Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The walking TED talk as president: Macron

J Ed

Follow Back Pro Expropriation
Thread for why Macron is awful, I think it has potential to be very long..

I'll start off with this

French President Macron’s party withdraws 2nd candidate who supported BDS

For the second time this month, the party of French President Emmanuel Macron withdrew from its parliamentary elections ticket a candidate who promoted online a boycott of Israel.

William Tchamaha was removed Thursday from the En Marche centrist party’s list in the northern Seine-Maritime in next month’s elections, the news site Actu reported
 
http://www.politico.eu/article/emma...reform-french-president-france-economy-unions

politicoeu said:
Divide and reform

Macron is counting on divisions within the labor movement. France’s most influential union, the CFDT, is an overall supporter of decentralizing labor relations. This reformist union would be ready to support Macron if the government is open to its suggestions. CFDT is up in arms, for example, about a planned cap on damages for workers deemed unfairly dismissed by the courts.

A government adviser acknowledged that everything would be done to soothe CFDT’s concerns. “We have made sure we’ve kept some concessions in store for them,” he said.

“It depends on what exceptions they add into the rule,” said one union leader who is generally favorable to reform, though he is still unsure about Macron’s real intentions.

The concessions might not be granted on the reform Macron wants to see through this summer, but on others he plans for later this year regarding unemployment benefits and the management of the welfare system, another source said.
 
Is anything normal allowed to be considered awful now Trump is here?

He is just a better looking version of most of the last 25 years. He did cause some perplexed apoplexy among the US right supporting Le Pen, who decided that a man trying to reduce France's reasonably strong workers rights was somehow a leftist.

Seems like he's going to use foreign affairs to bolster his image, he already went much further than Merkel in calling out RT right to Putin's face. Which shouldn't count as a big deal, it's obvious RT is propaganda, and yet here we are.
 
I suppose there's some small mercy that he's told Trump that he (Trump) is wrong vis-à-vis the Paris agreement, which is more than the Maybot has managed.
 
C_WzP4FVwAA3GAL.jpg
 
The news coming in on my Twitter feed says that Macron's party has made big gains in the French parliamentary elections with about 32% of the vote. Turnout was at a historical low though.

Fucking shit! What in God's name do the French people see in this vapid superficial twat?
 
32.2% of those who bothered to vote went for LREM. Mélenchon's Insoumise tied with the FN in third.

This is just in terms of voting - I've no idea how this translates into seats.
 
Interview with a German economist who is very sceptical of Macron, from yesterday's TAZ (I ran it through Google translate):

Taz: Mr Flassbeck, the new French President Macron wants to reform the Eurozone. Among other things, he calls for a joint finance minister. What do you make of it?

Heiner Flassbeck: This is a ridiculous illusion. Important is not a person, but a reasonable economic concept for the Eurozone. But a common vision is missing. Instead, Germany is dictating the rules by demanding austerity programs from all countries.

Macron reports, however, that he wants a European investment program.

To implement another concept, Macron has to face explicitly against Germany. For such a confrontation, however, he would need a finance minister who has expertise in economic policy. Instead he chose Bruno Le Maire. This professional politician has already looked after all kinds of topics, including the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, but he has never dealt with economic policy. Le Maire has no chance against Finance Minister Schäuble and the other Swabian housewives from Germany.

The Germans argue that France should make "its homework" before trying European solutions.

In France there is no "reform". This is a German invention. Hourly productivity is higher in France than in Germany. It is not the French who have to deliver, but the Germans.

If the French are so productive - why do they have deficits in foreign trade?

The French have made their wages rise as much as productivity - and the Germans do not. Germany has pushed wages through the agenda policy and thus gained a competitive advantage. This generated enormous export surpluses.

Macron wants to "make" the wages in France now "more flexible", by no more collective bargaining for whole branches, but only agreements for individual companies.

This is exactly the wrong policy and a blind copy of the German guidelines. France would have to cut its wages by about 20 percent to catch up with Germany. This is not possible, however, because domestic demand in France will break down and unemployment will rise dramatically. Instead, German wages would have to rise by about 5 per cent annually over many years. Only then will there be another chance to save Europe.

However, it is not yet clear that the Germans are changing their wage policy. What are the chances of Macron?

Absolutely none. He is, without understanding, completely walled up and will continue the policy of his socialist predecessor François Hollande. He will do a few reforms in France and wonder that it will not do anything.

However, Macron has already announced that he wants to expand public debt in order to boost the French economy. A good idea?

The approach is correct. There is not enough investment across Europe. Above all, Germany would have to put up an investment program, because much too much is saved here. Even the German companies are net savings. But if all the population groups park large portions of their income on accounts, the economy collapses. Germany has so far absorbed this demand gap through export surpluses, but this is not going on in the long term. The German state would have to pay € 50 to € 100 billion annually to compensate at least partially for the savings surplus.



Instead, Schäuble is aiming for the "Black Zero".

... and jeopardizes international stability: Germany can generate huge export surpluses only because the other countries are making permanent debts - in the private and public sectors.

So how will the Eurozone continue?

Macron was the hope-bearer of the desperate, for the ruling parties had no concepts. If he fails, chaos will break out in France. This applies to the whole of Europe. In all elections, including Brexit, despair was the real issue. The citizens do not know what to choose, because the same recipe always comes out: neoliberalism. At the same time, however, it is obvious that this recipe does not work. This leads to radicalization.

in the interview:
Heiner Flassbeck
66, was the chief economist of Unctad, the World Trade and Development Conference of the United Nations in Geneva until the end of 2012. He lives in France. His latest book is "Only Germany can save the euro".
 
Does he mean a 50% failure rate after four years and 70% failure rate after 10 years?

Doesn't seem ideal for a state, but then I haven't had a landslide vote so what do I know?

In addition, it is well recognised that you can't run a large business just as a scaled up version of a smaller business. It requires a totally different business model. Many companies fail precisely because they are trying to use their start up mentality for something that needs proper processes to handle its larger scale.

The Five Stages of Small Business Growth

Valid soundbite that is worse than meaningless -- it actually means something really, really stupid.
 
Last edited:
Perry Anderson: The Centre Can Hold. New Left Review 105, May-June 2017.

On Macron

By the second week of February, with both stanchions of alternation removed, it was already clear who would be the next President. In October Emmanuel Macron, Hollande’s Minister for the Economy, had resigned from his post to run against his patron. The previous April he had created a movement adorned with his own monogram, En Marche!, with the obvious intention of testing the waters for a bid to capture the Élysée, and in November duly announced it. A typical product of the upper reaches of the political class, an énarque moving effortlessly between public service and private enrichment, from Inspector of Finances to instant millionaire with Rothschild, he had joined the ps in 2006, dipping out of it in 2009, after making the connexions levitating him into Hollande’s personal entourage in 2012, where he became deputy chief of staff and in short order, at the age of 36, a leading minister in the government. Entranced by this enfant choyé, Hollande saw in him an earlier version of himself, adorning his regime with a touch of youthful glamour. Macron, c’est moi, he told his journalists. [8] So far as policy went, he was not wrong: little or nothing divided them, Macron’s background guaranteeing he would be a business-friendly icon of deregulation of the kind Hollande wanted. That formally he was no longer a member of the ps hardly mattered, since privately Hollande was already saying the party was a thing of the past. But in thinking that Macron would be a loyal princeling, since he owed his elevation to Hollande, he was deluded. Close up, Macron could see the likely fate of his regime, and at the right moment had no hesitation in helping to bring it down to further his own ambitions. By the time he announced his candidacy, he had assembled business, bureaucratic, professional and intellectual backers galore, along with a commensurate war-chest, and bathed in fulsome media coverage, could step forward as the embodiment of all that was dynamic and forward-looking in France.

...

Ideologically, from the outset Macron had launched En Marche! as a movement transcending the outdated opposition between Right and Left in France, for the creation of a new, fresh politics of the Centre, liberal in economics and social in sensibility. This was, of course, itself a time-worn appeal, repeatedly offered by assorted politicians of one kind or another, and corresponding to a real demand in the middle of the spectrum of political opinion, but never successfully dislodging the dichotomy of Left and Right; in part because of the polarizing logic of the electoral system, but equally because the dominant opposition was between two blocs each of which could legitimately claim the same prefix: Centre-Left and Centre-Right. Now, however, that both of these were disabled, a ‘pure’ self-declared Centre could for the first time command the stage. In projecting his construction, Macron had to deal with the last pretender to the role, the Catholic politician François Bayrou, who had run for the Presidency in every election since 2002 (achieving a high point of 18.57 per cent of the vote in 2007), and could subtract electors from Macron if he ran again. The political party from which he had come, the udf, was a creation of Giscard in the seventies, and in its subsequent metamorphoses—it is now the udi—served as a traditional, if not invariable, ally of the much larger party of originally Gaullist extraction led by Chirac—of whom Bayrou had been a Minister—and Sarkozy. [9] It had always been a more significant component of the Centre-Right bloc than any counterpart element in the Centre-Left. Since Macron could scarcely conceal his passage through the ps, it was all the more important he secure the support of Bayrou, to ensure that his candidacy had visible endorsement from the opposite field, where the banner of the Centre had always been most consistently raised. On 22 February, Bayrou came aboard without undue tergiversation. Macron immediately gained 5 points in the polls. The Centre was now truly his own. Well ahead of Fillon, with Hamon languishing low behind either, he had locked down the Presidency.


The newness and so called populism of Macron...

Neon-lit with hype in a jubilant international and sycophantic domestic press, Macron is presented as France’s version of Trudeau or Obama, or for those with selective memories, Blair. The similarities of ideology and image are real. But there are not insignificant differences. Personally, although much has been made of his charm, half the country has so far proved immune to it: on the eve of the first round, 46 per cent of the population expressed their dislike of him, his campaign having left among many an impression of arrogance, pretension and stridency. Arrogance: an énarque of énarques, exuding money and disdain for lesser fry, surrounded by his kind—five out of seven of his inner circle hailing from the ena too. Pretension: his banal campaign manifesto entitled nothing less than Révolution—a trumpet for himself, oblivious to ridicule in its claims of intimacy with the finest flowers of the nation’s literature and philosophy (‘I am very Camusian’), mingled with excruciating pronouncements of patriotard bombast. [21] Stridency: the shrillness of a televangelist, arms aloft shouting at the top of his voice at mass meetings. Once enveloped in the dignity of the Presidency, these liabilities will, of course, be under greater control.
 
Mélenchon is refusing to send his party's reps to Congress on Monday, claiming that Macron's victories violate La France insoumise (I'm loosely translating his tweets as best I can).
 
Back
Top Bottom