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EU watch

that is an interesting point (about capital flight) i havent heard before
how would it " create the conditions for a common European socialist movement"??

my optimistic/naive thought is that the EU is composed of the governments of the states within it and if key countries (Germany, France etc) go left together at some future point then the EU can also be reformed.... not totally impossible Id imagine....but unlikely for endless reasons

Sorry I forgot to reply to this before.

Basically because federal elections necessitate collaboration and cooperation between members states. There is already the left bloc in EU Parliament, but greater significance for this would necessarily lead to more cooperation.

So yes, a socialist grouping winning federal EU elections could reform it, and would have more ability to do something than e.g. Syriza in Greece.
 
The EU after Ukraine by Wolfgang Streeck
Summer 2022 / Volume VI, Number 2
Long but worth a read.

As the tensions increased around Ukraine, visible in the massing of Russian troops on the Ukrainian borders, western European countries, apparently as a matter of course, handed the United States power of attorney, allowing it through NATO to act in their name and on their behalf.

Now, with the war dragging on, Europe, organized in a European Union subordinate to NATO, will find itself dependent on the bizarreries of the domestic politics of the United States, a declining great power readying itself for global conflict with a rising great power, China.

Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan should have amply documented the American penchant to exit if their, always and by definition well-intentioned, efforts in other parts of the world fail for whatever reason, leaving behind a lethal mess that others must clean up if they require a minimum of international order at their doorsteps.

Astonishingly, nowhere in western Europe is the question asked what will happen if, in 2024, either Trump is reelected—which seems not at all impossible—or some ersatz Trump is elected in his place. But even with Biden or some moderate Republican, the notoriously short attention span of American imperial policy should, but does not, seem to enter into the strategic calculations, if there are any, of European governments.

One explanation that is too rarely invoked for the recklessness with which the United States all too often enters into and exits from far-flung military adventures is its location on a continent-sized island, away from those places where it might feel an urge to provide for what it considers political stability.

Whatever the United States does or does not do abroad has few if any consequences for its citizens at home. (Iraqi troops will never march into Washington, D.C., and arrest George Bush to deliver him to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.) When things go wrong, Americans can retreat to where they came from, where nobody can follow them.

There is, if only for this reason, an enduring temptation in American foreign policy to be guided by wishful thinking, deficient intelligence, sloppy planning, and a fickle tailoring of international policies to domestic public sentiments.

This makes it all the more amazing that European countries should, apparently without any debate, have so completely left the handling of Ukraine to the United States. In effect, this represents a principal turning the management of his vital interests over to an agent with a recent public record of incompetence and irresponsibility.
 
its been suggested this war brings the likelihood an EU military that much closer, and i wouldn't be surprised if there is work going on behind the scenes to prepare for that push
Wolfgang Streeck covers that in "Integration by Militarization?"

More recently, especially after Brexit, differences in foreign and security policy have also come to the fore. While they already existed in the 1960s, they were thrown in sharper relief, first by the end of the bipolar world after 1989 and then by the fact that, since Brexit, France is the only European Union member state with nuclear arms and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Because France is unwilling to share either, Germany’s nuclear dependence on the United States, which keeps roughly forty thousand troops on German soil, together with an uncounted number of nuclear warheads, effectively stands in the way of “European strategic sovereignty,” as the French call it—a transfer of strategic sovereignty to “Europe” that is acceptable to French national security doctrine only under French leadership.

Moreover, while France has strong interests in Africa and the Middle East, German national interests, as they relate to Europe, focus on Eastern Europe and the Balkans. As a result, disagreement, if carefully concealed, is endemic between the two would-be drivers of what is sometimes euphemistically called the French-German European tandem.

...

Regarding the EU, the rise of NATO implied its decline to the status of a NATO civil auxiliary, subservient to American strategic objectives, mostly but not exclusively in Europe.

The United States had long thought about the EU as something like a waiting room or a prep school for future NATO members, especially those neighboring Russia, like Georgia and Ukraine, but also the western Balkans.
 
There's mixed messaging, not least because different states have very different ideas about what the security architecture should look like.

The French are still making noises about EU military forces/structures, outside of NATO, but there's very limited support for this because a) there's long been a suspicion among other member states that French enthusiasm for EU military structures is based on a French intention to use the EU as a magnifier for French foreign policy, rather than France contributing to a European policy - and b) French credibility when it comes to solidarity with Eastern states under pressure from Russia is in the toilet.

I would say that I think the broad thrust of EU wide policy is going to be about enabling and support to NATO rather that force structures and military operations. It's about money, capabilities, joint procurement and sustainment, infrastructure - ports, railways, hardening stuff like telecoms and supply chains, cyber security. With NATO doing the actual military stuff.

The vibe I'm getting is that the EU's political centre of gravity is moving away from France and Germany, and to the north and east - those states are much more wedded to the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO, as well as to the UK, than the Franco-German group, and they are in the driving seat, particularly around security and defence policies.
 
There's mixed messaging, not least because different states have very different ideas about what the security architecture should look like.

The French are still making noises about EU military forces/structures, outside of NATO, but there's very limited support for this because a) there's long been a suspicion among other member states that French enthusiasm for EU military structures is based on a French intention to use the EU as a magnifier for French foreign policy, rather than France contributing to a European policy - and b) French credibility when it comes to solidarity with Eastern states under pressure from Russia is in the toilet.

I would say that I think the broad thrust of EU wide policy is going to be about enabling and support to NATO rather that force structures and military operations. It's about money, capabilities, joint procurement and sustainment, infrastructure - ports, railways, hardening stuff like telecoms and supply chains, cyber security. With NATO doing the actual military stuff.

The vibe I'm getting is that the EU's political centre of gravity is moving away from France and Germany, and to the north and east - those states are much more wedded to the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO, as well as to the UK, than the Franco-German group, and they are in the driving seat, particularly around security and defence policies.
North and East? Do you mean Sweden and Finland?
 
Since so many of you haven't been travelling these past 2 years I guess you haven't noticed that the EU is choosing to keep the UK on their € coinage. Reason is that previously non-EU countries were not shown and that made Sweden & Finland look like a droopy cock and balls about to piss on Germany...so they've put Norway on now and will leave the UK there.
 
Seems like the next EU crisis might be Italy having a bit of an economic wobble. Something to do with their bond yields shooting upwards - I don’t really understand, but these things have a habit of becoming big news stories, so maybe we will hear something.
 
Seems like the next EU crisis might be Italy having a bit of an economic wobble. Something to do with their bond yields shooting upwards - I don’t really understand, but these things have a habit of becoming big news stories, so maybe we will hear something.
Interesting, I didn’t know about this. Their stock market has mirrored the wider Euro market, so whatever it is, it doesn’t seem to have showed up there yet.
 
Seems like the next EU crisis might be Italy having a bit of an economic wobble. Something to do with their bond yields shooting upwards - I don’t really understand, but these things have a habit of becoming big news stories, so maybe we will hear something.
the EU can't afford for Italy to default or fail or need a bailout or whatever, so they'll keep giving it money and letting them get away with blatantly false promises of reform for a while yet: my opinion
 
Piece here by Michael Roberts on the crisis for the European Central Bank and the EU countries, the article covers the US as well I've just quoted the relevant bit (not sure if this is the best format to post it hopefully it's readable enough)
Roberts said:
But it is in Europe that the evidence for an outright slump is most convincing. And it’s not just the data on economic growth that support that. In addition, Europe faces a huge squeeze on energy production and imports as the sanctions being applied on Russian gas and oil imports will not be sufficiently compensated for by imports from elsewhere.

Many German manufacturers are warning that they will have to close down production completely if energy inputs dry up. Petr Cingr, the chief executive of Germany’s largest ammonia producing company, and a key supplier of fertilisers and exhaust fluids for diesel engines, warned of the devastating consequences of the ending of Russian gas supplies. “We have to stop [production] immediately,” he said, “from 100 to zero.” According to UBS analysts, no gas for the winter will result in a “deep recession” with GDP contracting 6 percent by the end of next year. Germany’s Bundesbank has warned that the effects on global supply chains of any Russian cut-off would increase the original shock effect by two and a half times. ThyssenKrupp, Germany’s largest steelmaker, has said that without natural gas to run its furnaces “shutdowns and technical damage to our facilities cannot be ruled out.”

And it’s worse. Inflation is still rising in most European economies. So the European Central Bank (ECB) has decided that it must act to raise interest rates sharply. It pushed up its policy rate by 50bp last week, more than expected, taking the rate into positive territory for the first time in a decade. The days of ‘quantitative easing’ have been replaced by ‘quantitative tightening’.

But this move comes at the worst time for countries like Italy, highly dependent on Russian energy. Last week, the technocrat former ECB chair, Italian prime minister Mario Draghi was forced to resign when several parties in his coalition government withdrew their support; some because they opposed his support for military aid to Ukraine; and some because they saw their chance to win an election. Italy has a very large public debt ratio to its GDP.

Up to now, the interest costs of servicing that debt have been low because interest rates have been kept low by the ECB, which has also provided billions of credit to Eurozone governments. But now interest rates are on the rise and investors in Italian government bonds have become worried that Italy (especially one without a viable government) may find it difficult to service these debts. So the yield on the Italian 10-year bonds surged to above 3.5%. The fall of the Italian government also threatens the distribution of billions of euros from EU Covid recovery funds, supposedly going to Italy next year to boost its economic growth.

So Europe’s economy is going down just as the ECB hikes rates to control inflation. As I have explained in previous posts, raising interest rates to control rising inflation caused by weak supply and productivity and the Ukraine war will not work, except to provoke a slump.

The ECB has now resorted to a desperate measure in introducing a transmission protection instrument (TPI), a new form of credit that will be doled out to governments like Italy if their bond prices collapse. However, this may never be used because it would mean the ECB would be providing open-ended financing of Italy’s fiscal spending, something likely to be against all the ‘Maastricht’ rules for the Eurozone.

The ECB is caught in what one analyst called a “nightmare scenario”. The deputy head of the Brussels-based Bruegel economic think tank, Maria Demertzis said, “The risk ahead of us is that because of the energy crisis, the euro area could end up in recession, while at the same time the ECB will have to keep raising rates if inflation does not come down.” Krishna Guha, head of policy and central bank strategy at US investment bank Evercore, said: “The combination of a brewing giant stagflationary shock from weaponised Russian natural gas and a political crisis in Italy is about as close to a perfect storm as can be imagined for the ECB.”
 
Article in Left Bloc re the EU's Energy Market ( usual google translate caveat)

European Union: will energy market rules finally change?​


The bet of European leaders seems to continue to be to set goals for saving natural gas that do not solve fundamental problems. Marisa Matias says that the European Commission considers emergency instruments “but refuses to consider energy as a right and protect people from ineffective and dangerous market logics”.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, admitted this week that it will be necessary to carry out “an emergency intervention and structural reform” in the European energy market, with an extraordinary summit of the European Council being convened for the next 9 September. The reason for this urgency is related to energy prices, which have skyrocketed since the beginning of the war and have been a source of difficulties for most families and micro, small and medium-sized companies.

“Rising electricity prices are exposing the limitations of the current configuration of our electricity market, developed for different circumstances”, said Von der Leyen, who recognized that “we need a new model in the electricity market that really works” and he also underlined the need to “end the dependence on Russian fossil fuels”.

How does the energy market work?

The energy market works on the basis of the logic of marginal production costs. In the wholesale market, generating companies present their electricity supply and the selling price for each hour of the day, depending on the expected demand. The various offers are ordered from the lowest price to the highest, and are awarded until the demand is met. The break-even point determines the electricity bill.

Renewable energies have a very low price because they have very low operating costs and they want to ensure that their supply is sold, so the price at any given time is normally determined by other energy sources. in an articlepublished on Esquerda.Net, Miguel Heleno, a researcher in energy systems, briefly explains what is at stake: “In the daily electricity market, what dictates the price is the last plant to be dispatched. This means that, at certain times of the day, when there is sun and wind, the dams are typically the last to be dispatched, which means that we all pay the price of electricity at the cost of hydroelectric production. However, at other times of the day, if it is necessary for any combined cycle power plant to enter the system, all electricity is paid at the price of natural gas.”

In other words, “even if there is 95% of cheap renewable production and only 5% of expensive natural gas in the system, it is the fossil fuel that dictates the price of energy”, as Miguel Heleno explains. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has accentuated this problem, as the European Union is heavily dependent on Russian fossil fuels, whose prices have soared as a result of the war and sanctions. As the market price of electricity is often dictated by gas, as explained above, bills have skyrocketed.

Background changes only in the next year

The European Commission never wanted to change the rules of this game, using the argument that the system generated greater profits for renewable energies and would encourage investment in their production, even if the market has failed in this objective.

Although the European Commission is preparing to present a proposal in the coming weeks, the substantive changes will have to be left for a later stage. The information has been advanced by the Commission's main spokesman, Eric Mamer, who explained that the institution "is working on two different issues: an emergency intervention to alleviate some of the issues that have arisen in the energy sector in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the disruptions in supplies to Europe and the effect this had on prices and in Europe, in particular on gas prices and therefore also on electricity prices, and secondly, a more structural reform of the market model of electricity”.

Some media advance the possibility for the initial proposal to include measures such as the imposition of limits on electricity prices (limiting the income of generators) and the definition of common guidelines for the taxation of extraordinary profits of large companies. The measure, defended by the Bloc despite criticism from the center and the right, had already been included in the package of instruments that the Commission recommended to European Union countries in March of this year.

However, there still does not seem to be a will to change the structure of the energy market, and decisions on this matter have already been postponed to the beginning of next year. The bet of European leaders seems to continue to be to set natural gas savings targets that do not solve the fundamental problems. For MEP Marisa Matias, “the European Commission is willing to consider emergency instruments, such as mandatory energy rationing, but refuses to consider energy as a right and to protect people from ineffective and dangerous market logics”.
 
A few snap shots on workers rights and the election in Sweden

The European Commission is set to adopt its proposal for a Regulation for a Single Market Emergency Instrument (SMEI) on Tuesday, which would put in place contingency measures to guarantee free movement as well as the availability of essential goods and services during any future crisis. However, as part of the reform, the Commission plans to repeal an existing regulation* on the functioning of the single market which explicitly safeguards the right to strike. No such safeguard has been included in the Commission’s draft proposal on SMEI.



Finnish government looks to ban nurses strike action in health dispute



Swedish far right are second largest party and their far right coalition are neck and neck with the Social Democrats and their 'centre-left' allies

 
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