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Peak Oil (was "petroleum geologist explains US war policy")

Sterling set to fall as oil revenue dries up

The Independent said:
The widening deficit will be exacerbated by a turnaround in the UK's net position in traded fuels. Official forecasts for UK oil production show production by 2008 will be down to 56 per cent of its peak. Gas production will also be falling at the same time, albeit at a slower rate. By 2008, UK gas production will be down to 70 per cent of its peak level.
Source
 
Short of energy?

How much oil is left - and where to find it

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/04/world_the_world0s_oil/html/1.stm

Slightly more statistical sophistication would help in p2:

2.jpg
 
TrueStory said:
What would it take to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil?<snip>

One thing would reduce anybody's dependence on oil, a reduction in demand for oil.

To achieve a standard of living comparable to that of the average EU citizen (a US citizen uses a lot more than this), without oil, under some plausible assumptions about energy systems and food production, you need, per capita:

0.5 Hectares of land for growing food.
1.0 Hectares of land for forest, pasture, etc.
1.5 Hectares of land of energy systems (solar, wind, biomass etc)

If the already severe problems of soil erosion were addressed effectively this implies a sustainable world population of around 1/3 of what we have already.

(source Pimentel, 'Food, Energy and Society')

To fill the energy gap between availability and predicted demand using nuclear you need to build about 500 reactors per year which is prohibitively expensive, and can only provide electricity, not petrochemicals, viable motor fuels etc.
 
Here's a rather interesting article from Asia Times (originally from Foreign Policy in Focus) about the relationship between Cheney's energy policy (the one he's refusing to discuss how he arrived at) and US military and policy intervention. (e.g. military adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq etc, political interventions in Latin America and Africa)

The fundamental assertion is that the US government policy is to be one of continued increasing consumption to fuel business as usual. The consequence of this with regard to foreign and military policy is likely to be increasing US intervention in: the Persian Gulf, Caspian Basin, Africa and Latin America for the forseeable future. The likely consequences of this policy are unpleasant.
 
Nice link Bernie

On a very similar vein, I recently came across this from this site written by Nicanor Perlas recent the winner of the alternative nobel peace prize. Enough to make you start taking wild conspiracy theories linking 9/11 to the wider geostrategic aims of the 'empire' as expertly set out by Nafeez Ahmed in this book seriously. Still I'm sure Nafeez is just another bonkers conspiracy theorist who can be dismissed in the same breath as Icke
 
sparticus said:
Nice link Bernie

On a very similar vein, I recently came across this from this site written by Nicanor Perlas recent the winner of the alternative nobel peace prize. Enough to make you start taking wild conspiracy theories linking 9/11 to the wider geostrategic aims of the 'empire' as expertly set out by Nafeez Ahmed in this book seriously. Still I'm sure Nafeez is just another bonkers conspiracy theorist who can be dismissed in the same breath as Icke

Idris2002 said:
Conspiracy theories are what they use to make sense of the world they live in, without actually turning to a radical analysis of that world. By believing in conspiracy theories, they are able to convince themselves that the problems they and their societies face are not the result of defects in the social and economic system itself, but are the result of conspiratorial activity by this or that group of evil individuals.

Please, this thread is one of the few genuinely excellent discussions of complex systems and incentives, not a place for conspiracies; start a different thread if you wish.
 
Given that the policy of the leaders of the US and hence the UK appears to be to continue business as usual, at gunpoint where necessary, albeit with some cosmetic programmes here in the UK, I'd really like to understand what that is likely to mean for all of us.

An increasing weight of evidence has been emerging over the last few months, since the Shell announcements, that the production peak for conventional oil is pretty much imminent. Given rising demand and the failure to implement programmes which could control demand, presumably this means a rising trend in oil prices, and energy prices generally. As far as I'm aware this always causes a recession, and if prolonged, is likely to result in an economic depression of unprecedented dimensions.

The UK is particularly vulnerable, because due to 'free-market' policies we've been following since Thatcher, we've trashed our coal mining infrastructure, burned through most of our oil; we've also, since WW2, trashed a whole lot of our arable land and our population has grown to about 6x what it was before the industrial revolution.

It appears to me that any transition to renewable energy is urgent, and best accomplished right now, while we're still relatively well-off in terms of these resources. While we have it, we should be using it to make the transition. If we wait until we're in a depression, then the transition becomes much harder.

This is pretty clearly not the likely outcome though. So what are we in for?

I'd be very interested in having a more substantial discussion of the likely implications of this situation for people living in the UK, over the next few decades. Assuming that we carry on with business as usual.
 
Quick one Slaar

This is precisely why I dislike the language of conspiracy theory. But that is the point of using CT language by people who wish to debunk them, because by labelling someone a CT it must mean that they are all spouting the same nonsense. This is not true but very handy if you want to dismiss them all as nutters.

The post Bernie posted and the 2 I referred are all making similar points about Peak Oil and US geostrategic policy leading to war and a rush for oil in the Caspian Basin, Middle East and around the world coupled with a drive for full spectrum military and other dominance that Perlas describes as US empire.

The point I was making is that you have some very credible people increasingly joining the dots and coming to similar conclusions. The fact that Nafeez also strongly questions the events of 9/11 and ties this in to the Afghan and Iraq wars led me to suggest that this discussion on Peak Oil and War also links to the Bush cabal's involvement in 9/11.

You can just as easily call a conspiracy, a crime, corruption or political scandal or 'realpolitik'. Just as using terrorist or freedom fighter for the same group people, you create a different impression depending which label you choose.
 
The Future Strategic Context for Defence - Ministry of Defence

Not sure if this has been seen before, but its from the MOD web site and is entitled: 'Future Strategic Context' and has various sections, most not about oil directly, but touching upon related issues. It also has some interesting comments about the environment, terrorism, warfare and various other interesting pieces that can be accessed from the menu on the left hand side of the link Ill post below.

However, I did found this piece which I thought was worth mentioning

Resources

13. We are becoming better at finding, producing and recycling materials. Diversifying sources of supply and the development of synthetic substitutes and alternative production technologies will continue to weaken the concept of strategic resource dependencies for developed countries. In a crisis, most resource choke-points can already be by-passed. There is little risk that the fundamental interests or security of Western nations will be jeopardised through actions directed against resources or trade. The possible exception is the oil market which, although other sources of supply will become more important, is likely to continue to be largely dominated by the Gulf. Disruptions to Gulf oil supplies could be by-passed in a short term crisis, provided that good relations with alternative suppliers are maintained. In a crisis of longer duration, alternatives would be difficult and prohibitively expensive. Only towards the end of the period are alternative energy sources likely to be beginning to challenge the dominance of hydro-carbons.

14. Reserves of fossil fuels are not expected to be nearing exhaustion by 2030, or for some time thereafter, but will become increasingly geographically concentrated. The UK will probably become a net importer of gas during the next decade, and by 2020 we could be importing as much as 90% of our gas supplies. The main sources of supply will include Russia, Iran and Algeria.

15. Offshore resources are likely to become a growing source of international dispute and potential conflict, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In the developing world, there is potential for aggressive competition for resources as nations seek to industrialise, to cope with population growth and to meet expectations of an improved standard of living. Increasing industrialisation, often without effective health and safety or environmental controls, will pose significant hazards both to people and to the environment through accidental or indirect damage. Deliberate damage to the environment may also be used as a strategic tool by adversaries.

http://www.mod.uk/issues/strategic_context/physical.htm
 
Disruptions to Gulf oil supplies could be by-passed in a short term crisis, provided that good relations with alternative suppliers are maintained.

Hmm, which raises the question 'what if there were a radical change in government in Saudi Arabia (perhaps they decided to give democracy a try, for instance) and a strongly islamic group were to rise to power and realise that the infidel Western world could be brought to its knees by them simply turning the taps off for a few months?
 
I found this

TRAILBLAZING THE POST CARBON AGE

http://www.postcarbon.org/

Despite the lack of general awareness and the paucity of mainstream media coverage, we are fast approaching a critical period in the history of humankind. A number of prominent petroleum geologists and energy experts predict a peak in oil production within the decade; natural gas production has already peaked in North America. The end of cheap oil and gas could be our last opportunity to veer off the course of biosphere destruction and climate change upon which we are headed. Unfortunately, industrial civilization is woefully unprepared for the repercussions of permanent declines in oil and gas production, as oil and natural gas are crucial inputs to essential food, transportation, health care, security, and economic systems. Furthermore, if awareness and acknowledgement of Peak Oil and Gas occurs in the context of skyrocketing prices at the pump and heating bills, governments and industry may find it more expedient to accelerate our destructive path than to lighten our load on the planet. In the context of imminent oil scarcity, almost unimaginable stresses on essential systems, and unheralded opportunity, the Post Carbon Institute is trailblazing the transition into the Post Carbon Age. We envision and champion a new path that is restorative for Earth's biosphere and ultimately leads to sustainable local communities. We are developing knowledge to assist and guide the transition and working with individuals and communities to develop skills, infrastructure, and culture that will help prepare them for life with much less (non-renewable) hydrocarbons and chemical feedstocks. Join us in the movement!

on the ever excellent newsletters sent out by Jean Hudon and to be found at www.earthrainbownetwork.com

And no, before someone searches the site, it does not mean I buy into every article to be found there, just that it is an excellent source of news and views for which discernment and an open mind is helpful
 
Returning to the question of what this would mean for the UK. We can do Pimentel's calculation above for the UK. Here are some very rough numbers.

CIA world factbook says there are (I've converted from square miles to ha)

24.4million ha of land in the UK and 6.4 million hectares of it is arable land.

Pimentel says that on the assumptions given in his book, you need per cap:

1.5 ha for energy systems (to get EU average levels of energy supply)
1 ha pasture, biodiversity, etc. (because we're assuming no petrochemicals)
0.5ha for growing food

If we just look at growing food and assuming (as an approximation) you can only do this on arable land, that means that in the absence of oil (as a limiting case) we have a sustainable population of about 12 million, so 1/5 of the numbers we presently have. This is pretty close to the 10m of the census of 1800, before the industrial revolution got started.

We can also be fairly sure that the remaining non-arable land isn't all usable or available for pasture, biodiversity or energy systems such as bio-fuels. So we can conclude from this that with our present population, whatever the real sustainable figure is, it probably isn't the 60million we have right now.

We aren't going to be totally without oil in the forseeable future though, so this is definitely a limiting case, rather than an immediate problem. It does however give you a pretty good feel for how bad things could potentially get.

The gap between these numbers and present day reality is largely plugged by oil and gas, in a variety of different ways. Fuels, fertilisers, pesticides, etc.

Those are all going to become much more expensive and much less available, producing economic hardship on a very large scale over the coming decades.

Once we're in a major economic depression, as a result of global oil shortages, something I think is likely within a decade or so, then we're in a much worse position to make any investments in sustainable alternatives.

With our current political system, only pro-capitalist parties can get elected, so if we're assuming 'business as usual' then we're assuming this is happening in a capitalist context, with major unemployment due to economic depression.
 
Add to this that assuming we still have enough hydro-carbons to continue to pump out greenhouse gases out at our current rate, there is growing evidence (including the Pentagon's recent report) to support a sudden onset climate change scenarion in NW Europe, triggered by the 'gulf stream or great conveyor' ceasing to flow. The impact of which could be a mini ice age of the icebergs off the coast of Portugal variety within months of the critical point being reached where the gulf stream stops.

Enough to make you look at moving south, way south.

Having said this I expect any production figures / ha make some huge assumptions as to how and what we would produce and how we would adapt in a post carbon world and hopefully makes us realise the lessons we would have to learn from more 'primitive' societies that rely less on chemical, fertiliser and hdro-carbon energy inputs and more on human and animal power and organic systems for a largely vegetarain diet

This is a pattern that humanity has gone through before where an empire expands outwards and then collapses as the natural resource base on which it was founded is raped and destroyed. We have been here before just not on a global scale. To explore some this and for a top read (IMO) I would also like to recommend "The last hours of ancient sunshine" by Thom Hartmann found here

Ian
 
No "October Surprise" Courtesy of the Saudis

http://www.prudentbear.com/internationalperspective.asp

By Marshall Auerback
international portfolio strategist for David W. Tice & Associates

The new, largely unarticulated high oil price strategy should be viewed in the context of Saudi promises to invest billions in the development of the Russian energy industry, and suggestions of an emerging Russo-Saudi oil alliance. Last December, the Russian government announced that its policy for production is to stay under 9.0mmbd for the next five years. Five years is also the term of the oil and gas co-operation agreement signed with Saudi Arabia on September 2, 2003, at the end of the state visit by Crown Prince Abdullah.


The significance of this alliance for the oil market lies in the fact that, in 1998, the value of Russian oil exports was a mere $16bn. In 2003, their value was over $63bn -- second only to the $80bn worth of exports by Saudi Arabia. This increasing cohesion of Russian and Saudi energy policies is occurring against a backdrop in which the oil supply/demand balance is tighter than usual and long-term depletion rates are much higher than is generally recognized. Although Saudi Aramco (the state oil company) has historically done what is required to offset declines in existing oil fields and maintain an estimated capacity of approximately 10mmbd through new projects, the higher production required to generate a sharp fall in oil prices cannot be achieved without more personnel and investment, according to both GLL and Houston-based oil analyst Matt Simmons of Simmons & Co, who has recently undertaken an extensive study of the Saudi oil fields.


In fact, given that most OPEC members are already producing close to full capacity (and well in excess of official quota figures), without significant new discoveries in Russia, the effects of more rapid depletion dynamics will manifest themselves much earlier than currently envisaged by the market. From a peak of 11.06mmbd in 1988, Russia's actual crude oil production in 2003 had fallen to a little less than 8.0mmbd, according to GLL. Much of the new technology introduced to develop Russia's energy fields will only accelerate rates of depletion in existing fields, leaving remote areas of Siberia as the key variable in determining whether the Putin administration can achieve its publicly stated goal of 9.0mmbd production, let alone get anywhere near the peaks sustained during the late 1980s.


Given that the Saudis and the Russians are two of the world's largest oil suppliers, the effects of their de facto alliance cannot be overestimated. In early 2003, Saudi Arabia facilitated the invasion of Iraq by temporarily increasing oil production, but all actions subsequent to a June 10th Saudi decision to end negotiations with U.S. companies on the development of the Saudi natural gas fields have been consistent with a broader Saudi reassessment of its respective relations with both the U.S. and Russia.


In 2002, the OPEC oil ministers met 4 times. In 2003, they met 7 times. Thus far in 2004, they have already met twice. The significance of the increased frequency of these meetings over the past 18 months (at least in contrast to the comparative paucity of meetings from the early 1990s through 2002) is that it has allowed OPEC member states to better minimize the risks of overproduction relative to quota allowances. The monitoring of overproduction can be more accurately calibrated with more frequent meetings, note Groppe, Long, & Littell. In fact, GLL argues that OPEC has in effect moved closer to the old model of the Texas Railroad Commission, which still sets monthly allowances for production in Texas. As GLL notes: "The genius of the monthly meetings of the Railroad Commission is that the commissioners did not have to depend on their ability to forecast accurately. Any mistakes made – and some were – could be corrected at the next meeting."


The goal here appears clear: limit overproduction and keep oil prices high, not flood the market with cheap oil. And with the Saudis clearly not playing ball on oil, one can only surmise that their hitherto almost reflexive move to recycle petrodollar surpluses back into the dollar has likely dissipated as well, removing an important marginal bid in the bond market, at a time when inflationary pressures are intensifying and 10-year bond yields have headed north of 5%. The broader economic and geopolitical implications are enormous: the House of Saud, which has cultivated a special relationship with successive U.S. administrations since the days of FDR, seems to have effectively decided that politically and economically distancing itself from at least the present American government provides a much better means of ensuring its long-term survival.


All of this implies an increasingly precarious backdrop for U.S. financial assets and the dollar, the rallies in which do not fully reflect today's deteriorating geopolitical and economic variables. Consumers have reached debt saturation with short-term rates at 1%. What happens as rates rise and the oil price explodes? A further price spike in energy could well exacerbate a growing inflationary psychology now predominant in the credit markets, which in turn could undermine the Fed's recent efforts to "talk down" yields on long-term interest rates.


An oil shock potentially endangering U.S. national security and economic interests is the last thing a debt-saturated America, embarking on expensive overseas ventures, needs right now. Yet that appears to be where we are headed today, the consequences of which are not yet fully reflected in the markets.
 
sparticus said:
<snip> Having said this I expect any production figures / ha make some huge assumptions as to how and what we would produce and how we would adapt in a post carbon world <snip>
Yes, assumptions are obviously made to arrive at Prof. Pimentel's figures. You can find them articulated in great detail in his book 'Food, Energy and Society.'

What he's assuming, roughly, is business as usual, only with sustainable energy and agriculture. So he's not for example assuming big changes in population distribution. This is quite important. In practice, a fairly large amount of the energy used by the average family is spent in putting food on the table, far more than on running cars or heating their homes for example.

Here's a graph of energy use by a typical (Swedish) family.
link

The relatively massive energy use in food production arises because of the process that puts food on the table. Pimentel offers a figure of 10 units of oil energy to put 1 unit of food energy on an average US table. This breaks down as petrochemicals used as fertiliser, drugs for animals and pesticide, transport of fertiliser, drugs for animals and pesticide, harvesting, transport of cereals, vegetables and fruit, transport of animals, transport and disposal of wastes, food processing, packaging, transport to supermarkets etc. See for example what's in your bag of supermarket salad? for a discussion of just some of these process stages in a bit more detail.

If I eat a tomato grown organically 3m from where I'm sitting right now, then clearly these costs don't apply. I don't want to spend my whole life growing food however (although I don't mind spending some time growing it, in fact I rather enjoy gardening as a recreation and believe that it's also a worthwhile spiritual practice, as a kind of meditation)

So in order to minimise these kinds of costs, but maximise the efficiency of food production and hence radically reduce the energy needs of our way of life, I would suggest that one should cooperate with others to grow food close to where one lives. Eco-villages with a population in the 2-500 range are optimal and experience with these models seems to imply an average of say 8 hrs per cap per week spent growing food.

You can do a fair bit better than Pimentel's assumed 1.5 ha for food, pasture, biodiversity etc, and also reduce his 1.5 ha for energy. You need about 0.25 ha per cap for this system to produce a complete and balanced diet, but you still need some space for energy systems, to heat your home etc. But around 0.5 ha or somewhere around one acre per human, is enough to provide for a decent way of life.

Assuming that acre is decent arable land, that still only implies a sustainable UK population of around 12m though, while we have 60m citizens at present. If you assume only half of it needs to be arable, you get 24m, but in practice, you mostly don't get land that's half arable and half marginal and that matters if were talking about something as localised as an eco-village.

I think that you still need to find some way to recover land that presently isn't viable, in order to sustain our present population in the absence of oil, but assuming big changes in our way of life.

I think it's in the realms of the possible, but not with 'business as usual' assumptions, or population distribution.
 
If we are indeed witnessing a "circling of the wagons", and projection of Strassian p

Seems to me that 1984 has already arrived in the US. There is an unelected dictator in charge of the country, there is a gulag in Guantanamo Bay set up for dissenters, and the media is being controlled to the point of total clampdown. there is a 'war on terrorism' which can never be won, and 'homeland security' against unspecified threats from outside. You are all Winston Smith now.
 
I think it's fairly clear that the Bush project is to secure oil supplies, since the US uses more than the rest of the world and raising the price of gas would kiss goodbye to re-election hopes. That said, history shows that this kind of strategy is fucked-up. While Bush Inc wates money and goodwill on chasing oil, the world will change and oil will soon no longer be the point. Personally, I can't wait.
 
Bernie Gunther said:
To achieve a standard of living comparable to that of the average EU citizen (a US citizen uses a lot more than this), without oil, under some plausible assumptions about energy systems and food production, you need, per capita:

0.5 Hectares of land for growing food.
1.0 Hectares of land for forest, pasture, etc.
1.5 Hectares of land of energy systems (solar, wind, biomass etc)

First of all, if we want to conserve the standard of life of an average EU citizen without oil, than it's not enough to have land. This "average EU citizen" needs slaves as well - somebody has to work on the land and has to take care for the animals. I think 10 slaves could be enough for this "average EU citizen" - assuming that slaves consume less energy than their masters - lets say one third or one fith of the energy used by their master.

Bernie Gunther said:
If the already severe problems of soil erosion were addressed effectively this implies a sustainable world population of around 1/3 of what we have already.

(source Pimentel, 'Food, Energy and Society')

I agree, our world would be more friendly with 1..2 billion people instead of 6 billion, but this is what we have and by 2050 the population will increase to 8 billion. However the master/slave combination presented above could solve the energy and living standard problem even without oil - at least for the masters :)




Bernie Gunther said:
To fill the energy gap between availability and predicted demand using nuclear you need to build about 500 reactors per year which is prohibitively expensive, and can only provide electricity, not petrochemicals, viable motor fuels etc.


This graph has been presented in 1985 by John F. Bookout, the president of Shell:



pic4740764.jpg


As you can see we will still use fossil fuels during the 21st century. Of course we shouldn't use carbon because of CO2, but as far as I know the humanity they wont take any measure until something really serious climate change happens (then it will be too late, but this is another question)

If we want to see what will happen in the near future than let's take a look at the next picture: the US Energy Flow in 2001.

usenflow01-quads.gif


for details se:

Download Adobe Acrobat PDF file of supporting report, US Energy Flow Trends — 2001

As you can see electricity is generated mainly from carbon and nuclear energy, therefore I think we won't have problem with this.

Oil is used for transport mainly, but since Peak Oil is comming around 2010 - transport will be more expensive, however it will be solved. The cheapest way is to use natural gas for transport, and later on when natural gas will peak than can be used hidrogen or liquified carbon. Again the problem: the hidrogen is even more expensive, and the liquified carbon is not good for the environment.

Hidrogen can be produced from water with electricity - but the electricity is produced using carbon or nuclear energy - however there are some plans for nuclear plants which could decompose the water directly - much more efficient.

Conclusion: energy problems will be solved - however energy will cost more therefore living standard will decrease somewhat. The costs of transport will be increased significantly and electricity will be more "popular". We will se some latent wars for energy resources - basically wars of secret services - disguised as terrorist acts.
Globalisation will be more and more extended which will lead to the modern form of slavery. There are some rumors with CIA mind control experiments, it could be possible to have some truth in it.
Around 2050 we will experience some serious climate changes.

Brave new world :)
 
Bernie Gunther said:
Could you elaborate on that please?

No, please don't. No need to bother this thread with that.

Bernie - looks to me as though the slaves are going to be controlled through their tinfoil hats.
 
Bernie Gunther said:
I must admit I'm slightly puzzled by your references to the need for slaves.

Could you elaborate on that please?

Well it's very simple. Today in the Western World around 10% of the people produce food for the rest - and their job is not very exhausting because of machineries.

In an upcoming world without fossil fuels around 90% of the population will be busy to produce food and other basic necessities. Of course theoretically it would be possible that this "food producing people" to have similar life standards to the rest of 10% (but this life standard would be much lower than today's average EU citizen living standard - considering 7..8 billion people worldwide).

My theory is a little bit similar to Marx's theory about the evolution of the human society. Marx distinguished the epochs of the human society based on the form of exploitation. I think it is more relevant to distinguish the evolution of the human society based on the forms of energy used. These are the epochs based on the newly discovered energy forms:



Code:
0. -                            2 million BC - 100,000 BC
1. Fire                         100,000 BC - 10,000 BC
2. Animals                      10,000 BC - 3,000 BC
3. Slaves                       3,000 BC - Jesus
4. -                            Jesus - 1000
5. Peasants, Laborers, Slaves
   Wind- and Hydro power        1000 - 1865
6. Fossil fuels: coal,
   petrol, natural gas          1865 - 1945
7. Atomic Energy                1945 - today

Notes:
1. The energy resulted from Fire today we call energy from biomass (it's a good one, because it's renewable :))
2. Domesticating of animals began at the end of the Ice Age (the first animal domesticated was the reindeer). After melting of the Ice the wheel has been discovered.
3. The discovery of the slavery is as important like the discovery of the fire and the discovery of the wheel.
The EROEI (Energy Returned on Energy Invested) in case of slaves is not very good, but since slaves possess intelligence, a combination of Slaves + Animals + Fire is a pretty good Energy resource - antic civilizations in Egypt, Greece and Rome were based on this Energy.
4. Then Jesus came. He said "Let's love each other!". It's OK, when masters love each other or slaves love each other, but when masters love slaves and liberate them, then problems arise: more free people who wants to use energy, and less slaves who provide energy. This is why Romans hated so much Christians, and not because of a different God - and this was the end of the Roman empire.
Then several hundred of years come, with only basic energy from Fire and Animals, enough only for surviving. This was the Dark Age, when nothing noticeable happened.
5. Human society discovered once again the master-slave combination, but this time slaves were called peasants and later-on laborers. Windmills and watermills have been constructed, but the most efficient was using the wind power for sailing. No wonder the most successful nations were those which could use this new type of energy: in the beginning the Vikings and Normans, and later on Great Britain, France and Spain.
6. Theoretically the Fossil Fuel Age begins in 1760, when James Watt discovered the steam engine, but this is valid only for Great Britain. Practically 1865 - the end of US Civil War signaled the new age worldwide. The US civil war was an "Energy War". The Southern States thought only slavery can assure the Energy needs for their society and Northern states thought farmers + laborers + fossil fuels will be more then enough.
7. First "atomic reactor" has been built in 1942, but this was top secret. The atomic energy has been presented to the world in the form of a very powerful bomb in 1945, then it was used to construct even more powerful bombs - therefore most of the people can't accept a society based on atomic energy.


Conclusion: if no new Energy resource is discovered than in 2050 human society will be based on coal or atomic energy or slavery - or a combination of these.
 
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