Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The war and "the left" - what do "we" do?

Which of the following would you support?


  • Total voters
    103
I do think that some academics working on this stuff do need to pay more attention to Ukrainian perspectives though - I went to a lecture on the holodomor on Monday and the woman speaking said that about 10 years ago there were people arguing it was justified from a pro Soviet pov within a uk university

Just that 'decolonisation' in the exact US sense isn't necessarily the right framework
 
What I'm saying it's a very bad idea for American style radlibs to start labelling random Russians in these places as colonists etc, for a start that's not how Soviet colonialism worked
One big difference is the majority of the Russians who settled in various parts of the Soviet Union weren't moving there in order to own the land and be the bosses. Mostly they were going to take jobs in factories, etc. This is nothing like, eg, the British empire.
 
One big difference is the majority of the Russians who settled in various parts of the Soviet Union weren't moving there in order to own the land and be the bosses. Mostly they were going to take jobs in factories, etc. This is nothing like, eg, the British empire.
Thats not entirely true tho. in Moldova a lot of them did end up as the bosses or at least in well paying jobs, and the leadership of the republic was mostly Russian. whereas the majority of Romanian speakers remained as poor farmers, that's why so much of the industry in Moldova is still in Transnistria and they're still dependent on it for some of their electricity. Few Romanian speakers or people from a non Russian or Ukrainian background got to any sort of high position in the Moldovan SSR until independence.
 
What I'm saying it's a very bad idea for American style radlibs to start labelling random Russians in these places as colonists etc, for a start that's not how Soviet colonialism worked. Russian and Russian speaking communities also existed in these places for centuries well before the USSR too, likewise with Ukrainians in what's now Russia too
That's true. But there was also a deliberate policy under the Bolsheviks and Stalin of massive Russian settlement in areas cleared by deliberate famine and ethnic cleansing. Precisely to make the break up of the Russian empire difficult. The Brits did a similar thing in Northern Ireland. It was never a policy designed for ethnicities to rub along easily together, but for one to dominate over the others. All it needs is for the 'planted' population to acknowledge its reason for being there. That seems not to be very easy.
 
I'd also say it very much depended where you were and who you were, Muslim minorities were particularly badly treated. The Crimean Tatars were deported en mass in 1944 and not allowed back until the late 80s.
 
One big difference is the majority of the Russians who settled in various parts of the Soviet Union weren't moving there in order to own the land and be the bosses. Mostly they were going to take jobs in factories, etc. This is nothing like, eg, the British empire.
What I'm arguing isn't that it was better than the British empire as it was at least as bad. but just that the situation of Russians and russian speakers isn't like that of eg white people in India or parts of Africa at the end of colonialism and shouldn't be equated to it
 
I'd also say it very much depended where you were and who you were, Muslim minorities were particularly badly treated. The Crimean Tatars were deported en mass in 1944 and not allowed back until the late 80s.
The late 1980s-when what we are seeing now could have been made near impossible.

Instead the ex-USSR got a bunch of neo-liberal carpetbaggers and chaos-and then the reaction...
 
(There was a vague feeling at large, although only among a minority, that maybe a future world war had been set in motion...)
 
Thats not entirely true tho. in Moldova a lot of them did end up as the bosses or at least in well paying jobs, and the leadership of the republic was mostly Russian. whereas the majority of Romanian speakers remained as poor farmers, that's why so much of the industry in Moldova is still in Transnistria and they're still dependent on it for some of their electricity. Few Romanian speakers or people from a non Russian or Ukrainian background got to any sort of high position in the Moldovan SSR until independence.
Fair enough. In Latvia and Estonia, the majority of the migrants were just ordinary workers. And of course it is largely them and their descendants who are stuck there now - those with greater social capital have moved away.

I don't want to downplay the cultural suppression that went on in the Soviet Union. But since independence, those actions have all too often found their mirror equivalents. You required everyone to speak Russian? Ok, well we're now going to require everyone to speak Latvian. I get that there is justifiable anger about the past, but this kind of ethno-nationalism is always ugly. Obviously, it is ugly somewhere like the Balkans. But it can also look very ugly in places like Catalonia.
 
(There was a vague feeling at large, although only among a minority, that maybe a future world war had been set in motion...)
I admit that I wasn't paying enough attention at the time, but the fact that the new nationalist leaders in so many ex-Soviet republics were former apparatchiks of the Soviet Union was a giveaway of what was really going on. Plunder by those positioned to plunder.

But tbh I saw in Ukraine signs that they were stumbling towards something better. And this might not be a popular thing to say, but I also see the EU as potentially a very positive force in this situation. Compare and contrast the states that have moved towards the EU with, say, the republics of Central Asia. For all their faults, I'd far rather live in any of the Baltic states than in any of the Central Asian states.
 
I admit that I wasn't paying enough attention at the time, but the fact that the new nationalist leaders in so many ex-Soviet republics were former apparatchiks of the Soviet Union was a giveaway of what was really going on. Plunder by those positioned to plunder.

But tbh I saw in Ukraine signs that they were stumbling towards something better. And this might not be a popular thing to say, but I also see the EU as potentially a very positive force in this situation. Compare and contrast the states that have moved towards the EU with, say, the republics of Central Asia. For all their faults, I'd far rather live in any of the Baltic states than in any of the Central Asian states.
Can you suggest anyone who would realistically have taken over in so many of the former Soviet republics who were not former apparatchiks? I don't think you can. Not saying it's right or good, just who else could have come in?
 
I admit that I wasn't paying enough attention at the time, but the fact that the new nationalist leaders in so many ex-Soviet republics were former apparatchiks of the Soviet Union was a giveaway of what was really going on. Plunder by those positioned to plunder.

But tbh I saw in Ukraine signs that they were stumbling towards something better. And this might not be a popular thing to say, but I also see the EU as potentially a very positive force in this situation. Compare and contrast the states that have moved towards the EU with, say, the republics of Central Asia. For all their faults, I'd far rather live in any of the Baltic states than in any of the Central Asian states.
But the EU is actually called the European Union for a reason. It's beyond its scope to encompass the former USSR evn if that was possible.
 
Can you suggest anyone who would realistically have taken over in so many of the former Soviet republics who were not former apparatchiks? I don't think you can. Not saying it's right or good, just who else could have come in?
Not everybody who got rich was a former Communist Party apparatchik anyway. You had new people muscling their way in who had always hated the system (although, it being Russia, attitides towards offialdom were always ambiguous), as well as veterans from the Vory v' Zakone.
 
But the EU is actually called the European Union for a reason. It's beyond its scope to encompass the former USSR evn if that was possible.
NATO is the north Atlantic treaty organisation yet it includes both landlocked countries and others with no access to the Atlantic. Israel play in the European championships not against their neighbours in Asia. Not all organisations are limited by their names as you suggest
 
NATO is the north Atlantic treaty organisation yet it includes both landlocked countries and others with no access to the Atlantic. Israel play in the European championships not against their neighbours in Asia. Not all organisations are limited by their names as you suggest
I know, but come on...
 
Not everybody who got rich was a former Communist Party apparatchik anyway. You had new people muscling their way in who had always hated the system (although, it being Russia, attitides towards offialdom were always ambiguous), as well as veterans from the Vory v' Zakone.
I didn't say anything which should have prompted that response
 
The thing about Eastern Europe is that it's recent history has been has shown shortcoming of nationalisms. Pre WW2 Ukraine had mixed Polish/ Ukrainian population in Western Ukraine. Part of Western Ukraine was in Poland after WW1.

There was tension in that area whilst under Polish control. During WW2 Ukrainian nationalists ethnically cleansed Poles. This conflict went on after WW2. And was independent of the war against Nazis.

To end it Poles were relocated to new Polish land taken from Germany at end of WW2.

Have Polish friend whose grandparents were ethnically cleansed from Western Ukraine. He hasn't forgotten.

Poland after collapse of Soviet Union hasn't as far as I know made an issue of this. It's accepted it's present borders.

Like Poland Ukraine is more "Ukrainian" in its Western regions at least than before WW2. The large Jewish population was decimated by Ukraine nationalists and Nazis.

The Jewish population of Eastern Europe were the big losers in the rise of small nation states after WW1 and the rise of Nazism. They were better off in Soviet Union.

Given the history I'm not clear how Ukraine being fast tracked into EU is going to help ensure a tolerant liberal Ukraine. EU despite friction appears to be able to function with some countries having quite intolerant illiberal right wing governments. Poland being one of them.

Is it progressive to support Ukraine joining EU?
 
Last edited:
It’s a verb! To fashjacket.

It’s the kind of thing a hatstand would say.
maybe it refers to the fashoda crisis of 1898 - or to the socialist reaction to it?

'...This was evidenced especially by the agreement between the English and French trade unions following the Fashoda Affair for the maintenance of peace and for the restoration of friendly relations between England and France...'

i.e:

fashjacket
verb
fashjacketed; fashjacketing; fashjackets
Definition of fashjacket (Entry 2 of 2)
transitive verb
1: to increase international solidarity and antimilitaristic activity as if by a jack (see JACK entry 1 sense 3a) : JACK UP
in response to an international crisis as exemplified by the Fashoda Incident.
 
This did not get much traction before, but would still be interested to hear if people have any thoughts on it?


Beware of over-the-counter geopolitics.

Certainly, it’s desirable to understand the economic, diplomatic, and military interests of the great powers; yet contenting yourself with an abstract geopolitical framing of the situation can leave you with an abstract, disconnected understanding of the terrain. This way of understanding tends to conceal the ordinary protagonists of the conflict, those who resemble us, those with whom we can identify. Above all, let’s not forget: what will happen is that people will suffer because of the choices of rulers who see the world as a chessboard, as a reservoir of resources to be plundered. This is the way that oppressors see the world. It should never be adopted by peoples, who should focus on building bridges between them, on finding common interests.

This does not mean that we should neglect strategy, but it means strategizing on our own terms, at a scale on which we can take action ourselves—not to debate about whether to move tank divisions or cut gas imports. See our concrete proposals at the end of the article for more...


If we understand and join the call to end the war, we insist that we must do so without any ambiguity as to the identity of the aggressor. Neither in Ukraine nor in Syria nor anywhere else in the world can ordinary people be blamed for taking up arms to try to defend their own lives and those of their families.

More generally, we advise people who don’t know what a dictatorship is (even if Western countries are becoming more overtly authoritarian) or what it is like to be bombed to refrain from telling Ukrainians—as some have already told Syrians or Hong Kongers—not to ask for help from the West or not to want liberal or representative democracy as a minimum political system. Many of these people are already clear on the imperfections of these political systems—but their priority is not to maintain an irreproachable political position, but rather to survive the next day’s bombings, or not to end up in a country in which a careless word can land you twenty years in prison. Insisting on this sort of purist discourse demonstrates a determination to impose one’s theoretical analysis on a context that is not one’s own. This indicates a real disconnection from the terrain and a very Western sort of privilege.

Instead, let’s listen to the words of Ukrainian comrades who said, echoing Mikhail Bakunin, “We firmly believe that the most imperfect republic is a thousand times better than the most enlightened monarchy.”...

Support popular resistance in Ukraine and Russia.

As the Arab revolutions, the Yellow Vests, and the Maidan have proven, the uprisings of the 21st century will not be ideologically “pure.” While we understand that it is more comfortable and galvanizing to identify with powerful (and victorious) actors, we must not betray our fundamental principles. We invite the radical left to take off their old conceptual glasses to confront their theoretical positions with reality. These positions must be adjusted according to reality, not the other way around.

It is for these reasons that in Ukraine, we call for people to prioritize supporting initiatives that come from the base: the self-defense and self-organization initiatives that are currently flourishing. One can discover that often, people who organize themselves can in fact defend radical conceptions of democracy and social justice—even if they do not call themselves “leftist” or “progressive.”

Also, as many Russian activists have said, we believe that a popular uprising in Russia could help end the war, just as in 1905 and 1917. When we consider the extent of the repression in Russia since the war began—over ten thousand demonstrators imprisoned, media censorship, the blocking of social networks and perhaps soon the internet—it is impossible not to hope that a revolution could lead to fall of the regime. This would finally put a stop, once and for all, to Putin’s crimes in Russia, Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere.

This is also the case for Syria where, following the internationalization of the conflict, far from resenting the Iranian, Russian, or Lebanese peoples, the uprisings of these peoples could make us believe again in the possibility that Bashar al-Assad will fall, as well.

Likewise, we want to see radical upheavals and radical extensions of democracy, justice, and equality in the United States, France, and every other country that bases its power on the oppression of other peoples or a part of its own population...

Proposed positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine


Express full support for Ukrainian popular resistance against the Russian invasion.
Prioritize support for self-organized groups defending emancipatory positions in Ukraine through donations, humanitarian aid, and publicizing their demands.
Support progressive anti-war and anti-regime forces in Russia and publicize their positions.
House Ukrainian exiles and organize events and infrastructure to make their voices heard.
Combat all pro-Putin discourse, especially on the left. The war in Ukraine offers a crucial opportunity to put a definitive end to campism and toxic masculinity.
Combat pro-NATO discourse by ideology.
Refuse support to those in Ukraine and elsewhere who defend ultra-nationalist, xenophobic, and racist policies.
Permanent criticism and distrust of NATO’s actions in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Maintain pressure on governments via demonstrations, direct action, banners, forums, petitions, and other means in order to enforce the demands of self-organized actors on the ground.

Unfortunately, this is not much, but it’s all we can offer as long as there is no autonomous force here or elsewhere fighting for equality and emancipation that is capable of providing economic, political, or military support.

We sincerely hope that, this time, these positions will carry the day. If that happens, we will be deeply happy, but we will never forget that this was far from being the case for Syria, and that it cost it dearly.
 
What I'm arguing isn't that it was better than the British empire as it was at least as bad. but just that the situation of Russians and russian speakers isn't like that of eg white people in India or parts of Africa at the end of colonialism and shouldn't be equated to it

This documentary Lenin's Children illustrates the complexities of the debate very well. Many old Soviet-era folk still refer to the collapse of the USSR as a "very great disaster"- not just for the immediate shock, economic collapse and vanishing savings, but the ushering in of a decade of gangster plunder and privatisations followed by C21st immiseration and loss; grandparents bring up their grandchildren whilst they children they brought up in the 80s and 90s go to work in Russia.



On Moldova, Brezhnev very famously did not trust Moldovans to govern the Moldavian SSR so it was Russian speakers as the local first secretary almost to the very end. Moldova was seen as a "Latin Periphery" of the USSR and people were little interested in it for the most part. Chisniau / Kishinev became well-developed in Soviet times but there were staggering differences in living conditions and levels of modernity between the big towns and the countryside. Check out the photogrpahs of Zaharia Cusnir for an illustration of Moldovan village life in Soviet times; much like the village life my grandfather lived in at the beginning of the C20th in Scotland. For a quick and throwaway conparator, the photos of Ion Chibzii and the period of urban development in Soviet Moldavia are a good comparator (glamorous photos of the Soviet film industry in Moldova, too).

People often reduce Moldova's history to a vastly oversimplified binary between Romanian and Russian but the history is much more complex and nuanced. So many different people- Greeks, Turks, Poles, Romanians, Russians, have all had their time in charge in Moldova and it's a minor miracle that it is (for now) independent.
 
This did not get much traction before, but would still be interested to hear if people have any thoughts on it?

thats really good.

do you know anything about them?

btw - anyone read this one yet?

 
thats really good.

do you know anything about them?

btw - anyone read this one yet?

Not really anything beyond that one article, they've got a website but it's just in French and Arabic:

And here's their instagram, fwiw:
 
Back
Top Bottom