repeat in english, and show how what you're saying contradicts my point please.
I've went over this at length countless times on here, so patience wearing a bit thin on typing out lengthy posts on this when it's been done a million times. I've written plenty on this in the past and even on this thread. Don't take this the wrong way, but there seems little sense to just constantly repeat the same thing.
If you're saying that there should be natural systemic constraints within the banking sector that prevent banks lending excessively compared to their reserves, then I'd agree, there should be, but such logical constraints as there were were widely ignored in the build up to the financial crisis, hence the crisis.
I'm saying that the logical constraints of circulation means that a bank can't magic the conditions necessary for money to circulate and be 'created' from within the bank itself. it is totally dependent on the flows of the circulation process itself outside of the bank's control. This is the 'natural' systemic constraint the restricts what the bank can do. Obviously in boom and bubble times, this fast moving flow and circulation process allows for the rapid expansion of the money supply out of all proportion with it's anchor of value, but eventually value asserts itself and everything gets reined in via crisis.
I don't see how anything you're saying refutes the central point though that a bank doesn't need to fully fund it's loans at the point that it makes them
I've explained countless time that it does - and pointed to the real life empirical examples of what happens when a bank is not able to maintain that funding that it had put in place for the duration of the loans it has made, i.e. northern rock. If you and jazz were correct that bank's didn't need to fund its lending, then northern rock shouldn't have collapsed, but it did (and it's collapse had nothing to do with customers transferring a couple of billion electronically from one bank to another - it was the funding gap of £30bn that opened up when NR was frozen out of the inter bank lending market - i.e. the clue is in the title there, it couldn't get access to the funding it required so it couldn't go on without emergency assistance)
again, I don't see how this actually contradicts what I was saying, although I take your point below about them mainly raising this finance by packaging these mortgages up and flogging them on, and the CDO crisis from US sub prime not being a major direct contributory factor - I think I must have got mixed up between the different banks on the latter bit, though I could have sworn it was a factor I may have misremembered, it's been a while since I even thought about this.
NR raised finance in the wholesale lending market to initially fund the mortgages they made (i.e. it couldn't make that mortgage lending without that funding - something that both you & Jazz suggest can happen, but it can't)
This short term funding was rolled over every 3 months until enough mortgages had been made to parcel them up and securitise them (i.e. sell those packaged assets/loans on to other investors)
At this point the mortgage lending came off NR's books and onto whoever bought the bundled loans
NR received money in exchange for the bundled mortgages which was then used to repay the initial wholesale lending that had funded them, and made that lending possible, in the first place
then the whole process started again
until
they were unable to package up & sell any more bundled mortgages when the crisis hit, which meant that those loans stayed on their books along with the initial wholesale lending that had funded them (so the US sub prime crisis was the impetus that closed up the securitisation route for NR, but it wasn't US sub prime lending that NR itself had actually been doing, it didn't have any of that stuff on its books to any material degree - and it wasn't buying bundled CDO's which then left it with toxic assets on its books, it was selling bundled CDO's to other investors, some of which may have went bad, but on the whole it was nowhere near the toxic state of the US sub prime market, but regardless it made no difference as these loans were now on some other investor's books, not northern rock's)
when those wholesale loans came towards the end of their latest 3 month period, it was clear that the interbank market was not willing to roll them over like they had previously done and like how NR's business model had expected to happen
At that point NR was faced with a £30bn funding gap - which had to be plugged by emergency funding from the state
The above is what happened in reality - Jazz (and to an extent your) hypothetical analysis suggests that in theory the above would not happen as you claim that bank's don't need to fund their lending. When I hold up that theorem to the cold light of reality through subjecting it to empirical reality it falls apart instantly. Jazz's analysis reminds me of the old austrian economists who used to implicitly argue 'if only reality would accord to what we write in our theoretical textbooks then everything would be ok' - i.e. reality was ignored because it got in the way too much of their theory. Not a great basis to go about understanding the world around us. If something doesn't hold up to robust testing against concrete reality, what use is it? Sure you can ignore reality to keep that theory on life support for a bit longer, but surely theories are about helping us to understand what actually happens in the world, not to blind ourselves to what happens in order to preserve discredited theory
But a significant part of the reason that the markets stopped wanting to buy the Northern Rock CDO's was due to the suspicion that they shouldn't actually have been given AAA ratings, and did contain significantly higher risks of UK sub prime type mortgages due to Northern Rock's very risky lending strategies (125% mortages etc)... This suspicion being fueled as a knock on effect from the US sub prime market collapse, once bitten twice shy.
Yes, but it was more a systematic retreat in general from bundled mortgages by the type of investors who had previously bought them - i.e. a move away from that kind of product in general, not an aversion to anything coming out of NR in particular - i.e. even bundled mortgages that were top quality at that time were shunned by those who had normally bought them because of the tainted packaging they came in