fighters in that country’s civil war, with some estimates as high as 10,000. Having suffered roughly 2,000 deaths and over 5,000 injured since their involvement in the conflict, Hezbollah has continued to be a stalwart ally of the Assad regime, fighting as far away as Deir ez-Zor. Since September 2015 this has included working closely with the Russian military, which intervened in an apparently effective attempt to save the Assad regime. Hezbollah’s success on the ground in Syria has been noted by Moscow, which views it as a capable ally that has strongly contributed to the survival of the Syrian government. But as the regime’s fortunes improve, Russia is signaling its willingness to rebels and their foreign backers to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, calculating that the regime’s current ascendancy will give it more leverage at the negotiating table to secure a favorable deal. Yet in the long term this solution may also limit Hezbollah’s influence in a post-conflict Syria.
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That's a dependency relationship of two partners on collision course.

I would not bet on the Russians being able to pull off a wide negotiated peace as the author does. Assad shows no real sign of bending to the Kremlin's will. He has no partner for peace just a diverse ecology of rebel groups some of whom are irreconcilable and will maintain Gulf backing. Both AQ and IS maintain Syrian agendas. There are too many sub-state actors within the regime side and the rebels doing very well out of this war. The SAA is being steadily overshadowed by NDF warlords who officers complain get all the best looting. Russia is entangled and really faces a complex societal rebuilding task that can't be done on a shoe string if it can be done at all. Iran has a far easier course solidifying the IRGC's GLOC to HA amidst the chaos and plotting war with Israel while filling Assad's begging bowl.
 

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There are several parties who disrupt the security in the liberated territories, most prominent are cells connected to Da’ash [the Islamic State], which has reorganized itself after it defected to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, whom it joined under the umbrella of Jund al-Aqsa. It has reorganized and started attacking civilians as well as fighters. Jabhat Fatah al-Sham guaranteed that it would oversee them in an agreement between us but its terms were not implied unfortunately. And the brother from Jabhat Fatah al-Sham may answer why the terms were not met. Secondly there are cells connected to the regime. Our security personal have caught several [regime] cells, we have showed some of them and others are still under investigation and we will publish [the results] at the appropriate time. And here we want to call upon the civilians to inform us about anything suspicious they have seen, and we will deal with it correctly with the will of Allah.
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Note: regime infiltration as well.

Hints at tactical changes towards the end: "many methods".
 

Links to Reuters Damascus was 2-3 weeks from falling when Russia intervened: Lavrov

Lavrov is talking out of his arse much like Kerry. However note the use of the less specific term "Terrorists".

On CMEC Falling Back, Fighting On: Assad Lays Out His Strategy
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The Syrian leader went on to explain that the military is forced to prioritize “vital areas that must be held as to prevent other areas from falling,” hinting that this could include places of military-strategic importance, politically symbolic cities, or regions housing infrastructure and institutions that offer key services.

According to a source with high-level connections in the Syrian government, the speech on July 26 had been long in coming. It represented an attempt to climb down from past rhetoric about defending all of Syria after new realities have dawned on even the most hawkish leaders within the regime. “There were two camps after Idlib,” explained the source. “One wanted to get it back and one did not. Then came the loss of Jisr al-Shughur, that was the real blow. When they were about to attack Jisr al-Shughur to take it back, Palmyra fell. It was then that the totality of it all became obvious.”
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From about a month before Russia intervened. This is as bleak as it got for the regime in 2015. Assad didn't even declare a general mobilisation as had been rumoured he might. In reality what the Russian intervention did was reenable Assad's defending in all corners strategy.

By this time Idlib, Jisr al Shughour, Ariha in the NW to had fallen to rebels. IS took Sukhnah and Palmyra (May 2015) in the Eastern Homs desert in a lightning but small offensive. But by July 2015 the SAA was already trying to take Palmyra back. Deraa had failed to fall when the chaotic Southern Storm offensive collapsed a month earlier; perhaps because the Jordanians decided creating a real threat to Damascus from the South was unwise. Really a decisive turning point in Assad's favour in retrospect.
 


This is the place were the Coalition accidentally bombed R+6 forces killing dozens last year wrecking peace talks. At the time that looked rather like deniable fire support to the R+6 gone wrong.

And POTUS Trump is soon to waddle over the horizon eager to embrace Putin and various despots.
 
On Syria Comment Quwat Dir’ Al-Qalamoun: Shifting Militia Links
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Much controversy has emerged recently over an article by Martin Chulov reporting on alleged Iranian-backed plans to engineer demographic change in regime-held Syria to reduce the proportion of potentially hostile Sunnis. An unidentified “senior Lebanese leader” is quoted in the report as saying that “Iran and the regime don’t want any Sunnis between Damascus and Homs and the Lebanese border.” Leaving aside the problem that the lack of precise identification of the source means it is impossible to identify the biases, this analysis is an oversimplification. Areas retaken from the rebels are potential sources of additional manpower for the regime, and the Qalamoun area is no exception, and it is not realistic to depopulate the entirety of Qalamoun of Sunnis and somehow hope the deficit can be compensated by influxes of Shi’a.

Thus we see how the recruitment efforts in the Qalamoun area have played over the years with multiple actors for the regime participating in the effort, with wider manpower deficits again playing a role partly on account of draft evasion and desertion. Even rebel supporters and those against the regime say that at least some of the recruits into Quwat Dir’ al-Qalamoun are ex-rebels, with their estimates of the proportion of ex-rebels in these forces ranging from less than 10% to 50% or more. Besides, Quwat Hisn al-Watan in particular has also promoted the notion of tribal recruitment from the Qalamoun area and elsewhere, as broadcast on one occasion by Sama TV.


One should compare pro-regime militia recruitment in Qalamoun with more recent developments surrounding some other remaining rebel bastions to the west of Damascus, like Beit Tema and Beit Saber, where the regime is trying to implement full ‘reconciliation’ initiatives in these areas, recruiting local rebels who accept taswiyat al-wada’ (i.e. amnesty) into a new planned auxiliary militia called Fawj al-Hermon (“The Hermon Regiment”), referring to the prominent Mount Hermon (aka Jabal al-Sheikh) in the area. The village of Beit Jann and its immediate environs, however, took a much more rejectionist stance, with the main rebel factions there being Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, the Jabal al-Sheikh Brigades and Harakat Shuhada’ al-Sham. That said, as of 17 January 2017, a former Syrian member of parliament and current activist in ‘reconciliation’ initiatives in the Damascus countryside- Mus’ab al-Halabi- has claimed progress on the Beit Jann case in addition to the Quneitra village of Jubatha al-Khashab bordering the Golan Heights, asserting that more than 1000 people want taswiyat al-wada’ while up to 140 people or so want to go to Idlib.

It does not follow from all of the above that there is no truth to aspects of the demographic change narrative. Increasing purchases of property in Syria by Iran is very real, along with some Shi’i proselytization efforts. The removal of some rebels and civilians to Idlib, the main rebel-bastion in western Syria now, is very real as well (as documented above). Considerable ethnic cleansing in fighting has also occurred in places like Homs city. However, the regime and Iran cannot wish away the reality of a large Sunni majority in Syria. Multiple approaches are therefore adopted towards dealing with territories retaken from the rebels, one of which includes amnesties and recruitment to pro-regime militias, undoubtedly contributing in the grand scheme to the regime’s long-term plan to reconquer the entirety of Syria.
My bold, it's not surprising that some rebels might join a regime militia on the Qalamoun or elsewhere. The motives for joining rebel groups are often not very ideological. Opportunities for looting, a perk which features prominently on both sides of this conflict, usually lie with the winning side. Joining the conflict is sometimes just a form of employment especially for defected soldiers or draft dodgers. The rise of NDF militias is in itself very connected with young men wishing to avoid service in the SAA with its appalling conditions and attrition rates.

The Syrian Baath security apparatus is notably vindictive but the state's primary means of population control is eventual cooption. Political dissidents in Syria are often killed in the gulag but many are released some no doubt on a promise to diligently tout on peers in the best PIRA volunteer manner. Often part of the price of being an active ideological revolutionary is being somewhat compromised by state forces. Poor security has plagued the revolt especially its less radical parts. To control the less reliable areas of Syria Assad will need a sea of collaborators.

Turncoats fearing punishment for past offences can be eager servants of even the fiercest authoritarian regimes. Former political opponents and even Soviet NKVD officers switching to the Nazis in occupied territory and taking a prominent part in the Holocaust as part of their absolution was not uncommon. Kill a Jew and all was forgiven; even the Nazis needed manpower and its being shot over mass graves that accounts for most of that butchers bill. In Chechnya many former Jihadis ended up serving in vicious state militias despite the brutal repression of their nationalist revolt. Some are now serving in Syria in Russian Military Police detachments. A large part of the first insurgency in Iraq became the Sahwa and fought what remained of their comrades. This involved a good deal of bribery. More simply went home and put the pike in the thatch. IS regarded this as a masterly move by the US and learnt from it. A few years later the Sahwa commanders faced the choice of being assassinated by IS, flight or being coopted. Many chose the latter. Complicity in IS atrocities often against kin then ensured loyalty. This is how resistance is defused but not always reliably.

The subtle point here is the regime and Iran may be creating a corridor of regime support for the GLOC to HA but exchanges of population is just one aspect betrayal of the rebel cause is another. Most Sunni will just be wanting to get on with their day job. I don't doubt the IRGC see Sunni Iraq in exactly the same way. Anbaris slowly get used to the new arrangements and even start to slip a little Basra dialect into their speech.
 
On War Is Boring Syrian Militias Ask America — Give Us Your Surface-to-Air Missiles, Please
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In January 2017, spokesman Talal Silo of the Syrian Democratic Forces said his group wants shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, or MANDPADs, to confront any airborne threats his group might face in the future, according to Reuters. He offered no speculation as to whose aircraft the missiles might be needed to shoot down.

More likely than not, it would be Syrian, Turkish or Russian aircraft.

But good luck, SDF. The odds are practically zero that the United States will supply air-to-air missiles to the group, unless there is a major shift in U.S. policy. That will leave the SDF with a significant military vulnerability in the months and years ahead.
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Well as IS doesn't actually have an airforce...
 
On Al Monitor What will be the cost of Aleppo victory for Damascus?
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Where do Iran and Hezbollah stand?

Syria will definitely insist that its allies in the war play major roles in its reconstruction. Nobody challenges the role Russia will play. But it is not the same for Iran, the other major ally. It's not hard to detect resentment among the people and even government officials of Iran's interventionist attitude. Many Syrians even prefer an alliance with Russia because they believe Moscow is not interfering in their domestic affairs. Moreover, Al-Monitor was told that Iranians' overbearing, superior attitude especially annoys the Syrian army.

A veteran Syrian journalist told me Iran's assistance won't result in Iranian influence on Syrian politics. "You have to understand the political structure in Syria. Syria’s alliances don't allow [for] influence on the country. Assad is balancing Iran with Russians and vice versa. If Iran presses too hard, he cites Russian reservations. If Russia presses too hard, Assad then refers to Iranian objections."

Curiously, Syrians' unease with Iranians doesn't apply to Iran-supported, Lebanon-based Hezbollah, which hails from the same cultural basin as Syrians. Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is no less prestigious in Syria than Assad. In Damascus, Homs and elsewhere — even in Aleppo, with its prominent Sunni identity — you will see Nasrallah posters all over, and there is widespread affection for him among Christians.

In the government offices I visited, all I saw were joint photos of Nasrallah and Assad. Some shops even have Nasrallah’s portrait painted on the shutters. Street vendors sell lapel pins, cigarette lighters and wallets with photos of Assad and Nasrallah. I didn’t see a single photograph of Iranian leaders. You see Iranians on the front lines but not in city centers. In short, people distinguish between Hezbollah and Iran.
Very similar dynamic to US-Shia Baghdad-Iran relations. The Iranians also rapidly entwined themselves with the Iraqi economy in a pretty intrusive way. It's really the rise of IS that made Iraqis a little less suspicious of Iran. It's still a balancing act for Abadi. The Russians have a relatively light foot print based mainly on airpower actually not unlike the US role in Iraq now. When the rebels describe Iran's role as an "occupation" in Syria they are not far wrong: it's there to stay and has sharp elbows. Interesting HA escapes similar criticism here after having hung its yellow banner all over fallen East Aleppo, said they going nowhere and being rather prone to call the SAA pussies.

An Aleppo academic who opposes the regime says in this article 70% of Aleppo would vote for Assad. The same is probably true of Damascus. He probably always had majority support in Syria's biggest cities. Of course that's not the same outside Useful Syria.

The author is far too sunny about sectarian relations. He should pop over to Idlib and try to find some minority folks to talk to.
 
From The Atlantic Council Tillerson on Syria
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Asked about the situation in Syria during the course of his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson said the following:

We’ve had two competing priorities in Syria under this administration—‘Bashar al-Assad must go’ and the defeat of ISIS. And the truth of the matter is, carrying both of those out simultaneously is extremely difficult because at times they conflict with one another. The clear priority is to defeat ISIS. We defeat ISIS, we at least create some level of stability in Syria which then lets us deal with the next priority of what is going to be the exit of Bashar al-Assad but importantly, before we decide that is in fact [what] needs to happen, we need to answer the question, what comes next? What is going to be the government structure in Syria, and can we have any influence over that or not?"
Mr. Tillerson stopped well-short of promoting an American alliance with a regime that has made Syria safe for Islamist extremism, including the brand represented by Iran and Hezbollah. But aspects of his statement suggest that much work lies ahead for Team Trump in terms of Syria policy planning and execution:
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In which Fred Hof entirely overlooks that Tillerson bracketed the MB with AQ, IS and Iran. How does the US go on supporting a largely Islamist revolt when the incoming regime is declaring war on "radical Islam" in what's clearly a very broad sense? No amount of comparing Bashar Assad to Hitler will change that.
 

Interesting series of tweets from Stein.

He's right that al Bab has rather demonstrated the uselessness of Turkey's rebels in the fight with IS. It's turned into TSK V IS fight with a fig leaf of rebel involvement.

Mattis wants Raqqa taken ASAP and that means doubling down on the PKK. Erdogan may continue to act as a spoiler.
 
From Orsam WEAK STATES, STRONG NONSTATE ACTORS: THEORY OF COMPETITIVE CONTROL IN NORTHERN SYRIA
ABSTRACT

State weakening in Syria unearthed long-dormant processes of disenfranchisement, contributing to the regime’s loss of territory in the north-eastern half of the country. Out of this state weakening, two major armed non-state groups emerged: Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Both groups have uprooted the control tools and actors of the central authority, taking on an increasingly state-like dual role of security provision and day-to-day administration. How non-state armed groups emerge in the wake of state weakening is best conceptualized by David Kilcullen, who introduced the concept of ‘theory of competitive control’ to identify how challengers to state authority need to prove their capacity in administration. Kilcullen further argues that when states fail, whichever non-state actor emerges most capable of providing administration will convert the loyalties of the local population over time. This perspective is important to understand why Rojava and ISIS are long-term phenomena and will be impossible to eliminate through military-only methods.
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IS's conquest economy V the PKK's cultivation economy. Actually both come across as fairly successful in Kilcullen's terms.

In Iraq you do have to regard IS as a well embedded insidious presence that's not liable to go away. In Syria it's less well rooted and the PKK appears to have successfully displaced it. Of course IS does suffer the disadvantage of having a superpower trying to stamp its pesky ways out for over a decade and having effectively declared war on all conventional Muslim states. The PKK only winds up regional powers and rival sub-state actors surrounding it. Though this does point out the PKK's Syrian project isn't even supported by all Syrian Kurds. A comparison with the foreign sponsored economy of rebel Idlib would be interesting.

I hadn't really thought of Rojava's society in terms of the old Israeli Kibbutz.
 
From IFRICross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy
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As the contours of Russian campaign design in Syria are slowly emerging, one may assume that it may also draw from the NGW concept, at least in some aspects. Some of the features of the Russian move seem to correspond with the characteristics of campaign planning outlined in this paper. In terms of threat perception, Moscow perceived the situation in Syria as the result of a U.S. effort, albeit one which failed to conduct HW against the incumbent regime along the lines of the Libyan scenario. Moscow’s demarche, although driven by the interplay of several factors, 88 was a countermeasure to such a perceived U.S. effort, but was shaped along similar operational lines. Sophisticated orchestration of hard and soft power across military, diplomatic, and public domains has been already evident. Intensive informational, active measures and diplomatic campaign were synchronized with the military build-up, which enabled, thus far, the generation of some tangible operational results through sophisticated reflexive control.89 As such, the campaign design, at least at the initial stage, seems to reflect the NGW guideline of 4:1 ratio of non-military and military activities. Synchronized air and informational struggle strikes that started in late September seem to prepare optimal conditions for the forthcoming ground operation that might be led by non-Russian forces of the Moscow-led coalition. The use of precision-guided munitions, air power, and long-range precision strikes, that campaign already demonstrated, is unprecedented for Russia and confirms the feasibility of conventional coercion outlined in this paper. Also, this impressive demonstration of performance counter-balances the skepticism of Russian commentators who argued in recent years that pre-nuclear deterrence is not a feasible option for Russian military, since it lacks sufficient IT-RMA era capabilities, and thus cannot function as reconnaissance-strike complex.

If the Russian campaign design continues to capitalize on indirect action, informational operations, paramilitaries, and special operation forces supported by the sophisticated Russian IT-RMA capabilities and by military power of its allies, Moscow might minimize its visible presence, blurring, for domestic and international purposes, the line between its involvement and intervention. This does not mean, of course, that Russia will only take on campaign design/management and air power responsibilities without sending operatives into the fray of ground warfare. Indeed, if the “polite people” of the Russian military, together with pro-Russian Chechen fighters and Donbass field commanders, start appearing on the Syrian battlefield, it should come as no surprise. Unlike in Donbass or Crimea, these fighters
will have more issues with blending in. Given their experience and training, though, they can still act as a force multiplier. And if Russia deploys them while keeping mindful of the reasonable sufficiency principle, it can hope to avoid a quagmire in Syria along the lines of the one in Donbass and achieve something closer to the effective campaign in Crimea.90

If indeed the Russian campaign design in Syria continues to correspond with characteristics of cross-domain coercion, it may come with a twist of informational struggle (both digital-technological and cognitive- physiological) and nuclear muscle flexing. Moscow may operate the range of informational struggle capabilities (electronic and cyber) for the purpose of a military-diplomatic anti-access/area denial operation against adversarial activities. Establishing such an electromagnetic-cyber cordon sanitaire around the operational environment of the pro-Assad coalition can disrupt reconnaissance-strike UAVs, precision-guided munitions, aerial operations, and political-diplomatic demarches. Also, dual-use platforms, both aerial and ground, may appear in the theater of operations and even conduct limited conventional strikes. Such a hypothetical eventuality may never materialize. However, if it does, it should come as no surprise. Although such conventional strikes may produce battlefield effects, the actual operational outcome will be less important. The main expected utility would be an informational/public relations effect that enables Russian coercion signaling for regional and global purposes in the current or future tensions with the West. Such standoff vis-à-vis the US and NATO would be along the lines of Russian cross-domain coercion that has been visible on European and Atlantic theaters during the last several years.
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From the Conclusion.

For something written in November 2015 shortly after the Russian intervention this is quite insightful. What's missing was reliance on a surge of Iranian backed militia manpower rather than a lot of Russian Little Green Men but that evolved along with Iran's own version of Hybrid Warfare and was carried out behind a screen of misinformation.

It's quite a frightening paper as it reveals a great deal of confusion in Russian strategic thinking on Regional Nuclear Deterrence. Escalation to tactical nukes on starting to lose a conventional battle has been in place since the 90s but it's unclear under what exact circumstances.
 
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On The Aviationist The Turkish Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Forces have launched a joint raid against Islamic State targets in the Aleppo province.
Four Su-24Ms, four Su-25s and one Su-34 bomber of the Russian Air Force along with four F-16 and four F-4 jets belonging to the Turkish Air Force have carried out the first joint strike in Syria on Jan. 18: an interesting mix of aircraft for a quite rare COMAO (Combined Air Operation) made of platforms able to perform CAS (Close Air Support), BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction), S/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) and Strike as well as Air Superiority and Aerial Escort.

The raid aimed at destroying 36 ground targets was previously agreed with Syrian authorities, said Lt. Gen. Sergei Rudskoy, the chief of the Russian General Staff Main Operational Directorate in a briefing in Moscow. Considered that Turkey is a NATO member hence the TuAF regularly trains with other western air forces and that the Russian Aerospace Force jets employ completely different procedures, standards, etc., it would be interesting to know something more about the preparation, coordination and execution of such joint raid.
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Well I would not have anticipated that a year ago.
 

Well quite.

Confident policy wonk predictions that the liberal Arab Spring would stifle and AQ that was practically done for was swamped by the rise of reactionary Salafi. The emergence of a new Sunni Arab identity based on victimhood. Takfiri rose in several states across MENA and transnational terrorist threats worsened significantly. Authoritarian state structures proved resilient and the US often fell back to complicity with them.

The policy community picked favourites poorly. "The Kurds" were often valued over "The Arabs" when the Alphabet Soup of squabbling Kurdish factions emerged as a serious regional problem. Failure to prioritise Kurdish issues particularly the peace process between the PKK and Ankara while allying with the Turks old terrorist enemy was a mistake. Amongst "The Arabs" Sunni where favoured over all others. Shia tarred by association with Iran and the failed Iraq project were distrusted and blamed. Prejudices often slanted by petro-dollar driven hasbara. Yet it would be Shia Baghdad that fought hardest against IS while effective Sunni Arab opponents of the Caliphate failed to emerge and AQ blossomed amongst Syrian Sunni.

America's enemies also had slanted visions. Facing the Syrian revolt they characterised as "Takfiri" Iran created it's own rival international of rather better organised Jihadis. When Mosul fell Iran seized the day in Iraq and Syria exploiting a deep grasp on on carefully cultivated social and economic infrastructure in Iraq while the Whitehouse sulked and dithered. The Russians seeing the Syrian revolt as an American colored revolution behind a blizzard of misinformation designed to unseat an old Soviet ally opportunistically used the revolt as an excuse to restart Soviet ME policy and re-assert their old role as a dangerous peer competitor for a startled Uncle Sam suddenly poked in the eye.

It's Yemen that really stinks of failure and complicity. The reckless European folly in Libya had similarities. The US allowed itself to be railroaded by unreliable allies in both cases. Obama hoped US client states would "step up" and the results of that were worse than when the US led.

In Syria Obama was too quick to demand the rather well supported Assad step down. The Syrian rebels looked at Libya and were emboldened by an easy victory facilitated by airpower and US logistics of the sort they assumed might be theirs given enough hasbara. What Obama saw was for once the reality a Somalian mess as Libya's weak factions fell to fighting each other and the smug European saviours of Benghazi failed to lift a finger. Facing the brutal meat grinder of Baathist oppression a hopelessly divided revolt militarised. A fairly violent uprising escalated into a bloodbath. An initially reluctant Turkey and various GCC states made most of the running not the US. These states further buggered up the revolt in a failed pursuit of their own diverse and often shifting interests. However they have good reason to be very disappointed in Obama. There would be no easy US imposed victory granted to the rebels. Obama wasn't going to risk a shooting war with Russia. The US allies who backed the rebels now generally welcome Trump. How could he be worse than Obama? We are soon to find out.

Like Bush before him Obama was often blinded by a vision of the world as he wanted it to be and often refused to be told how it was. Unfortunately the great confabulator Trump has that problem in spades.
 

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The regime side of the rebuilding equation

The war economy and militia-ization of Syria has taken deep hold in regime-held areas. While the war is far from over and the contours of the political settlement that may conclude it remain stubbornly unclear, discussions of rebuilding and reconstruction need to take into account the hollowed out nature of regime areas and the real potential for a warlord-ization of large swaths of Syria. Poor governance and fragmentation in regime-held areas of Syria should be the starting point for policy discussions. If and when Western policy makers choose to engage with the Syrian regime on reconstruction, assuming Assad asks for it, they should realize that they do have some leverage vis-à-vis Assad in the form of desperately-needed reconstruction aid. In this scenario aid can conditioned on at a minimal set of political inclusions that address the power and status of these Syrian pro-Assad militias.

One useful decision policy makers can take today is to commit resources for better intelligence gathering and research to their embassies in the region to understanding these pro-regime militia in order to be able to deal with them during a post-conflict phase. At the same time, policy makers should be aware that it is highly likely that the Assad government will try to persuade donors put their focus on rebuilding of formerly rebel-held areas since they will be the most heavily damaged or destroyed and will require the lion’s share of resources. Moreover, it will be loath to admit the frailty of control over the territory it controls and in many cases were never long-held by rebel groups.
One problem in Syria is the unbending Assad. Another that Bashar's authority is undermined by a new generation of warlords with perverse incentive to keep fighting. It would be wrong to see the regime as being as fragmented as the rebels but Assad even if finally interested in compromise may have difficulty delivering.
 

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18,000 Afghan Combatants in Syria

In a video published last week in Farsi news sites and circulated on Twitter and Facebook, an Iranian official revealed that 18,000 Afghans were currently fighting in Syria to defend the embattled regime of Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad. Speaking at a meeting with the grieving family of an Afghan Shiite killed in Syria, Hossein Yekta, a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and a senior recruiter for the IRGC and the Basij Force, briefly explains how the Afghan contingent in Syria, now known as the Fatemiyoun Division, was founded by a couple dozen Afghans in the Iranian city of Mashhad almost six years ago and has now turned into a formidable force in the Syrian war theatre.

While it is difficult to corroborate the exact number of Afghan combatants in Syria, if the 18,000 figure is accurate, Afghan Shiites now constitute the largest Iran-backed militia unit fighting in Syria. The Lebanese Hezbollah, arguably the most skilled and well-trained pro-Assad group, reportedly has only about 5,000 fighters inside Syria. In May 2015, Defa Press, an outlet affiliated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Iran, reported that the Fatemiyoun had been upgraded from a brigade to a military division due to its increasing size and operational capabilities. Given that an Iranian military division is said to comprise between 10,000 and 20,000 personnel, the 18,000 figure is not far-fetched.

According to IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, the Fatemiyoun was founded by leaders of two Afghan Shiite militant groups: Sepah-e Muhammad (Muhammad Army), an Iran-backed group that operated against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and the Abuzar Brigade, which fought alongside Iranian military forces against Iraq in the 1980s. According to Iranian military sources, more than 2,000 Afghans perished during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The founder of Fatemiyoun, Alireza Tavasoli, was a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and was a close confidante of Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s elite Quds Force; when Tavasoli was killed in Syria, Suleimani visited his family to pay tribute.

The Fatemiyoun’s sister organization, the Zainabyoun Brigade, is much smaller in size and is comprised of hundreds of Shiites from Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province and Parachinar in the Kurram tribal area as well as Pakistanis living inside Iran.
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Sounds like an exaggeration of the size of the Afghan Shia contingent to me. Of course they might not all be deployed at once. IRGC rotation cycles are reported to be short.
 

This is obvious and it's indicative of the regime's chronic manpower shortage. They've been conscripting poor bastards fleeing the East Aleppo and throwing them into the Deir fight. That's not going to lead to a quality defending force.

It occurs to me IS are trying to take Deir before IRGC backed manpower is freed up by the fall of Mosul and Tal Afar in Iraq. Though that's well behind schedule. It's also a forward defence of Raqqa like snatching back Palmyra.
 

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EDAM’s analysis of the al-Bab campaign shows that the second (and probably third) phase of the operation, which will entail clearing settlements and holding them, necessitate a different force composition compared to the one that is currently aimed at breaking ISIS’ defensive resistance. Furthermore, as part of the initial phase of the campaign, the main determinant of the Turkish force generation strategy is the intelligence regarding the number of ISIS militants and their capabilities. Though, it should be kept in mind that “fog of war” will always be a factor in enemy forces and the battlefield as put forth by Clausewitz.

On the other hand, the task of holding al-Bab will probably be carried on by local forces backed by the TAF, instead of Turkish units. In this case, the amount of personnel necessary (force density) to maintain stability in al-Bab will come into the equation. The most widely accepted doctrinal approach was provided by mathematician and defense analyst James Quinlivan in 1995. Quinlivan’s calculations suggest that at least 20 security personnel should be allocated for a population of 1000.60 On the other hand, some other studies in military sciences claim that a strictly statistical point of view may not be so accurate especially when faced with asymmetric adversaries. This approach suggests that numerous factors, such as the cultural traits of the local population and the relations between the terrorist elements and the local populace would come into play.61 In sum, after al-Bab is cleared of ISIS, a population-centric strategy, which takes into consideration the cultural traits of the local populace and aims to “win hearts and minds”, will be essential in holding the city and fostering stability.
Rather wooly report but worth reading.

Last estimate I saw of al Bab's population was 60K. So if you plan using the (rather dated) recommendation above the Turks need to leave behind over a thousand defenders. That's about a quarter of their not very effective rebel contingent. Al Bab is a likely area of IS support as it had a history of sending Jihadis to Iraq. I'd assume IS will plan to contest it via terrorist means even after they've lost territorial control.

The other complication for the Turks is PKK and SAA proximity. Ankara appear to have the Russians on board. The Russians claim they have Syrian state approval but the SAA is advancing from the SW. The US appears to be also providing air support al Bab after the Russian and Turks announced their first joint air op.
 
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