Flavour
hang the bankers
Regime change.
Greek elections
- Thread starter ska invita
- Start date
Regime change.
And even after a thumping great popular mandate had been delivered--twice in fact. It's enough to put one off representative democracy altogether.
ska invita
back on the other side
Its an Exit of sorts I guess....
yeah but (weve done this before) the mandate was no to that deal, yet polls show overwhelming desrie to stay in the eurozone - a contradictory position - Syriza have done their best to try and stay true to those popular mandates. Turns out its a cant have your cake and eat it position.
Patteran
A nowadays excuse
I'm hoping this is bollocks - if Syriza are abandoning the process then surely the time to do it is before signing up to debt colony status, instead of, not afterwards.
newbie
undisambiguated
Around the election we were told loads about social movements and 'from below' but ever since there's been a vacuum where reports of how that's working out ought to be.
I must disagree. Opinion polls do not provide a mandate. Elections do, and so do referenda. By the standards of representative democracy, Syriza had an unimpeachable mandate to tell the Troika to piss off. And they still couldn't bring themselves to do it.
As I said above, it's really a testament to the power of ideology.
Patteran
A nowadays excuse
Yeah - although I don't know whether this is due to a lack of reports (to/for an international audience) or a lack of activity.
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
Yes, but they (particularly Varoufakis) went into the process of negotiation with their cards shown. From the outset they made clear that their desired outcome lay within the currency union.
The trouble with Varoufakis is that he accepts the basic neoliberal paradigm. He represents the far "left wing" of that paradigm, but he's still within it. What we need is a new paradigm.
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
In that sense Syriza may well have done some good in confirming the limits of a state-based, 'democratic' response to the economic terrorism of financialised capital.
belboid
Exasperated, not angry.
Syriza's mistake was in ever thinking it could win this battle. It should have become apparent to them by February, at the latest, that the support they hoped to get from France and Italy wasn't going to come. They might have been right in all their economic arguments - of course they were - but so fucking what? When did capital ever care about how is 'right'? They were doomed to failure.
But thy were trapped in that perspective because they couldn't challenge the lie that Greece's future lies in the Euro. It's popular - for a variety of reasons, good and bad - so they just went along with it, ignoring it's fundamental structure. The whole questin of surviving outside of the Euro is anathema to Greek politicians (KKE & GD excepted), and so they just ducked the question. But it is clearly the fundamental question that needs addressing, the key argument that needs making. But they left it too late. Varafoukis says they tried to have the argument for a couple of days toward the end of the talks, but that is ludicrously too late, and it wasn't a couple of other leadership figures the argument needed having with, it's the entire Greek people.
Sadly, it still seems to be an argument Syriza are unwilling to make, they still will do anything to appease their creditors. Which also means they can not consider any alternative course, they can't think about how to reconfigure Greek industry to actually be productive, how to retake the spoils the (mostly, but not entirely, shipping) oligarchs have stolen, and simply how the reintroduction of the drachma would work.
On the positive side, they have made Merkel and the German government look like utter cunts.
But thy were trapped in that perspective because they couldn't challenge the lie that Greece's future lies in the Euro. It's popular - for a variety of reasons, good and bad - so they just went along with it, ignoring it's fundamental structure. The whole questin of surviving outside of the Euro is anathema to Greek politicians (KKE & GD excepted), and so they just ducked the question. But it is clearly the fundamental question that needs addressing, the key argument that needs making. But they left it too late. Varafoukis says they tried to have the argument for a couple of days toward the end of the talks, but that is ludicrously too late, and it wasn't a couple of other leadership figures the argument needed having with, it's the entire Greek people.
Sadly, it still seems to be an argument Syriza are unwilling to make, they still will do anything to appease their creditors. Which also means they can not consider any alternative course, they can't think about how to reconfigure Greek industry to actually be productive, how to retake the spoils the (mostly, but not entirely, shipping) oligarchs have stolen, and simply how the reintroduction of the drachma would work.
On the positive side, they have made Merkel and the German government look like utter cunts.
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
trabant
Well-Known Member
There are social movements that Syriza supported by dribbling funds to them. From my experience of working at a local group for two years, it had turned into a depoliticised charity that attempted to shield those hit hardest, the ones the state abandoned or didn't even know or wanted to acknowledge existed. Its initial focus was well intentioned, helping people and hoping to politicize them as a result so that they would help back (kind of like how I understand solfed operates). It ended up becaming a volunteer group that consisted of collecting food outside of supermarkets and then redistributing them, as well as helping immigrants (my area has a very large registered and unregistered immigrant population) with various issues, from tutoriing Greek, to helping their children with schoolwork etc. Last I heard they were feeding around 2000+ people every fortnight.. This is of a group of around 10-15 'core' people..
Aside from that, there are a few underfunded NGOs working with addicts and the homeless, but the brutality of the police and the difficulty of providing any, kind of semi-permanent link to those who require help, as well as the state providing zero factilities (and actively moving them around every other day, beating them, detaining them etc.) has made it difficult to really improve their conditions. The increase in unemployment and the destabilizing of relations with the state have produced a surge in these two categories. As a side note, in Exarchia there was a neighbourhood movement to kick out drug dealers that the police had pushed into a block of Exarchia. They were successful which was a nice victory!
Politically, imo, a lot of energy was put towards anti-fascist and anti-racism groups, nearly every neighbourhood (in Athens) has an antifa group and they vary in openness, effectiveness, activity etc. The GD have been generally quiet for a while, there was an attack again (in collusion with the cops) a few weeks back, and reports of them leafleting again.
In addition, environmental, anti-privatisation, strike support, free-clinics, prisoner solidarity, squat/social space solidarity (and fight back after the cops went on a rampage shutting them down), public sector shutdown (e.g. ERT, public universities, the cleaners) movements have popped up all over the place in the last few years and again, their effectiveness has varied quite a lot. Scant victories leads to burn out and disillusionment. A lot of time and energy was also spent hanging outside of police stations waiting for comrades/supporters to be released, providing support at courthouses, raising money for the ones that were severly beaten by cops and then charged with something to absolve the cops etc...
Thats a crap summary, but it'll do.
How are the governments of other eurozone members not democratic?
belboid
Exasperated, not angry.
The EU, and most especially its leading financial institutions, are not democratic.
newbie
undisambiguated
it's a fine summary, thankyou. Has Syriza used its brief time in power to develop social movements and pathways for government to listen to bottom up views? Or is it like any other administration, treating them as powerless and irrelevant lobbyists?
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
No-one gets to vote for the corporations of financialised capital in whose interest they govern.
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
Bingo
brogdale
Coming to terms with late onset Anarchism
Yeah, but he asked a valid question, got some replies and now appears to have accepted the reality of the situation. His mind is being blown....
belboid
Exasperated, not angry.
As neither of the people that replied to you said of the kind, we can only assume that you are being deliberately dishonest in your question.
Jeff Robinson
Marxist-Lentilist: Jackboots and Jackfruit
Documenting the vested interests of the blood drenched EU vermin:
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2015/07/13/a-tangled-web-the-vested-interests-of-the-eu-right/
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2015/07/13/a-tangled-web-the-vested-interests-of-the-eu-right/
ska invita
back on the other side
I do like this tweet:
Nick Malkoutzis @NickMalkoutzis
Govt's 2 lines of argument: They wanted to kick us out of euro so we're staying in & they wanted a coup so we're not going anywhere #Greece
Nick Malkoutzis @NickMalkoutzis
Govt's 2 lines of argument: They wanted to kick us out of euro so we're staying in & they wanted a coup so we're not going anywhere #Greece
trabant
Well-Known Member
Note that the following are just from my observations.
From my understanding no they haven't _further_ developed permanent formations that already existed before the election. I _think_ (but can't be sure) that they gave some help to impromptu groups that have popped up, for example to help the arriving Syrian immigrants, generally getting them fresh clothes, food and enough money to get to Athens.. The one I am thinking of was a very informal grouping and dissolved when the immigrants left.
They run local assemblies which listen to bottom up views. The only person I knew who actually regularly attended these in her local municipality left and stopped supporting Syriza after sheer disappointment. I have no idea how effective these were. I also have no idea how effective they could really be if there are no funds to distribute.
Syriza, despite its rhetoric does not have as large a formal bond to social movements. Its weakly connected to a few unions, has no representation in the universities (unlike for example KKE and ND). Its main links are members/local representatives etc. who have been active in social movements. Again, this last part is what I have observed from people who I knew that were involved with Syriza.
In addition, parties generally have yearly 'festivals' here in Greece. Festivals for the youth of Syriza, Antarsya, KKE for example. I went to a youth of Syriza/syriza one last month (an awesome Greek band was playing..) There are a _lot_ of small groups there with stands, LGBTQ groups, disability groups, palestinian solidarity, the types of social movements I mentioned at the beginning of my last post. I believe that they receive funding, at least they probably didn't have to pay for the stand...
Libertad
Sparking up a rollie in the Reichstag
Filthy filthy lucre.
butchersapron
Bring back hanging
Another quick passage from Streeck's book, does fit in with was briefly touched on above - apologies for length, but it really does put it all nicely:
It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here in detail the rush of new regulations, institutions and instruments that the European Council has negotiated and decided upon since the beginning of the crisis. Less than three months separated the coming into force on 13 December 2011 of the ‘sixpack’ – six European laws to reform the Maastricht stability and growth pact – and the signing of the European Fiscal Pact on 2 March 2012. Additional rule changes, going ever further beyond the powers assigned by the treaties to the bodies of the EU, were under active preparation in summer 2012. The tendency has for a long time been the same:
1) Guidelines for the fiscal policy of member-states are becoming more and more detailed. Their observance is required in return for any rescue measures by the European ‘community of states’, and particularly for its willingness, under the pressure of market threats, to mutualize public and private credit risks.
2) National governments are under ever tighter obligations to press ahead with the market-conforming reconstruction of their economic, social and legal orders. For example, in line with the German model, they must incorporate debt ceilings into their constitution. They must also find ways of adapting their wage formation systems to macroeconomic stability goals defined by the EU, and must for this purpose be prepared to ‘reform’ their national institutions, if necessary against the resistance of their citizens and without regard for either national rights to free collective bargaining or the limits of the jurisdiction of European-level institutions.
3) Equally important are the areas in which the new EU statutes refrain from interfering in the autonomy of member-states. No provisions stipulate a minimum level of taxation, such as would limit fiscal competition within the single market.27 This keeps up the tradition of the European Monetary Union, whose convergence and admission criteria contained nothing about a maximum tolerable level of unemployment or social inequality.
4) EU institutions, whether already existing or still to be built, get ever more far-reaching rights to oversee the economic, social and fiscal policies of member-states, even prospectively and in matters before national parliaments. The body with the greatest powers at European level is the Commission; the Council, representing the democratically legitimated member-states, takes only second place, with some kind of veto right, often on the condition of unanimity.
5) The penalties that the EU can impose on member-states for failing to observe its rules are growing larger. Enforcement procedures have an increasingly judicial form and are automatically started, with less and less scope for discretionary political decisions.
6) The national and European regulations that are supposed to determine the economic and fiscal policies of member-states are to be formulated in such a way as to be valid forever, protecting them from being changed by new political majorities.
7) Lastly, in the event of non-compliance by a member-state, it is increasingly demanded that Brussels, in particular the Commission or the Court of Justice, get the power to act on behalf of the respective national state and take decisions for it and in its place to ensure conformity with the requirements of the market.
The direction in which this is heading is clear from a speech that Jens Weidmann, the president of the Bundesbank (who before this had been the chancellor’s closest economic policy adviser), gave in Mannheim on 14 June 2012. At a key point he remarked:
In the event that a country does not keep to the budgetary rules, national sovereignty would automatically pass to the EU level to the extent necessary for the targets to be reached … One example might be the right to implement – and not simply demand – tax increases or proportionate spending cuts … Within such a framework, the EU level could secure the path to consolidation, even if no majority can be found in the national parliament concerned.
It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here in detail the rush of new regulations, institutions and instruments that the European Council has negotiated and decided upon since the beginning of the crisis. Less than three months separated the coming into force on 13 December 2011 of the ‘sixpack’ – six European laws to reform the Maastricht stability and growth pact – and the signing of the European Fiscal Pact on 2 March 2012. Additional rule changes, going ever further beyond the powers assigned by the treaties to the bodies of the EU, were under active preparation in summer 2012. The tendency has for a long time been the same:
1) Guidelines for the fiscal policy of member-states are becoming more and more detailed. Their observance is required in return for any rescue measures by the European ‘community of states’, and particularly for its willingness, under the pressure of market threats, to mutualize public and private credit risks.
2) National governments are under ever tighter obligations to press ahead with the market-conforming reconstruction of their economic, social and legal orders. For example, in line with the German model, they must incorporate debt ceilings into their constitution. They must also find ways of adapting their wage formation systems to macroeconomic stability goals defined by the EU, and must for this purpose be prepared to ‘reform’ their national institutions, if necessary against the resistance of their citizens and without regard for either national rights to free collective bargaining or the limits of the jurisdiction of European-level institutions.
3) Equally important are the areas in which the new EU statutes refrain from interfering in the autonomy of member-states. No provisions stipulate a minimum level of taxation, such as would limit fiscal competition within the single market.27 This keeps up the tradition of the European Monetary Union, whose convergence and admission criteria contained nothing about a maximum tolerable level of unemployment or social inequality.
4) EU institutions, whether already existing or still to be built, get ever more far-reaching rights to oversee the economic, social and fiscal policies of member-states, even prospectively and in matters before national parliaments. The body with the greatest powers at European level is the Commission; the Council, representing the democratically legitimated member-states, takes only second place, with some kind of veto right, often on the condition of unanimity.
5) The penalties that the EU can impose on member-states for failing to observe its rules are growing larger. Enforcement procedures have an increasingly judicial form and are automatically started, with less and less scope for discretionary political decisions.
6) The national and European regulations that are supposed to determine the economic and fiscal policies of member-states are to be formulated in such a way as to be valid forever, protecting them from being changed by new political majorities.
7) Lastly, in the event of non-compliance by a member-state, it is increasingly demanded that Brussels, in particular the Commission or the Court of Justice, get the power to act on behalf of the respective national state and take decisions for it and in its place to ensure conformity with the requirements of the market.
The direction in which this is heading is clear from a speech that Jens Weidmann, the president of the Bundesbank (who before this had been the chancellor’s closest economic policy adviser), gave in Mannheim on 14 June 2012. At a key point he remarked:
In the event that a country does not keep to the budgetary rules, national sovereignty would automatically pass to the EU level to the extent necessary for the targets to be reached … One example might be the right to implement – and not simply demand – tax increases or proportionate spending cuts … Within such a framework, the EU level could secure the path to consolidation, even if no majority can be found in the national parliament concerned.
butchersapron
Bring back hanging
..and for how for ties in with (allows? demands? is consistent with?) a form of national democracy:
The neoliberal revolution left almost nothing of this. Its objective was to trim the states of postwar capitalism as much as possible, reducing them to providing for the functioning and expansion of markets and making them institutionally incapable of corrective intervention in the self-regulating enforcement of market justice. Its full triumph, however, came only with the internationalization of the European political economy and the conversion of the European system of states into a multilevel regime with nationally confined democracy and multinationally organized financial markets and supervisory authorities – a configuration that has long proved an ideal vehicle for the neutralization of political pressure from below while expanding the realm of private contractual freedom vis-à-vis the state. The latest phase of this development is the ongoing transition from the national debt state to the international consolidation state. With it the Hayekian blueprint of a liberalized capitalist market economy immune from political pressure finally comes close to full realisation.
...
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the markets, examples like this notwithstanding, the domestic policies of democratic states can never be fully relied upon to deliver structural consolidation. Since in Europe it is not yet possible, in the name of economic rationality, to do away with the remnants of national democracy, especially the accountability of governments to their voters, the method of choice is to integrate national governments into a non-democratic supranational regime – a kind of international superstate without democracy – and have their activities regulated by it. Since the 1990s, the European Union has been converted into such a regime. Today the integration of member-states into a supranational system of institutions insulated from electoral pressure, and above all the binding force of a common currency, serve to eliminate national sovereignty as one of the last bastions of discretionary politics in an internationally integrated market society. In particular, the removal of devaluation ensures that investors, and in particular financial investors, need no longer fear that struggling governments will use sudden exchange-rate adjustments as a weapon of self-defence; in this way the single currency too serves the ends of market justice.36
...
The European consolidation state of the early twenty-first century is not a national but an international structure – a supra-state regime that regulates its participating nation-states, without a democratically accountable government but with a set of binding rules: through ‘governance’ rather than government, so that democracy is tamed by markets instead of markets by democracy. This is a historically novel construct, designed to ensure the market conformity of formerly sovereign nation-states: a market strait-jacket for democratic politics, with powers formally resembling various other innovations in international law, except that in this case what they involve are not a ‘duty to protect’ but a duty to pay. The purpose of the whole edifice, whose completion is drawing ever closer, is to depoliticize the economy while at the same time de-democratizing politics
The neoliberal revolution left almost nothing of this. Its objective was to trim the states of postwar capitalism as much as possible, reducing them to providing for the functioning and expansion of markets and making them institutionally incapable of corrective intervention in the self-regulating enforcement of market justice. Its full triumph, however, came only with the internationalization of the European political economy and the conversion of the European system of states into a multilevel regime with nationally confined democracy and multinationally organized financial markets and supervisory authorities – a configuration that has long proved an ideal vehicle for the neutralization of political pressure from below while expanding the realm of private contractual freedom vis-à-vis the state. The latest phase of this development is the ongoing transition from the national debt state to the international consolidation state. With it the Hayekian blueprint of a liberalized capitalist market economy immune from political pressure finally comes close to full realisation.
...
Nevertheless, from the point of view of the markets, examples like this notwithstanding, the domestic policies of democratic states can never be fully relied upon to deliver structural consolidation. Since in Europe it is not yet possible, in the name of economic rationality, to do away with the remnants of national democracy, especially the accountability of governments to their voters, the method of choice is to integrate national governments into a non-democratic supranational regime – a kind of international superstate without democracy – and have their activities regulated by it. Since the 1990s, the European Union has been converted into such a regime. Today the integration of member-states into a supranational system of institutions insulated from electoral pressure, and above all the binding force of a common currency, serve to eliminate national sovereignty as one of the last bastions of discretionary politics in an internationally integrated market society. In particular, the removal of devaluation ensures that investors, and in particular financial investors, need no longer fear that struggling governments will use sudden exchange-rate adjustments as a weapon of self-defence; in this way the single currency too serves the ends of market justice.36
...
The European consolidation state of the early twenty-first century is not a national but an international structure – a supra-state regime that regulates its participating nation-states, without a democratically accountable government but with a set of binding rules: through ‘governance’ rather than government, so that democracy is tamed by markets instead of markets by democracy. This is a historically novel construct, designed to ensure the market conformity of formerly sovereign nation-states: a market strait-jacket for democratic politics, with powers formally resembling various other innovations in international law, except that in this case what they involve are not a ‘duty to protect’ but a duty to pay. The purpose of the whole edifice, whose completion is drawing ever closer, is to depoliticize the economy while at the same time de-democratizing politics
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How/Why?
