Personally, I am not as sanguine about the idea that war isn't about to happen until there a 500,000 strong invasion force on its way - living memory is rammed with examples of wars being launched long before the conditions required for a successful outcome have been met.
It's a necessary condition for them to drive the US out of the Pacific and to achieve naval hegemony in Asia and over the world's busiest shipping routes.I just don't see what China stands to gain from invading Taiwan. Seems foolhardy, if the real objective is to quell dissent at home.
It's a necessary condition for them to drive the US out of the Pacific and to achieve naval hegemony in Asia and over the world's busiest shipping routes.
Their ambition is to be the dominant global power and you can't be that if you can't bring your back yard to heel.
Nuanced is the word. Ship building they have been and from a numbers point of you they have been but they are way behind in terms of projectable air sea power. Within South China sea though quite formidable.Strong. However, it's nuanced.
Distance is a huge problem for the US and its allies - they are all sufficiently distant from each other that mutual support is difficult, while each is close enough to China that China can concentrate a huge quantity of force onto each.
On the other hand, neither the Chinese military, nor the Chinese government, have fought a war in living memory. War, as Ukraine shows, isn't simply about numbers, it's much more complicated than that - so there's probably a great of scope for fuck ups on the Chinese side caused by a) unrealistic military exercises that are simply about firepower demonstrations with none of the friction that real world operations are full of, and thats even before a very motivated, skilled enemy starts shooting at you, b) unrealistic political leadership /management who think that a big parade/firepower demonstration is the same as a war, and c) a political/military culture where telling uncomfortable truths about deficiencies in equipment/training/planning is a good way to end your career/end up in a camp for crimes against the revolution.
Personally, I am not as sanguine about the idea that war isn't about to happen until there a 500,000 strong invasion force on its way - living memory is rammed with examples of wars being launched long before the conditions required for a successful outcome have been met.
China has announced a no-fly zone north of Taiwan, and has - in the last week - talked about stopping and searching vessels, including other Navies, sailing in the Straights of Taiwan.
I wouldn't fall off my chair if, when the history books are written, it's decided that the war has already started.
Completely.. would just knock out high end chips globally for about a decadeView attachment 370438
(Of course, the way the company is, deliberately, structured means it would be useless after an invasion.)
Still regular skirmishes with India around the borderYeh not counting ww2 or the Chinese civil war China haven't fought a war in living memory except in Korea, and against Vietnam and India
The trouble with the road part of belt and road, as Xi has realised, is that because it's actually really a rail link, any regional power (or insurgency) along the whole route can turn the whole thing off overnight.This is kind of what the Silk Road concept is about, to create alternative trade routes through Central Asia that are less sensitive to military disruption.
or anyone who can be arsed to google or work out how to derail trainsThe trouble with the road part of belt and road, as Xi has realised, is that because it's actually really a rail link, any regional power (or insurgency) along the whole route can turn the whole thing off overnight.
The ones sprang to my mind were the two fights with Vietnam, bit more recent and a mixed bag.Not sure how much institutional memory remains from those conflicts...
Not that bizarre when you remember that the KMT is a Chinese nationalist party, and that Taiwanese nationalism emerged as a reaction against the KMT's heavy handed approach to occupying Taiwan.Chiang Kai-Shek’s old party the KMT is bizzarly the reunification party ( although it’s split between people who want closer ties with China on a one country two systems model, to people who nostalgically yearn for the mainland being reunited with Taiwan under Taiwanese government (!)) The DPP looks like a European center left party till you scratch the surface and see the spectrum of independence to nationalism it covers.
Predates that, emerged during the fight against Japanese colonialism, see second book of Li Qiao's family saga trilogy for example.Not that bizarre when you remember that the KMT is a Chinese nationalist party, and that Taiwanese nationalism emerged as a reaction against the KMT's heavy handed approach to occupying Taiwan.
What I found interesting about Taiwan is despite it's location and modern history it didn't have that much to do with China. The Chinese only started building forts there after the Dutch East India Company did the same. Han Chinese people only started moving there in numbers (illegally) in the 18th Century. The Japanese, who had also tried to annexe it in the 1500s, made it more like a French DOM than the rest of their colonies post kicking 'us*' out in 1880s, they didn't behave with quite as much barbarity as in Korea or China (lots of older Taiwanese speak Japanese as their first language). It was only when the KMT bugged out to the Island did the whole 'one China' thing come about (on both sides TBF).It's interesting to note that early CCP texts and statements refer to the Taiwanese in the same bracket as Koreans and Mongolians, with sense they would be helped to self determination, this inviolable part of national territory stuff is also post civil war.
ETA Here's the reference, happened to be reading it the other day as am doing something related to this period: https://sci-hub.ru/10.2307/2757657 Looks like I remembered the watershed wrong, they say it comes after the Cairo Conference in 1943
Of course to the Han settlers, the Qing was as much an alien regime as the Japanese. The nationalist revolution did also spark Chinese nationalist sentiment and was certainly a big spur to resistance movements on the island, but alongside nativist stuff too as I mentioned above.What I found interesting about Taiwan is despite it's location and modern history it didn't have that much to do with China. The Chinese only started building forts there after the Dutch East India Company did the same. Han Chinese people only started moving there in numbers (illegally) in the 18th Century. The Japanese, who had also tried to annexe it in the 1500s, made it more like a French DOM than the rest of their colonies post kicking 'us*' out in 1880s, they didn't behave with quite as much barbarity as in Korea or China (lots of older Taiwanese speak Japanese as their first language). It was only when the KMT bugged out to the Island did the whole 'one China' thing come about (on both sides TBF).
And the Nationalists tried to hold Hainan as well, which the West often forgets, but being much closer the the mainland they got kicked out of there in 1950.
(WARNING Massive over simplification)
*See the Camphor War for another great example of Victorian Colonial fuckery.
It was interesting that there is a theory that most of the pacific peoples (of which the Taiwanese indigenous people are one) actually originated on Formosa and not what is now Vietnam/Cambodia/Loas. Not sure if that theory has much traction outside Taiwan...Of course to the Han settlers, the Qing was as much an alien regime as the Japanese. The nationalist revolution did also spark Chinese nationalist sentiment and was certainly a big spur to resistance movements on the island, but alongside nativist stuff too as I mentioned above.
Think that's widely accepted, not looked at mainland discussions but given it's indigenous issue probably OKIt was interesting that there is a theory that most of the pacific peoples (of which the Taiwanese indigenous people are one) actually originated on Formosa and not what is now Vietnam/Cambodia/Loas. Not sure if that theory has much traction outside Taiwan...
For China, starting a war without having an invasion force ready to roll would be a disaster. What they want is a fait accompli and the war to be over before a reaction can be decided upon, and minimal disruption to business. If they start bombing Taiwan before they are ready to invade then Taiwan is fully capable of bombing their ports in response which would result in their economic isolation. It would also give ample time for a geopolitical response to be organised.
This is kind of what the Silk Road concept is about, to create alternative trade routes through Central Asia that are less sensitive to military disruption.
I wouldn't fall off my chair if, when the history books are written, it's decided that the war has already started.
Think it will be generational too as mainlanders and their children maybe had more hankerings but grandchildren less so, though don't doubt evidence of 'one country, two systems' being a con hasn't helped the peaceful reunification cause.The numbers of Taiwanese in favour of reunification with China has declined massively over the last couple of decades. I wonder if part of this is down to seeing how things turned out for Hong Kong?
They can probably survive, but of course their economy will be much weaker. I think the likely trend for China is not necessarily a severe economic decline but Japanese style stagnation and decline relative to India, SE Asia, parts of Africa etc which will start to catch up to China.Can they survive de-linking economically from the US? Near as I can tell, the US is already migrating away from China and moving toward Mexico and other low wage countries as a source of production. Some of it is even coming back to the US after the supply chain issues during the pandemic.
They can probably survive, but of course their economy will be much weaker. I think the likely trend for China is not necessarily a severe economic decline but Japanese style stagnation and decline relative to India, SE Asia, parts of Africa etc which will start to catch up to China.
I've seen it argued that globalization is coming to an end or at least seeing a major contraction. Do you think this is happening? ... or will happen?
There's lots of talk of onshoring, nearshoring, friendshoring.I've seen it argued that globalization is coming to an end or at least seeing a major contraction. Do you think this is happening? ... or will happen?
Some businesses are increasing the inventory they keep on hand and entering into longer term contracts with key suppliers. Others are diversifying their manufacturing to create regional hubs with local suppliers and investing in technology to give them greater advance warning of potential bottlenecks. Some companies are also investigating ways of working with their rivals to share information to develop emergency back up facilities without falling foul of competition regulators.
Rather than a return of the nation state we're seeing the reinforcement of regional blocs.It depends what you mean by globalisation.
I think the Thomas Friedman era of unbridled optimism about neoliberal globalisation is over, and there is indeed some return to the nation state. But there can hardly be a return to 20th Century level of non-globalisation because of how transportation and communications have developed, so I don't think it can come to an end exactly, only go through a period of contraction.