ska invita
back on the other side
Savanta:
Wave 4 dip?
other 10?
Savanta:
Wave 4 dip?
Maybe, but fieldwork ending 24th puts it pre-shit for most, I'd have thought?Partly wave 4, partly an early reaction to the "shit in the water" farce and the focus on the climate conference, with the Greens picking up a few extra fans.
The parliamentary vote was on the 20th. It wasn't the biggest immediate story of the year by any stretch of the imagination, but it's been gaining a bit of traction (partly because it's so easy to put it into simplistic terms of "Tories want to fill your rivers with shit") ever since so there might have been a slow drip feed into the responses to Savanta.Maybe, but fieldwork ending 24th puts it pre-shit for most, I'd have thought?
SDP, Liberal Party, and Laurence Fox.other 10?
As I said, gradual decline...from a mean high of 43% down to a mean of 39% as of Monday, but a few more like Savanta might obviously pull that mean a little lower. If the LP offered any discernible opposition the convergence might not be far off.that looks to be more or less flat since mid september?
there was a gradual decline until mid september, but it's been flat since then - this could be a sign of a further decline, or it could be noise, like the other polls showing a drop in tory support in the last month and a half.As I said, gradual decline...from a mean high of 43% down to a mean of 39% as of Monday, but a few more like Savanta might obviously pull that mean a little lower. If the LP offered any discernible opposition the convergence might not be far off.
If the LP are remaining resolutely static on 36%ish...then someone's gotta pick up the shed vote elsewhere, I guess.I imagine the greens are getting a bit of a polling boost from the debacle that is the Glasgow Climate jolly.
Makes sense so, i guess, would be ignored by Starmer.Posting this here on the basis that it is a report based on polling. Yes, it’s a report and polling of working class voters in America, but I think the results have a wider applicability for those interested.
Executive Summary
Our experimental study, the first of its kind, offers a new and powerful perspective on working-class political views. In collaboration with the public opinion firm YouGov, we designed a survey to test how working-class voters respond to head-to-head electoral matchups. By asking voters to choose directly between thousands of hypothetical candidates — rather than isolated policies or slogans — we can develop a richer, more realistic portrait of voter attitudes than conventional polls can provide. And by presenting this survey to a representative group of 2,000 working-class voters in five key swing states — a much larger sample of this demographic than appears in most polls — we are able to focus on these voters in much greater depth.
The key takeaways of our survey, listed briefly below and discussed in greater detail in the full report, can inform future progressive campaigns.
Key Takeaways
1. Working-class voters prefer progressive candidates who focus primarily on bread-and-butter economic issues, and who frame those issues in universal terms. This is especially true outside deep-blue parts of the country. Candidates who prioritized bread-and-butter issues (jobs, health care, the economy), and who presented them in plainspoken, universalist rhetoric, performed significantly better than those who had other priorities or used other language. This general pattern was even more dramatic in rural and small-town areas, where Democrats have struggled in recent years.
2. Populist, class-based progressive campaign messaging appeals to working-class voters at least as well as other varieties of Democratic messaging. Candidates who named elites as a major cause of America’s problems, invoked anger at the status quo, and celebrated the working class were well received by working-class voters —even when pitted against more “moderate” strains of Democratic rhetoric.
3. Progressives do not need to surrender questions of social justice to win working-class voters, but “woke,” activist-inspired rhetoric is a liability. Potentially Democratic working-class voters did not shy away from progres- sive candidates or candidates who strongly opposed racism. But candidates who framed that opposition in highly specialized, identity-focused language fared significantly worse than candidates who embraced either populist or mainstream language.
4. Working-class voters prefer working-class candidates.
A candidate’s race or gender does not appear to matter much to potentially Democratic working- class voters. But candidates with upper-class backgrounds performed significantly less well than other candidates. Class background matters.
5. Commonsense Solidarity
Working-class non-voters are not automatic progressives. We find little evidence that low-propensity voters fail to vote because they don’t see suffi- ciently progressive views reflected in the political platforms of mainstream Democratic candidates.
Democratic partisanship does not hurt progressive candidates. Working- class voters prefer progressive candidates running as Democrats to candidates who stress their independence from the party.
6. Blue-collar workers are especially sensitive to candidate messaging — and respond even more acutely to the differences between populist and “woke” language. Primarily manual blue-collar workers, in comparison with primarily white-collar workers, were even more drawn to candidates who stressed bread-and-butter issues, and who avoided activist rhetoric
Full report here:
Crossover ahoy?
True, but not really supported by other polls.Most striking thing about that one is the Green vote.