And next, Syria?

[roryer]

This is a very good short interview with Vanessa Bealy a British investigative journalist who has just returned from Allepo.

 

[Casually Red]

This is a very good short interview with Vanessa Bealy a British investigative journalist who has just returned from Allepo.

Spot on

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The Guardian Amid Syrian chaos, Iran’s game plan emerges: a path to the Mediterranean

...
Securing Aleppo would be an important leg in the corridor, which would run past two villages to the north that have historically been in Shia hands. From there, a senior Syrian official, and Iraqi officials in Baghdad, said it would run towards the outskirts of Syria’s fourth city, Homs, then move north through the Alawite heartland of Syria, which a year of Russian airpower has again made safe for Assad. Iran’s hard-won road ends at the port of Latakia, which has remained firmly in regime hands throughout the war.

Ali Khedery, who advised all US ambassadors to Iraq and four commanders of Centcom in 2003-11 said securing a Mediterranean link would be seen as a strategic triumph in Iran. “It signifies the consolidation of Iran’s control over Iraq and the Levant, which in turn confirms their hegemonic regional ambitions,” he said. “That should trouble every western leader and our regional allies because this will further embolden Iran to continue expanding, likely into the Gulf countries next, a goal they have explicitly and repeatedly articulated. Why should we expect them to stop if they’ve been at the casino, doubling their money over and over again, for a decade?”

You'd think from this piece that Iran hadn't successfully set up shop in Lebanon decades ago. It's the bit in between that was their problem. What's actually changed is Iraqi collaboration with Iran as our reconstructed Shia Baghdad shares Iranian concerns over a Sunni revanche in Syria. The Syrian revolt besides that is a minor complication and Aleppo is almost an irrelevance were it not were the revolt can be broken.

 

[Casually Red]

Well that's partly nonsense, there were some surrenders of besieged places but the Southern front was quite lively until Jordan stopped supporting efforts to topple Assad. I recall at least one pretty disastrous Iranian offensive down Deraa way not so long ago. The Saudis were pretty hopeful that they could organise a thrust at Damascus from the South but the Russians entry into theatre and killing of JaI head Alloush quashed all hope of that. It's only gone quiet since then with a number of regime victories and lots of rebel infighting.

Assad is notorious for reneging on ceasefire terms often breaking pragmatic agreements brokered by the Russians and Iranians. They have far higher levels of trust from the rebels than the Syrian government. The regime's allies are just as ruthless but not as stupidly vindictive as that's just bad tactics. Several sieges that were essentially starved out found the starving went on after surrender. Daraya recently was entirely emptied out with the population dumped into Idlib. Fighting aged males who don't get being bussed out as part of surrender terms are liable to end up hanging from the ceiling with dislocated shoulders which tends to toughen the will to resistance rather than break it. This is what the Baathist state is like. Syrian intelligence methodically persecuting even relatives of rebels isn't new, from the Lund article above:
And these days Bashar actually has little control over NDF militias that methodically loot vacated property and prey on IDPs mercilessly. SAA officers get rich hoarding food and selling it at inflated prices in the camps while moaning about the NDF guys getting all the best spoils. He can't even guarantee people fleeing sieges safety because that is often down to the whim of a predatory local warlord.

In Chechnya the Russian state was remarkably brutal but they were also wise enough to eventually offer conciliatory incentives to a population mashed into a pulp by the big stick which led to some reconciliation. It will never happen under Assad, he's weak and terrified of looking weak.

No doubt Lister told you this tale of woe ....note you've totally sidestepped the issue of his tenure as a Qatari shill Cue more handwringing . The dictator that can't dictate is we're we are at now ?

 

[Casually Red]

In The Guardian Amid Syrian chaos, Iran’s game plan emerges: a path to the Mediterranean
You'd think from this piece that Iran hadn't successfully set up shop in Lebanon decades ago. It's the bit in between that was their problem. What's actually changed is Iraqi collaboration with Iran as our reconstructed Shia Baghdad shares Iranian concerns over a Sunni revanche in Syria. The Syrian revolt besides that is a minor complication and Aleppo is almost an irrelevance were it not were the revolt can be broken.

It's not a Sunni revanche, it's a jihadist one . Allepo has long been a Baathist stronghold. It's population is overwhelmingly Sunni . The Syrian Army is mostly Sunni . Sunni tribes and militias from one end of the country to the other are dedicated to the Syrian cause . Assad has way, way more Sunni loyalists than the entire Alawite population combined . Shia barely make up 2 % of the Syrian population .
It's not even a Syrian revolt . There's every jihadist bastard under the sun running about there. From China to Indonesia, Chechnya to Somalia . Funded and armed by western and gulf states . The jihadists happen to be Sunni . That in turn doesn't mean it's a Sunni revolt .

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Tahir Institute For ME Policy A Breakthrough for Russia and the Regime in Syria

...
Russia, meanwhile, knows the constraints and priorities of the two rivals in northern Syria. For Turkey, the priority is to prevent the PYD from connecting its cantons in the north and to fight the Islamic State. The regime factors later in Turkey’s calculations today. Crucially, Turkey also finds itself in a new reality where it has to maintain a level of calm with Russia, especially as the two countries work to improve their bilateral relations.

For the United States, the priorities continue to be the Islamic State and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. Russia’s operations are concentrated in the north, where the front’s influence is mostly concentrated. This means that if the U.S. wants to fight Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, it has to reach a deeper understanding with Russia than the existing deconfliction procedures that exist in eastern and northeastern Syria, where the regime has little to no presence.

Russia finds itself in an optimal position of leverage against the only two countries that can make a substantive difference for the rebels in northern Syria. Both the United States and Turkey have clear priorities that do not involve the regime and their hands are tied by the need to maintain a certain balance with Russia. This new reality opens new possibilities for the Russian involvement in Syria unconceivable some months ago.

Turkey uncharacteristically quiet on the pounding of the East Aleppo pocket.

We have an odd situation in Syria where Turkey's primary dilemma is containing a US backed terrorist group (once an ally of the USSR) which their NATO ally the US is only backing to fight other terrorists. To continue these fights both allies must deconflict with the Kremlin, the heart of an evil empire that NATO was set up to contain. Russia on the other hand is propping up an evil despot the US and Turkey previously regarded as a priority to topple by backing rebel proxies. The Russians regard all these rebels as terrorists. The terrorists that worry the Americans flooded into Syria to join/exploit the rebellion while outrageously Turkey often looked the other way and sometimes aided them. The most worrying ones actually came in from an Iraq the US still struggles to stabilise after toppling an evil despot. And the US would now also like to kill some of the rebels who it also classes as terrorists as they belong to the group that got the whole GWOT rolling fifteen years ago. However too many of the rebels the US supports won't support that. They say as the US and Turkey won't topple the evil despot for them they've got no choice but to back these terrorists.

 

[CrabbedOne]

It's not a Sunni revanche, it's a jihadist one . Allepo has long been a Baathist stronghold. It's population is overwhelmingly Sunni . The Syrian Army is mostly Sunni . Sunni tribes and militias from one end of the country to the other are dedicated to the Syrian cause . Assad has way, way more Sunni loyalists than the entire Alawite population combined . Shia barely make up 2 % of the Syrian population .
It's not even a Syrian revolt . There's every jihadist bastard under the sun running about there. From China to Indonesia, Chechnya to Somalia . Funded and armed by western and gulf states . The jihadists happen to be Sunni . That in turn doesn't mean it's a Sunni revolt .

Jihadist is a very vague term that can apply to all Muslims at war, Shia Iraqi militias are also Jihadists. About a third to a half of the revolt is ideologically Salafist, and yes this includes hard fighting Salafi-Jihadis of the sort we are so scared of. The rest is largely typical Syrian Sunni Muslims of different degrees of laxity. It's deceptive as a Jihadi complete with big beard is what a Muslim revolutionary usually looks like.

Looked at from Shia Baghdad the risings in Syria are a Sunni revanche. It's exactly how these risings were seen in the GCC press even after IS emerged in Iraq. The Syrian regime worked hard to cast the rising in this light as well as its core support is in Syria's minorities and they've long been paranoid about Sunni pogroms. Syria has a history of outbreaks of violent sectarian strife. Balanche who mines the demographic changes see both sides as pretty sectarian.

From what polling I've seen it's quite possible Bashar is the single most popular leader in the country but he's also justifiably hated by a majority of Syrians. You could compare this to Iraq where 14% of Iraqis were Baath Party members and the cult of Saddam was strong while he had a Stasi like grip on the place. The revolt is fragmented and isn't that popular either but tends to lose all support when it stops fighting Assad and turns on the likes of IS. The Salafi-Jihadi elements are plainly pretty popular in places. I suspect more Syrians loath all the combatants than are partisans of them.

There are Sunni worshippers of the Assad Clan who would burn the country for Bashar but they are a minority. That Bashar still pressgangs unwilling Sunni youth into his awful army as cannon fodder isn't a sign of wide support amongst Sunni just heavy handed Baathist oppression. The fact Alawites dominate its kleptocratic officer corps far more than they did before the revolt rather reflects the reality that Sunni led units can't really be trusted by a regime that poses as secular. The mafia like NDF militias that have emerged at the expense of the SAA are heavily sectarian and sometimes Khomeinist. That the relatively well equipped SAA often runs away discarding kit, fights so poorly in Bashar's cause and must rely on heavily on foreign allies in the offensive has a lot to do with its demographics.

Urban Aleppo was an area of regime support. Unsurprising, it was rich and heavily subsidised. Bashar deliberately purchased the loyalty of many in the Sunni elite and focused funding on the big commercial centres like Aleppo while neglecting the sticks his father had cared for. The Sunni middle classes were often badly payed state employees and in general they didn't much care for Bashar's trickle down economics. That incompetent attempt at reform, that may owe something to his years in the Tory heading toward New Labour UK, really is the seed of the revolt, it has an element of class war. The risings happen in the more neglected provinces. Better off Aleppo largely failed to rise though there were protests in the university area. As around Mosul the slums and back country on the other hand had an awful lot of highly conservative Sunni and Salafi. Impatient with the urbanites they brought the revolt into the Old City after about a year. I've read it's not an entirely comfortable presence with sophisticated city folk grating against alien Salafi.

However half, over a hundred thousand, Syrians seem willing to endure the siege of East Aleppo with the Beards rather than flee into Bashar's arms according to Lund's article above. You might call that voting with your feet or neck. I'm reminded of the stubborn support for Hamas in heavily bombed Gaza in which IAF bombs only seem to grow their support.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Islamic State hits back against Syrian rebels north of Aleppo: monitors

Well Euphrates Shield is within a few kms of Dabiq but I'm getting the impression Turkey's rebels even backed by a TSK Armoured Brigade do not appear to be as good at holding IS territory as the Syrian PKK. That may be because they are too thin on the ground, too fragmented and mainly being fresh outta rebel Idlib they are just as alien as a force that relies on lefty Kurds from Eastern Syria and beyond. The SDF at least has some local Arabs on board.

IS is reckoned to be pretty popular in some places just West of Aleppo. A lot of young men from thereabouts went on Jihad a decade ago against the US occupation of Iraq. As in Anbar this can make IS with its excellent intelligence arm a tough opponent to permanently reclaim territory from as they leave sleepers behind and filter back. The Iraqis deploy far higher force levels but in some Iraqi areas this has led both Irbil's and Baghdad's forces to exclude large blocks of the Sunni Arab population from returning. Even some Anbari Sheiks are currently calling for the permanent expulsion of tribal rivals who sided with IS there.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In WaPo Little consensus within administration on how to stop fall of Aleppo to Assad

...
Echoing the arguments for accountability in the book, “A Problem From Hell,” Kerry last week publicly called for Russia and Syria to be investigated for war crimes for the targeted killing of civilians and wanton destruction in Aleppo and beyond.

On Friday, Moscow described Kerry’s call as “propaganda” and repeated its assertion that the United States, by failing to separate rebel forces from the targetable terrorists it insists control Aleppo, is to blame for the failure of the cease-fire.

According to international-law experts, however, the likelihood of a war crimes prosecution of either country is virtually nonexistent. Neither Russia nor Syria belongs to the treaty-based International Criminal Court, and a referral to its jurisdiction would require a resolution by the U.N. Security Council, a body in which Russia holds a veto. At the same time, both the ICC and the International Court of Justice, the United Nations’ judicial branch, are designed to prosecute individuals rather than states.

“The law of war crimes is individual and personal,” said Kenneth Anderson, a law professor at American University.

“Talk of war crimes trials by itself is not serious,” Anderson said. “It’s an evasion of policy by a state that does not want to have to respond to the concerted actions of another state, another two states.”

This snip is rather revealing.

All the talk of war crimes prosecution of Russia and the comparison with the Rwandan "acts of genocide" is pretty empty. A decade ago the US ignored a far larger war in Central Africa that killed perhaps 5 million people without a whimper of guilt. With both the US and UK often scurrying to block any scrutiny of a rather similar bombing campaign in Yemen that they are both complicit in also not a little hypocritical.

This article has rather a lot of disagreement within the Obama administration with the Iraq focused Pentagon being quite a big obstacle to a more entangling intervention in Syria that many US lawmakers if not voters seem compelled towards. This is unlikely to change under the next President.

The Pentagon has sometimes strong armed Obama but in Syria they have tended to agree with the President's caution. Ash Carter and the Generals may see Russia as their most dangerous enemy but Iraq has been a CENTCOM priority for a quarter of a century and is still a major headache. It's hard to see how messing with Assad much helps with taking back and holding Mosul. In fact collaborating at arms length with the regime in areas like Deir makes more sense militarily and that may have been what was happening up there until the recent cock up and CoH collapse. It's Wilsonian liberals like Clinton and later Kerry in the State Department and a Langley devoted to Saudi policy goals that have been the hawks on Assad.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From IHS Islamic State Caliphate Shrinks by 16 Percent in 2016, IHS Markit Says

...
“The Islamic State’s territorial losses since July are relatively modest in scale, but unprecedented in their strategic significance”, said Columb Strack, senior analyst and head of the IHS Conflict Monitor. “The loss of direct road access to cross-border smuggling routes into Turkey severely restricts the group’s ability to recruit new fighters from abroad, while the Iraqi government is poised to launch its offensive on Mosul.”

The Islamic State’s losses in Syria over the last three months have been concentrated in northern Aleppo province, where Turkish proxy groups have pushed the jihadists back to around 10km from the border with Turkey. In Iraq, government forces have secured Qayyarah Airbase in Iraq’s Nineveh province, a critical staging area for the anticipated offensive to liberate Mosul.
...
Huge drop in fighting between Syrian Democratic Forces and Islamic State

Turkey’s intervention in northern Syria has stalled the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operations against the Islamic State, which led to the liberation of Manbij in August. IHS Conflict Monitor recorded an 87 percent drop in the volume of fighting between the SDF and the Islamic State from August to September.

“There is deep underlying competition between the Kurdish-dominated SDF and Turkey’s Sunni proxies over their conflicting ambitions for Syria’s future,” Strack said. “For the time being, the US is cooperating with both, but once the Islamic State has been defeated as a conventional force, Washington will have to pick a side.”

Given Turkey’s vehement stance against Syria’s Kurds, US support for them is more likely to be sacrificed the report said. “The Kurds know that support from the US may dry up,” Strack said. “They will be looking for assurances from the US on their plans for federal governance as a precondition for their involvement in any offensive on Raqqa.”
...

Syrian PKK pretty much ground to a halt. I doubt they have many illusions about the US sticking with them once victory is declared over IS; Turkey is a NATO ally and just too important. If that victory proves as hollow as last time in Iraq the US may end up looking to the PKK as a holding force in a chaotic Syria again. It would be prudent for the US to work hard on Ankara-PKK relations.

Talking about percentages of lost territory is a little misleading. The loss of IS lines of supply to Turkey is far more significant. That is undoubtedly a blow. If you want to measure a body's control it's the number of folk they rule and the wealth that they can extract from their territory rather than its area.

With the very extractive IS Caliphate I recall the population being about 8 million at its height. Its oil biz was much talked about but its economic heft was mostly about taxing the cities in Iraq and particularly its power base Mosul. The PKK in Syria rules (not that badly) about 4.5 million mostly dirt poor people about half of them IDPs. It has grabbed some useful hydro carbons. That may be due in large part to US air power but it's no small achievement to be able to hold all this. The TSK behind a thin screen of rebels has rolled into one significant Syrian border town Jarabulus and a handful of villages some of which IS just grabbed back.

You do have to see these as entirely competitive projects carving up Syria in which Turkey's can best be thought of as an unproven start-up. I'd bear in mind that Ankara probably also has the Kremlin's red lines in Syria to consider. Many rebels would fight the PKK but are focused on Assad and fragmented. And the Russians have some PKK sympathies, it would be pragmatic to let Rojova alone, I don't think they'll do much to help the regime reconquer Rojova. I doubt the Iranians will bleed for it either.

 

[CrabbedOne]

More rebel infighting, Jund al Aqsa are a bit militant, there was always a lot of disquiet among the AQ aligned beards about fighting IS despite the bad blood with them. JaA has occasionally fought alongside IS.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks WHAT’S REALLY AT STAKE IN THE SYRIA DEBATE

...
Faced with the horrors of the last few years and the recent signal atrocity in Aleppo, decent people naturally want something to be done and bridle at the suggestion that it cannot be. But ethical analysis cannot avoid rigorous analysis of consequences. Only the most naive interventionists would argue for acting on moral grounds if the policy had no chance of succeeding. Policy proposals are typically put forward to demonstrate that some option exists to dosomething in the face of evil, even if the prospects of success are low.

Framing the argument about American intervention as one between morality and pragmatism is ultimately misleading. The real argument is not over the moral calculus of action. What gives the Syria intervention argument such intensity and broad resonance is a deeper contention over the value placed on American involvement in the war for its own sake. Advocates of intervention believe, for a variety of reasons, that the United States and the world would be better served were the American military involved more directly in Syria. Opponents do not.
...

PoliSci wonk Lynch tossing about the intervention argument.

His basic point is deeper US military involvement in Syria has never been likely to lead to better outcomes. He thinks it probable never the less as that's the way things have tended to go. He's right that foreign interventions in civil wars have a very poor record in humanitarian terms tending to escalate the conflict as is certainly the case in Syria where diverse foreign powers and private actors have pursued many agendas.

I think the next President will face similar constraints to Obama. The stakes changed radically in Syria with Russian intervention. Really it's a geopolitical issue in the confrontation with Russia now. Its very odd the debate has moved so little since the Arab Spring. Syria has become a bigger version of the brutal war in Chechnya. Folk still advocating for a NFZ need to face up to the reality that the Russians appear willing to shoot that down. Imposing one will involve killing their personnel with unpredictable consequences. While kicking Iran's puny butt in Syria or Political Islam being the answer there had some appeal to them no US regional ally is willing to contemplate a clash with the faded but still dangerous superpower. NATO powers were quite alarmed when Turkey played chicken with Russia up to the brink.

The current Pentagon leadership sees direct intervention against Assad as a mugs game. The Brass can be fired or over ruled but that won't change the fact that the brutal Assad has a good deal of support amongst Syrians and powerful committed allies. A new US leader won't weld the multi-stranded revolt into a unified political cause or tame its ugly aspects. The Oval Office will still wish to pursue the GWOT in Syria and it will have to figure out an MV with the Kremlin in Syrian airspace.

A new President won't alter the lack of support in Congress or amongst US voters. The fact is the last few US interventions have not left US voters feeling good about themselves. Unflattering it may be but they are evermore fiercely pro-Israeli and since 9-11 Septics have been methodically taught to hate and fear folk that look just like the Syrian rebels. Few Septics are as haunted by "acts of genocide" Rwanda as the Clinton team. Rather more or puzzled as to why that's Uncle Sam's business. There just isn't the support for wars of salved political consciences in the name of Arab causes.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IHS Janes Russia sends cruise missile ships to Mediterranean

Three Russians warships, including two armed with long-range land-attack cruise missiles, have been sent to the Mediterranean.

Russia's TASS news agency reported on 5 October that the Black Sea Fleet's Buyan-M class corvettes Serpukhov and Zelyony Dol had left their home port of Sevastopol on 4 October and were en route to the Mediterranean.

A day later TASS reported that the Nanuchka-III class (Project 1234) missile corvetteMirazh had sailed from Sevastopol for the Mediterranean.

"In the Mediterranean Sea, the Serpukhov and Zelyony Dol are set to join the permanent operational task force in the distant maritime zone on a planned rotational basis," TASS quoted Russian Black Sea Fleet spokesman Nikolai Voskresensky as saying.

The Russian Navy has maintained a task group off Syria since September 2015.

Turkish ship observers confirmed the southbound passage of Serpukhov and Zelyony Dol , with photographs of them passing through the Bosphorus appearing on social media on 5 October.

Commissioned in December 2015, the two Buyan-Ms operated in the Eastern Mediterranean for just over a month from mid-August and carried out a strike against targets in Syria on 19 August using Kalibr NK cruise missiles. The missiles have a range of more than 1,500 km.

Mirazh does not have land-attack missiles, but is normally armed with P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 'Siren') anti-ship missiles.
...

My bold, well obviously that's to deal with the risk of IS developing a Blue Water Navy.

 

[Idris2002]

On IHS Janes Russia sends cruise missile ships to Mediterranean
My bold, well obviously that's to deal with the risk of IS developing a Blue Water Navy.

I thought 'carrier group' was more pithy.

 

[teqniq]

Syria: "East Aleppo is being devastated in front of us"

 

[Casually Red]

Jihadist is a very vague term that can apply to all Muslims at war, Shia Iraqi militias are also Jihadists. About a third to a half of the revolt is ideologically Salafist, and yes this includes hard fighting Salafi-Jihadis of the sort we are so scared of. The rest is largely typical Syrian Sunni Muslims of different degrees of laxity. It's deceptive as a Jihadi complete with big beard is what a Muslim revolutionary usually looks like.

Looked at from Shia Baghdad the risings in Syria are a Sunni revanche. It's exactly how these risings were seen in the GCC press even after IS emerged in Iraq. The Syrian regime worked hard to cast the rising in this light as well as its core support is in Syria's minorities and they've long been paranoid about Sunni pogroms. Syria has a history of outbreaks of violent sectarian strife. Balanche who mines the demographic changes see both sides as pretty sectarian.

From what polling I've seen it's quite possible Bashar is the single most popular leader in the country but he's also justifiably hated by a majority of Syrians. You could compare this to Iraq where 14% of Iraqis were Baath Party members and the cult of Saddam was strong while he had a Stasi like grip on the place. The revolt is fragmented and isn't that popular either but tends to lose all support when it stops fighting Assad and turns on the likes of IS. The Salafi-Jihadi elements are plainly pretty popular in places. I suspect more Syrians loath all the combatants than are partisans of them.

There are Sunni worshippers of the Assad Clan who would burn the country for Bashar but they are a minority. That Bashar still pressgangs unwilling Sunni youth into his awful army as cannon fodder isn't a sign of wide support amongst Sunni just heavy handed Baathist oppression. The fact Alawites dominate its kleptocratic officer corps far more than they did before the revolt rather reflects the reality that Sunni led units can't really be trusted by a regime that poses as secular. The mafia like NDF militias that have emerged at the expense of the SAA are heavily sectarian and sometimes Khomeinist. That the relatively well equipped SAA often runs away discarding kit, fights so poorly in Bashar's cause and must rely on heavily on foreign allies in the offensive has a lot to do with its demographics.

Urban Aleppo was an area of regime support. Unsurprising, it was rich and heavily subsidised. Bashar deliberately purchased the loyalty of many in the Sunni elite and focused funding on the big commercial centres like Aleppo while neglecting the sticks his father had cared for. The Sunni middle classes were often badly payed state employees and in general they didn't much care for Bashar's trickle down economics. That incompetent attempt at reform, that may owe something to his years in the Tory heading toward New Labour UK, really is the seed of the revolt, it has an element of class war. The risings happen in the more neglected provinces. Better off Aleppo largely failed to rise though there were protests in the university area. As around Mosul the slums and back country on the other hand had an awful lot of highly conservative Sunni and Salafi. Impatient with the urbanites they brought the revolt into the Old City after about a year. I've read it's not an entirely comfortable presence with sophisticated city folk grating against alien Salafi.

However half, over a hundred thousand, Syrians seem willing to endure the siege of East Aleppo with the Beards rather than flee into Bashar's arms according to Lund's article above. You might call that voting with your feet or neck. I'm reminded of the stubborn support for Hamas in heavily bombed Gaza in which IAF bombs only seem to grow their support.

Last year the people claiming there were 100,000 in east allepo were talking about 40 or 50 000 . It appears to have jumped massively as an estimate in the last 12 months . As we e seen from that video of the moderates beheading that kid there are loyalists stuck there either with no way out or simply determined to stay put for whatever reason . Eastern Syria around Deir EZ zor , Raqqa etc is also wholly Sunni , well out in the sticks, and also a hotbed of Baathist and loyalist support . Many Sunni tribes there ..most notably Shaitat..have paid a very heavy toll for that loyalty despite the largesse the gulf and IS oil revenue could bestow upon them for years now . These areas were simply overrun, they never rose up . Just like in Allepo itself . I've no idea were you got that figure of over half Syrians population hating Assad from. That's just some random whim you've plucked from nowhere in particular with no statistics to back it up .
The NDF itself is majority Sunni, as is the army. As is Allepo, Damascus . as for conscripts running off and abandoning equipment that's what conscripts often do . You've plainly never heard of the British army in France or Singapore . Didn't mean for a second they were in any manner sympathetic to either Hitler or Hirohito.

 

[CrabbedOne]

ME polls are notoriously unreliable and often subject to spin but here's one Poll suggests Syrians believe civil war resolvable despite social strife.

...
The poll, which surveyed a cross section of 1,365 people across all of Syria’s 14 governorates - including areas controlled by IS - also suggested that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was slightly more popular among ordinary Syrians that any of the opposition groups - though no one was ranked as having a net positive influence.

"It's very, very regional - if you look into the actual data it differs massively by region," Johnny Heald, managing director of ORB International, told Middle East Eye.

"At the moment, it's fair to say the opposition in Syria isn't as strong as it used to be. It's split right down the middle. It's been infiltrated by all kinds of militias - so Assad in certain sectors of society is the preferred option, but in others, absolutely not."
...

And that about sums it up from what I've read in general, all the actors are seen as somewhat malign if you sample all Syrians.

As it says here its very regional. The basic reality in Syria is the government is hated and heavily opposed in many provinces but submitted to in the most important big urban centres. Areas like Latakia and urban Aleppo and much of Damascus did well under the Bashar and there is genuinely warm support though I do notice rather a lot of grumbling about him not being a patch on his brutal old man. Though often flooded with IDPs the only way the rebels will rule such areas is very oppressively.

However there are also populations in these areas there are large groups of urban poor that were excluded by the state. As in much of the ME the peasants have flooded into the cities creating vast ungovernable slums like Sadr City in Baghdad that jar with the cosmopolitan culture of the big city. These urban poor have little to lose and very good reasons to revolt against a plainly rotten system. It's not just radicalised Salafi levellers it has elements of a classical class war. As in Iraq the increasing cooption of Sunni elites by a deeply corrupt state does seem to have been a revolutionary trigger.

In Aleppo rebels came in from outside hoping to take all the city but it is mostly filled with folk who wanted little to do with them. The core group of fighters was not Salafi-Jihadi but MB aligned and funded by Turkey. AQ only had a small presence until recently. The rebels found sufficient support in East Aleppo. They armed local youth as a sort of police force, Ibna’ al-Hayy. The rebels became the government operating Sharia courts and providing social services. They often commuted back from front lines in the Old City to their families slums in the East of the city which the regime bombed punitively knowing it to be hostile turf. And what is left is being crushed in the East Aleppo pocket.

It's been a brutal rentier state that Syrians feared for as long as I can remember. It appears to have got much worse as a new class of NDF crime lord predates in regime areas but they've always complained about the awfulness of their government, kleptocratic, crazily inefficient with an arbitrary vindictive injustice system. Of course there are always happy enthusiasts for this sort of rule in any population. Those at the top of the heap do exploit those below and some authoritarian minded people just love the smack of firm government. As with the junta in Egypt the dirty little secret is authoritarian consolidation. Most government support is from badly paid civil servants who are effectively slow moving wards of state. Minority groups including better off Sunni genuinely fear the MB tendency in Syrian politics which for a long time was the main opposition. Christians in particular saw no future in Syria if Islamists even of the watery Turkish variety came to power.

Many Syrians are just as bewildered by hardline Salafists emerging out of the urban slums and countryside as we would be. While perhaps one in five Syrians think the likes of IS is a fine alternative to the awful Assad. A bigger proportion appear pretty happy under Idlib's crappy Sharia court system which I'd see as a prototype for Syria after a rebel Salafist victory.

From polling it's also 20% of Sunni Arabs in Iraq who seem to support continuing the insurgency despite the disastrous experience of IS rule. Down from maybe half before the second rising. With maybe 19% of Iraqis being Sunni Arabs that's about 4% of the Iraqi population still up for a ruck and that historically is enough to support a pretty hot terrorist war. By some accounts the insurgency that created American democracy consisted of 3% of the population up in arms. Consider the numbers in Syria with a large part of the majority Sunni Arab population determindly revolting against vicious Baathist oppression. I doubt it will ever be still.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment How Will the Syrian Crisis End? – By Ehsani2

...
Salafists and Jihadists

Regardless of how liberal and reform minded were the masses who made up the opposition at the beginning of the uprising, those who make up the armed groups today are largely Salafists and Jihadists. They control the battlefield. The Syrian state has long been accused of releasing Islamists from its prisons in an effort to achieve precisely this outcome. While such accusations are impossible to dismiss wholesale, it is important to recall that one of the early and consistent demands of the opposition was for the release of political prisoners. And who were those prisoners? The vast majority were Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood had long been the central enemy of the Baathist regime. Liberals were inconsequential and presented little threat to Assad’s Syria. The vast majority of the political prisoners brought before the security courts and convicted to lengthy prison terms were jihadists and those returning from Iraq or who preached against the regime in surreptitious dawa circles. Leading up to the events of Daraa in 2011, Damascus had for decades charged Islamists with long sentences, often seven years, in prisons such as Sednaya.

The release of prisoners

As the crisis first unfolded in Daraa, Sheikh Sayasneh was invited to Damascus in an attempt by the authorities to de-escalate the situation. One of the key demands of the cleric was the release of prisoners, the majority of whom were Islamists. This pattern was often repeated throughout the early phase of the crisis. The U.N mediator took up this demand. He too requested the release of prisoners as a trust building measure. While many in the opposition are convinced that the release of people like Zahran Alloush was engineered by Damascus to help radicalize the opposition, the truth is probably more nuanced. The Syrian State was desperately trying to stop the uprising through both using a stick (swift response against protestors) and a carrot (release of prisoners when urged). While one may still debate this argument and claim that the government’s secret intent was to turn the uprising into an jihad, the fact is that what Damascus sees today are insurgents and Islamist armed groups who want nothing less than to destroy the Syrian State and replace it with a state designed to conform to Sharia. They call it “more Islamist in identity”.
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During the Arab Spring Baghdad also released a lot of prisoners who'd go on to join the rising. This is absolutely typical of what a state does when faced with growing popular protests.

Alloush is a good example a staunch Saudi backed Salafi just a shade away from being a Salaf-Jihadi ideologically who ran Jaish al Islam, an efficient organisation that compares to HA in Lebanon in the scope of its projects. Charismatic and a firm believer in the establishment of a Caliphate (but not yet) he was not without political nous. He was classed as "moderate" by our side and was probably the best known leader in the revolt. He was killed last year by a Russian strike targeted by Syrian intelligence.

Of course his release and others like him changed the character of the messy Syrian rising but Salafists were emerging out of the woodwork anyway advocating for a wider call for Jihad. It turned out the MB strain of Salafism that the Turks saw as ascendent had much weaker grassroots support in Syria than expected. The exiled Brothers were reduced to funding conservative Salafi who'd often picked up their beliefs as migrant labour in the Gulf. The Saudis as is usually their preference also sought out reactionary Salafi to fund.

As this article points out there is little chance such men could ever strike a political deal with the Baath. Alloush's brother was part of the SNC delegation in the last talks. The Syrian FM at one point insisted he shave his beard off before he'd talk to him. Terms will only be worth discussing when one side in this war faces strategic defeat.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct A high price for rebel infighting in Hama as regime forces regain territory

Fallout from Jund al Aqsa and Ahar al Sham clash.

 

[agricola]

Meanwhile, at Westminster....

Mitchell, advised by former British military officials and supported by the former CIA director David Petraeus, has been arguing for a no-fly zone for many months. In recent weeks some of Mitchell’s advisers have developed this proposal into a call to track Russian jets from UK warships off the coast of Syria, and for a complete no-fly zone for Syrian helicopters over civilian areas. It has been argued that Syrian helicopters are doing all the damage with chemical, napalm and high explosive barrel bombs. One proposal has been to bomb air runways.

 

[Matchbox]

By the way there is an emergency meeting today in Parliament about what to do about the crisis in Aleppo and how to stop Russian airstrikes. See this: Emergency debate: Humanitarian catastrophe in Aleppo and Syria - News from Parliament

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC Eastern Approaches

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Though there are virtually no more nomads in today’s Syria, the people of eastern Syria’s towns and cities are proud of their tribal heritage and frequently refer to aspects of their tribe in explaining their political behavior. This has been especially true since the beginning of the uprising in 2011. The different protagonists in the east—which includes the Deir al-Zor, Raqqa, and Al-Hassakeh governorates—have appealed to tribal identities to motivate inhabitants to join their cause, and the traditional leaders of tribes have often claimed that their entire tribe was behind them in declaring their allegiance to the opposition or the regime.

However, the reality was frequently quite different. Members of the same tribe often found themselves on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict, and even the traditional leaders of the same tribe could be seen taking contrary positions—some supporting the regime in Damascus, others opposition circles in Turkey. This was due to the fact that, among Syrian tribes, localized identities—relating to neighborhood, village, or town—have often prevailed over broader tribal solidarities in determining actions on the ground.

Such a process of localization was already unfolding before the Syrian conflict began in 2011, though the war only accentuated it. This has allowed the regime, radical Islamic groups, the Kurds, and members of tribes themselves without leadership roles in their formal tribal structures, to advance their agendas within tribal communities.
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On the bleak prospect for Damascus ever establishing a firm grip on Eastern Syria.

Iraq is sometimes described as a post-tribal society where there's a legacy of such old structures sometimes with a mafia like nature but not that much cohesion. Sheiks that US soldiers encountered as fixers were often described as shady figures of very dubious respectability amongst their kin. There the arrival of the Islamic State often split tribes sometimes on generational lines. This continues a divisive strategy of playing factions under Saddam. In places like Fallujah it was Tribal Military Councils that were at the forefront of the revolt. It was very detailed knowledge of local networks amongst its leadership that allowed the relatively small IS group to navigate into a position of dominance. This probably wasn't helped by tribal leaders fleeing to foreign capitals where they often did little but call those who stayed to oppose IS traitors. Not that that may be entirely incorrect as one of causes of the revolt was large parts of the Sunni Arab elite appearing to have very profitably rented themselves out to Shia Baghdad. The result as IS is pushed back in Iraq is an awful lot of bad blood between Sunni Arabs. It's even been described as a fracturing of Iraqi Sunni Arab identity. And that makes for an ideal environment for an insurgent group to gain control: the Hobbesian rubble of a society.

Eastern Syria unsurprisingly appears to have much in common with Iraq. The tribal networks run across borders. South Eastern Syrian tribes have often proved wary of fighting IS and it's partly because they are well aware what happened to their cousins in the Iraqi Sahwa that turned coat to strategically defeated IS predecessor AQI only to have the group reappear and methodically pick off the Sahwa's leaders. In the second Iraqi rising nothing of the scale of the first Sahwa has emerged.

That's despite Iraq having substantial US backed security forces that after a catastrophic early defeat have proven much more able to batter IS than any in Syria. The regime lost Raqqa essentially because local tribes that had been loyalist lost faith in its guarantees and swapped sides. I look at the awful mess of the recent Tabqa offensive and do wonder if any tribal force careful of their heads would pick an army as unreliable as the hollowed out SAA as an ally against either what's left of IS or the PKK.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The National As rebel factions fracture, hardliners seek to prosper

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Ahrar Al Sham accused the group before of collaborating with ISIL, but it still did not fight it until Jund Al Aqsa started to advance militarily in Hama. The direct trigger of the latest clashes was Jund Al Aqsa’s takeover of a town in southern Idlib.

Even though Ahrar Al Sham accused Jund Al Aqsa of being an ISIL enterprise, it pointed only to some members as ISIL-type "extremists" – deliberately chosen to legitimise its war. Similar accusations are often levelled against Ahrar Al Sham itself. If Ahrar Al Sham views the existence of ISIL-type extremists within a group’s ranks as a cause of attacking it, it puts itself and its defenders in an awkward position, as the group has many of that type. Some of them left the group last month following an approval of their participation in the Turkish-backed operation.

In the same vein, if those extremists have now joined JFS, will Ahrar Al Sham cease to cooperate with a group that has them in its ranks? Ahrar Al Sham has already accused JFS of providing protection to ISIL-type extremists, echoing a similar accusation against JFS’s former incarnation, Jabhat Al Nusra, when it protected ISIL during the rebels’ clashes with ISIL in January 2014. Syrian activists point to a similar pattern. The episode might increase tension between JFS and Ahrar Al Sham and weaken the rebels militarily. But it also offers an insight into what lies ahead for Ahrar Al Sham, especially with regard to JFS’s attempt to co-opt it.

Ahrar Al Sham has hinted that it seeks to dissolve Jund Al Aqsa, rather than to eradicate it. After reports that the latter joined JFS, Ahrar Al Sham rejected the wholesale allegiance and demanded instead that members not involved in the bloodletting could join JFS as individuals, not as a group.
...

Well that's how IS often absorbed Syrian groups including members of AQ.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Meanwhile, at Westminster....

Yes, the runways those helicopters really need to take off.

 

[camouflage]

By the way there is an emergency meeting today in Parliament about what to do about the crisis in Aleppo and how to stop Russian airstrikes. See this: Emergency debate: Humanitarian catastrophe in Aleppo and Syria - News from Parliament

I bet there is. Yemen not so much.

 

[agricola]

I bet there is. Yemen not so much.

that funeral fired first, it seems

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEE UN Syria envoy's offer could hand Aleppo to Assad

Which makes the fair point that in asking the large AQ contingent to vacate East Aleppo Staffan de Mistura is running with the regime narrative of its war as part of the GWOT. This is the same way Putin's brutal war on Chechnya was sold. After all AQ isn't the only group resisting the siege in the pocket. It's not so unusual to ask trapped fighters to throw in the towel or request that they allow trapped civilians to leave, that was done in Fallujah recently, but this was odd. You need to think through the politics both in Syria and internationally to understand it.

That large AQ presence inserted itself into the pocket earlier this year over the objections of the existing rebel force that's mostly less radical Salafi. AQ Syria then rebranded itself for the benefit of its Syrian audience. Then an even larger AQ led offensive surged in from Idlib in a heroically failed attempt to break the siege. AQ is plainly grandstanding in Aleppo and rapidly increasing its footprint in the revolt. This does make central battle of the Northern revolt harder to defend in the West and particularly the US even if the MSM and our politicians are determindly wearing blinkers.

Not just Russia but the US itself has finally demanded the rebels separate themselves from AQ. Demands many groups have refused. Even forgetting about the dangerous pissing contest with the Russians no US President could really sell even the threat of an R2P intervention that would hand a victory to regiments of AQ fighters or proud allies who refuse to disown them. It's a new double bind which leaves the UN with bugger all leverage. Of course AQ know this which is why they sent 900 beards most of whom are likely die defending rebel East Aleppo. That could leave AQ decimated in Syria but with its eye on the prize.

AQ Syria's narrative is one of defending victimised Sunni Arabs and here it rings sort of true even if they are willing to get tens of thousands in Aleppo killed in the process. It's become a suicide action that's part of its scheme to claim primacy in the revolt. This presents quite a dilemma to which a solution is separating the scary beards from the not so bad ones.

 

[Casually Red]

Such as the " not so bad ones " who sawed that Palestinian child's head off with a knife for the cameras a few weeks ago ? The " not so bad ones " currently shouting about " Christian pigs " etc all over their twitter accounts ?
Theyre all sectarian murderers and the only solution is to wipe the lot of them out if they don't surrender first . And it seems in Allepo they will be .

Other jihadi counter offensives have now failed. Hama offensive blunted by Tiger regiment and rolled back . Latakia offensive in the past few days just ground to a halt and advanced nowhere . Syrian Army knocked them for 6 . Add that to their defeats in Allepo and time is definitely running out for these shitstains .

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks THE MISADVENTURES OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN SYRIA: COMPLETE STRATEGY IMPLOSION EDITION

...
In late August, Reuters told us that fighting in Aleppo exposed the “limits of Russian airpower,” and a few days later The New York Times explained how Syrian forces made their gains in that siege thanks to Russian help. This results in great stories but poor analysis. I offer a different perspective on why the ceasefire collapsed and what it tells us about the Russian intervention. Essentially, Russia got caught selling something they did not have — Assad’s agreement to a ceasefire before the Syrian Arab Army subdued Aleppo — and U.S. Secretary of State Kerry accidentally trapped them by conceding to a grand deal sooner than Moscow expected.
...

This is a smart piece, reckons what Russia wants in Syria is lots of jaw jaw but only a very small war aimed at destroying the moderate opposition.

That is a bit overly clever, that this is more about bumming up Russia as a peer of the US is on the money. However the Russians from the start appeared very willing to target radicals but it's fair to say the more moderate rebels were fair game as well. Russia's mission in Syria is propping up Assad and anyone fighting him is going to get bombed. It's actually the success in Idlib Salafist alliance of JaF which includes AQ Syria that threatened Latakia and caused the IRGC to call the Russians in. I'd say that JaF's success also should have provoked worries on our side about who was likely to head the revolt especially when it was under new military pressure. It's the US's framing of its interest in Syria in terms of the GWOT that drives Russia to always talk about fighting IS while IS only presents a very secondary problem for Damascus. The (flawed) Russian approach to Syria is a strong state is needed to beat back chaos. That for them is Assad's path to legitimacy. After all Putin built a political career based on crushing Chechnya into submission in a very similar manner.

Kofman gets at the nub of the problem: Russia cannot control the Assad clan. I'd note that's not a new problem for the Kremlin in Syria. The USSR could not bend them even when the IDF was thrashing the SAA.

He points up the usual Russian military build up before a planned offensive are absent in the recent one. I have noticed the Iranians on the other hand had been building up forces in Aleppo. And they do appear rather dissatisfied with Russia's windy focus on diplomacy.

Nor, he says, can the Assads be got rid of by Moscow as they've occasionally hinted. This is true the Syrian state is deliberately designed to collapse into rival warlord fiefdoms if that is attempted. Frankly it's already close to that due to the prominence of NDF militias. I rather suspect the Russians failed to understand Syria as well as the Iranians who also often seem frustrated with Bashar's obstinacy.

He suggests that perhaps if Russia had intervened earlier things might possibly be in better shape. Well I'd say HA did intervene early and even then it was evident the SAA was barely fit to defend areas where there was heavy regime support amongst the civilians. HA's commitment of basically a brigade of not very suitable light infantry skilled in the defensive rapidly reversed rebel gains. Many rebel victories even early on were spearheaded by small forces of radical Salafi. This indicated similar rebel weaknesses most obviously a chronic lack of political cohesion.

He's very skeptical on there being a deeper US intervention correctly pointing out that much of the chatter in policy circles seems to be stuck in a vanished 90s unipolar era. I do hear far too many twits banging on about the success of tiny Kosovo and the Iraqi NFZ. He thinks East Aleppo will fall and despite our outrage then there will be some space for talks with Russia again.

Well it's not hard to anticipate the problems there. Assad will fail to compromise sensibly with rebels and pursue an absolute victory. Aleppo will prove insecure as Assad's ambitions stretch to controlling the whole country. Ambitions his allies don't appear to support but they'll be dragged into rescuing him again and again. And that's where I really differ with Kofman: Syria is going to be a frustrating quagmire for Russia. It's much bigger than Chechnya. The Russians will likely again fail to deliver what they boastfully promise.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In JPo Assad, like Hitler, would manipulate elections

...
Guess who denounced Bashar Assad’s multi-candidate race in 2014: Secretary Kerry. He called the Syrian election “meaningless” and “a great big zero.” Why Kerry thinks a new Syrian election under Assad would be any more meaningful than the last one is a mystery.

Considering how many of Assad’s opponents have been murdered or exiled, it’s hard to imagine that the results of a new election could accurately represent the will of the Syrian people.

One should always be cautious about comparing current leaders or events to the Nazis or the Holocaust.

But the Syrian elections issue raises questions that may warrant a Hitler analogy.

Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party won a plurality of 33% in the November 1932 election, which resulted in the coalition bargaining that brought Hitler to power in January.
...

Well I assume Kerry thinks supervised elections could be held as they were in Egypt when the MB to took power. Egypt also has a tradition of despots winning 90%+ of the vote that was recently revived. Of course cynicism is appropriate in Syria were everything in civic life is bent.

The cliched Hitler comparison is apt as Assad in a straight election might well win a third or more of the vote and the Baath be the largest party. In important parts of Syria he clearly has a lot of support. The opportunity for a gerrymandered result are considerable. The rebels have baulked at the idea of running in elections against the Baath as none of the groups appear to have wide popular support across the country just in particular areas. It's unlikely they could present a unified front. The Salafists, who often regard elections as kufr, would face a lot of opposition in the big cities. As with the MB in Egypt the opposition is politically fragmented. Even the MB in Syria is weakly supported and there are too many factions. That's why the Iranians have continually advocated for elections to sort out who rules Syria just as they did in Iraq.