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And next, Syria?

The many articles soft soaping of HTS is a disappointing if predictable trend. What however is more disappointing is in some gullible and enthusiastic quarters the support they have received as ' they may be Islamists but they are our kind of Islamists'. The trend to rehabilitate and sanitize reactionary forces is not a new phenomena nor is it just confined to the Middle East.

No lessons to be learnt here

IMG_20241209_095956.jpg
 
Ok, so what are the alternatives?

What are the coercive levers we (anyone) have to persuade them to be nice?

I personally don't see what leverage we have to get them to be nice internally, and I see a little bit of leverage (diplomatic relations, trade etc.. ) to persuade them to be nice externally.

Part of that is going to be how quickly you turn up and want to be friends, or to at least coexist to the benefit of both sides - if we turn up next weekend with a bunch of flowers we'll get to make friends with al-Jolani and maybe have a look through the Syrian Int files on IS, but if we wait 6 months we'll be in the queue behind the Iranian Winemakers Guild to see a an Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary and we'll get fuck all.

We're going to have to live with them - given that wet don't have the levers or the appetite to remove them and replace them with someone nicer - so we may as well see if we can have a constructive, if limited, relationship with them. If not, fine, but let's give the cheap/easy option a go first.
 
The many articles soft soaping of HTS is a disappointing if predictable trend. What however is more disappointing is in some gullible and enthusiastic quarters the support they have received as ' they may be Islamists but they are our kind of Islamists'. The trend to rehabilitate and sanitize reactionary forces is not a new phenomena nor is it just confined to the Middle East.

No lessons to be learnt here

I'm going to reserve judgement on certain aspects because of the way the HTS leader has manoeuvred over a good number of years leading up to this, rendering certain assumptions I might otherwise make unsafe.

But yes, the current propaganda manoeuvres will complicate the task of establishing the details of the reality that emerge in the coming weeks and months.

I note that a BBC form of the softening to which you refer hinges itself around the idea of a pragmatic, 'politically flexible' form of jihadism. For example:

To Syrians, including minorities, they promised safety; to neighbours and powers like Russia, they pledged peaceful relations. Jawlani even assured Russia its Syrian bases would remain unharmed if attacks ceased.

This shift reflects HTS's "moderate jihad" strategy since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over rigid ideology.

Jawlani's approach could signal the decline of global jihad movements like IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is increasingly seen as ineffective and unsustainable.

His trajectory might inspire other groups to adapt, marking either a new era of localised, politically flexible "jihadism" or just a temporary divergence from the traditional path in order to make political and territorial gains.

Thats from How Syria rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani reinvented himself
 
What are the coercive levers we (anyone) have to persuade them to be nice?

I personally don't see what leverage we have to get them to be nice internally, and I see a little bit of leverage (diplomatic relations, trade etc.. ) to persuade them to be nice externally.
If the HTS leader stays true to his form of recent years then we might already assume that certain levers will remain available by virtue of his attention to his own image, and the degree of pragmatism demonstrated in the past. In areas of Syria they've long controlled, they were sensitive to complaints about own internal security forces, and citizens making comparisons to the previous regimes hated internal security. But the extent to which they genuinely addressed those concerns as opposed to simple airbrushing, isnt completely clear to me. I believe he did once disband an internal security force that was subject to accusations of brutality, but whether what it was replaced with was any better is something I dont know.

It will probably come down to what sort of opposition they face, how well they do at the unification mission and balancing all sorts of things, and what they choose to do with the large amount of 'credit in the bank' that recent events have given them. And the extent to which he is able to negate particular demands from hardliners, an areas where he seems to have proven to be relatively competent in the past. If the reassurances already given prove not to be hollow, then there will be a fair bit more room for hope, but I offer no predictions on how that will actually evolve.

Plus when it comes to external pressure, when it comes to western states desires for him to 'be nice to his people', of course the usual contradictions may also emerge on the occasions where our professed values and associated propaganda prove incompatible with particular things we actually want him to do.
 
Ok, so what are the alternatives?

What are the coercive levers we (anyone) have to persuade them to be nice?

I personally don't see what leverage we have to get them to be nice internally, and I see a little bit of leverage (diplomatic relations, trade etc.. ) to persuade them to be nice externally.

Part of that is going to be how quickly you turn up and want to be friends, or to at least coexist to the benefit of both sides - if we turn up next weekend with a bunch of flowers we'll get to make friends with al-Jolani and maybe have a look through the Syrian Int files on IS, but if we wait 6 months we'll be in the queue behind the Iranian Winemakers Guild to see a an Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary and we'll get fuck all.

We're going to have to live with them - given that wet don't have the levers or the appetite to remove them and replace them with someone nicer - so we may as well see if we can have a constructive, if limited, relationship with them. If not, fine, but let's give the cheap/easy option a go first.
Who is the we here, the British state ? You want a discussion about what the British state should be doing ?
 
SDF press officer denying reports of SNA taking Manjib

Referring to the social media accounts close to the gangs and the news made by the mainstream media organizations in Turkey according to which "Manbij has fallen", Ferhat Shami said: "Occupying Manbij is not that easy. The Manbij Military Council, Bab Military Council and Jabhat al-Akrad fighters are in control of the situation. The security forces are responding to the gangs with great determination. There are clashes, but we are in control.
Drawing attention to the fact that fake news is being circulated through the media within the framework of a special war, Ferhat Shami said: "When a war starts, it starts from many directions. Attacks on Manbij are not the first. Since Manbij was cleared of ISIS by the SDF, the occupying Turkish state has not stopped its attacks. Manbij knows well who brings peace. We have also encountered the same situation in Raqqa, Tabqa and other regions. Everyone should wait for official statements to be made. The settlement of gangs in a neighborhood does not mean that the war has ended. If the gangs had not suffered heavy blows, the warplanes of the occupying Turkish state would not have intervened. We will share news about what happened.
 
Who is the we here, the British state ? You want a discussion about what the British state should be doing ?

I was hoping for kebabking to take the lead of a moderate U75 delegation ideally consisting also of yourself, hitmouse and zahir to hopefully get an audience with al-Jolani, before the general secretary of the Iranian winemakers' guild can press his claims.

I'm sure everything will be cleared up after you guys talk him through this thread, and patiently explain the urgency of being nice in a gradual evolution towards a socialist society.

:thumbs:;)

(I'm not a Syria expert at all so not commenting, but you are not human if you don't feel joy at some of the scenes of celebration since that horror Assad hightailed it to Russia, as his "regime" melted like snow in April. Even in 2024, tyrants always fall.)

If the Russian position collpases there (some juicy reportage as Lavrov and the Iranian delegation looking peevish and humilated as Assad's regime collapsed behind them) then so much the better. If only Lukashenka and Putin would fall as easily.
 
Who is the we here, the British state ? You want a discussion about what the British state should be doing ?

I mean we could discuss the options open to the Rotherham Soviet, but...

What else is there?

What options do you think you as an individual, or your immediate geographically or political community have?

I think we're looking at what's going to become a shit show, and we've neither gloves nor a hose.
 
As an aside here, the PKK is a proscribed organisation in the UK. You're not legally allowed to voice your support for them. But what about the SDF, or the YPG, or other related or sympathetic groups and organisations? What about suggesting agreement with their aims? Can you say that you supported their aims historically, but not now of course? Was it ever legal to say you supported the overthrow of the Syrian government by force? Can you say that now?
 
Interview with Joseph Daher

Tempest: Will the rebels advance in Syria open space for progressive forces to renew the revolutionary struggle and provide an alternative to both the regime and Islamic fundamentalism?

JD: There are no obvious answers except more questions. Will struggle from below and self-organization be possible in the areas in which the regime has been expelled? Will civil society’s organizations (not narrowly defined as NGOs but in a Gramscian sense of popular mass formations outside of the state) and alternative political structures with democratic and progressive politics be able to establish themselves, organize, and constitute a political and social alternative to HTS and SNA? Will the stretching of HTS and SNA forces allow space to organize locally?

These are the key questions, in my opinion, without clear answers. Looking at HTS and SNA’s policies in the past, they have not encouraged a democratic space to develop, but quite the opposite. They have been authoritarian. No trust should be accorded to such forces. Only the self-organization of popular classes fighting for democratic and progressive demands will create that space and open a path toward actual liberation. This will depend on overcoming many obstacles from war fatigue to repression, poverty, and social dislocation.

The main obstacle has been, is, and will be the authoritarian actors, previously the regime, but now many of the opposition forces, especially the HTS and SNA; their rule and the military clashes between them have suffocated the space for democratic and progressive forces to democratically determine their future. Even in the spaces freed from regime control we have yet to see popular campaigns of democratic and progressive resistance. And, where the SNA has conquered Kurdish areas, it violated Kurd’s rights, repressed them with violence, and forcefully displaced large numbers of them.

We have to face the hard fact that there is a glaring absence of an independent democratic and progressive bloc that is able to organize and clearly oppose the Syrian regime and Islamic fundamentalist forces. Building this bloc will take time. It will have to combine struggles against autocracy, exploitation, and all forms of oppression. It will need to raise demands for democracy, equality, Kurdish self-determination, and women’s liberation in order to build solidarity among the country’s exploited and oppressed.

To advance such demands, that progressive bloc will have to build and rebuild popular organizations from unions to feminist organizations, community organizations, and national structures to bring them together. That will require collaboration between democratic and progressive actors throughout society.

This said, there is hope, while the key dynamics was initially military and led by HTS and SNA, in the past few days, we saw growing popular demonstrations and people coming out in the streets throughout the country. They are not following any orders of HTS, SNA or any other armed opposition groups. There is a space now, with its contradictions and challenges as mentioned above, for Syrians to try to rebuild civilian popular resistance from below and alternative structures of power.

In addition to this, one of the key tasks will be to tackle the country’s central ethnic division, the one between Arab and Kurds. Progressive forces must wage a clear struggle against Arab chauvinism to overcome this division and forge solidarity between these populations. This has been a challenge from the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and will have to be confronted and resolved in a progressive manner in order for the country’s people to be truly liberated.

There is a desperate need to return to the original aspirations of the Syrian Revolution for democracy, social justice and equality—and in a fashion that upholds Kurdish self-determination. While the Kurdish PYD can be criticized for its mistakes and form of rule, it is not the main obstacle to such solidarity between Kurds and Arabs. That has been the belligerent and chauvinist positions and policies of Arab opposition forces in Syria—beginning with the Arab-dominated Syrian National Coalition followed by the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, the main opposition bodies in exile supported by the West and regional countries, that tried to lead the Syrian Revolution in its early years—and today those of the two key military forces, the HTS and SNA.

In this context, progressive forces must pursue collaboration between Syrian Arabs and Kurds, including the AANES. The AANES project and its political institutions represent large sections of the Kurdish population and have protected it against various local and external threats.

That said, it too has faults and must not be supported uncritically. The PYD and AANES have used force and repression against political activists and groups challenging its power. And it has also violated the human rights of civilians. Nonetheless, it has scored some important achievements, in particular its increase of women’s participation in all levels in society, as well as the codification of secular laws and a greater inclusion of religious and ethnic minorities. However, on socio-economic issues, it has not broken with capitalism and has not adequately addressed the grievances of the popular classes.

Whatever criticisms progressives may have of the PYD and the AANES, we must reject and oppose Arab chauvinist descriptions of it as “the devil” and a “separatist” ethno-nationalist project. But in rejecting such bigotry, we must not uncritically romanticize the AANES, as some western anarchists and leftists have done, misrepresenting it as a new form of democratic power from below.

There has already been some collaboration between Syrian Arab democrats and progressives and AANES and institutions connected to it, and that must be built on and expanded. But, as in any kind of collaboration, this should not be done uncritically.

While it is important to remind everyone that Bashar al-Assad’s regime and its allies are the first responsible for the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians, mass destructions, deepening impoverishment and the current situation in Syria, the objective of the Syrian revolution goes beyond what HTS leader, al-Jolani, said in his interview with CNN. It is not only to overthrow this regime, but to build a society characterized by democracy, equality, and full rights for oppressed groups. Otherwise, we are only replacing one evil with another.
The international Left must not side with the remnants of the regime or the local, regional and international forces of counter-revolution. Instead, the political compass of revolutionaries should be the principle of solidarity with popular and progressive struggles from below. This means supporting groups and individuals organizing and fighting for a progressive and inclusive Syria and building solidarity between them and the region’s popular classes.

Amidst a volatile moment in Syria, the Middle East, and North Africa we must avoid the twin traps of romanticization and defeatism. Instead, we must pursue a strategy of critical, progressive, international solidarity among popular forces in the region and throughout the world. This is the Left’s crucial task and responsibility, especially in these very complex times.
 
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Had a 3 day wiped out from civilisation power cut.

Missed the fall of Assad.

It was less exciting that you might have hoped - towns fell without a fight, the Syrian army stayed at home, Assad jumped on a plane to Russia, and a 'transitional government' came into power/effect even before HTS got into Damascus. It contained a remarkable number of people from le ancien regime...

It was a coup d'etat, with HTS as the medium, and less bloodied corpses being dragged through the streets than might of been foreseen.
 
The White Helmets
Specialized White Helmets teams are continuing search in Sednaya Prison, notorious for holding thousands of detainees and being one of the world’s most horrendous prisons. They are looking for hidden doors or undiscovered basements reportedly connected to the facility, which could potentially hold detainees beyond those released yesterday. The search is guided by individuals familiar with the prison’s intricate details, alongside information from people contacted by families who claim to know about hidden entrances or basements. As of 4:45 PM Damascus time on December 9, no evidence has been found to confirm the presence of detainees other than those already released. The search will continue until all areas of the prison have been thoroughly inspected.
 
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North and East Syria’s Manbij canton, in the north-east of the Aleppo region, is currently facing the threat of a large-scale offensive by Turkey and Turkish-backed SNA (Syrian National Army). For several years, Turkey has repeatedly stated that it aims to seize Manbij. Recent developments in Syria have opened the way for a renewed attempt to take the canton from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Manbij is a vital city for North and East Syria (NES), governed by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), of which the SDF form the official military wing.

In this explainer, the Rojava Information Center (RIC) will provide the necessary context to understand the events currently unfolding in Manbij.
 
Ragip Soylu
Here is the state of affairs on day one of the HTS-led government in Damascus:
• Central Bank operating; commercial banks reopen Thursday.
• Mohammed al-Bashir appointed to form a temporary government.
• Jolani met Bashir and Assad’s PM to arrange power transfer.
• Aleppo airport to resume domestic flights soon.
• State employees told to return to work.
• Gov’t officials say Women free to wear what they wish.
• Harm to journalists punishable by prison.
• General amnesty to all Syrian military conscripts
 
Over the past week, almost all attention on Syria has been directed at the HTS/opposition vs. Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in Damascus.

Meanwhile, the SDF in northeast Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:

As the anti-Assad advance gained steam in western Syria, the Arab tribal component of the SDF sought to take the fight to Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.

The SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in Hasakeh & Raqqa abandoned by Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the Turkey-backed SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then Manbij.

With multiple axes in play, driven by differing motivations & needs, the SDF has allegedly drawn manpower away from several prisons holding ISIS detainees in Hasakeh -- while also ceasing anti-ISIS operations in Deir ez Zour altogether. Not good, for now.

Strategically, the SDF is more vulnerable now than at any point of its 9yr existence -- as Turkey now has zero restrictions on its potential desire to make a move on it along its border with Syria.
 
I was hoping for kebabking to take the lead of a moderate U75 delegation ideally consisting also of yourself, hitmouse and zahir to hopefully get an audience with al-Jolani, before the general secretary of the Iranian winemakers' guild can press his claims.

I'm sure everything will be cleared up after you guys talk him through this thread, and patiently explain the urgency of being nice in a gradual evolution towards a socialist society.

:thumbs:;)

(I'm not a Syria expert at all so not commenting, but you are not human if you don't feel joy at some of the scenes of celebration since that horror Assad hightailed it to Russia, as his "regime" melted like snow in April. Even in 2024, tyrants always fall.)

If the Russian position collpases there (some juicy reportage as Lavrov and the Iranian delegation looking peevish and humilated as Assad's regime collapsed behind them) then so much the better. If only Lukashenka and Putin would fall as easily.
Not sure if I can put up with hitmouse music for the car journey tbh
 
Also interesting for the mention of relations between HTS and the Kurds.

Pawel Wojcik
"A Yazidi woman kidnapped by the Islamic State n Shingal in 2014 has been rescued from Syria's northwestern Idlib province"
I wonder, likely HTS returned that woman to KRG through SDF. Another link to the web of HTS-Kurds relations.
 
The authoritarian regime in Damascus is no more.13 years, 8 months, and 23 days after the “Day of Rage,” and while the final bullet of the Syria's Civil War has yet to be shot, a Caliph crowned himself in Sham—a : 🧵

1/ "Horror is the removal of masks."The fall of Assad’s regime is a moment of euphoria. The streets erupt in celebration. Prisons swing open, unearthing the true depth of the regime's depravity and brutal cruelty. Every hour, new stories of horror surface. Like this one:

2/ Michel Kilo once recounted a story of a woman giving birth in Assad’s dungeons—a tale once dismissed as fiction. Today, it’s no longer “just a story.” Over 70 children, raised in regime prisons, have been found. Just like the one in the picture.

3/ That baby, born in a dungeon, grew up in that dungeon. For 3 years, he knew nothing but concrete, cold, and fear. But this week, that child stepped into the light for the first time in his life. Not because of the UN, not because of diplomacy, not because of "justice."

4/ It happened because one man made it happen. Abu Mohammad Jolani. And he did it with an army. His army. No protests. No UN decrees. Just war. A war led from the heart of Al-Fath al-Mubin (الفَتح المُبين) operation room.

5/ There’s a scene in Game of Thrones that comes to mind. Jon Snow, a bastard, is crowned King in the North—not for his birthright, but because he avenged the Red Wedding. Jolani has done the same for Syria. For many Syrians, he has avenged 50 years of Ba'athist oppression.

6/ As the dominoes fall in Syria and various actors scramble to grab what they can, they are merely reacting to the calculated moves of one faction: Jolani's HTS. For they have not only seized land — they have seized the state's institutions.

7/ Before entering Damascus, Jolani ordered his militias NOT to touch the Ba'athist institutions left behind as the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) retreated. No looting. No torching. No "purges." Instead, their goal was to occupy them intact. But why?

8/ HTS had been engaged in secret talks with Syria’s Prime Minister for days. When the SAA retreated, it wasn’t a collapse — it was a handover. HTS militants escorted Assad’s Prime Minister as he delivered the government’s authority directly to Jolani in the military operations room.

9/ What is HTS building? Not the “local councils” Jolani promised, nor “decentralization.” Those were lies. If HTS sought local autonomy, they’d dismantle Ba’athist institutions—not inherit them. Jolani isn’t tearing down Syria’s state—he’s becoming it.

10/ There's a precedent. ISIS did the same. People forget: ISIS wasn’t just jihadists and foreign fighters. It was built by Saddam’s ex-Ba’athist generals, spies, and intelligence chiefs—they repurposed Iraq’s bureaucracy for ISIS’s “state. Jolani is now doing the same in Syria.
 
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Ok, so what are the alternatives?

What are the coercive levers we (anyone) have to persuade them to be nice?

I personally don't see what leverage we have to get them to be nice internally, and I see a little bit of leverage (diplomatic relations, trade etc.. ) to persuade them to be nice externally.

Part of that is going to be how quickly you turn up and want to be friends, or to at least coexist to the benefit of both sides - if we turn up next weekend with a bunch of flowers we'll get to make friends with al-Jolani and maybe have a look through the Syrian Int files on IS, but if we wait 6 months we'll be in the queue behind the Iranian Winemakers Guild to see a an Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary and we'll get fuck all.

We're going to have to live with them - given that wet don't have the levers or the appetite to remove them and replace them with someone nicer - so we may as well see if we can have a constructive, if limited, relationship with them. If not, fine, but let's give the cheap/easy option a go first.
Just to be clear. I'm not part of this "we" you speak of.
 
Interesting. I notice Lister makes no mention of the psychopath Maher Assad, the now fled ex-president's younger bother. he just makes mention of his wife. A few months ago there was a rumour, quite a large one actually as it had people dancing in the streets that Maher had been killed in an Israeli airstrike on a villa just outside of Damascus. And now Lister is making mention of just his wife. Was he actually killed in the airstrike (I never found out for sure despite searching every now and again) or has he like his brother, fled?
 
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