And next, Syria?

[CrabbedOne]

...
Wadi Barada has been under siege since July, when Syrian and Hezbollah troops cut access routes to a spring that provides much of the capital's water. Under the direction of its Iranian patron, Hezbollah has been working diligently to strengthen its control over the suburbs, in line with a wider plan to establish a Sunni-free corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. This entails securing Damascus as the Alawite capital, with Bashar al-Assad staying on as president. The group aims to finalize this corridor before negotiating any division of power in Syria, so it is sidestepping the ceasefire as much as possible.

For its part, Russia genuinely seems to want the ceasefire to work, at least until the Astana meeting. Yet Iran is not trying so hard, indicating that Moscow and Tehran have different priorities in Syria. Iran's involvement in the lead-up to the agreement was limited -- while it sent a delegation to the final meeting in Moscow, the ceasefire itself was brokered by Russia and Turkey.

This does not mean that Iran and its Shiite militias will be pushed out of Syria anytime soon, however. The stakes are too high for that to happen, and all of the pro-Assad players still need each other. Yet even if the regime and the rebels push past the limited ceasefire violations -- which seems likely given the generally strong appetite for a political solution -- Hezbollah's actions signal potential disagreements between Russia and Iran regarding the future of Syria. Moscow prefers a political solution that guarantees Russia's sway over Syria's state institutions, in which it has invested for years. Yet Iran and its proxies prefer a military solution that yields faster demographic changes, with the aim of consolidating the "Shiite crescent" they have been working on for decades.

DISPARATE INTERESTS

Iran and Russia's alliance in Syria has always seemed like a temporary one -- while they agree on war, they differ on peace. Tehran often treats Assad's army as just another one of its militias in Syria, and a weaker one at that. It does not trust the army to secure its "Shiite corridor," instead relying on Hezbollah and other Shiite militias to help change the demography of towns within regime-held areas. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which oversees much of the pro-Assad camp's military activity, believes that any future solution in Syria will be based on sectarian grounds. Accordingly, Tehran prefers a partition plan that guarantees a Shiite statelet under its control. It also wants to make Damascus a full client government with weak institutions that are incapable of making independent decisions, similar to what it has in Lebanon. Among other things, this would give Iran access to Israel's northern borders via the Golan Heights, expanding its current access through Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon.

In contrast, Russia has no interest in demographic changes or sectarian division in Syria. Vladimir Putin does not want Assad's authority to be usurped behind the scenes by IRGC-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani. Instead, he prefers a political solution that leads to a gradual transition of power. Syria's state institutions are more significant to Russia than Assad and his family are. Brokering a solution would give Putin a chance to secure his influence over these institutions, and perhaps even strengthen his negotiating position with Europe on a variety of other interests.
...

Rather a lot of Sunni in the way there and rather a lot of them really not a problem for Iranian ambitions to restore the GLOC to HA. The Iranians certainly are prey to bigotry but don't really see the Arab world in quite such sectarian terms. This is a common Sunni misconception. The Iranians who aspire to lead Islam are quite happy to work with Sunni actors Hamas most prominently but even at times the Taliban and AQ. The Alawites of Syria weren't even recognised as a Shia branch by them until it became pragmatically convenient.

What's right here though is Iranian and Russian ambitions in Syria are on collision course and it does not bode well for the Russians. The Syrian institutions they've invested in since Soviet times are pretty hollowed out while the Iranians have the clout on the ground. It's the Iranians that finally have funded Damascus for the past years and will continue to.

This article misses the fundamental divide with the Russians is that revolutionary Iran correctly sees them not as a lasting ally but as another imperial interloper like the US. They don't even like it when the Russians arrogantly let slip their planes are using an Iranian air field. Iran won't permit Putin to pull the strings in Damascus and even they have problems getting Assad to tow their line. Even the linchpin of Baathist Syria Bashar has been essentially bought by Persian oil but is just not a typically rentable Arab.They both are more imminently at odds over how to handle Israel. The Russians don't want Israeli trouble and neither does the timid IDF fearing Bashar. The revolutionary Iranians and HA on the other hand know that war with the Joos is coming as surely as the Mahdi.

 

[Casually Red]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blog Syrian Rebel Mergers: A Harakat Nour Al-Din Al-Zinki Perspective
Has al-Zinki's political office promoting a rather naive (well calculated to sugarcoat) line on the AQ fraternity as brother Syrian rebels with no wider ambitions.

Fellow head choppers .

 

[Casually Red]

Wadi Barada - What Happened to Damascus's Water? - bellingcat

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
U.S. officials and military advisers in Syria declined to discuss details of the training being provided to the Arabs in the force. But they said they were unaware that the Arab recruits were receiving lessons in Kurdish political theory before their U.S. military training. “What happens to them before they come to us, we don’t know,” said one of the U.S. military advisers in Syria, who spoke on the condition that he not be identified by name or rank.
...

The PKK indoctrinating Arabs into Apo's little ways as beneath the Pentagon's notice as whatever ideological shaping process rebels go through. Though that's likely rather religiously conservative and not particularly rich in moustachioed icon idolatry or feminism these days. What could go wrong?

Of course HA are also giving all those new Syrian militias their full Great Satan hating Death To The Joos Khomeinist schtick which is really not much more compatible with Baathist Bashar worship and basic thievery.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Around 50 killed in Azaz. Traditional IS MO as favoured on Shia markets in Iraq. Not new but the sort of thing that we can expect more of as IS switch to a a more terrorist tactical mode in Syria as they plan to once more in Iraq.

 

[CrabbedOne]

He's a very bad liar himself but it's really funny the tails Kerry will buy. There's never been any sort of serious IS threat to take Damascus. The rebels were much stronger in the South than IS and were never even close to that themselves.

With the exception of the attack on a small garrison on Palmyra Russians have barely attacked IS they went after rebel actors mostly in the NW including allied radical Salafi. And the Russian force on Palmyra was almost the first to retreat when IS grabbed it back. This is not the behaviour of a power quivering with fright in the face of IS threats.

JaF's move in Idlib potentially threatened Latakia and lines of supply to capital but that's as imminent as the rebel threat got and in reality that's far less danger of collapse than Shia Baghdad was ever in in 2014. Russian motivation are probably more to do with the mundane but for them very signifiant concern for a small Med navy port, lots of personnel in Latakia and the SAA, their main lever of influence in Syria, showing increasing signs of decay. The Russians first move queering Saudi plans to back a big move from the rebel Southern Front aimed at strangling the capital by getting the Jordanians to give on toppling Assad was signifiant. But this has more to do with Jordanian fears of growing Takfiri and Iranian influence than Russian fears of creeping Islamo-fascism.

What type of regionally troubling regime ended up ruling Damascus after Assad was always a legitimate concern even back in 2012.

 

[teqniq]

Hezbollah refuses Russian entry to Syria's Wadi Barada: activists

Hezbollah denied Russian observers entry to rebel-held Wadi Barada, a besieged Damascene enclave that supplies water to the capital, for a second day on Friday, local activists and media outlets claimed.

Lebanese news site al-Mayadeen reported on Friday evening that a ceasefire had been agreed for Wadi Barada, and that a Russian delegation had been allowed to enter the area - but local activists immediately denied the claim, saying no Russian troops were on the ground and a truce had not been agreed.

Elders from the besieged area had invited the Russians to assess damage to water infrastructure and monitor ceasefire violations committed by pro-government forces, it was previously reported....

 

[teqniq]

Air strikes resume on rebel-held Damascus water - source valley

 

[Idris2002]

The PKK indoctrinating Arabs into Apo's little ways as beneath the Pentagon's notice as whatever ideological shaping process rebels go through. Though that's likely rather religiously conservative and not particularly rich in moustachioed icon idolatry or feminism these days. What could go wrong?

Of course HA are also giving all those new Syrian militias their full Great Satan hating Death To The Joos Khomeinist schtick which is really not much more compatible with Baathist Bashar worship and basic thievery.

Wouldn't it be ironic though, if all those CIA goons got infected with Marxism and came back to Washington to stage a repeat performance of the Carnation Revolution?

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Cipher Brief Placating Patrons Who Control the Cards in Syria\

...
President Bashar al-Assad is unlikely to step down. More concerning is that serious political reform is beyond the regime’s capabilities. Loosening the strictures built over 53 years could lead to its complete unraveling. The regime may offer cosmetic changes by allowing a token opposition, but sharing power is likely a tonic it will not stomach.

Senior government officials, ranging from the president to the foreign minister, have argued the opposite, saying that they are intent on fulfilling the will of the Syrian people. In October, President Assad told me, “What is the best political system? Is it parliamentarian? Is it presidential? Is it semi-presidential?...that is another debate that needs to be comprehensive.”

Peace talks in Kazakhstan will allow him and his negotiating team to broach the topic with the opposition. It remains to be seen whether the Russians, who rescued the government, can now convince it to make the concessions necessary to end a conflict, which has devastated the country.

Piece has the Russian's supplanting the Iranians as power brokers in Syria. Looks like wishful thinking to me along the same lines as John Kerry's doomed Geneva peace process that fell into the same optimistic trap.

What seems more accurate is the rebels probably do see the mendacious Russians having a role as "honest brokers". The Crusader imperialists have less conflicting interests than the revolutionary Iranians who are identified as the head of a treacherous Rafida snake in what's often a sectarian mindset. Russia appears very open to a wider negotiated compromise. Though it is worth pointing out that rebels and even radical Salafi amongst them have cut deals with the IRGC in Syria. It's the habitually treacherous Assad the rebels with good judgement lack any trust in.

What the Russians bring that Iran can't is Great Power clout around Syria with the 3rd world Iranians only swaying Iraq and Lebanon. The Kremlin is really set on building this influence up and has been quite smart about it and this is a very valuable quality. They've seduced Israel, bullied Jordan and now are working on Turkey. Finally it's about fucking the Americans and NATO for the Kremlin but that's not incompatible with attempting to make a peace in Syria. Indeed that process even if it fails can lock in Russia as a ME player on the Eastern Med. But this traps Russia into clinging to the despised Bashar as they've only a shallow grasp on Syria and really no other viable alternative.

In Syria it does not look like it's Russia calling the shots. The rest of the R+6 simply will not be told by a haughty Kremlin. Assad is still Syria's greatest warlord and he's closer too and most dependant on Iran not Russia. This might change but as rebel threats fade it's hard to see what Russia could offer the Assad clan or threaten them with. Perhaps one thing: like the Americans long overstaying their welcome in the Shia Baghdad they created but an external power to play against insidious Iranian subversion.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War Is Boring Take a Guess at How Long Russian Troops Will Remain in Syria

...
Hauer also had a more general reason why Russia is likely to retain the bulk of its forces in Syria for the long term. “Russia has plans for major expansions of both the Hmeimim air base and the Tartus naval dock, transforming the latter into a true military port facility,” he added.

“These will be able to support a very large Russian presence in the country with an eye to projecting power in the region after the expansions are finished in several years’ time.”

These plans alone indicate that Russian troops are staying put.

Yes, as permanent as that US mega-Embassy on the Tigris or that big JSOC base next to Irbil. 21st Century Imperialism is all about basing be it a Russian or American game of dumbass Monopoly.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE Assad says ready to negotiate on 'everything,' vows to take back all Syria

...
Asked if the government planned to recapture the Islamic State-held city of Raqqa, Assad said it was the Syrian army's role to liberate "every inch" of Syrian land and all Syria should be under state authority.

"But the question is related to when, and our priorities. This is a military matter linked to military planning and priorities," he added.

The United States is backing an alliance of militias including the Syrian Kurdish YPG in a campaign aimed ultimately at recapturing Raqqa city.

Syria being Assad clan property is something Bashar is very consistent on.

Essentially saying his own position is constitutional, only amended subject to the will of the Syrian people as expressed in elections and therefore non-negotiable which in the past has been a redline for the rebels. But he's obviously not going and he implies in saying this no external party will change that.

The Assad clan will rewrite the scared constitution at the drop of a hat of course and Syrians election are rigged but he's always been very confident about taking it to the people and so have the Iranians. At bottom the rebels would probably fail to win even a fair election as their cause after over half a decade is politically diverse in its goals. Opposition to the resulting mess of often unappealing choices is probably stronger than that to corrupt, bumbling Baathist despotism.

 

[CrabbedOne]

That's quite sharp: the Syrian revolution buggered up by international Salafi-Jihadis and local warlords with little care beyond their own their own little fiefdom.

It's the latter who'd we'd often identify as "moderates" and they may have queered it just as surely as folk dreaming of al Andulus once more being under Sharia.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC Will History Repeat Itself?

You can't really understand this revolt without reference to the last one and this Beard's been in both. He sees quite a lot of similarities. If he survives he may be in the next one. The way he pong-ponged between different state's prisons after the last revolt is interesting.

Like most Syrian rebels he's really not a fan of the Americans for a variety of reasons:

...
Is it not the United States that opposed, and still opposes, a safe zone in northern Syria? Is it not the United States that prevents the revolutionaries from being supplied with advanced weapons, in particular air-defense weapons capable of repelling the aggression of aircraft against our people? Is it not the United States that supports the Kurdish separatist parties that work with the regime and whose oppression of other ethnicities in the areas under their control has been proven? Is it not the United States that allows weapons to reach the Islamic State in twisted ways, only to then claim it wants to fight the group?

There are many such acts that the United States has committed against the Syrian people. All of this has led to a loss of trust in the United States and in the veracity of its position. Because of this, the people and the revolutionaries view cooperation with Turkey and cooperation with the Americans very differently.

Of course this is probably engrained habit of mind just as with the Great Satan hating Iranians who also insist the US covertly assists IS.

Though that he doesn't see the Turks as betrayers as well at this stage suggests a degree of capture.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In Newsweek HEZBOLLAH IS THE REAL WINNER OF THE BATTLE OF ALEPPO

...
But all that came with a cost—one that went beyond loss of life. Hezbollah members now say there is tension between the Shiite group and the regime in Damascus. In his hideout, Ali, the Hezbollah fighter, snorts when asked about his feelings on Assad’s government. “We and the Syrian regime often shoot at each other,” he says, laughing. “We don’t give a damn about the Syrians. We have no intention of giving up most of the territories we control in Syria. We are not in Syria because we’re in love with a person named Bashar al-Assad for his good looks. If you come to us and tell us tomorrow that the Syrian regime is coming back to [invade] Lebanon, we would fight them. We would kill them all. Fuck those sons of bitches. We’re only there for our own benefit. We’re defending our interests.”

Slim says Hezbollah’s antipathy toward the Syrian government has been building for some time. “It is no secret that Hezbollah's military leaders are not impressed by the Syrian army’s capacity and the discipline of pro-regime militias,” she says. “I don't think that Assad and his army have the interest and the means to contest their presence in the near future.”

Ali’s grizzled friend seems to agree. “Assad is just a figurehead,” he says. “He has no real power. We won this war, not the regime.”
...

The SAA during another bloody civil war once occupied Lebanon an HA ally but not always a comfortable one. Now the Party of God and it's Khomeinist allies occupy important parts of Syria. Their officers often command Syrian units.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On LWJ PMF deputy commander Muhandis details Hezbollah ops in Iraq

...
Like his allies in Hezbollah, Muhandis believes in establishing a Shiite theocracy on the Iranian model, and considers himself a representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. His future plans for the PMF also sound similar to Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon. Hezbollah – which claimed it was resisting the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon – refused to disarm after the IDF withdrew from Lebanon on May 25, 2000. Likewise, Muhandis now says PMF will not disarm after the battle for Mosul. And like Hezbollah, which claims its presence is still necessary because Israel still occupies Lebanese lands and either the Jewish state or Sunni Islamists could attack Lebanon in the future, Muhandis said the PMF’s continued presence would still be required because Iraq still needed to be “cleansed of ISIS.” He hinted that the PMF would remain in existence even after that because of the fear that ISIS could return in another form, “just like the Baath [Party] transformed into al-Qaeda, which itself became ISIS, and who knows what will come in the future?”

Muhandis also said that after the battle for Mosul and Iraq, his fighting groups would “go to any area that threatens the security of Iraq.” Then, with the consent of the Iraqi and Syrian governments, PMF intended to “fight ISIS” in Syria, noting the presence of Iraqi Shiite militias fighting on behalf of Bashar al-Assad. He also stressed the “constitutional and legal right” individual PMF members to pursue political careers.

Muhandis is on the US list of designated terrorists but it hasn't stopped him being one of Iran's main men in Abadi's Baghdad. Here talking up a deeper Iraqi Hashd involvement in Syria again.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Washington Institute The Battle for al-Bab Is Bringing U.S.-Turkish Tensions to a Head

...
Yet telling the Kurds to leave Manbij could end their alliance with the United States -- a troubling prospect given their proven efficiency against IS, seen most recently in the successful SDF offensive toward Thawra Dam, the key to capturing Raqqa. What are Washington's options in this delicate situation?

Doing nothing means upsetting Erdogan, who would not hesitate to withdraw access to Incirlik Air Base. This would make the coalition's task more complicated, but not impossible; allied forces could strike the Raqqa region from bases in Jordan, Iraq, the Gulf states, or Cyprus (albeit with extra hurdles related to distance and route security). Yet Turkey will eventually take al-Bab with or without U.S. help, likely by shelling the city and otherwise causing heavy civilian casualties. Erdogan might then apply the same technique to Manbij if the SDF has not withdrawn by then, leaving Washington with the prospect of major civilian carnage, direct Turkish-Kurdish military confrontation, and further interference by the Russians, who would likely insert themselves as arbiters between Ankara and the Kurds.

Alternatively, if Washington supports Erdogan in al-Bab, it could help limit the death toll by precluding indiscriminate bombardment of civilians. Turkish soldiers and rebels would be assured of quality air support that hits the right targets, encouraging them to make progress in the ground battle against IS.

To be sure, this approach runs the risk of Erdogan building on a victory in al-Bab by attacking Manbij or even the SDF stronghold of Tal Abyad. The latter scenario could foreclose the possibility of Kurdish autonomy in Syria once and for all, even in divided cantons. Convincing the Kurds to leave Manbij voluntarily could avoid that outcome. And while the wider Kurdish goal of unifying their Syrian cantons could die with the fall of al-Bab, U.S. officials need to carefully consider whether supporting that Kurdish political dream is more important than maintaining the U.S. military alliance with Erdogan. Whatever the case, avoiding a Turkish-Kurdish confrontation in Syria is crucial to liberating Raqqa sooner rather than later, particularly if the United States wants to do so without being obliged to cooperate closely with Russia.

I think whatever the US does about al Bab and Manbij Erdogan will be determined to crush Rojava. According to this he's now committed 8K TSK. Along with a few thousand rebels they are facing only a couple of hundred IS defenders. This is going to be a quagmire for the Turks.

Trump will have to pick a side and his options are narrowing. His Russian chums appear to have chosen to favour the Turks not the PKK in this struggle. The Russians want the US off balance in Syria. With the Iranians they've already buggered the early pro-revolt US strategy. Russia taking the Turkish side offers a better chance of reconciliation over Syria with Ankara but is also a shrewd way to collapse the later US anti-IS damage limitation strategy in Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Nor do the Russians usually answer “guard calls,” urgent summons on a common emergency radio frequency. In one eight-hour shift on Dec. 11, for instance, the crew of a U.S. radar plane, called an AWACS, made 22 such calls to some 10 Russian planes and received not a single response. A few of the Russians approached within five miles of allied aircraft.

The controller aboard the AWACS scattered U.S. planes to keep them clear of the Russians. “We’ve had several co-altitude incidents,” the officer said, referring to planes flying too close together.

Russian pilots have sometimes broken their silence when contacted by a female air-traffic controller.

In early September, a female U.S. air-surveillance officer spotted an unidentified plane approaching allied aircraft over Syria. “You’re operating in the vicinity of coalition aircraft,” she warned the pilot.

A heavy Russian accent emerged through the static: “You have a nice voice, lady. Good evening.”
...

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
For Sabouni, part of the answer to why war broke out here lies in the way the city developed in the last century or so, a question she explores in her 2016 book, The Battle For Home.

The evolution of the city is long, but one place to start is with industrialization in the 20th century.

"More people came into the city," Sabouni says. "The working forces, as they were called, changed their occupations from peasants to farmers."

They lived not in the Old City, where rich and poor used to live in relatively close proximity, but on the fringes in badly planned slums.

"It snowballed into what we have now, we have just slums around the cities where 40 percent of the population was living prior to the war," Sabouni says.

A similar thing happened in the capital, Damascus, and some other cities. Sabouni says that because rural people moved in with their friends and family from their old villages, the slums divided not just rich and poor but also people by geographical origin and religion. The city became ghettoized.

You can see that as contributing to the sectarianism that's overlaid the civil war, and also, she contends, to a simple loss of social cohesion that caused unrest to erupt swiftly into violence.

"When you have something that is strong and cohesive among people, when you have something to preserve, something to care about, something not to lose, people may find alternative ways of expressing — alternative ways to solve their problems," she says.
...

The clash of Rif and Medina again. A decay of social cohesion caused not just by lousy Baathist governance but by an inflow of very clannish villagers into the burbs. The lack of coherence in the Syrian risings reflects a deeper fragmentation. This basic fragility won't go away even with the reimposition of the fearsome Baathist police state. Real estate is much easier to rebuild than a society.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In FP To Crush ISIS, Will Trump Send U.S. Troops Into Syria?

...
Any forces entering Raqqa would be in for a hard, close-quarters urban fight, the kind that has vexed U.S.-trained Iraq commandos in Ramadi, Fallujah, and now Mosul. When 10,000 U.S. Marines led by Gen. James Mattis — now Trump’s nominee for defense secretary — stormed Fallujah in November 2004, they suffered 95 killed and about 450 wounded in weeks of brutal house-to-house fighting. Once the United States pulled out of Iraq in 2011, Islamic State militants seized it back in 2014.

Cafarella points out that the butcher’s bill in eastern Aleppo was even worse. “The Iranian-led forces took thousands of casualties” in and around the city, she said.

But Trump is wary of partners. Trump said he doesn’t trust the mainly Kurdish, U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces pushing toward Raqqa, and few believe there are enough fighters in their ranks to force the Islamic State out of the city. It’s unlikely “Trump will jeopardize his newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin to support rebels in northern Syria that he doesn’t trust anyway,” Mansoor said.

That could mean outsourcing Raqqa to other forces, such as Russian aircraft, Iranian militias, and Syrian troops, though that would likely mean an unpalatable civilian carnage. Instead of a small U.S.-armed rebel force moving on the city, it’s much more likely that Russian and Iranian-backed fighters will “isolate the city and starve it out, like a medieval siege,” Mansoor said.

That happened in Aleppo. Russian and Syrian aircraft reduced eastern Aleppo to rubble throughout 2016; only in December did the last rebels and civilians clamber onto government buses, headed for camps.
...

I doubt Trump will commit substantial US ground forces permanently to Syria which leaves him looking for local boots on the ground.

With Raqqa the main problem is not taking it but holding it and securing the countryside. Even if the PKK didn't have the TSK sniffing at its rear it isn't really up to the latter and have said they've no wish to occupy Raqqa. That would be left to the PKK's thin screen of questionably loyal Arab allies. It's an even bigger stretch for the Turks and their rebel allies who are mostly from the NE and liable to be seen as foreign interlopers in Raqqa.

Even the local rebels may not have a big base of support as Raqqa was a loyalist city. It's hosted the only Divisional HQ the SAA ever lost. It was subject to a large inflow of IDPs from places like Homs during the early revolt, getting nicknamed hotel of the revolution. JaN took and FSA flagged groups took it in Spring 2013 before the acrimonious split with IS. The key thing is the loyalty of Arab tribes in the middle Euphrates. Some have been hostile to the PKK. Some were aligned with the regime but as the revolt weakened the SAA they swapped sides eventually seeking security guarantees from IS. As IS weakens they might be peeled away. In turn coating on IS a tribal leader has to be willing to engage in a very high stakes game that may involve mass graves if they stage a come back.

It might be a more plausible idea that the regime could hold Raqqa again but as always you run into its chronic manpower problems. The spectacle of the SAA originally being chased out of Raqqa province by IS in a string of massacres and the R+6's recent loss of Palmyra probably does not inspire much confidence.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Iranian popular feeling on their Russian "allies" really not much different from attitude to the Great Satan.

 

[CrabbedOne]

I doubt HMG will be paying Syrian rebels millions to get some of its own erring citizens back after they emigrated to the Caliphate.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TPM America's Failure — and Russia and Iran's Success — in Syria's Cataclysmic Civil War

...
The radicals won not because America ignored the moderates and starved them. They won because they had better fighters, who were more committed and better led by seasoned fighters who had a vision of the sort of society and government they wished to build. They dominated the battlefield. That’s why ISIS swept through the area Eastern Syria in 2014 and gobbled up most of Sunni Iraq without firing a shot. Islamism proved to be the only ideology capable of uniting Syrians on a national level, binding rebels together from north and south of the country.

The so-called moderates were simply local strongmen who gathered around themselves cousins, clan members and fighters from their village and the village next to theirs. But go two or three villages away, and they were viewed as foreigners and troublemakers, who were venal and predatory. They were warlords. Few could gather more than a thousand men around them. Most a lot less. They didn’t have an ideology and couldn’t articulate a vision for Syria. This is why America’s effort to unite the Free Syria Army amounted to a hill of beans. Syrian society is fragmented. Assad and ISIS both deploy lots of coercion, corruption and clientelism to hold their states together, whether they profess ideologies of secular nationalism or Islamic Caliphalism. America cannot buy its way to success in such an environment.
...

Landis on the basic flaws of the rebellion as supported by the US.

Not really a revolution at all more of a dissolution into a myriad of minor "moderate" (i.e. ideologically void and easily bought) warlords. The Turks in backing the genuinely revolutionary likes of Ahar al Sham where at least onto a potential winner. But what lies at the end of that path: a larger version of Talibanized Idlib. Hardly a neighbour a conservative Islamist like Erdogan would relish. Landis goes on to imagine a rebel victory and a US army eventually trying to subdue an intolerable radical Salafi held Damascus.

On the other hand what the revolt has produced is a greatly weakened Syrian state. It's also rather fragmented and far less centralised devolving into warlord fiefdoms on the regime side as well. Assad will likely have a fragile grasp on his country compared to what he had in 2010. Syria is flooded with hard fighting radical Salafists who have signifiant local support and not liable to be still but plagued by insurgency as neighbouring Iraq is. Bashar is forced to look to the Iran for both military manpower and reconstruction funding. Khomeinist banners fly over East Aleppo; the flags of a very real insidious revolution. Iran's Supreme Leader relishes his new ability to shoulder up to Israeli border on the Golan. The regime and its Iranian allies treat every Russian peace move with contempt.

It's Sykes-Picot II; regional powers with Russian connivance move of carve up Syria into zones of influence. This is fundamentally incompatible with Assad's vow to reconquer every inch of Syria and often on collision course with implacably pursued Iranian strategic objectives. Ankara moves to stamp out the Syrian PKK the only ground force in Syria that's really supported the US campaign against IS.

And then there's that new Russian Med basing twinned with Sebastopol port and a revived Kremlin ME strategy centred on Syria nipping at NATO's vulnerable Southern nethers. Unlikely to have happened if JaF hadn't taken Idlib and threatened Latakia. That was partly down to the support of a very active Coalition MOC in Turkey.

I'm more pessimistic than Landis; Syria does not move towards a stable conclusion. Covert intervention in Syria has been a mistaken enterprise for the US and its allies not just getting a lot more Syrians killed but seeding future wars. It has not been $20 Billion well spent.

 

[rekil]

Long interview with Yasser Munif in Jacobin.

Syria and the Left | Jacobin

I think the Left in general would benefit from shifting its understanding of politics in the region and should avoid reducing all politics to a state-centric geopolitics and try to understand the significance of micro-processes and grassroots movements and their momentum and power. Those movements are operating on a horizontal level and oftentimes, they’re difficult to perceive if you’re not involved or not interested in the region except for making an “anti-imperialist stance.”

Also, the Left should stop its Islamophobic, Arabophobic reading of the region and stop using Western politics as the sole entry point to understanding politics in the region because obviously, people are using different political and cultural tools to operate. They’re not using the same kind of language. The nature of the Arab revolts and their newness are preventing a part of that Left from understanding what’s happening.

As such, that so-called anti-imperialist left is reducing everything to conspiracy and to a jihadist war, to foreign, imperialist intervention. That’s obviously very detrimental in the short run and the long-term. I think that the Arab revolution and Syrian revolt more specifically will not only topple the Syrian regime, but also that kind of archaic old-left ideology that’s not able to acknowledge the struggle of the Syrians and understand their suffering and pain and their politics of dignity.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Landis from the article above on "dignity".

...
The only problem is that the Arab uprisings were not primarily about democracy or even liberalism. Democracy was not a central demand voiced in the slogans of the demonstrators. “Dignity” or “karama” in Arabic and “freedom” or “hurriya” were central words used from Tunisia to Syria; so were phrases such as “down with the regime,” and “get out, Bashar.” Demonstrators were unanimous in wanting to get rid of the oppressive and corrupt dictators that ruled over them. The benefit of these general demands was that Islamists, who wanted a caliphate or Sharia law, could use them as readily as liberals who shared western values.
...

He's not quite right here early protests in Syria often had a flavour of calling for reform and the release of often Islamist opposition political prisoners rather than Bashar's head; that came later. It's probably wrong to see it as a movement but Arab Spring protesters were just after a fairer shake from the rentier state recently subjected to shortages and neoliberal reforms not the systems collapse. But this became narrower and more dominated by Sunni conservatives; the traditional opposition.

It's not just the US that got the Syrian rising's nature wrong. The Turks greatly overestimated the strength of the Syrian MB. When it came to it the money they funnelled to the Brothers who had little grassroots left in Syria often went via them to harder line Salafists.

In Egypt the democratically elected rule of the religious right was to some extent rejected by a population heavy with civil servants dependant on the state. In Syria the rebels also came to face considerable popular opposition. Though this probably shouldn't be mistaken for enthusiastic support for the brutal Baath. That enthusiasm for strongman authoritarianism certainly exists in substantial numbers, as does cowed submission to a Stasi like state but a fearful rejection of the sort of chaotic Salafist rule by Sharia Court as found in Idlib is probably more common. The diverse rebels have simply never cohered into a recognisably viable proto-state that appeals to most big city Syrians.

Even the largely Islamist rebels fleeing East Aleppo complain about authoritarian political conditions in Idlib. Some of the Beards running Idlib for fear of revolt won't even risk taxing the population and so shaking off the demanding foreign donors who keep the place going.

 

[CrabbedOne]

The word peripheral comes to mind looking at the turf the moderate rebels control in greater Idlib.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TIMEP Combating al-Qaeda in Syria: A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

...
Our strategy also requires that the next administration would commit to monitoring, identifying, and punishing non-compliance of the cessation of hostilities, both by the Assad government and its allies and by the armed opposition and its foreign backers. The strategy we lay out also seeks to harmonize the current counter-Islamic State campaign with a new campaign to undermine and defeat al-Qaeda’s long-term ambitions in Syria, utilizing the same authorization for the use of military force. Certain complexities of the coalition-run counter-Islamic State campaign, particularly the coalition’s continued reliance on predominately ethnic Kurdish and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked militias in the Syrian Democratic Forces coalition as the primary vehicle for moving on the would-be caliphate’s putative capital of Raqqa, are also germane to a new and partnered campaign against al-Qaeda. It is a distinct possibility that the United States’ continued reliance on predominately ethnic Kurdish forces in the SDF, which are linked to the PKK, to conduct the counter-Islamic State campaign will undermine American ability to achieve the effects outlined in this report, and risks escalating into wider Kurdish-Arab war in Syria.

Such a Kurdish-Arab war in Syria would likely pit Turkey and other actors such as Qatar and even Saudi Arabia against the United States and some of its NATO allies. This conflict would not only frustrate American-Turkish cooperation that is necessary to holistically confront and outcompete both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria. It would also risk another, winning propaganda narrative for JFS to utilize against U.S.-backed, moderate armed opposition groups who already have U.S. backing and have been vetted. When pushed to choose between an American-supported, predominately ethnic Kurdish project, or a predominately Arab and Turkish and Gulf Arab-backed project that also has a core component of Sunni ideological extremist organizations, most vetted, moderate Arab armed opposition groups would be hard-pressed to work with the United States. The politics of ethnic identity in Syria will also be a challenge that the United States will need to overcome to harmonize the counter-Islamic State and counter-al-Qaeda components of this strategy. As much as possible, the United States and Turkey will need to coordinate with each other, and then with their local partners, to find a compromise solution that allows a multi-ethnic governance administration in these areas. There is an opportunity for the United States to leverage its escalating (and likely long-term) presence in the Kurdish-led region in northeastern Syria, to work closely with the Kurds, Arabs, and other ethnic and religious groups and sectarian groups in this region of the country to build out effective, inclusive, and resilient local governance that marginalizes al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Syrian Sunni fundamentalist groups.
...

This report is mostly more of the same. There's not a magic bullet in Syria.

I doubt Trump will throw in the towel entirely. He's even more fixated on terrorist threats than Obama. Takfiri are now an endemic problem in Syria and will continue to be. Here he'll probably seek some not very useful collaboration with Russia. However his schoolboy crush on Putin can't get round the Iranians having advanced their hand in Syria under a shield of Russian airpower. The US problem in Syria really becomes not toppling an increasingly futile insistence on toppling Assad but Iran subverting the rotted out Syrian State. Not that Russia has too much influence there but too little.

This is the way the influential Israelis will see an attempted Assad reconquista manned increasingly by IRGC auxiliaries. AQ&IS worry them but their old enemy HA far more. The rebels then become for the Americans what the Jordanians seem to have come to see them as: a mercenary force guaranteeing zones of influence carved out of the body of Syria leaving a lesser Syria infected by revolutionary Khomeinism.

In the snip above it confronts a basic problem: the PKK's US backed Syrian land grab really isn't compatible with the rebels goals and never has been. As means of reducing IS in Syria it's worked well enough but it's now running into that internal contradiction.

Additionally if you start to consider the rebellion's AQ infestation and IS remaining in the middle Euphrates also far from Kurdish turf that the PKK actually desires what use are they? The Turks have now moved to strangle Rojava which brings into question even their value as a holding force. Erdogan will try to convince Trump to abandon the PKK entirely with this sort of argument. The Pentagon may well resist that though it's been making a lot of pro-Turkish noises lately.

 

[Pickman's model]

Iranian popular feeling on their Russian "allies" really not much different from attitude to the Great Satan.

why does that surprise you?

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Yahoo News Nazi war criminal Brunner 'died in Syria basement in 2001'

...
The Austrian-born SS commander was in charge of the Drancy camp north of Paris from which Jews in occupied France were sent to the gas chambers.

He remained to the end an unrepentant Nazi and anti-Semite, the sources told XXI.

One of his guards said Brunner, who went by the name of Abu Hussein, "suffered and cried a lot in his final years, everyone heard him".

The man, identified only as Omar, said he "couldn't even wash".

All he had to eat were "army rations -- awful stuff -- and an egg or a potato. He had to choose one or the other."
...

Bizarre story, an SS Hauptsturmführer (Captain) taken refuge with the Baath, believed to have advised them on torture techniques, reduced finally to subsisting on SAA rations in a Damascus cellar.

 

[CrabbedOne]

why does that surprise you?

Rather conforming to non-aligned Iranian Revolutionary principles as well as far older basic Persian prejudices.