D
Diesel
Guest
Mobilizations Hint at Date and Strategy for Iraq War
2 August 2002
Summary
As the debate over a potential U.S. attack on Iraq continues in Washington and abroad, a subtle increase in the mobilization of Army combat troops is underway. This development offers a hint to the Pentagon's evolving Iraq strategy, with the specific units involved indicating that a conventional attack on Iraq could be slated for January or February, with a major thrust possibly coming from Turkey.
Analysis
According to a July 31 news release by the U.S. Department of Defense, the total number of National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty in support of the war on Al Qaeda declined over the previous week by 834 people to 79,780 troops. This represents the fifth consecutive week of declines in mobilized guard and reserve troops, with the total mobilized now down to levels not seen since mid-March.
However, while reductions continue in the number of mobilized Air National Guard and Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve forces, call-ups of Army National Guard and Reserve troops continue to rise. Total mobilized Army forces surpassed those of the Air Force in the week preceding July 24, the first time this has happened since call-ups began Sept. 20, 2001.
Numbers of National Guard and Reserve Mobilized
As Of 2002 Army Air Force Navy Marines Coast Guard Total
01/02
17,952
30,628
9,193
1,492
2,108
61,373
01/30
23,606
33,550
10,008
3,135
1,904
72,203
02/27
25,731
36,723
10,597
4,387
1,831
79,269
04/03
28,615
37,813
10,597
4,398
1,836
83,259
05/01
28,013
37,451
9,629
4,380
1,762
81,235
05/29
31,431
37,404
9,011
4,265
1,635
83,746
06/26
34,478
36,773
8,760
4,096
1,485
85,592
07/31 36,914 30,923 6,882 3,846 1,215 79,780
Source: US Department of Defense
In addition to the shift away from air and naval assets to ground forces, the types of ground forces being mobilized are changing as well. Beginning last September, the Army call-ups concentrated on units such as military police, chemical and biological warfare, medical, mortuary affairs, intelligence and civil affairs.
Mobilization of these units was reactive and primarily defensive in preparation for any potential follow-on attacks by al Qaeda after Sept. 11. Later call-ups included units responsible for logistics and training, some infantry for guarding airports and federal facilities and Special Forces for dealing with contingencies in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Now the mobilization appears to be shifting to include more infantry, armor, artillery, engineer and combat medical units. Moreover, the Army is mobilizing full companies, battalions, and brigades, rather than just individual augmentees or skeleton crews. Major units from the 28th, 35th and 40th Mechanized Infantry divisions, 29th Light Infantry Division and 49th Armored Division have been mobilized.
Some of these are tasked to other missions. For example, the 28th mechanized is slated to deploy to Bosnia for six months beginning in October. But others could be employed in action against Iraq.
Elements of the 35th mechanized are scheduled to deploy to Europe to provide security and force protection to troops based there. Soldiers of the V Corps' 1st Infantry and 1st armored divisions, based in Europe, are contingency forces for the Persian Gulf region. In late March, more than 9,000 soldiers of the V Corps, in conjunction with Army Reserve and National Guard troops, took part in exercise Urgent Victory, which modeled combat in the Gulf region. V Corps troops continue to train, with air units of the 1st Infantry Division currently engaged in live-fire exercises in Hungary.
The deployment of elements of the 35th Infantry Division to Europe presents an interesting scenario. When National Guard and Reserve troops were called up for action in the Persian Gulf in 1990, they received a great deal of criticism for their state of readiness and the condition of their equipment.
One option, should Washington wish to avoid a recurrence of that problem, would be to deploy National Guard and Reserve troops earmarked for an attack on Iraq to large, underutilized bases in Europe, where they could train and link up with vast stocks of pre-positioned equipment. From there they could deploy quietly to Turkey to prepare for an attack.
The trouble is that such a move would require Europe, or at least Germany, to buy into Washington's plans. And the Europeans currently remain highly wary of an attack on Iraq or are outrightly opposed to such a plan
The timing of combat unit call-ups is interesting as well. Routine mobilizations are limited to nine months in duration, meaning the clock is ticking on the involvement of any of the currently mobilized combat units in an attack on Iraq. Interestingly, the current mobilizations suggest a repeat of the Desert Storm timetable. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 1, 1990, after which the United States began a rapid buildup ahead of its attack on January the next year.
The weather conditions in Iraq are familiar and tolerable for combat in January or February, and action then would allow the currently mobilized troops to rotate home on schedule by the end of March.
Finally, the mobilization of heavy ground combat units indicates the Pentagon's evolving strategy for an Iraq operation. There is an apparent compromise being forged between those in Washington who argue for a high-tech, low-manpower attack -- built around air strikes, Special Forces and Unmanned Air Vehicles -- and those who argue that the Afghan model of fighting will not work in this case.
The Iraqi army is not the Taliban, the ethnic Kurds are no Northern Alliance and it is going to take more than a piecemeal international police force to stabilize Iraq after the war. As yet, there is no indication the Pentagon is planning for a massive ground war akin to Desert Storm. But large numbers of conventional forces are certainly part of the plan. "
This is, IS, a cut and paste job...found this story interesting because it appears to be delibeartely planted disinformation coming from STRAFOR and because it is disinformation must be taken as a put off to the 'enemy' about what is really going on.
For my money I'm betting on 9/11 at dawn but it could start sooner and with some good cause.
Diesel
88888888
2 August 2002
Summary
As the debate over a potential U.S. attack on Iraq continues in Washington and abroad, a subtle increase in the mobilization of Army combat troops is underway. This development offers a hint to the Pentagon's evolving Iraq strategy, with the specific units involved indicating that a conventional attack on Iraq could be slated for January or February, with a major thrust possibly coming from Turkey.
Analysis
According to a July 31 news release by the U.S. Department of Defense, the total number of National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty in support of the war on Al Qaeda declined over the previous week by 834 people to 79,780 troops. This represents the fifth consecutive week of declines in mobilized guard and reserve troops, with the total mobilized now down to levels not seen since mid-March.
However, while reductions continue in the number of mobilized Air National Guard and Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Reserve forces, call-ups of Army National Guard and Reserve troops continue to rise. Total mobilized Army forces surpassed those of the Air Force in the week preceding July 24, the first time this has happened since call-ups began Sept. 20, 2001.
Numbers of National Guard and Reserve Mobilized
As Of 2002 Army Air Force Navy Marines Coast Guard Total
01/02
17,952
30,628
9,193
1,492
2,108
61,373
01/30
23,606
33,550
10,008
3,135
1,904
72,203
02/27
25,731
36,723
10,597
4,387
1,831
79,269
04/03
28,615
37,813
10,597
4,398
1,836
83,259
05/01
28,013
37,451
9,629
4,380
1,762
81,235
05/29
31,431
37,404
9,011
4,265
1,635
83,746
06/26
34,478
36,773
8,760
4,096
1,485
85,592
07/31 36,914 30,923 6,882 3,846 1,215 79,780
Source: US Department of Defense
In addition to the shift away from air and naval assets to ground forces, the types of ground forces being mobilized are changing as well. Beginning last September, the Army call-ups concentrated on units such as military police, chemical and biological warfare, medical, mortuary affairs, intelligence and civil affairs.
Mobilization of these units was reactive and primarily defensive in preparation for any potential follow-on attacks by al Qaeda after Sept. 11. Later call-ups included units responsible for logistics and training, some infantry for guarding airports and federal facilities and Special Forces for dealing with contingencies in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
Now the mobilization appears to be shifting to include more infantry, armor, artillery, engineer and combat medical units. Moreover, the Army is mobilizing full companies, battalions, and brigades, rather than just individual augmentees or skeleton crews. Major units from the 28th, 35th and 40th Mechanized Infantry divisions, 29th Light Infantry Division and 49th Armored Division have been mobilized.
Some of these are tasked to other missions. For example, the 28th mechanized is slated to deploy to Bosnia for six months beginning in October. But others could be employed in action against Iraq.
Elements of the 35th mechanized are scheduled to deploy to Europe to provide security and force protection to troops based there. Soldiers of the V Corps' 1st Infantry and 1st armored divisions, based in Europe, are contingency forces for the Persian Gulf region. In late March, more than 9,000 soldiers of the V Corps, in conjunction with Army Reserve and National Guard troops, took part in exercise Urgent Victory, which modeled combat in the Gulf region. V Corps troops continue to train, with air units of the 1st Infantry Division currently engaged in live-fire exercises in Hungary.
The deployment of elements of the 35th Infantry Division to Europe presents an interesting scenario. When National Guard and Reserve troops were called up for action in the Persian Gulf in 1990, they received a great deal of criticism for their state of readiness and the condition of their equipment.
One option, should Washington wish to avoid a recurrence of that problem, would be to deploy National Guard and Reserve troops earmarked for an attack on Iraq to large, underutilized bases in Europe, where they could train and link up with vast stocks of pre-positioned equipment. From there they could deploy quietly to Turkey to prepare for an attack.
The trouble is that such a move would require Europe, or at least Germany, to buy into Washington's plans. And the Europeans currently remain highly wary of an attack on Iraq or are outrightly opposed to such a plan
The timing of combat unit call-ups is interesting as well. Routine mobilizations are limited to nine months in duration, meaning the clock is ticking on the involvement of any of the currently mobilized combat units in an attack on Iraq. Interestingly, the current mobilizations suggest a repeat of the Desert Storm timetable. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 1, 1990, after which the United States began a rapid buildup ahead of its attack on January the next year.
The weather conditions in Iraq are familiar and tolerable for combat in January or February, and action then would allow the currently mobilized troops to rotate home on schedule by the end of March.
Finally, the mobilization of heavy ground combat units indicates the Pentagon's evolving strategy for an Iraq operation. There is an apparent compromise being forged between those in Washington who argue for a high-tech, low-manpower attack -- built around air strikes, Special Forces and Unmanned Air Vehicles -- and those who argue that the Afghan model of fighting will not work in this case.
The Iraqi army is not the Taliban, the ethnic Kurds are no Northern Alliance and it is going to take more than a piecemeal international police force to stabilize Iraq after the war. As yet, there is no indication the Pentagon is planning for a massive ground war akin to Desert Storm. But large numbers of conventional forces are certainly part of the plan. "
This is, IS, a cut and paste job...found this story interesting because it appears to be delibeartely planted disinformation coming from STRAFOR and because it is disinformation must be taken as a put off to the 'enemy' about what is really going on.
For my money I'm betting on 9/11 at dawn but it could start sooner and with some good cause.
Diesel
88888888
