And next, Syria?

[camouflage]

This is costing the Russians virtually nothing as the expenditure is being taken directly from the training budget . Stockpiled ordnance is simply being dropped on jihadis in Syria rather than wooden targets in a Russian field and the live fire experience gained is invaluable . The vast majority of the stuff being dropped is cheap unguided munitions that were produced during the soviet era and stockpiled in huge quantities . Absolutely no shortage of it . The fuel to get it there costs them nothing either .
Once Allepo is secured ...and thats a certainty because theyre beseiged, have shot their bolt already and defences they spent years preparing are collapsing like dominos as we speak...there'll be a huge Syrian military force freed up to go on the offensive wherever it likes . Same with the besieged Eastern ghouta were huge numbers of Republican guard and Special forces are currently tied up . The outcomes of both sieges are certain government victory . They've those areas firmly locked down . There's no break out possible, no cavalry, no relief . After the failed attempt to lift the Allepo siege that was months in planning and preparation we now have major jihadi groups trading bitter accusations . With one even referring to the fate of their relief force as " a holocaust " .
And to add to jihadi woes as soon as Mosul is taken, which it will be, there'll also be a massive influx of Iraqi militias into Syria. Huge numbers . The manpower and firepower necessary to liquidate every last jihadi occupied position won't be a problem . Assads calculations are sound in that regard . He can take every inch back . Damascus is secure, Allepo is finally secure, latakias secure . He can do it . Methodically and slowly but it can be done . He has no obligation to capitulate to western and gulf demands whatsoever . The Syrian people would lynch him if he did after all the sacrifices they made to hold out this long .

Saw this article over at Sic Semper Tyrannis: Showdown in Aleppo, the author agrees with your own point a few pages ago when al-Nusra "broke the siege" of their forces in Eastern Allepo.

author seems a little naive in thinking the US would find being allied to Al-Qaeda/al-Nusra distasteful though, I've seen no evidence of that anywhere (apart from members of the Green Berets and the like, who don't like having to train them obviously).

 

[teqniq]

More war crimes

Russia warns US not to intervene as hospital is hit in latest Aleppo blitz

An unrelenting Russian and Syrian blitz of eastern Aleppo heavily damaged one of the city’s three remaining hospitals on Saturday, as Moscow warned that any American attempts to stop its assault would lead to “frightening tectonic shifts in the Middle East”.

The Russian raids struck at least five areas of the opposition-held half of the city, which is bracing for a ground assault by Shia forces allied to the Syrian regime. Syrian helicopters are believed to be responsible for the strike on the M10 hospital, which has left those who remain in the east with next to no access to essential healthcare....

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TSG Russia Warns the U.S. in Syria

...
The U.S. is operating in Syria under the 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF), which is grounded on counterterrorism. As U.S. officials have repeatedly pointed out, the U.S. has no current legal framework to directly target regime forces unless in self-defense. This legal distinction is lost on rebel groups that see the world’s most powerful air force targeting the so-called Islamic State, but failing to protect the civilians of Aleppo. Further, the rebels do not care about U.S. concerns over further involvement and cascading secondary effects, as their sole focus is the overthrow of the Assad regime. The Russian warning of these cascading negative effects will fall on deaf rebel ears as well. As a result, the U.S. will increasingly find itself stuck between rebel groups that do not trust it, and a Russia determined to deepen that distrust while providing cover for the Assad regime to continue bombing Aleppo and other cities.

It's not just legal it's political.

When Obama nearly went towards "degrading" the regime using direct US military power he hesitated to do so without the authorisation of Congress. Technically this is not necessary for a US President he only needs to seek Congress's permission if there's a need to open the public purse. However his far more prone to be unilateralist predecessor sought and got the strong support of Congress in toppling Saddam. Bush also had over 70% of the country behind him according to polling. Levels of support that compare with the early Vietnam era. He also had the strong support of the British PM heavily endorsed by Parliament and many other US allies. Congress would go on to approve huge sums of spending on the Iraqi project. Bush won reelection and the Iraq war remained well supported by Republicans into the end of Bush's last term.

Obama was in part elected to undo and refute this mistake. He was then bullied by Paris and London into facilitating something rather similar in Libya. That proved a very unpopular failure in the US.

In contrast to regime change in Iraq the British House of Commons rejected direct action against Assad. Congress was anticipated to be heavily against it. Less than 30% of the US public were convinced by Obama's argument for such action. Support for action against Assad at the moment is running at about 25% amongst Democrats lower among Republicans. This is despite very slanted media coverage painting Syria as a simplistic despot V The People war. There's a substantial risk of any direct US action in Syria against Assad leading to a slippery slope towards ever greater US commitment. The Pentagon is even somewhat dubious about attempting to impose a No Fly Zone. The worst case outcome would now be provoking a very expensive shooting war with Russia.

To get into such a game on such a slim basis of support and with very limited US interest in Syria would be political suicide. FDR despite his strong strategic inclination to fully enter WWII bided his time until the US was attacked and public anger overcame instinctive isolationism. The US is not obliged to be an exceptional nation that ignores the will of its own polity in the dubious cause of R2P.

I come back to the tests of the Powell Doctrine:

...

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?[2]

...

And I'm not getting a straight yes on any of those.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Consortium News How the US Armed-up Syrian Jihadists

Hashes over a Green Beret's complaints over the rival T&E programs for Syrian rebels already relayed via SST above. This does look conflicted but that's pretty normal. You've got two different lines of policy arrived at at different times that don't make much sense in combination.

Since the Church Committee Langley has an overly close relationship with the KSA and often acts as if it is a rival of the Pentagon rather than an arm of the US state. The Pentagon itself is often a rival political actor trying to drive the Oval Office and has been known to go way off reservation as well. It's natural for Langley to rapidly align with friendly regional powers against an enemy regime allied to Iran and see IS as a very secondary problem. This was basically State's position as well until they had to start straddling both problems increasingly at the cost of regime change. And until it was evident IS was able to inspire attacks abroad and doing rather well out of a chaotic Syria this isn't so daft a position.

The Pentagon on the other hand was heavily invested in Iraq and IS's resurgence messed up the results of their last big campaign. The other one was also thwarted by Pakistan being a safe haven rear area for the Taliban. Going after IS's rear area in Syria was always going to appeal to the US military whereas toppling a dictator because he's bombing insurgents that look just like (and sometimes are) the ones they fought in Iraq probably causes as much head scratching as sharing an enemy with Iranian backed Iraqi Shia militias. This happens to align better with Obama's later policy direction.

A guy training insurgents often has to rub soldiers with types that could easily be enemies, it's their job to hold their noses. We've had intimate (and useful) fighting alliances with Salafi-Jihadis before in more instances than the Muhj war. For instance US officers also complained bitterly about having to work with former insurgents who had been trying to kill them but flipped to the Sahwa. Yet it was a well conceived US exit strategy most admired by IS. IS actually aped that combination of seduction, bribery, coercion targeted and targeted man hunting of enemies. Some of those Sahwa beards ended up getting killed fighting under IS's black flag in the next round.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
Conclusion

Turkey is wary of the Iranians and their regional aims, but it also wants to pursue a pragmatic relationship because of the need for economic cooperation, particularly on energy.

Speaking at the UN General Assembly earlier this month, Erdogan called for a safe haven in northern Syria spanning some 5,000 square kilometers. That is much larger than the nearly 1,000 square kilometers of border territory currently controlled by Turkey and its rebel proxies.

This suggests that Ankara will be the non-IS opposition’s main sponsor in the north going forward. Iran and Russia may be willing to live with such a zone, but that would be a considerable climb-down from Assad’s pledge to retake the entire country.

In the short term, the sustainability of Turkey and Iran’s rewarming ties will depend on the extent to which they can avoid a scenario similar to the November shootdown incident with Russia.

It will also depend on whether Ankara can withstand Saudi pressure to boost support for anti-Assad jihadists.

Iran's main area of interest in Syria is the South and the GLOC to HA. Aleppo City was the prosperous commercial capital, a big part of Useful Syria and largely loyalist. The countryside especially to the West in Idlib is not and it's rife with Salafi including the powerful JaF coalition that took Idlib city. The IRGC did show some signs of wanting Assad to consolidate around a more defensible rump Syria when Idlib fell. The Turks are in a position to spoil any victory the R+6 has in Aleppo. To keep NW Syria a burning land. There are limits to how much Iranians will bleed for the boneheaded Assad and his nearly useless army. It's increasingly the IRGC and their proxies on the ground who die to hold territory Russian air power conquers. The Iranians are actually rather supportive of the MB tradition the AKP and some of the rebellion derives from that. Both Russia and Iran appear more open to negotiating with the rebels than Assad. It's probably the Iranians not the Russians who have greater influence with the Assad clan.

Both countries see IS and the PKK as a problem. In Iraq Mosul is a traditional area of Turkish influence. This Northern border country was seen as Turkey's potentially prosperous near abroad in AKP policy. The KRG's in some danger of fragmenting along KDP-PUK lines. Those are Turkish and Iranian clients respectively.

The Persians are also the Turks traditional ME competitors going back to medieval times. Despite tensions over Syria Turkish-Iranian commercial cooperation persisted. Such compartmentalisation is pretty typical for these old imperial nations. You do business with your enemy. The Islamic Republic has long shared a interest in containing Kurdish separatism with the Turks. The Kurdish factions have often been pawns and foot soldiers. The neighbouring Arabs have often been viewed as dangerous savages by these powers. The wealthy Saudis are chippy Bedu arrivistes in this game not quite able to manage it with that level of detachment. There's a lot here for the Turks and Iranians to talk about.

 

[teqniq]

Despite 50 feet of stone, ‘bunker busters’ wreck underground Hama hospital

 

[CrabbedOne]

In TDB Russia and Assad Regime’s Destruction in Aleppo Likely to Leave Only Extremists Standing

...
That is, the collapse of rebel held areas of eastern Aleppo could mean not just a stronger position for Syrian President Bashar al Assad but radical terror groups, the last remaining opposition forces still standing. The fate of Aleppo could be the turning point of the five-year civil war.


“The rebels have been willing to go along with the coalition up until now. But how long can they hold out against a [Russian] assault?” one distraught U.S. official asked

If that happens, it will validate a long standing Russian narrative that U.S. backed rebels are not moderate as the U.S. claims but radical elements seeking to destroy Syria. And forcing such groups toward more radical elements may be the very intent behind their aggressive assault on eastern Aleppo for the last week, which was launched after the collapse of the latest cease fire.

The Russians and the regime are using “brutal tactics to radicalize other side. And that appears to be by design, not a defect,” Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow at the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“This is self-fulfilling Russian propaganda,” the U.S. official said.
...

Are the Israelis trying to make Gaza more radical every time they send the IDF lawnmower in? Again that may be the result but I think not. In fact the Israelis seem to hope it'll sap the support for Hamas. The methodical bombing of civilian infrastructure including hospitals and civilian casualty rate in Aleppo does remind me of the last one of those events. The Israelis as least bring things to a conclusion or rather a pause.

Insurgencies differ but consider the second battle of Fallujah in the earlier phase of Iraq's troubles. AQI was a small very violent foreign led organisation at the time. Like Assad from that point the Pentagon deliberately painted the very large, rather diverse insurgency as AQ and foreign when in fact it was mostly sacked Baathists some of whom increasingly adopted Salafi ways as a fighting ideology. Many proved to be hostile AQI when, despite JSOC's attempts to kill it off, it grew and tried to take over the rising. These men joined the Sahwa and collaborated actively with the US military. Others could be bribed to do so or simply to go home. Some may even have been genuinely prepared to reconcile with Shia ruled Baghdad in that sense they were "moderate".

The position snipped above is a bit like saying that the policies of Bush's second term were designed to enhance AQI's role in the Iraqi insurgency. Which is in fact what happened with IS emerging as a largely Iraqi led group and dominating the revived Sunni insurgency a decade later. There are people who read only diabolical US intent to spread chaos across the ME in this but I don't, it's clearly conspiratorial nonsense.

The R+6 strategy may see value in this natural drift but the reality is the suppression of an insurgency by violent means tends to radicalise those who survive and boy has Assad given cause for that. However his view that he faced an often Islamist revolt with foreign support that was prepared to resort to terrorist means can't be simply dismissed or creatively blamed entirely on devious Damascus flirtation with Jihadis.

There were always radicals in the Syrian revolt and it always was somewhat violent and rather sectarian. Tellingly it lost minority support rapidly. Just as in Libya we tended to be in denial about the "flickers of al Qaeda" despite Derna's Jihadi history. The previous MB revolt was also very violent just short and crushed by 82. It was a major inspiration to Salafi-Jihadis worldwide. The call to Jihad in 2012 changed the Arab Spring rising in Syria drastically with Salafists becoming far more prominent and a large influx of very radical foreigners that puts the Iraqi jihad rather in the shade. While it's not true of all of it large elements of the Syrian revolt are now by any sensible measure extremist with a rather Taliban like vision of a future Syria. That this form of rule would be popular with urban Syrians is highly questionable. It can also be argued that these elements, such as the beards of JaF, are critical to the revolt's military success. Also that unlike AQ and IS most mean us no harm and may never. That they'd be as passive towards Israel as Assad has been is far less likely. Other elements in Aleppo have developed a dependency relationship with AQ. When the US finally demanded a clear separation so that AQ could be targeted the response from some rebels was to offer support to AQ instead. I'm afraid describing these groups as "moderate" fails to fit at that point even if it's a measure of desperation by an abused junior partner.

If they did that in the UK they'd likely be in prison. Supporting AQ on the internet has got US citizens assassinated by Hellfire. In Iraq we killed or captured irreconcilable folk like that. The latter course proved to be a mistake. We probably should make that example clear because that is inexorably were this is headed if a rebel group's response to losing is to pal up even more closely with AQ.

 

[Pickman's model]

In TDB Russia and Assad Regime’s Destruction in Aleppo Likely to Leave Only Extremists Standing
Are the Israelis trying to make Gaza more radical every time they send the IDF lawnmower in? Again that may be the result but I think not. In fact the Israelis seem to hope it'll sap the support for Hamas. The methodical bombing of civilian infrastructure including hospitals and civilian casualty rate in Aleppo does remind me of the last one of those events. The Israelis as least bring things to a conclusion or rather a pause.

Insurgencies differ but consider the second battle of Fallujah in the earlier phase of Iraq's troubles. AQI was a small very violent foreign led organisation at the time. Like Assad from that point the Pentagon deliberately painted the very large, rather diverse insurgency as AQ and foreign when in fact it was mostly sacked Baathists some of whom increasingly adopted Salafi ways as a fighting ideology. Many proved to be hostile AQI when, despite JSOC's attempts to kill it off, it grew and tried to take over the rising. These men joined the Sahwa and collaborated actively with the US military. Others could be bribed to do so or simply to go home. Some may even have been genuinely prepared to reconcile with Shia ruled Baghdad in that sense they were "moderate".

The position snipped above is a bit like saying that the policies of Bush's second term were designed to enhance AQI's role in the Iraqi insurgency. Which is in fact what happened with IS emerging as a largely Iraqi led group and dominating the revived Sunni insurgency a decade later. There are people who read only diabolical US intent to spread chaos across the ME in this but I don't, it's clearly conspiratorial nonsense.

The R+6 strategy may see value in this natural drift but the reality is the suppression of an insurgency by violent means tends to radicalise those who survive and boy has Assad given cause for that. However his view that he faced an often Islamist revolt with foreign support that was prepared to resort to terrorist means can't be simply dismissed or creatively blamed entirely on devious Damascus flirtation with Jihadis.

There were always radicals in the Syrian revolt and it always was somewhat violent and rather sectarian. Tellingly it lost minority support rapidly. Just as in Libya we tended to be in denial about the "flickers of al Qaeda" despite Derna's Jihadi history. The previous MB revolt was also very violent just short and crushed by 82. It was a major inspiration to Salafi-Jihadis worldwide. The call to Jihad in 2012 changed the Arab Spring rising in Syria drastically with Salafists becoming far more prominent and a large influx of very radical foreigners that puts the Iraqi jihad rather in the shade. While it's not true of all of it large elements of the Syrian revolt are now by any sensible measure extremist with a rather Taliban like vision of a future Syria. That this form of rule would be popular with urban Syrians is highly questionable. It can also be argued that these elements, such as the beards of JaF, are critical to the revolt's military success. Also that unlike AQ and IS most mean us no harm and may never. That they'd be as passive towards Israel as Assad has been is far less likely. Other elements in Aleppo have developed a dependency relationship with AQ. When the US finally demanded a clear separation so that AQ could be targeted the response from some rebels was to offer support to AQ instead. I'm afraid describing these groups as "moderate" fails to fit at that point even if it's a measure of desperation by an abused junior partner.

If they did that in the UK they'd likely be in prison. Supporting AQ on the internet has got US citizens assassinated by Hellfire. In Iraq we killed or captured irreconcilable folk like that. The latter course proved to be a mistake. We probably should make that example clear because that is inexorably were this is headed if a rebel group's response to losing is to pal up even more closely with AQ.

Tbh aq in such a shit state it's barely worth being at war with http://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=19828858

 

[CrabbedOne]

Tbh aq in such a shit state it's barely worth being at war with http://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=19828858

That is from February, I'd have agreed with that narrative last year. It's been rather overtaken by events. The AQ franchise now looks rather revived relying on two powerful affiliates. Embedded in the civil chaos in both Syria and Yemen. At the same time IS's vulnerable core is burning out perhaps to go into the shadows again and return remade again or not.

Of course neither are remotely the existential threat we hype them as compared with a seriously dangerous nuclear power like the Russians, that really is delusional.

 

[Nylock]

As I understand it things are rather reversed from the USSR days NATO or even the US alone does have massive conventional superiority. The Pentagon seems bullish about the outcome if none to willing to go there.

Anyone in the pentagon who is 'bullish' about the outcome of armed conflict with Russia ought to be carted off to the most out of the way backwater there is and be put on permanent latrine duty.

That's why the Russians introduced a couple of years ago a "deescalation" doctrine of escalating to use tactical nukes when they start to lose such a conflict.

...Then surely the fact that this is Russian doctrine should countervail any 'bullish' viewpoints on the outcome of war with Russia. Anyone who would still have a bullish attitude in light of that knowledge... well... I wouldn't trust them to run a bath unsupervised let alone anything else...

At which point according to war gaming there is fair chance city killing ICBMs start flying around. But our position seems to be that they are bluffing and they'll just look at the wreckage of their Desert Stormed armies and fold. Of course this bit is a high stakes gamble on the Kremlin's rationality but so was the Cold War.

So again, this bullishness is dangerous nonsense no? Also, the cold war was a different scenario in every respect (including, most critically, the balance of conventional and nuclear forces between the two powers) and anyone in pentagon military planning who is basing their judgements on a situation that is nearly 30 years out of date needs to be retired with immediate effect.

The interventionist argument over Syria is all we (well the Americans) need to do is vigorously wave the big stick and bomb the end of a few runways. America has the military capability to stop Russia's rather Yemen like war in Syria and so is morally obliged to. And the fallback hope is any conflict with Russia would be containable, limited and rapidly over.

Well, that would be a forlorn hope. Any armed conflict between NATO/US and Russia will become very nasty with terrifying rapidity. Only an idiot of the 'let's watch the world burn' variety would even entertain such an idea.

They might even be right about that but the reward being a still chaotic Syria crawling with Salafi-Jihadis seems not worth even a slight risk of this going horribly wrong.

A chaotic Syria crawling with salafi jihadis would be the least of our problems if we got embroiled in a shooting war with Russia.

TL/DR Version:
A winnable war versus Russia* is an idiot's fantasy.




(*E2A: where the world isn't turned into an uninhabitable irradiated wasteland)

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment Aleppo and America’s Syria Policy – by Robert G. Rabil

...
Meanwhile, once the regime’s hold onto power had begun to teeter, despite considerable support from Iran and Hezbollah, Russia stepped in not only to save its old satellite capital but also to entrench itself in the Mediterranean basin as a bulwark against what it considers American hegemony. Strategically speaking, by helping the Syrian regime, Moscow would create in Western Syria a bastion of Iranian influence beholden to Russian power, while at the same time turning the Eastern Mediterranean into a Russian lake. No doubt, the entry of Moscow into the Syrian fay further complicated Washington’s maneuvers. Whereas Moscow came to the help of an old client, Washington has had reservations with certain predominant Salafi-jihadist group spearheading the opposition. And, if history is any guide, it is naïve to think that Russia would not pursue a Grozny-like campaign to ensure that its military involvement in Syria would not become ominously perpetual. This explains the forcible displacement of Sunnis from parts of Western Syria and the savagery with which Russia and its allies have pursued their campaign to seize full control of Aleppo.

Consequently, Washington found itself in a quandary. It ironically found itself on the same side with Russia and the Syrian regime fighting Salafi-Jihadist opposition groups while at the same time supporting the moderate opposition whose power paled in comparison to the Jihadists. Expectedly, neither the Obama Administration, Congress, nor the US public support sending troops to an unfriendly land crisscrossed by jihadists on one side, and Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and Iraqi Mobilization units on the other. How could one expect the U.S. to attack the regime, even in a limited capacity, without potentially incurring the wrath and retaliation of its Russian, Iranian, Hezbollah and Iraqi allies, all of which are really running the deadly show? Similarly, should anyone expect that Salafi-jihadists will not jump at the opportunity of Washington striking at the regime to widen their sphere of influence and in the process slaughter non-believers? Or should anyone brush aside the possibility that the Iraqi mobilization units would use their partnership with the Iraqi government to attack the approximately 6000 American soldiers advising the same government? Or should American people forget the high pitched fictitious slogan that Iraqis would welcome Americans with flowers as liberators in 2003? Certainly, the U.S. is in an unenviable position in both Syria and Iraq, where American enemies vastly outnumber American friends! Nevertheless, The U.S. has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees, and has sent dozens of U.S. troops to train and equip moderate Syrian opposition forces.
...

Article provides a potted history of US-Syria relations shaped by Cold War imperatives.

Points out the US has mostly been regarded as hostile by Syrians. This is still reflected in anti-AQ opposition demos despite the US intervening with its powerful military being the hope that has kept the revolt alive. I hadn't thought of the parallel with the exiled Iraqi opposition that proved rather fickle friends after finagling the Pentagon into toppling the Baath.

Russia's Cold War role in the ME also needs to be seen in a historic context with an eye on breaking out into the Med. That was long an obsession of British Imperial policy. The Russian's gas pump in Latakia is currently pretty trivial but is certainly expanding. I think at a strategic level it's more with the US having exhausted itself after 25 years of fiddling unproductively with MENA a much diminished Russia sees imperial opportunity once again. In Cold War times the Kremlin was ruthless in its exploitation of conflict in the region. That has not changed. I'd note the Iranians despite luring The Bear in are rather wary of the Russians as a partner in Syria and with good cause. At bottom the Persians still see Russia as another malign meddler in their region like a low rent Great Satan.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Anyone in the pentagon who is 'bullish' about the outcome of armed conflict with Russia ought to be carted off to the most out of the way backwater there is and be put on permanent latrine duty.


...Then surely the fact that this is Russian doctrine should countervail any 'bullish' viewpoints on the outcome of war with Russia. Anyone who would still have a bullish attitude in light of that knowledge... well... I wouldn't trust them to run a bath unsupervised let alone anything else...


So again, this bullishness is dangerous nonsense no? Also, the cold war was a different scenario in every respect (including, most critically, the balance of conventional and nuclear forces between the two powers) and anyone in pentagon military planning who is basing their judgements on a situation that is nearly 30 years out of date needs to be retired with immediate effect.


Well, that would be a forlorn hope. Any armed conflict between NATO/US and Russia will become very nasty with terrifying rapidity. Only an idiot of the 'let's watch the world burn' variety would even entertain such an idea.


A chaotic Syria crawling with salafi jihadis would be the least of our problems if we got embroiled in a shooting war with Russia.

TL/DR Version:
A winnable war versus Russia* is an idiot's fantasy.




(*E2A: where the world isn't turned into an uninhabitable irradiated wasteland)

Well consider the German General Staff in 1914 after a vast military build up. Not stupid people, seeing Czarist Russia starting to modernise its military and anticipating a war in a decade inevitable and much harder to win. Not that that went well but such is the military mind.

Russia is impudently breaking out of containment. The long dominant Pentagon's conventional advantage is far greater but is declining. The place is there to imagine future wars and buy the ludicrously expensive kit to win them. Russia and China are the only credible enemies. All that's porky spending is done despite the rival genocidal nuclear cosh being on a hair trigger. Such wars remain very thinkable. If you read QDR 98 amongst others you'll find a fair description of the coming armoured dash to Baghdad. Col Lawrence Wilkerson reckoned Rumsfeld's Pentagon was itching for a proper target rich war over Taiwan before 9-11. We then charged into Iraq yelling it was 1939, Saddam had gassed his own people was a whisker away from nukes and to do otherwise was appeasement. It wasn't a rational response to the traumatic shock of 9-11, we did it in part because the capability had been bought to do it easily as regime change in Iraq was US policy.

Obama is pilloried for failing to protect Syrians from their despotic ruler in a similar manner that we are assured will lack such complications. The US position has weakened but "Assad must go" is still there just caveated with eventually. The only way that's happening any time soon is if we chase him down with JDAM's like Qaddafi. The Kremlin appears willing to fight for the brute. And yes a clash with Russia could make chasing a few poorly armed beards round the ME seem rather trivial. That is in fact trivial compared with a conventional tussle with a near peer in which losing a carrier is not that unlikely. There's even an off chance a clash over Syria might result in a devastating nuclear war. Reading his speeches I don't find Putin very rational when it comes to blood sacrifice for Mother Russia. I tend to believe his insane nuclear blackmail. Others are convinced nuclear inevitably deterrence works. But that's rather my point if you are going to sail into such dangerous waters you need very strong strategic reasons. Are we really going to risk that over who rules the wreckage of Syria or is it 1939 again?

 

[Nylock]

Which bit of 1939 are you referring to? A lot happened that year....

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
As a convoy of blacked-out SUVs roared past him, Refaat smirked. “I got offered a job with one of the ‘new bosses,’” he said—referring to the commanders of the pro-government militias now enjoying extravagant lifestyles thanks to their side gigs as war profiteers. They asked him to work with them and play at their parties. “I said no. If I work for them, then they own me, and I can’t work anywhere else. At least let me be free in my own self.”

Refaat’s story illustrates another reality of Syria’s brutalized economy. George Saghir, a Syrian economist based in New York, explained that people in both the public and private sectors have found ways to profit from it, with the aid of a sanctions regime designed for precisely the opposite effect. “They were some of the most punitive sanctions ever … not a single person abroad can do business inside Syria,” Saghir said. “The way the sanctions were written were certain to hurt the country’s economy and turn its business elites against the government.”
...

Unintended consequences!

Great piece on the extreme corruption of Useful Syria focused around new NDF militia crime lords added on top of traditionally light fingered military badly paid and licensed to steal. The private security companies that you hire not to protect you from terrorists but to ease your way through a maize of rent seeking NDF thugs is a great wheeze authorised by the government.

This actually sounds even worse than Baghdad or Irbil. I'm reminded Serbia's thuggish militia captains living high on the hog. It predicts these NDF parasites will make out like gangbusters in any Assad led reconstruction. But also that there are a lot of incentives here to keep a very profitable spiv war economy going.

Of course the rebel side is riddled with rackets and banditry as well. Some FSA mobs look more like mercenaries taking the foreign shilling rather than revolutionaries. Both IS and AQ have exploited groups profit taking as an excuse when the stage take overs.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In NOW. Did Turkey abandon Aleppo to fight Syrian Kurds?

...
Sources on the ground also confirmed a recent cutback in military aid to rebel groups in Aleppo. “Any large scale attack by the Syrian regime to capture Aleppo usually leads to an immediate increase in the support we receive from our allies in order to halt the offensive. But it seems that something has changed. Although the regime and Russia are launching the worst attack so far to capture Aleppo, we still have not received any significant support to counter them,” said Ahmed Hussein, a media activist in Aleppo affiliated with Ahrar al-Sham. Commenting onto the recent escalation in the city, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan only provided vague statements on the need for foreign powers to “continue our discussions.” Coupled with Turkey’s lack of a response to the targeting of an aid convoy outside Aleppo during the now-dead ceasefire, the government in Ankara has markedly changed its previous belligerent tone toward the actions of the regime and Moscow in the country.

Moreover, a well informed western diplomat based in Beirut, who spoke on condition of anonymity, also confirmed the existence of such a deal. “Different officials allied with the Syrian regime confirmed on several occasions the existence of a trade-off deal with Turkey,” the envoy claimed. “None of them revealed the details of the deal; however, they all mentioned that Turkey gave up on Aleppo in exchange for its operations against the Syrian Kurds along the Turkish border in northern Syria. They also mentioned that Turkey asked for a few months in order to distance itself from some rebel groups that are considered radical.”

The mystery that is surrounding the details of the rumored agreement between Turkey and Russia could be due to the fact that secrecy is essential for the success of the deal. However, the prevailing mystery may also be related to the inability of the actors to finalize the details of such a complicated agreement. However, if such a deal comes to fruition, it will very likely increase the complexity of the Syrian conflict, with more killing and displacement of civilians in Aleppo, radical groups increasing their influence on the ground and renewed ethnic tensions between Syrian Arabs and Kurds.

Turks effectively selling out their rebels in return for being allowed to thwart the PKK in Syria. The sources are a bit vague and the details unclear here but both parties would have good reasons for leaving it opaque. It would be a very delicate matter with the KSA, the Americans and the Turks would need to keep their rebels on side while the Russians would have to reassure their allies it's not a ruse and they'd probably want to keep switching to supporting the PKK as an option.

There did appear to be a lot of support coming in from Turkey behind the last rebel offensive. But that started months before the unsuccessful push to break the siege during the CoH. The Russian-Turkish rapprochement was ongoing. Of course that's the sort of hardball Erdogan plays. I doubt Ankara would entirely abandon the rebels. They're leverage to shape the outcome in Syria even if the Baath prove tenacious and they need proxies to fight the PKK in Syria.

The article implies an attempt to split the rebels from the most radical Salafi may be included. The Turks probably know that would defang the revolt but when you work with such people tactically you always have to have a plan to kill them. That would mirror the Russian deal that seems to have been made with Jordan. That diverted the revolt from toppling Assad to serving as effectively a mercenary force looking after Jordan's interest in keeping undesirables away from their border. The Southern rebels have since been fighting IS affiliated groups and each other. In that case part of the agreement seems to have been to limit Iranian activities in Southern Syria. Not something that's proved to be entirely in Russia's gift. Though I have seen smug Iranian statements that they regard the Southern revolt as no longer a problem. If the Russians are getting a similar deal together in the North as well it could be a major development.

There has been much focus on the fairly small and somewhat clumsy Russian air campaign as a game changer in Syria. It's actually the careful diplomacy with Israel, Jordan and now perhaps Turkey while keeping the strategically confused US off balance that I find impressive. Of course the superpower muscle flexing supports that even if Russia is much diminished compared to the USSR.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The WSJ Putin Tightens His Grip on Syria

SA-23 anti-ballistic missile system deployed to Syria beefing up air defences. They say just for Russian basing.

I recall when Obama was talking about "degrading" Assad's forces using ship launched cruise missiles was discussed.

Our assault on Libya featured a barrage of over 100 US cruise missile taking out important military nodes. The British also fired off a few of these expensive items. One of which got stuck in the launch tube. This is the sort of attack you do before imposing a humanitarian No Fly Zone or deciding to hunt down a troublesome despot with JDAMs.

 

[CrabbedOne]

At which point the nasty Russians scurry away with their casualties to drown their sorrows in well chilled aftershave, at least that's the theory.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TNI Why the United States Should Exercise Restraint Before Launching A New War in Syria

...
If the U.S. military does intervene in Syria, and Russian and Syrian forces fight back, American F-22s would likely be able to quickly eliminate the Russian S-400, Pantsir-S1 as well as Russia’s Su-30, Su-35s and Su-34s with relative ease. Conventional U.S. fourth-generation fighters such as the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 would have to wait until the Russian-built air defenses—which, given the S-400’s nearly 250 mile coverage radius, encompass nearly the entire Syrian landmass—were cleared by stealth aircraft such as the Raptor and the Northrop Grumman B-2 Sprit strategic bomber. It is not clear if the long-range 40N6 is operational, but regardless, actions can have unintended consequences.

Russia might not limit its retaliation to just American and NATO forces in Syria. Given Moscow’s arsenal of Kaliber-NK cruise missiles and long-range bombers and submarines, the Kremlin has options to strike back across a huge geographic range. It is not outside realm of the possible that Russia would hit back at U.S. bases in Qatar, United Arab Emirates or Turkey using long-range precision-guided cruise missiles. The Russian Black Sea fleet and the Caspian Sea flotilla can easily hit such targets. Then there is Moscow’s formidable bomber fleet which can target the continental United States itself.

Thus, while it is easy to start a conflict with Russia and Syria, a shooting war could easily escalate out of control. It might be prudent to exercise restraint before launching a new war—against a nuclear-armed power—that the American people don’t necessarily want to fight. That’s especially true in a conflict where the lines are blurry and there are no clear-cut good guys—where even so-called “moderate” rebels backed by the U.S. government are beheading children. Under such circumstances, the best policy for the United States might simply be to leave well enough alone—there is simply no need to stick our fingers into yet another hornet’s nest.

That is the thing as with a clash with Turkey if the Russians choose to they can bring far more conventional capabilities to bear than the small part that is deployed in Syria and it would probably be accompanied by asymmetric Iranian action. They might not when bullied into a corner but that is a gamble.

Points out that US actions in Syria are a bit hampered by being "technically illegal" (i.e. illegal) as there's no UN resolution (and never going to be one as Russia and China have a veto) and unlike Russia and Iran the US hasn't been invited in. And Kerry says sorrowfully to the rebels while Russia flouts international law the upright US cannot be seen to do so. An odd argument they might say as the US is already chasing IS across Syrian territory aided by what was an arm of a US designated terrorist group (and would be but for a large obvious fib flagrantly violating US Federal law) while supplying TOWS to groups who provide fire support for another designated terrorist group AQ Syria. The latter part can't even be framed in traditional terms of national self defence.

 

[Nylock]

...
Russia is impudently breaking out of containment. The long dominant Pentagon's conventional advantage is far greater but is declining. The place is there to imagine future wars and buy the ludicrously expensive kit to win them. Russia and China are the only credible enemies. All that's porky spending is done despite the rival genocidal nuclear cosh being on a hair trigger. Such wars remain very thinkable. If you read QDR 98 amongst others you'll find a fair description of the coming armoured dash to Baghdad. Col Lawrence Wilkerson reckoned Rumsfeld's Pentagon was itching for a proper target rich war over Taiwan before 9-11. We then charged into Iraq yelling it was 1939, Saddam had gassed his own people was a whisker away from nukes and to do otherwise was appeasement. It wasn't a rational response to the traumatic shock of 9-11, we did it in part because the capability had been bought to do it easily as regime change in Iraq was US policy.

Had Iraq been sitting on a similar stockpile of nukes as the Russians, regardless of conventional superiority, there is no way the US would have gone near them with a shitty stick. As far as piling into a 'target rich war over Taiwan' is concerned, you have a scenario where a war with China -even a nuclear one- is a winnable prospect for US military planners. Russia and China have always had a shaky 'alliance' and either of these are not above chucking the other under the bus if it is in the national interest to do so. You also have the fact that, whilst China is a nuclear power, it's arsenal is dwarfed by the US' one so a limited exchange and eventual surrender is more of a realistic prospect from that anti-human point of view as well.

Obama is pilloried for failing to protect Syrians from their despotic ruler in a similar manner that we are assured will lack such complications. The US position has weakened but "Assad must go" is still there just caveated with eventually. The only way that's happening any time soon is if we chase him down with JDAM's like Qaddafi. The Kremlin appears willing to fight for the brute.

...and right there is your problem.

And yes a clash with Russia could make chasing a few poorly armed beards round the ME seem rather trivial. That is in fact trivial compared with a conventional tussle with a near peer in which losing a carrier is not that unlikely. There's even an off chance a clash over Syria might result in a devastating nuclear war. Reading his speeches I don't find Putin very rational when it comes to blood sacrifice for Mother Russia. I tend to believe his insane nuclear blackmail. Others are convinced nuclear inevitably deterrence works. But that's rather my point if you are going to sail into such dangerous waters you need very strong strategic reasons. Are we really going to risk that over who rules the wreckage of Syria or is it 1939 again?

Poorly armed? If by 'poorly armed' you mean everything short of ballistic missiles, a navy and close air support then yeah they're poorly armed... There are no strong strategic reasons for risking turning Syria into a wider, possibly global, conflict. Again, which part of 1939 are you referring to here?

 

[teqniq]

Hospitals legitimate target for Assad and Moscow: Russian ambassador - ARA News

 

[CrabbedOne]

Had Iraq been sitting on a similar stockpile of nukes as the Russians, regardless of conventional superiority, there is no way the US would have gone near them with a shitty stick. As far as piling into a 'target rich war over Taiwan' is concerned, you have a scenario where a war with China -even a nuclear one- is a winnable prospect for US military planners. Russia and China have always had a shaky 'alliance' and either of these are not above chucking the other under the bus if it is in the national interest to do so. You also have the fact that, whilst China is a nuclear power, it's arsenal is dwarfed by the US' one so a limited exchange and eventual surrender is more of a realistic prospect from that anti-human point of view as well.


...and right there is your problem.


Poorly armed? If by 'poorly armed' you mean everything short of ballistic missiles, a navy and close air support then yeah they're poorly armed... There are no strong strategic reasons for risking turning Syria into a wider, possibly global, conflict. Again, which part of 1939 are you referring to here?

I was referring to the part about 39 where British appeasement of Germany failed catastrophically which was cited as a reason for launching a preemptive war before Saddam strengthened his capabilities. Similar reasoning 1914 led the German High Command to favour a clash with Russia. It occurs to me that the Pentagon might be daft enough to prefer to knock Russia about while it is relatively weak in order to "restore deterrence"; it's the way the Israelis think in this region. You can rely too much on countries being calculating or even rational actors in these things especially when they haven't had a proper war in some time. There was little evidence of strategic thinking when we invaded Iraq.

I agree with you about the folly of risking a clash with Russia over who rules Damascus. The very belligerent Israelis almost instantly went very cool on regime change once Russian airpower was in theatre. The Russians are peculiarly dangerous because they may have signifiant conventional strength but are much weaker than the USSR and still could fry the Eastern Seaboard. Obama is right to be cautious but he faces an awful lot of outraged critics comparing Syria to Rwanda. We often seem to have lost track of the hugely more dangerous risk parameters of a new Cold War in comparison with heavily hyped terrorism threats.

If the Russians were actively backing comparatively puny actors like AQ or IS in Syria it still would not be worth a fight with them. Instead they are propping up the brutal Baathist state. Ironically from the Russian point of view after a decade and a half of GWOT after 9-11 we've managed to engineer ourselves into a situation in Syria where we are backing a revolt in which AQ and their fellow travellers are increasingly prominent and now are inventing excuses for not reversing that obtuse position.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
If the rebels and their backers are in fact unable to prevent Aleppo from falling at some point, as U.S. intelligence seems to think, then the opposition, its international backers, and the United Nations must soon decide how to handle that slow collapse. Many will argue that they should try to negotiate a deal that would at least limit the suffering of civilians, though the question is if that can be done without putting a stamp of approval on what amounts to a strategy of deliberate war crimes. It is already the route taken by Staffan de Mistura, who must be well aware that excising Fateh al-Sham from the wider Aleppan insurgency would weaken the opposition’s military posture, perhaps fatally so. But his ambition now seems to be to provide the civilians of Eastern Aleppo with a soft landing, and little more.

With so little leverage and such poor odds, rejectionist grandstanding is not likely to serve the opposition well. There is virtually no chance that Bashar al-Assad and his allies will relent or loosen their grip on the enclave. In an interview on Danish television on October 6, the Syrian president again stated what he has always said: that he intends to “continue the fight with the rebels until they leave Aleppo. They have to. There’s no other option.”

He seems to mean it.

According to Lund here about half the civilian population of the East Aleppo pocket wants to leave. However they are scared about how state forces might deal with them and there may be some coercion from the opposition. In some recent cases after surrender I recall both armed fighters and civilians were bussed out to rebel territory.

Separating the insurgents from the population could be said to be the main aim in COIN. It's absolutely normal in Iraqi sieges for population to flee bombardment of IS held areas and to be enabled in doing so by aid agencies. Nearly a million people are expect to flee the siege of Mosul and the UN is working busily to receive them. In East Aleppo things are a little different as the usual humanitarian impulse of the UN to mitigate civilian suffering is criticised as helping Assad crush a revolt that the international community has some sympathy with. The regime is even trying to look like a little less intimidating host according to Lund in order to facilitate emptying the pocket.

Staffan de Mistura offer to personally walk AQ Syria fighters out of the pocket was greeted with hostility by other rebels. Lund points out probably rightly that that would severely weaken their defences. There was a small AQ presence but this large contingent of nearly a thousand AQ fighters entered Aleppo months ago from Idlib before the siege closed. Initially they were not that welcomed by other rebels. Recently AQ has played an heroic role in attempting to break the siege of East Aleppo. They aren't why Damascus wants East Aleppo. Just a handy excuse for the Russians.

That such a UN offer can be made at all is remarkable. Imagine the field day of outrage FOX News would have had if Kofi Annan walked AQI fighters to safety before the USMC stormed Fallujah. When IS convoys fled Fallujah a couple of months ago no UN suit was offering to rush in to play Pied Piper. Unlike shattered Ramadi the city finally fell fairly easily. It was probably an exit IS negotiated with the ISF. Shia militias wearing their Federal Police uniforms sifted through those who remained disappearing hundreds of men some of whom may have been sleepers. The IS convoys got lit up by Iraqi and then our airpower out in open desert though there was some hesitation as their families were with them.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On the interpreter Syria: What are we going to do now?

...
Only Charles Lister from the MEI has had a crack at outlining a series of steps that constitute something that approaches a strategy, an effort for which he should be congratulated. But his proposal is practically unworkable as it requires international law to be ignored. It assumes the Russians would be willing to sit and take whatever the US throws at them. It suggests pro-Al Qaeda jihadists should not be targeted in favour of other opposition groups being made to ‘re-realise’ that the jihadists were not preferred battlefield partners, despite the fact the AQ fighters are largely Syrians and the most capable rebel military force. Any one of the assumptions on which the plan is based doesn’t stand up to much scrutiny, and the combination of them all even less so.

President Obama has no shortage of commentators and pundits who have any number of suggestions for getting involved in military action in Syria, but not one of them has any coherent sense of where such action would lead, or even what to do when the opening military actions don't achieve the effect envisioned. That is the difference between the calculations of a commander-in-chief, who needs to look at things strategically, and commentators and advocates who can't see past the tactical.

Assad has been a weak passively aggressive enemy even for the Israelis. His lack of competence and capability to ever control the country is their main problem with him. He's become too much of an Iranian puppet. It's a cold view that sees no better solution emerging on the revolt side and eyes the Russians warily as a force to counter Iranian domination of his weak hand. It's largely oblivious to R2P arguments that demand a dutiful intervention in order to end Syrian suffering. The Israelis do not think of their country as an obligated NGO. It's actually not that far from how the typical US voter feels about Syria.

Like Lister I have doubts even with Russian and Iranian support Assad can pacify the place. Assad lacks the muscle to entirely crush the revolt and his allies don't look eager to hold all of Syria for him. Assad is a terrible leader who disastrously also lacks the political nous to cut deals with his rebel enemies short of abject surrender. But then it's hard to see the multiple rival factions of the revolt ruling a peaceful Syria and Iraq isn't liable to be still either.

 

[Casually Red]

A terrible leader who's still there after 5 years of attempts by a superpower and Gulf sheikhdoms to remove him .

As has been pointed out before Lister is a paid Qatari shill. A mouthpiece for the sheikhs sponsoring the Jihadists . A paid propagandist . It's no surprise at all he regards Assads refusal to surrender to Qatari demands as an example of " terrible leadership " . As regards necessary muscle its currently being flexed in Allepo , to the wails of the Qataris, Saudis etc who see the writing on the wall for their proxies . Once that issue has been settled that necessary muscle will be freed up to do the same all over Syria. Every last inch of it .

We are also seeing it being flexed in Hama . A massive jihadist offensive there intended to create a diversion for Allepo has now also been blunted by the Syrian Army and is currently being rolled back . The sheikhs are running out of cards to play . The breaking of the siege has failed abysmally. Jihadist defensive lines are crumbling daily . The diversion has also failed . Assad and Putin are chewing them up and spitting them out .

 

[Casually Red]

Assad is a terrible leader who disastrously also lacks the political nous to cut deals with his rebel enemies short of abject surrender. But then it's hard to see the multiple rival factions of the revolt ruling a peaceful Syria and Iraq isn't liable to be still either.

This isn't even remotely correct . Southern Syria, for example , has been largely quiet for years now after a woeful failure of a rebel offensive was wiped out . Since then the rebels and the SAA have largely left each other alone . No formal agreement but a definite policy of non aggression on the ground by both sides that's lasted years .
There's been a reconciliation programme ongoing for years now . That's seen thousands of rebels hand themselves in and regularise their status with the government . An effective amnesty . Some have even switched sides and joined the NDF .
There are other rebel pockets were there's been a truce in place for years . Rebels agreed to hand over any heavy weaponry, they can keep their small arms . Government respects truce and stays out of area and let's supplies and aid enter . And there have been a number of evacuation deals ..Homs the best known example..were rebels are bussed out along with their families , and their guns . Usually to Idlib province . There were other deals in Daraya , Zabadani , Southern Damascus etc .

Many of these deals and agreements have provoked deep anger among the Syrian population who want to see the rebels wiped out . It's taken strong and skilful leadership on Assads part to sell them as necessary to his support base who've paid an absolute terrible price standing up to the aggression .



And a good article here on the national reconciliation programme

Reconciliation Is The Only Way Forward For Syria

 

[CrabbedOne]

On The Washington Institute Who Will Take al-Bab?

...
CONCLUSION

Since 2011, most Western (and Russian) analysts have underestimated Iran and Moscow's support to Damascus and the resilience of the Assad regime, arguing that the Syrian army's manpower shortage would be an insurmountable handicap. Once again, however, the regime and its allies appear strong enough to launch further offensives, including against al-Bab. Their siege of Aleppo seems close to success given the recent breakdown in U.S.-Russian ceasefire talks, so more troops may soon be freed up for such offensives. To be sure, cities such as Hama and Damascus continue to face rebel threats, but the danger is probably not dire enough to draw massive forces away from the north in the near term. And if the army and its Shiite allies are not sufficiently strong to retake al-Bab, Assad and Putin's interests may still be served by allowing the SDF to conquer the city or even helping them do so. These scenarios leave Washington with two salient alternatives: support an SDF advance on al-Bab and risk alienating the Turks, or push for a strong offensive by Turkey-backed rebels to take the city quickly, which could damage relations with the Kurds, the principal U.S. partner against IS thus far.

Balanche has al Bab as an IS friendly area but one that has lost most of its strategic value.

It's interesting to consider what force IS might benefit most from handing al Bab to. Loyalist forces are nearest, just 10 km away and the regime is too weak to push towards Raqqa and will look weak if it does not try to take al Bab. Balanche here suggests Turkey's rebels would be the worst new occupiers from IS point of view perhaps pursuing them to Raqqa. With such a sparse force seems unlikely to me. The best for IS though may be the SDF as the PKK are liable to fall to fighting with an outraged Turkey and be distracted from Raqqa. He might be right there.

It does strike me that al Bab being taken by the regime might be the least complicated outcome for Ankara.

 

[CrabbedOne]

That always 1939 feeling. Somehow no one ever has the imagination to turn up as Erich von Falkenhayn babbling in 1914: “Even if we go under as a result of this, still it was beautiful.”

 

[Idris2002]

That always 1939 feeling. Somehow no one ever has the imagination to turn up as Erich von Falkenhayn babbling in 1914: “Even if we go under as a result of this, still it was beautiful.”

As I've said before, appeasement is remembered as an act of naivete carried out from a position of weakness, when in reality it was an act of cynicism carried out from a position of strength.

Today, we have acts of cynicism carried out from positions of weakness. What an innovation in social progresss.

 

[CrabbedOne]

This isn't even remotely correct . Southern Syria, for example , has been largely quiet for years now after a woeful failure of a rebel offensive was wiped out . Since then the rebels and the SAA have largely left each other alone . No formal agreement but a definite policy of non aggression on the ground by both sides that's lasted years .
There's been a reconciliation programme ongoing for years now . That's seen thousands of rebels hand themselves in and regularise their status with the government . An effective amnesty . Some have even switched sides and joined the NDF .
There are other rebel pockets were there's been a truce in place for years . Rebels agreed to hand over any heavy weaponry, they can keep their small arms . Government respects truce and stays out of area and let's supplies and aid enter . And there have been a number of evacuation deals ..Homs the best known example..were rebels are bussed out along with their families , and their guns . Usually to Idlib province . There were other deals in Daraya , Zabadani , Southern Damascus etc .

Many of these deals and agreements have provoked deep anger among the Syrian population who want to see the rebels wiped out . It's taken strong and skilful leadership on Assads part to sell them as necessary to his support base who've paid an absolute terrible price standing up to the aggression .



And a good article here on the national reconciliation programme

Reconciliation Is The Only Way Forward For Syria

Well that's partly nonsense, there were some surrenders of besieged places but the Southern front was quite lively until Jordan stopped supporting efforts to topple Assad. I recall at least one pretty disastrous Iranian offensive down Deraa way not so long ago. The Saudis were pretty hopeful that they could organise a thrust at Damascus from the South but the Russians entry into theatre and killing of JaI head Alloush quashed all hope of that. It's only gone quiet since then with a number of regime victories and lots of rebel infighting.

Assad is notorious for reneging on ceasefire terms often breaking pragmatic agreements brokered by the Russians and Iranians. They have far higher levels of trust from the rebels than the Syrian government. The regime's allies are just as ruthless but not as stupidly vindictive as that's just bad tactics. Several sieges that were essentially starved out found the starving went on after surrender. Daraya recently was entirely emptied out with the population dumped into Idlib. Fighting aged males who don't get being bussed out as part of surrender terms are liable to end up hanging from the ceiling with dislocated shoulders which tends to toughen the will to resistance rather than break it. This is what the Baathist state is like. Syrian intelligence methodically persecuting even relatives of rebels isn't new, from the Lund article above:

...
That said, the larger problem does appear to be a deep mistrust of the government among Eastern Aleppans. Fear of the Baathist security apparatus ran deep in Syria long before 2011, and, historically, the government has rarely shown itself a gracious winner. Many middle-aged or elderly Syrians will recall horrendous abuses against suspected Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers, which did not end after its failed 1979–82 insurgency. Rather, thousands of suspected Islamists disappeared in government captivity and petty harassment of their family members continued for years, in some cases decades. Since 2011, innumerable new stories about the vindictiveness, disorderly brutality, and duplicity of the Syrian security apparatus will have sunk into the collective consciousness of Eastern Aleppo, where, even by the deprived standards of these ruined neighborhoods, trust in an enemy’s good intentions is likely to remain in short supply.

The Assad government seems well aware of its credibility problem and is belatedly making ham-fisted attempts to show a softer side. When the assault on Eastern Aleppo began on September 22, the armed forces sought to publicly assure civilians that they would not be arrested or even questioned at the designated exit checkpoints. The army later clarified that Russian observers will also be present to guarantee safe conduct, in case Eastern Aleppans do not trust the military to stay true to its word. But for people seeking to leave the enclave, the problem is more complex and difficult to resolve. Passing a single checkpoint is one thing, but those who decide to cross the frontline must also know that they can stay and live in government-held territory without being pressured or extorted, subjected to revenge attacks by out-of-control militias, or, as happened in the 1980s, picked up by the intelligence services years later. Could the Russians or anyone else guarantee the safety of civilians and ex-rebels next week, next month, and next year?
...

And these days Bashar actually has little control over NDF militias that methodically loot vacated property and prey on IDPs mercilessly. SAA officers get rich hoarding food and selling it at inflated prices in the camps while moaning about the NDF guys getting all the best spoils. He can't even guarantee people fleeing sieges safety because that is often down to the whim of a predatory local warlord.

In Chechnya the Russian state was remarkably brutal but they were also wise enough to eventually offer conciliatory incentives to a population mashed into a pulp by the big stick which led to some reconciliation. It will never happen under Assad, he's weak and terrified of looking weak.