The case against nuclear power - does it stack up?

[elbows]

A paper has come out that I havent read properly yet:

Swift and deep decarbonisation of electricity generation is central to enabling a timely transition to net-zero emission energy systems. While future power systems will likely be dominated by variable renewable energy (VRE) sources, studies have identified a need for low-carbon dispatchable power such as nuclear. We use a cost-optimising power system model to examine the technoeconomic case for investment in new nuclear capacity in the UK’s net-zero emissions energy system and consider four sensitivity dimensions: the capital cost of new nuclear, the availability of competing technologies, the expansion of interconnection and weather conditions. We conclude that new nuclear capacity is only cost-effective if ambitious cost and construction times are assumed, competing technologies are unavailable and interconnector expansion is not permitted. We find that bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and long-term storage could reduce electricity system costs by 5–21% and that synchronous condensers can provide cost-effective inertia in highly renewable systems with low amounts of synchronous generation. We show that a nearly 100% variable renewable system with very little fossil fuels, no new build nuclear and facilitated by long-term storage is the most cost-effective system design. This suggests that the current favourable UK Government policy towards nuclear is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544222023325?via%3Dihub

 

[platinumsage]

A paper has come out that I havent read properly yet:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544222023325?via%3Dihub

At a glance it seems to be base its case on the usual reliance on stuff that isn't here yet, whereas nuclear build decisions need to be made right now.

For example they model systems using dozens of GW of grid-installed lithium battery storage, as well as carbon capture and storage, and stuff like "we include long-term storage which uses hydrogen produced by electrolysis as the energy storage medium in salt caverns and H2 burning CCGT and OCGTs for power output"

I'm sure it's pretty easy to come up with nuclear-free net-zero futures if you include all that sort of stuff, but deciding to go down those routes now in the hope it all works out quickly is a different matter.

 

[elbows]

I'm in the middle of reading it so I will get back to you on that point.

They dont agree with the reduced nuclear costs over time thing you mentioned recently:

Negative learning-by-doing has been measured for the French and USA nuclear programmes (i.e. capital costs increased rather than reducing as the programme progressed). At best, costs have been reduced only very slightly in major programmes, for example in South Korea [43]. An assessment of US LCOEs concluded that cost estimates tend to be overly low and that historical analogues provide a better indication of likely costs [44]; one reason is that nuclear reactors are the most prone to cost overruns as a percentage of budget and frequency [45].

 

[elbows]

At a glance it seems to be base its case on the usual reliance on stuff that isn't here yet, whereas nuclear build decisions need to be made right now.

For example they model systems using dozens of GW of grid-installed lithium battery storage, as well as carbon capture and storage, and stuff like "we include long-term storage which uses hydrogen produced by electrolysis as the energy storage medium in salt caverns and H2 burning CCGT and OCGTs for power output"

I'm sure it's pretty easy to come up with nuclear-free net-zero futures if you include all that sort of stuff, but deciding to go down those routes now in the hope it all works out quickly is a different matter.

In recent days I have started to study via half-hourly data stretching back several years the large amount of variability that we already have with our existing renewable generation capacity.

Its a massive issue and its going to require some of the 'stuff that isnt here yet' in order to even begin to make the 2050 plan workable. Unless I am missing something I really dont see nuclear changing this point at its most fundamental level. Even the most ambitious new nuclear build plans touted to date dont seem to me to significantly change this picture, they only make a difference to the exact scale of deployment of various forms of storage, interconnectors and demand flexibility that will be required. And that potential difference in scale is already relatively modest compared to the size of the holes we have to fill due to weather-related variations in renewable generation. So as far as I can tell right now, whether we have no new nuclear or maximum new nuclear, the technologies you are expressing skepticism about are still required. The amount of wiggle room that nuclear offers seems very modest to me, can you demonstrate otherwise?

There is no truly 'typical month' that I can use to illustrate this point so for now I will pick just two months from 2022 to illustrate this point. And note that these graphs show what proportion of total demand each generation source was fulfilling during each half hour, not the raw amount of GW generated, due to the data source I have so far got available to me to construct these graphs. And since I am not directly showing demand separately, its baked into the oscillations shown by this data, eg the nuclear proportion is oscillating every day as demand varies over the course of each 24 hour period.

There is no nuclear plan where nuclear is going to fill the huge gaps currently filled by gas (in red) is there? So some of those other technologies and flexibility options that papers like the one above include in their model absolutely have to be a large part of the future path to net zero dont they? Nuclear, whether we embrace it, abandon it, or proceed in a half-hearted manner, is not going to remove the need for these other solutions to be made to work and deployed at scale is it?

May 2022:



October 2022:

 

[platinumsage]

There is no nuclear plan where nuclear is going to fill the huge gaps currently filled by gas (in red) is there? So some of those other technologies and flexibility options that papers like the one above include in their model absolutely have to be a large part of the future path to net zero dont they? Nuclear, whether we embrace it, abandon it, or proceed in a half-hearted manner, is not going to remove the need for these other solutions to be made to work and deployed at scale is it?

Sure, but there's all sorts of non-improbable scenarios involving problems with one or more of these future technologies to which "thankfully we have some nuclear" might be part of the answer. We need to give the denizens of 2035-2050 as many tools in their armoury as we can. Most of these we'll hopefully develop in the coming years by making R&D decisions now, but nuclear needs build decisions now.

 

[platinumsage]

October 2022:

View attachment 350351

People often say that nuclear doesn't help plug the gaps, but of course it makes the gaps smaller. If Ed Milliband's modest 2009 plan for UK nuclear had gone ahead, the above chart would look something like this:

 

[elbows]

People often say that nuclear doesn't help plug the gaps, but of course it makes the gaps smaller.

Thats not a simple purely good news story though because it wouldnt just make the gaps smaller, it would also reduce the amount of renewable capacity we'd be looking to end up with, reducing the total scope for wind. And the gaps would still be very large and would necessitate a huge amount of success with storage etc. I'm still contemplating these sorts of details, and am open to evolving my stance in future. But at the moment given the massive amount of clean energy we can and already do get from wind and the massive amount of already unavoidable work that will be required to fill in the gaps due to variability of wind in our current supply picture, I'd rather put most of the effort, funding etc into the tech that will fill those gaps in a fully flexible, on demand way.

If Ed Milliband's modest 2009 plan for UK nuclear had gone ahead, the above chart would look something like this:

Delivering on that ambition was not a modest ask at all and we cant judge whether nuclear makes sense in future plans without taking account of how these delays and uncertainties are some of the downsides of nuclear that make people look for alternatives in the first place. I doubt the Milliband would have delivered the first new power station very much quicker than we are actually going to get Hinkley C, despite what timescale claims they made at the time. Yes politicians changes of heart are part of the picture of delays, but there are many other factors too. Fukushima would still have caused a pause, there would still have been issues with approving the reactor designs quickly enouygh to fit the original timescale. There would still have been issues with finding commercial partners, still issues with finance, EDF would still have run into issues and delays with its other reactors of the same EPR design, with knock on consequences for their project(s) here. And there would still have been the sort of report that David King did, that the following 2011 news article covers British nuclear industry needs overhaul before it can expand, says top scientist

The structure of the UK nuclear industry, having been designed to address the rundown of nuclear power in the UK, is not well suited to the changed situation involving new nuclear build and an expanded UK nuclear role, and there is a need for realignment of policy across the sector," the report found.

 

[elbows]

Regardless of what I think, this wont be the last time a case such as the one in the above report will be made. More questions will be asked about what 'baseload' we really need from the likes of nuclear in the future. Various attempts at costing the different options will be made. Any dramatic further setbacks with nuclear and its funding will play into these discussions.

And when some of the storage etc options start to prove themselves more comprehensively, the rug could be pulled from under the feet of the more sizeable nuclear ambitions. And if, in the meantime, some in government have these possibilities in the back of their minds, they might moderate their nuclear ambitions and drag their feet in an attempt to play for time. Nuclear advocates will always be there, but I still wouldnt bet on them ultimately getting their way. There are still some aspects of nuclear that are attractive to those in power for sure, which is why it isnt game over already, but there are still limits to how much the nuclear industry can over-promise and under-deliver before they end up being left out in the cold. And at this rate it doesnt even need to be a conscious decision by those in power, it will happen by default via lack of funding and the alternatives surging past them in the transition.

I may still change my tune in future, but only if additional projects actually get the go ahead and funding, going past the point of no return. If we only end up with Hinkley C then I'll probably paint a dramatic picture of nuclear being relegated to the margins in the UK. If we get Sizewell C as well then I wont be quite so dramatic about it. But I suppose its down to what projects, if any, we get beyond Sizewell C that will cement my opinion of where nuclear is going in this country and how much of the future energy mix its going to influence. I wouldnt want to have to put a bet on which eventuality will actually come to pass.

 

[alex_]

The tragedy is that you probably don’t get economies of scale unless you build about 5, which they will never do. not only do you never get really cheap power (
Offshore wind in the last contract for difference auctions was less than half of the hinkley point price - and the wind will be online sooner ), but you look like a bunch of jokers who can’t build nuclear power stations so you don’t get any foreign orders either.

They should be aiming to build a nuclear power station coming online every 24 months forever.

 

[elbows]

The tragedy is that you probably don’t get economies of scale unless you build about 5, which they will never do. not only do you never get really cheap power (
Offshore wind in the last contract for difference auctions was less than half of the hinkley point price - and the wind will be online sooner ), but you look like a bunch of jokers who can’t build nuclear power stations so you don’t get any foreign orders either.

I dont think there will be much reputation damage bleed into other industries, not at this stage of the nuclear programme. Because with Hinkley C and Sizewell C if there are further embarrassing issues then the damage will just get added to the already large and well known story of EDFs struggles with that particular reactor design (EPR). Or into an even broader narrative about the difficulties of Europe in general managing to get a new nuclear build era humming on all cylinders, including staffing, skills and civil construction issues. And thats a story that can potentially even be blended with a post-pandemic workforce challenges story. And should the reputation damage spread even further beyond the bounds of these stories, the broader reputation of nuclear power is no stranger to these sorts of issues and this will just be seen as the latest chapter in the nuclear saga. If we have a proven track record at delivering non-nuclear energy projects then our broader reputation will not be significantly contaminated by failures on the nuclear front.

The front where UK reputation damage and loss of investor etc confidence could spread beyond nuclear is more on the decision making front when it comes to large, partially government funded project approval, investor confidence and project delivery, and issues such as governments delaying, flip-flopping and moving the goalposts. Stuff that is on the radar at the moment anyway due to 'UK political turmoil' etc. But even in this area, there is likely to be more forgiveness when the issues show up with nuclear builds, because there are funding and delivery issues with nuclear that arent a problem unique to the UK, its tricky, and inflationary pressures, recessions and the somewhat fragile status of some parts of the nuclear industry arent going to help. UK government and PLC likely wont end up being seen as the only ones culpable if it goes tits up. Not unless we end up being the only country that struggles with effective delivery of nuclear power on time and budget this century, and it seems unlikely we'll be alone in that if it happens.

They should be aiming to build a nuclear power station coming online every 24 months forever.

In this country or more broadly? I would drop the concept of 'forever', because even if everything was going really well in terms of political will, financing, reactor design, industry challenges and public support, there are limits to exactly what scale of new nuclear build is desirable and practical. There are limits to the number of sites where nuclear is practical, and limits to what share of the electricity generation picture it is desirable to let nuclear provide. Even a country like France which had a very high proportional of nuclear in its energy mix up to this point understands that and has introduced a bit more of a balanced approach to its future plans and the proportion of the picture that nuclear is envisaged to supply. And I'd still say this even if my own personal opinion about what percentage of nuclear made sense was quite different to my opinion that I've more than hinted at in recent posts, this stuff is stuff pro-nuclear governments will acknowledge, not just me and the anti-nuclear brigade.

 

[elbows]

I've been guilty of not paying much attention to the state of play in the USA so I'm going to try to familiarise myself with that in the coming weeks.

Here is an article from a couple of years ago which forms a small part of my starting point. There are many familiar themes such as new designs, issues with capital costs and turning around an industry that has been in a long decline. And claims about a role nuclear might have there in a decade or two to compensate for some of the issues that come with a much increased share of renewables, including some claims which given our recent conversation I view with quite some skepticism. For example theres a claim in here that as the share of intermittent sources like solar and wind climb, the cost of them will go up, and I doubt that a simple claim about cost is really the right way to consider those issues of intermittency at all.

Science | AAAS

www.science.org

Next I will try to find some info about more recent, post-Trump developments. Certainly I've seen a few Westinghouse stories in the news recently, including the company being sold (with unsurprisingly upbeat assessments of the industry by those doing the buying), and also of Westinghouse being chosen to get Polands new nuclear build programme started:

Westinghouse to be sold in $7.9-bln deal as interest in nuclear power grows

Cameco Corp and Brookfield Renewable Partners said on Tuesday they would acquire nuclear power plant equipment maker Westinghouse Electric in a $7.9-billion deal including debt, amid renewed interest in nuclear energy.

www.reuters.com

https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Poland’s-government-confirms-Westinghouse-for-nucl

I suppose I better look into their AP1000 design thats being touted in the Poland article. Since I go on about the state of the industry in Europe and EDFs EPR issues, I really have to look at the other current commercial options in order to get a fuller picture.

 

[elbows]

So the history of the AP1000 reactors so far has some similarities with issues seen in Europe. Only more stark witht he economic side of things in some ways, since Westinghouses bankruptcy scuppered various plans including some US and UK power stations. Also in common with the story of EDFs new reactors, China is the main location so far that has actually gotten some of these reactors built and running.

AP1000 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Turkey is listed as a customer but from what I can tell those plans have stalled and a Russian reactor has been the one to reach the most advanced stage there, although that project may now have been complicated by the effect of sanctions against Russia on the ability to obtain overseas components.

I guess I may end up judging progress with these reactors in the West via what happens with the planned switch on of Vogtle 3 & 4 in the US in about a years time. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Wikipedia

 

[alex_]

What I mean by “forever” is that they take 10 or 15 years to build, and seem to last for 40 or 50 years. So rather than building a small number every few decades you’d be better off building them “every couple of years” ( or whatever the optimum gap is ) - so there are always about 20 (or whatever that optimum number is )in service, plus you’d maintain a skills base and potentially actually be good at it.

Comment about exports was specifically about building nuclear power stations for other countries, rather than general exports.

The key point is that building one off nuclear power stations is really, really expensive, because you never get economies of scale.

This last point is true of any large scale infrastructure projects, such as high speed rail - and the uk’s general inability to do projects of this type because of our inability to do any sort of strategy.

We don’t do them because we aren’t good at them, we aren’t good at them because we don’t do them.

 

[elbows]

Certainly one of the reasons our procurement of AGRs back in the day was considered to be a disaster was that we kept fiddling with the design. Although I havent yet had time to read a proper post-mordem on that eras nuclear build yet, so maybe other factors will show up when I do.

Nuclear power stations are very expensive, very capital intensive even if you build lots of them. Yes in theory it gets a bit easier over time, the more you build, but thats only one factor and many others have blighted nuclears economic reputation over the decades. Also if there are issues with the first ones that are learnt via the experience of building them, the temptation is to fiddle with the design for subsequent ones, which can introduce new issues.

Attempts to make the economics make sense via economies of scale is also why we've ended up with some very large stations based on the EPR design as our first attempt to launch a new era. But the high output from these plants also limits how many of them it will be plausible to build in future, there is no way we are going to plan to have 20 of them. I'll do some research to see what a plausible number would be, but I think it will be a low number, and it wont surprise me if Hinkley and Sizewell end up being the only ones of this type. I'll get back to you on that one. Maybe if Sizewell goes ahead and goes well, and France is successful at rebooting EDF, we might end up with another pair of this type of reactors at a site up north one day, but I wouldnt have any deep conviction about that at this stage.

The skills base issue is important but its often seen from an angle thats more about the running & maintenance of the plants rather than the construction phase with a specific eye on construction contracts overseas. Which is not to say there is no ambition at all on that front. And however well the UK does with these particular reactors they are ultimately a EDF design with reputation issues that became entrenched long before we started building any here. Hinkley delays wont help that reputation, but it is still possible that more successful delivery and costs of the 2nd Hinkley reactor and the Sizewell ones could become a part of turning that reputation round. But when it comes to our hopes for UK PLC nuclear exports and overseas contracts, the hopes at the moment are more about certain smaller reactor designs, eg the stuff Rolls Royce is currently touting and a small bunch of other SMR designs, including molten salt based ones. And even further ahead, they would like fusion research in this country to strike gold one day. Some of the SMR hype may be unfounded, with claims and hopes far from proven, but can see why they want to promote this possibility because the scale makes them more suitable for use in smaller countries with less total electricity demand, and they hope to move a lot of the tricky stuff away from the sphere of civil construction and into the realm of factory assembly. And if they actually get a successful design and factories churning these out, it can bring down costs and create viable exports. But even in that respect I end up with some hype alarms flashing because that factory angle has something in common with all the hype about non-nuclear modular building construction in general, which is another area where setbacks and failures to deliver have been more common over the last 70 years than roaring successes.

 

[elbows]

A simple chart that tells a story or three.

 

[elbows]

I found some scathing written evidence to the select committee that covers plenty of my own complaints and suspicions. To quote just one part of it that refers to one specific issue that I have alluded to in the past:

An additional important jeopardy to the stability and sustainability of nuclear financing lies in an evident lack of public candour about civil nuclear policy. It has been documented in evidence to other Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiries that the consistent pattern observed here – of official favouritism towards nuclear power in the UK energy sector – reflects military pressures to sustain a nuclear industrial base that is shared with the naval submarine programme. These incentives have been confirmed by the submarine industry itself and (on questioning by a different Parliamentary Select Committee) by the then senior responsible UK government official. The same pattern is also openly officially acknowledged in France and the USA. In effect, an otherwise arguably unaffordable military infrastructure is being invisibly subsidised by taxpayers (through disproportionate support for civil nuclear power) and by energy consumers (through elevated electricity prices) – outside the defence budget, away from critical scrutiny and entirely off the public books. Yet this rationale remains virtually entirely unacknowledged – and even actively denied – in general official public communications. This evident warping of zero-carbon energy strategies by pressures from another field of policymaking may help to further undermine the confidence of markets in the rigour and objectivity of UK nuclear strategies and make financing in this field even more difficult and more expensive to secure.

From https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/112071/pdf/ found at https://committees.parliament.uk/work/6864/delivering-nuclear-power/publications/

Thia written submission comes from various people at the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex.

 

[elbows]

Anyway that particular issue is a mixed bag. Its certainly one of the reasons why I havent tended to expect us to end up with no nuclear power stations, no nuclear industry, and no nuclear research at all. And I dont doubt that people with far more positive opinions about the role of nuclear power than me would use such things to justify the use of nuclear and to label other potential paths as unrealistic and incompatible with the needs of our country, should they feel comfortable acknowledging the military aspects at all. And flipping things around, probably in the past I was most likely to touch on that issue when talking about why abandoning nuclear was an easier decision for the likes of Germany.

I suppose it is also possible to argue that the need for the industry and skills base to support the military applications of nuclear still leaves plenty of room for debate about the exact extent that nuclear power stations are required to underpin such things. There are probably some ways to keep that foundation alive without having to indulge in a large number of new builds. And this entire angle wouldnt matter so much if nuclear powers costs, risks and timescales were better able to compete and improve. But the military angles probably do at the very least provide added impetus to gush out large quantities of positive spin about the prospects of nuclear, to talk it up and for it to continue to have a sacred place around the tables of power despite its messy history and blatant downsides.

 

[elbows]

Meanwhile I have reviewed government papers from recent years on energy and net zero transition in order to see if we can get a better sense of what scale of nuclear they have decided upon, and whether there are any numbers in there that we can use to end up with a number in mind when it comes to scale of new build of either plants of the large output variety we've been talking about in recent posts, or the other, smaller ones.

What I found seems pretty consistent with what I already thought I knew:

The only solid aspiration applicable to the ERP sized nuclear power stations is to get one more to the finance stage within the lifetime of this parliament, and we can probably assume that its Sizewell C that they have in mind for that.

Pages that deal with such projects have caveats such as 'subject to clear value for money'.

They wont commit to a sense of scale at this stage of this decade at all. They arent even willing to commit to a fixed sense of what proportion of electricity generation should come from nuclear, wont commit to a particular defined mix of sources.

They do have in mind the obvious stuff such as a large increase in electricity demand, such as double the current demand for electricity by 2050, in order to support climate change & energy transition goals and the electrification of various sectors.

Several illustrative scenarios, modelled in other technical papers, are made use of to put some flesh on those bones. The nuclear industry is fond of pointing to these in order to be able to positively spin that we'll need 30GW or 40GW of nuclear generation capacity to meet the needs of that future. But the government is not actually prepared to commit to that at this time, they are only prepared to highlight some scenarios where this is the case, and they dont shout about those numbers unlike when they talk about wind where they are happy to state that 40GW of offshore wind by 2030 is their ambition, for example.

One of the reasons they dont want to put numbers on the nuclear thing involves the key differences between different modelled scenarios. For example when it comes to things including the heating of buildings, there are different scenarios depending on exactly what role hydrogen ends up playing at great scale. Including whether hydrogen is used directly in peoples homes as a fuel, or whether all the action inside homes will be electric and hydrogen is therefore used for generation at power plants in pursuit of that goal.

They are happier to shout more loudly about their nuclear ambitions when talking about the more futuristic stuff, such as small modular reactors, advanced gaqs-cooled reactors, and fusion. Including export potential. But again they arent going to put capacity numbers or generational mix numbers on such things at this stage, with those things their vision is to do with how much research funding to put into such things, and ensuring the regulatory approval pathways are ready for such designs. When it comes to timescales, they are prepared to state ambitions for when certain test reactor projects might emerge.

Having said all that, I am still prepared to post the following chart in order to give people some sense of possible scale of future generation mix to grasp. Just be aware that its illustrative, it is very far from being set in stone as far as government public pronouncements go:


I got to all these recent papers via this page from the Nuclear Industry Association. Because I dont mind seeing what positive spin they put on things, but have to read the actual papers they link to in order to unspin some of their claims.

UK Nuclear Policy - Nuclear Industry Association

www.niauk.org

 

[elbows]

I've established that the page I used is missing a more recent paper, April 2022's Energy Security Strategy.

I havent read it yet but I was reading a report from the Climate Change Committee (an independent, statutory body established under the Climate Change Act 2008), called "June 2022 Progress in reducing emissions report to parliament", which spells out what new government nuclear ambitions were in the ESS:

Long-term ambition. In the ESS the Government announced an ambition to deploy up to 24 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050, which could represent up to 25% of UK electricity generation. In addition to taking one project to a final investment decision (FID) this Parliament, the plan is now to take a further two projects to FID in the next Parliament.

Oh and since I mentioned a 40GW offshore wind by 2030 ambition in my previous post, I should say that this was increased to a 50GW ambition in the ESS (including 5GW floating offshore).
The ESS that I havent read yet:

British energy security strategy

www.gov.uk

Decarbonising the electricity sector is supposed to be covered by a subsequent CCC report due this year. I'm still wading threough their website to see if this or anything else of note is already availabe. Skimming through the rest of the June 2022 document I see that in the risk mitigations chart, for nuclear they have the following:

Accelerate development and No deployment of alternative forms of schedulable low-carbon generation

Identify key decision points required to preserve optionality

And nuclear gets by far the worst marks on their policy scorecard:



From 2022 Progress Report to Parliament - Climate Change Committee

 

[elbows]

Quoting the ambition directly from the ESS this time:

• increasing our plans for deployment of civil nuclear to up to 24GW by 2050 – 3 times more than now and representing up to 25% of our projected electricity demand
• within this overall ambition, we intend to take one project to FID this Parliament and 2 projects to FID in the next Parliament, including Small Modular Reactors, subject to value for money and relevant approvals. This is not a cap on ambition, but a challenge to the industry to come forward and compete for projects and aim to come online this decade
• depending on the pipeline of projects, these ambitions could see our nuclear sector progressing up to 8 more reactors across the next series of projects, so we improve our track record to deliver the equivalent of 1 reactor a year, rather than 1 a decade

So in terms of scale tahts basically the equivalent of 8 Hinkley C sized plants by 2050. Not that this is really the right way to think about it, since I think its very unlikely they want all the projects to be that big, they want a mix of different things.

This is also hinted in the way they mention sites a bit later on:

• the UK has 8 designated nuclear sites: Hinkley, Sizewell, Heysham, Hartlepool, Bradwell, Wylfa, Oldbury and Moorside. To facilitate our ambitious deployment plans we will also develop an overall siting strategy for the long term

 

[elbows]

Bradwell B is another example of setbacks and difficulties in guessing what will actually happen next.

This is a site on the designated list, and the original hope involved China General Nuclear being very interested in putting its HPR1000 pressurised water reactors on the site. They have big hopes for that reactor type in the export market, and Bradwell would have been a showcase. They would partner with EDF.

But then UK-China relations deteriorated, palcing this project in jeopardy, and since then Bradwell B has tended not to be mentioned much in the national press, and government doesnt seem keen to mention it by name.

I've had a brief poke around and Bradwell B does still come up in local press articles, and on nuclear industry news sites. It appears that the regulatory approval process for HRP1000 has still been progressing, but this on its own is not a reliable guide as to what might happen next due to the sensitive politics with regards China. I suppose one plausible possibility is that the next time we hear our government going on about Bradwell B, it will be with a different partner and reactor type in mind.

 

[alex_]

I can’t see them doing any deals like this with Chinese companies, as there really aren’t any Chinese companies who aren’t actually the Chinese state.

 

[elbows]

I cant say I was previously aware of the National Infrastructure Commission but they are:

The Commission is an Executive Agency of HM Treasury, providing government with impartial, expert advice on major long term infrastructure challenges. While the Commission carries out its work in accordance with the remit and terms of reference for specific studies set by the government, it has complete discretion to determine its own work programme and recommendations.

I havent read any of their full reports yet but in the energy section they say this about nuclear:

The case for committing to a new fleet of nuclear power stations now is weakened as the costs of deploying onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar have fallen dramatically.

The National Infrastructure Assessment recommended that government should not agree support for more than one nuclear power station, beyond Hinkley Point C, before 2025.

The Assessment also stressed that future nuclear power plants will not be built by the private sector without government support. The shape this support takes has implications for the balance of risk between the private sector, electricity consumers and the taxpayer. These considerations impact the potential value for money a project offers and therefore its financial viability.

In October 2019, the Commission published a paper comparing different ways to procure nuclear infrastructure and providing a method for evaluating the type and size of costs associated with funding a nuclear plant using a regulated asset base (RAB) model.

From Energy & Waste - NIC

I will read some of those documents when I get a chance.

 

[elbows]

Oh and one of their number is at this weeks select committee meeting. Their chief economist, James Richardson.

Also features people from the nuclear side of GE Hitachi, Jacobs, Bechtel. And the chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association, the MD of Terrestrial Energy, and the chair at the Nuclear Skills Strategy Group.

Time permitting I will watch like I did last week.

https://committees.parliament.uk/event/14628/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/

 

[Pickman's model]

Oh and one of their number is at this weeks select committee meeting. Their chief economist, James Richardson.

Also features people from the nuclear side of GE Hitachi, Jacobs, Bechtel. And the chairman of the Nuclear Industry Association, the MD of Terrestrial Energy, and the chair at the Nuclear Skills Strategy Group.

Time permitting I will watch like I did last week.

https://committees.parliament.uk/event/14628/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/

can you catch up on iplayer?

 

[elbows]

can you catch up on iplayer?

You can get replays from the parliament live tv site, for example here is last weeks session:

Parliamentlive.tv

Science and Technology Committee

parliamentlive.tv

Its pretty dull stuff most of the time though, not exactly riveting viewing, although it does have its moments from my particular point of view.

 

[Pickman's model]

You can get replays from the parliament live tv site, for example here is last weeks session:

Parliamentlive.tv

Science and Technology Committee

parliamentlive.tv

Its pretty dull stuff most of the time though, not exactly riveting viewing, although it does have its moments from my particular point of view.

but useful for insomniacs

 

[elbows]

Skimming through the first National Infrastructure Assessment 2018 mentioned a few posts ago. Perhaps some more material for the 'they are doing the bare minimum to keep the industry (& military) going' pile:

For energy, the Commission’s judgement is that the supply chain for nuclear power should be maintained by agreeing a further plant beyond Hinkley Point C, even though renewables look like an increasingly viable alternative, as the costs of re-establishing the nuclear supply chain would be very high.

Given these uncertainties, the Commission is recommending a ‘one by one’ approach to new nuclear plants, as opposed to the current government policy to develop a large fleet. This is preferable to a ‘stop start’ approach, in which the nuclear programme is cancelled only to be restarted at a later date. It will allow the UK to maintain, but not expand, a skills base and supply chain. This allows the UK to pursue a high renewables mix, which is most likely to be the preferred option, without closing off the nuclear alternative.

National Infrastructure Assessment 1 - NIC

This assessment - the UK's first - looks at the UK's long term needs up to 2050 across a wide range of different infrastructure

nic.org.uk

There is loads of stuff in there about cost, and costs and risks of a renewable system instead, but I cant really do justice to that topic with a reasonable number of small quotes, so I wont try for now.

Instead I will try to skim through their more recent documents to see how their position has evolved since that report of some years ago.

 

[elbows]

Well their next assessment is not due until autumn 2023. So I cant see a direct evolution of though in that format from them.

There are a few other documents from the intervening years that mention nuclear. For example they provided advice to government before the autumn 2021 budget and spending review:

Advice note on nuclear power plant deployment - NIC

nic.org.uk

It should not be more nuclear beyond what government has already committed to. Nuclear is a firm low carbon source of power and more nuclear may well have a role to play in a 2050 net zero emissions power system. By constructing two new projects, the UK will already be building four reactors over the next decade, twice as many as the United States is and four times as many as France. But over 70 years of experience building large scale nuclear power plants shows that they are incredibly difficult to deliver on short timescales. Since 1990 around half of all plants have faced at least a 50 per cent delay in construction, and 1 in 4 plants have faced at least a 90 per cent delay in construction. If a third new large scale nuclear project began next year and took as long as the Hinkley Point C project is expected to take to complete, it wouldn’t come online until the mid 2040s. It is highly unlikely that a new large scale nuclear plant is deliverable in the next 15 years; trying and failing would jeopardise delivery of the sixth Carbon Budget.

New nuclear technologies, such as small and advanced nuclear reactors, may have a role to play in the long term. But relying on significant capacity being deployed before 2035 would be risky. They will face both the challenges of being first of a kind plants and being a nuclear technology.

Instead, alternative technologies should be pursued. The analysis from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy sets out that a near zero carbon power system can be delivered by complementing renewables with a combination of gas power plants with carbon capture and storage, hydrogen fired gas plants and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage. This is supported by analysis previously conducted for the Commission and by other expert bodies such as National Grid ESO and the Climate Change Committee.

These alternatives are more likely to be deliverable at scale in the next 15 years. Whilst none of these technologies have been deployed at scale in the UK, there are pilot or commercial projects deployed elsewhere in the world. And the engineering of each is fundamentally sound. These technologies are smaller and more modular, exactly the type of technology the UK has experience delivering over short timescales. Deploying new technologies at scale will never be risk free. But the best way government can mitigate this risk is to act swiftly and finalise the policy frameworks under development that can facilitate the investment needed.

Given the gas component of that, I will now need to check whether their thoughts have already evolved, eg in their response to this years Energy Security Strategy.

 

[elbows]

It seems their response to the Energy Security Strategy was to emphasise things that can yiend quicker results, which is certainly not nuclear:

“The government should be credited with its scale of ambition to expand offshore wind and solar generation. The challenge is to take these stretching targets and turn them into delivery of cheaper electricity into people’s homes as quickly as possible.

“The steps on onshore wind are unlikely to unlock significant new capacity rapidly, while government’s aim to build more major nuclear plants will also take many years to realise.

“Alongside shifting supply away from fossil fuels, some of the quickest wins can be found in improving energy efficiency by better insulating our homes and public buildings to cut overall demand. The potential benefits are now bigger than ever, and we again call on government to set out a costed, long term plan for meeting its own targets and help households make the right choices for their pocket and the planet.”

Commission welcomes "scale of ambition" of Energy Security Strategy - NIC

The Commission's immediate response to the Government's Energy Security Strategy

nic.org.uk

But now I better look at their infrastructure progress review 2022 which is mentioned on that page.