Still in the tens of thousands (£90,000 each) and emotional damage was just one of the three prongs that the judge argued as having relevance to the total, which were:Quite a bit more in the Lozza Fox case...
(a) compensation for the substantial victimisation and natural consequent distress wrongfully inflicted upon them by Mr Fox’s libels; (b) recompense for the general reputational jeopardy and harm actually sustained as a result of those libels, including as evidenced in the abuse they have received; and (c) a completion of the vindication process sufficient to convince a fair-minded bystander of the utter baselessness of these libels and enable and entitle the Claimants, as free citizens, to put this unpleasant incident and its consequences behind them.
The judgement is here and is actually quite an interesting read to see how these things are put together: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Blake-v-Fox-Remedies-Judgment.pdf. It’s particularly worth reading paragraphs 4-10, which lays out the basis on which values are placed on the damage. I won’t reproduce it all, because you can just click through, but paragraph 9 is worth pulling out:
Broadly, the purpose of an award of damages in defamation proceedings is to compensate for injury to reputation and to feelings, and in particular to vindicate claimants, so far as money can to do that. Vindication and compensation are not to be thought of in compartmentalised terms: the overall purpose of the award remains to restore a claimant, to the extent money can do so, to the position as if the libel had not occurred. But in defamation cases that means not only redressing the balance in terms of quantifiable losses, but unequivocally albeit proportionately restoring a claimant’s standing to its previous state. (In the present case, I have already described the Claimants’ previous standing as ‘pristine’.) As the authorities put it, the sum awarded must be an outward and visible sign of vindication, sending a message restoring a claimant’s good name ‘sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge’. If an award fails to achieve vindication, it fails properly to compensate and restore the status quo ante.
Let’s not forget that Fox accused two men that worked with children, of previously “pristine standing”, of being paedophiles. The judge needed to make a judgement big enough to recompense for their reputational harm in a way that would undo the damage of this specific claim for these specific individuals — parts (b) and (c) in the first paragraph. As she says, you have to award an amount big enough that people sit up and take notice, so bystanders afterwards are left in no doubt that these two still have pristine standing, Even including that, and even with all the exacerbating factors for emotional distress that the judge goes through, the total only came to £90,000. So you can draw your own conclusions that emotional distress alone is not enough for a particularly material award, without all these other factors. Like I said, a handful of tens of thousands in the most extreme cases and low thousands otherwise. And there many cases out there where the judge has awarded £1 — defamation is technically accurate, but there is essentially no harm done by it.
So then we look at Martha’s case. Definitely not of “pristine standing”. A judge would have to think about the extent that she has been harmed by implications in the programme that are not true about her, when there are also things (including things not put into the programme) that are true. She’d only get a small fraction of the £90,000 that the Fox victims got. Frankly, she’s much more likely to be one of the £1 cases if she can prove defamation at all.