Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows the limits of nuclear deterrence
www.scientificamerican.com
A couple of things, there.
First of all, nuclear power station accidents are a rather different thing, as they tend to produce a lot of very long-lasting isotopes from large quantities of fissile material (compared to a nuclear weapon) that can be seriously problematic, in a way that isn't necessarily the case with a nuclear detonation (and particularly an airburst, which maximises damage, but produces a lot less long-lasting fallout). The two aren't really all that comparable.
A typical tactical nuclear weapon would have a yield of around 50kT. Using Wellerstein's map, that gives you a thermal radiation radius of some 3km.
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(I used a 50kT ground burst for that, so we're maximising the fallout plume. Which you will note heads north-west towards Russia itself - another reason they might be quite reluctant to use it).
Yes, it would be devastating for those within the blast radius, but the point I am trying to make here is that, in terms of casualties and damage done, it isn't quite a quantum leap up from, say, the damage done to Dresden as a result of the RAF firebombing attacks.
I note from your quote that Russian sources
say they would regard the detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon as the start of a full MAD nuclear exchange, but we don't know if that applies in practice. And it may well be that NATO would say similar things, but in practice would be doing everything they could to hold back from a major escalation.
I'm not quite sure what you mean about the 11000km thermal radiation radius - I'm assuming that's a typo, and you're referring to the 1psi overpressure radius that you might expect from a typical SS-25 800kT (not a tactical weapon) nuclear detonation.