CrabbedOne incidentally you might be able to live with the 'odd beheading' but imo it makes them no better than the regime they are supposedly seeking to overthrow - I say 'supposedly' as their allegiances seem somewhat fluid and contingent on the goodwill of Turkey who have just done a gas pipleine deal with the Russians Moreover when they were pulled on it they attempted to gloss over it by saying that he was a young man rather than a child as if somehow that made it OK.
Explores the growing chorus for greater US intervention in Syria from the foreign policy establishment. Accuses Obama of having a "Goldilocks notion of the “just-right” intervention"....
But that’s misleading, only part of the story. When America changes course, so will other players, including Russia, Iran, and the government of Syria. A different style of intervention from the one America is pursuing now could save some lives, which is no small accomplishment. And finally, while it’s not only about America, (or about Syria), an escalation in Syria that is designed to send messages to American rivals and contain the strategic fallout could, if well executed, produce yields in surprising places, as America’s deterrent stock rises and a renewed belief in American activism and engagement restores the U.S. role as global ballast.
We are not all interventionists yet, no matter how shrill the protests from the camp that has tried to defend every twist and turn of Obama’s Middle East policy and now finds itself suddenly on the losing side of the debate. But it is not foolish to hope that somewhere between the destructive overreach of George W. Bush’s militaristic foreign policy and Barack Obama’s pursuit of balance and restraint, there exists a happier medium where America’s never-ending engagement with the most troubled parts of the world yields better results.
That's Lionesses of the Mountain, a defensive female loyalist militia that's an auxiliary of the SAA....
Labawat al-Jabal is by no means a major militia force in Suwayda’ province, which, according to one source in Bayraq Al Kiwan who spoke with me in May this year, is now host to more than 35 factions. Nonetheless, it offers an interesting case study of female militia mobilization and its political connections within regime-held Syria. Whatever resentment there might be towards Labawat al-Jabal among those who lack the regime loyalist inclinations, full-blown war between the Suwayda’ factions remains a remote prospect, as no one side would emerge decisively victorious. In addition, incidents such as the Qadisiya al-Janub rebel offensive in Quneitra province last month that pushed towards the area of the Druze village of Hadr only served to draw attention away from internal quarrels as forces mobilized to defend Hadr out of Druze solidarity, whatever assurances might have been made that the intention was not to capture Hadr itself. According to a media director for Rijal al-Karama who spoke with me, this mobilization to defend Hadr included fighters from Rijal al-Karama though not going under this name on account of problems with the regime’s intelligence apparatuses. In any event, hopes of the ‘revolution’ coming to Suwayda’ remain a long way off.
On War On The Rocks ARE WE ALL INTERVENTIONISTS NOW?
Explores the growing chorus for greater US intervention in Syria from the foreign policy establishment. Accuses Obama of having a "Goldilocks notion of the “just-right” intervention".
Well I'd say that hasn't changed and this is just wanting to try the hotter porridge even if the likely outcome is that that prolongs the war and gets even more Syrian killed. Only for us to wander away to poke more novel hornets nests just we did from the pile of Afghan skulls and rival rabid beards spawned in the Muhj war, Iraq and Libya.
I have to blame Syrians mainly for this war and particularly the bungling Bashar Assad but outsiders have certainly made it worse. On our side the motives are hazy, the desire to poke Iran in the eye by taking down a member of the axis of evil, a constant public obsession on entirely tactical humanitarian objectives with no real desire to actually take responsibility backing that urge up. Obama's policy in Syria was initially to encourage its reluctant regional allies like Turkey into intervention by proxy in what was a fairly low level civil conflict in which less 10K souls had perished. Then it joined in itself via Langley's rebel T&E program. This rather large multi-national but leaderless intervention tended to fragment a patchy provincial revolt that already lacked political cohesion. The agenda of various Salafist groups tending to come to the fore over time. After the fall of Mosul the US then mainly moved on to damage control: dealing with the side effect of IS developing rear basing in Syria by backing the PKK. It dragged behind it a conflicted legacy policy of supporting the revolt that now looks more like an attempt to tamp down a fire that's getting out of control. On the other side HA entered the war, then increasingly Iranian personal and finally it conjured a fairly a small direct intervention by Iran and Russia that then slowly escalated. And only at that point did we show any real interest in seeking terms of peace more complex than the regime's abject surrender.
Now it is clear this hasn't worked but its not just bungling. In part it's the high price of Obama being bullied into being a briefly feel good saviour of Benghazi which after Iraq collapsed US public support for R2P. It's a disaster even if the hollowed out Baathist state was removed or collapses. The current intervention just laid the grounds for another phase of civil war in Syria. Between the rival strands of rebels, between the rebels the Turks and the PKK and even within the rotten Baathist state itself if it crumbles. It's produced a long bloody stalemate. Iran's influence has expanded greatly in Syria and is only likely to be constrained a little by that of Russia. The rebel side(s) we've backed strategic tipping point with their foothold in Aleppo being crushed, areas around Damascus falling and the Southern revolt defanged by Jordan throwing in the towel. But Assad is so weakened he may struggle to control Useful Syria and be an Iranian puppet permanently dependant on growing Russian basing. As IS fades AQ rises within the revolt. The only real winner is the PKK and their land grab has stalled as the TSK feints towards it. Syria is probably doomed to be a terrorist nesting ground with a Med coast and Israeli border.
Soon we'll have a new President that some see as a magic wand. However a more direct US intervention clearly now bears much higher risks because of Russian commitments. There is still no plan that looks beyond an unlikely transition process or is willing to invest signifiant resources over the longterm. In confronting Russia we may finally just deny Assad control of territory and enable the likes of AQ not force a conclusion. We may not like were an escalatory spiral goes with Russia and Iran and back down as our public political support for intervention in Syria is very shallow compared to theirs.
Any plan needs to look beyond immediate problems and "doing something" that may cause great harm. We probably need to face up to the fact that slightly hotter porridge may make Syria a bigger problem. A better President might look to shape a coherent agenda with US allies in Syria that aims at deescalation rather than the opposite. The same could be said in Yemen. The Ankara-PKK peace process urgently need US attention on a par with Israel-Palestine. Rojova is a US created regional problem that could be developed into something useful in Syria if there was a reconciliation. I suspect all that's politically practical in Syria is a US CT program like that in Yemen and that will require some Russian collaboration because the Iranians will welcome it no more than they do in Iraq. Clinton's promised civilian surge in Iraq never happened after Obama's perhaps hasty withdrawal. A vast reconstruction project is needed in the Sunni Arab cities of a still fragile Iraq. Diplomatic attention is needed to the fractious politics of Baghdad and Irbil. The US might be better directing resources to where they might actually do some good.
My bold....
In total, 72 percent of Americans were found to favor conducting airstrikes against violent Islamist extremist groups, and 57 percent supported sending Special Operations forces into Syria to fight these groups — two military actions that have already begun under the Obama administration.
However, there was less support for new measures. A slim majority, 52 percent, said they favored a no-fly zone that would include the bombing of the Syrian regime's air defenses, but only 42 percent favored sending ground troops in to fight violent Islamist extremist groups in the region. In addition, just 26 percent favored sending arms to anti-government groups, but a similarly low 31 percent wanted the United States to help negotiate an end to fighting that would keep Assad in power.
In general, supporters of both major political parties were fairly in line with each other, with Republicans slightly more in favor of military action than Democrats — more than half of Republicans (53 percent) favored sending ground troops in to fight extremists, for example, whereas just 42 percent of Democrats and 32 percent of independents agreed.
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Which is a fair description of the Iranian position in Syria and it's stupid to have rated the boastful Russians as more influential in Damascus. Air power diplomacy can only get you so far. Real influence is bought on the ground and if anyone can bend Assad it's Iran. But as in Iraq I doubt the Iranians are interested in anything but excluding US influence and advancing their own....
Losing access to Syrian territory, in other words, would undermine Iranian deterrence and make it more vulnerable to Israeli and U.S. coercion. As one former official with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) put it, Syria is so strategically important that Iran considers it to be its “35th province.” It would be better for Iran to lose its oil-rich southwest province to adversarial forces (as had happened in the Iran-Iraq war) than to lose Syria, he reasoned. “Because if we hold Syria, we would be able to retake Khuzestan [province]; yet if Syria were lost, we would not be able to keep even Tehran.”
From its perspective, the Islamic Republic has little reason to support any variation of regime change on offer in Syria. The country’s Sunni rebels have displayed a strong bias against Shiites. Jihadi groups like the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State advocate a virulently anti-Shiite worldview. The Islamic State has put that ethos into practice through massacres of Shiite Alawites in Syria and mainstream Shiites in Iraq. Iran assumes other rebel groups would act similarly if given power in Syria and that such Sunni extremism would quickly spill over into Lebanon and Iraq, threatening Shiites in those countries. Iran also has its own problem with Sunni sectarian militants, particularly within its western and southeastern provinces.
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Which is a fair description of the Iranian position in Syria and it's stupid to have rated the boastful Russians as more influential in Damascus. Air power diplomacy can only get you so far. Real influence is bought on the ground and if anyone can bend Assad it's Iran. But as in Iraq I doubt the Iranians are interested in anything but excluding US influence and advancing their own.
Think about what incentive structures that created for the rebels....
U.S. efforts that have prioritized ideology over core interests have mostly yielded disastrous results. In the early stages of the Syrian revolt, the U.S.insisted that Assad must go, an unacceptable condition to him and his allies. This Pollyannaish stance arose from the “Washington playbook” derided by President Obama, which calls for bold proclamations followed by militarized responses, often with no consideration for national interests at stake. This policy not only encouraged opposition groups to take up arms with a mistaken expectation of direct U.S. assistance, but also led the regime’s allies to escalate their support in challenge to America’s stated goals.
That same year, the U.S.-led coalition went beyond its UN mandate in Libya to prevent a massacre in Benghazi and instead toppled Muammar Gaddafi’s government. This ultimately proved disastrous. Since 2011, the various rebel militias have fought each other for power, rendering Libya a failed state. The aftermath of this seemingly successful operation should stand as a warning about the folly of idealistically expecting to remake the Middle East by helping the “good guys” win internal struggles.
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Targeters suddenly working with a degraded system. You'd have thought there be a failover system at another campus but it is the Pentagon....
Creech, in Nevada, is considered the heart of the US’s “targeted killing” program. From there, Air Force pilots operate the armed “remotely piloted aircraft” — drones — via satellite links over Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and elsewhere, and fire missiles at alleged al-Qaeda or ISIS figures. The Predators and Reapers, known as MQ1’s and MQ9’s, are also used for surveillance and intelligence gathering.
Within weeks of the network crash at Creech, there were a series of airstrikes that went terribly wrong. Those incidents, which resulted in scores of deaths in Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, are still under review and investigation. But “if there are any issues on a SIPR network, it would not disrupt flight operations” of Predator and Reaper drones, said Air Force spokesperson Singleton.
On Sept. 17, just one week after the computer disaster, 62 Syrian soldiers positioned at a base, were accidentally killed by US airstrikes in the middle of a ceasefire. The case is under investigation, a CENTCOM official told BuzzFeed News. There has been no official explanation for the targeting snafu though the US expressed its regrets quickly after the incident.
In Afghanistan, 15 civilians were reportedly killed in a US drone strike on Sept. 28, according to the United Nations. A Pentagon official said the incident is under review.
Also on Sep. 28, in Somalia, 22 Somali soldiers were reportedly killed in US drone strikes. Somali authorities say none of them were al-Qaeda and it was a case of “misdirection.” That incident, a separate Pentagon official told BuzzFeed News, is also being reviewed.
BuzzFeed News learned of the network crash from a contracting notice posted by the US government posted in early October, which says: “On 9 September 2016, the SIPRNet system currently in operation at Creech AFB failed and critical services were impacted. The services were somewhat restored with the use of multiple less powerful devices,” according the notice, and “there is currently no other backup system.”
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An Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), so the US faces a well coordinated, resilient, mobile set of Russian air defences in and off the coast of Syria....
U.S. officials, including presidential candidate Hilary Clinton, have suggested establishing a no-fly zone in parts of northern Syria. This would mean using U.S. aircraft to patrol Syrian airspace in order to prevent Russian and Syrian planes from carrying out strikes. Russian expansion of its IADS network means that U.S. coalition aircraft risk being shot down while operating within Russia’s A2AD envelope. A shoot-down of a U.S. coalition aircraft would force the U.S. to either drastically escalate in order to answer Russia’s provocation, or to downscale or cease operations in Syria. Russia aims to present the U.S. with these two undesirable options on the assumption that the U.S. would choose to avoid any potential conflict. By establishing this expeditionary IADS in Syria, Russia aims to establish a de facto no-fly zone for US and coalition aircraft over much of Syria.
To which you might say but you are not doing much fighting against IS in Syria. You are fighting mostly Sunni Arab rebels with some Takfiri amongst them. And while IS still hold Mosul your guys are dying for despot who is an unpopular milquetoast version of Saddam and not even a proper Shia....
“For us, the primary battle is in Syria. If it is not dealt with, then we will pay the price here,” said Aws Khafaji, head of the Iraqi subsidiary of the Abu Fadl Abbas Brigade, a Shiite faction that emerged in Syria in 2012 and whose membership is dominated by Iraqis.
“We already paid the price once and we lost three provinces to Islamic State,” Khafaji said, referring to the extremist group’s audacious blitz campaign in June 2014, when the jihadists crossed the Syrian border, overran wide swaths of Iraq’s northern and western provinces and announced their caliphate from the northern city of Mosul.
The fight in Syria, however, goes beyond a pre-emptive strike on an imminent threat. It has become the main battlefield between Islam’s two major denominations, pitting the Shiite-majority militiamen of the PMUs, who fight alongside pro-Assad troops, against the Sunni-dominated insurgency.
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Cook makes the point that to do other than provoke a Russian counter-escalation you probably need to be prepared to use far more force and accept a deeper US involvement in Syria than Lister was suggesting....
As Thanassis Cambanis wrote in this space last week, the devastation in Aleppo has increased the calls for American intervention in Syria. The “failure of the hands-off approach” is abundantly clear, but even as the devastation continues, the policy community remains bereft of ideas to stop it. This is not a failure of leadership or the result of misbegotten retrenchment, but rather the hard realities of devising a plan that simultaneously serves U.S. strategic interests, restores Washington’s moral standing, and relieves Syrian suffering without burdening Americans with another potentially decade-long fight in the Middle East. This is an extraordinarily difficult task made worse but the multilayered nature of the fight in Syria. Lister and others deserve credit for tackling this issue. They believe that there is a solution to the war in Syria. But if there is one, it is not the one Lister has put forward.
Issa goes on to contemplate the terrorist fallout and basically write that off as pretty negligible. Issa's less sure if an uppity Russia is getting its way requires a slap from the global policeman. It's essentially correct to say no compelling US national interest case has been presented just preferences....
If it is solely for humanitarian purposes, the United States will abstain every day of the week. It is necessary, thus, to determine what America’s interests are in the Syrian civil war, which remain unclear. Obama’s failure is not in that he has refused to intervene, but that, after five years of war, he has yet to clearly articulate what America’s interests are in this war. The egg cannot hatch before it is laid.
Obama is correct, however, in approaching the Syrian war with caution. This is not a war Washington started, nor is it in a country of great strategic value to the United States. At present, the war poses no existential threat to the United States, and has certain benefits from Washington’s perspective. That it has severely weakened Syria, a traditional adversary to American interests in the Middle East, is a positive result for Washington. That it is bleeding Hezbollah and Iran financially and militarily—the Iranians have lost dozens, including high-ranking generals, thus far—is an added bonus. That its enemies are slaughtering each other—Iran, Assad and Hezbollah on the one hand, and Sunni jihadists on the other—is also a welcome scenario in Washington.
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Lund casts his eye around Team Clinton finds some diversity of opinion. He suspects despite the Wilsonian hawkery any shift in Syria will be incremental and cautious....
Indeed, virtually all of Clinton’s advisers oppose an outright military-led ousting of Assad and many seem to think that the road to peace in Syria runs through Moscow, one way or the other. For example, in an address to the Asia Society last May, Sullivan repeated calls for U.S.-imposed safe zones in Syria, but also stated that there was ultimately “no solution that didn’t involve the U.S. and Russia working together.”
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Some naval wonks regard even the mighty US carriers as relics in an age in which submarines rule. Well carriers are as much about imperial display as anything. The French defiantly tow their one about the Med with tugs and that that works well enough....
ENTER THE KUZNETSOV
Putin's decision to dispatch his lone aircraft carrier to the region may seem strategically insignificant at first glance. After all, the Kuznetsov is old, prone to onboard fires, and hardly a match for America's ten operational carriers, which have been well honed by heavy use in nearly every international conflict since World War II.
Yet the deployment matters a great deal, for both symbolic and military reasons. America's use of naval power has proven to the world that an aircraft carrier is the floating embodiment of assured access and military support for national interests. And as the Pentagon's Operation Odyssey Lightning against Islamic State forces in Libya has shown, even a single amphibious assault ship -- which carries fewer aircraft than Russia's carrier -- can create an important military advantage in the region. Once Moscow begins ordering strikes from the Kuznetsov's rusty flight deck, it will take its place alongside the United States, France, and Britain as the world's only projectors of significant power ashore since the end of the Cold War.
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