And next, Syria?

[Casually Red]

I am still waiting for you to provide evidence for your 'claim' but going on past form you will do plenty of swerving distraction and ignoring to evade actually answering the question.

You want me to provide evidence there are thousands of Islamic extremists locked up in jails in Syria ?

 

[rekil]

More Casually Brown lies via whatever joos joos joos loon youtube channel he has wired into his veins.

MSF operates 4 facilities directly in Syria, and supports about 150 more across the country. The regime denies access to government controlled areas and supply convoys are routinely ransacked at checkpoints. They cannot operate in IS areas, and their facilities are hit by airstrikes regularly.

Syria: Al Quds hospital death toll rises to 55
Airstrikes destroy MSF hospital in Syria and leave 13 people dead
Syria conflict: Air strike destroys MSF-supported hospital - BBC News

Spoiler: Forensic Architecture investigate the bombings of hospitals in Ma'arat Al Numan

Remarkably, MSF staff (who aren't in Syria) responded to April's gas attack (which didn't happen, false flag, child actors etc) at Khan Sheikoun.

A Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) medical team supporting the emergency department at Bab Al Hawa Hospital in Syria's Idlib Province has confirmed that patients' symptoms are consistent with exposure to a neurotoxic agent.

A number of victims of the April 4 attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun were brought to the hospital, located about 60 miles to the north, near the Turkish border. Eight people who were examined by MSF staff displayed symptoms consistent with exposure to an agent such as sarin gas or similar compounds, including constricted pupils, muscle spasms and involuntary defecation.

 

[teqniq]

You want me to provide evidence there are thousands of Islamic extremists locked up in jails in Syria ?

You made the claim liarboy, you provide a credible source for it.

 

[butchersapron]

Excellent piece from Michael Karajdis - too late for some, too long for some as well probably:

US vs Free Syrian Army vs Jabhat al-Nusra (and ISIS): History of a hidden three-way conflict

This article deals with a specific aspect of the US role in the Syrian conflict: its drive to co-opt the Free Syrian Army (FSA) into a proxy force to fight only the jihadist forces of Jabhat al-Nusra (now Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, or JFS) and the Islamic State (ISIS/Daesh), while giving up their fight against the Assad regime.

This reality sharply contrasts with the comic-book view widely expressed in tabloid journals of the mainstream, left and right, that alleges the Syrian rebellion against the dictatorship of Bashar Assad is a conspiracy involving both the US, al-Qaida, the Gulf states, Turkey, Israel, George Soros and many others.

In reality, the US and the al-Qaida spin-offs have been involved in Syria on opposite sides from the outset. It is a particularly bad case of “alternative news” when the US is depicted as “supporting” the forces it bombs in Syria – the Islamic State and Nusra/JFS (and often mainstream rebel groups[2]) – while supposedly “trying to overthrow” the Assad regime which is untouched by US bombing.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TCF Strengthened by War, Hezbollah Displays Regional Power

...
Through all these crises on the border, Hezbollah has steadily built its capacity and deepened its relationships with institutions and governments, making clear that it is de facto a peer, rather than a player in a less significant category simply by dint of being defined as a non-state actor.

When Hezbollah dived headlong into Syria’s civil war, many observers of the Middle East wondered whether the adventurist gamble would the undoing of the Lebanese Party of God.

Instead, it appears that five years of open international warfare have strengthened Hezbollah’s regional position, consolidating its transnational military and political organization. The Party of God entered the Syrian war as a dominant force inside Lebanon; it appears set to emerge from it as a decisive regional player, likely to be as powerful in the coming period as most of the Middle East’s full-fledged states.

Goes over HA's growing strengths and also limitations. Operating more as a smaller peer regional player these days than an Iranian subordinate.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog Documents of the al-Qasimiya Court in West Aleppo Countryside: Translation and Analysis

...
To sum up Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki: it has always been an Islamist but not jihadist group, while also gaining notoriety for corruption/criminality and adopting a 'go with the strong horse' policy as regards the relations it developed with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its predecessors, combined it seems with a naive belief that a merger in Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham could somehow uphold the interests of the 'revolution.'

Khalid al-Sayyid, the overall head of the Supreme Judicial Council who was killed in October 2016.

There have been many allegations of criminality, abuses and corruption in relation to the al-Qasimiya court's links with Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki and the group's own reputation, with claims that kidnappings and demands for ransom have been widespreadin areas controlled by the group in west Aleppo countryside. Mahmoud Bitar, who was doing work with the Syrian interim government and was imprisoned in the al-Qasimiya court in 2014, has criticised the apparent consensus among judicial groups in some of the rebel-held areas on the preference for torturing a detainee to extract confessions, including the hitting of detainees with electrical cables on the soles of their feet to extract those confessions. Based on his experiences, he cites Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki's court in al-Qasimiya in 2014 as representative of these problems. One should compare his criticisms with a report by Souriatna in April 2015, which notes a case of two workers in a foundation in Aleppo being subject to arbitrary arrest, beating and torture in the al-Qasimiya court by members of Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki.

In short, the debate over the group's supposed ideological moderation or extremism in relation to the infamous beheading incident, as I have discussed in part previously, is misplaced. What is striking is the continuity in Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki's behaviour, contrary to Charles Lister's claim that it was somehow only the group's "recent actions" that were "disgusting" and that the "Zinki of 2014 was not the Zinki of '16 (groups evolve; AQ [al-Qa'ida] poached)." In the group's history, nothing points to a clear ideological shift, and one wonders how al-Qa'ida supposedly "poached" Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki. In fact, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki chose to merge with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and chose to have a close working relationship with its predecessors, even while never being an advocate of jihadism. Meanwhile, throughout the period of 2014-2016 that Lister refers to is clear evidence of criminality and human rights abuses by Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zinki.
...

Points out Zinki split from HTS recently.

The distinction between Salafi-Jihadists and groups proper with a high Salafist membership who are involved in Jihad isn't a fine one. Hassan Hassan made a similar point on Jaish al Islam, a radical clearly Salafist group but with delayed vision of the Caliphate (acceptable to the Gulfies) and no evident focus on the "Far Enemy".

Interesting Al-Tamimi disagrees with Lister on Zinki's historic tendency to criminal behaviour. Heller wrote a long article a while ago saying if the revolt was going to be supported it was necessary to suck it up and go with the likes of Zinki. There being a shortage of spotless heroic martyrs in love with western democracy in Idlib who actually could fight. Some of the more secular rebel groupings we supported also had poor records when it comes to governance, human rights, criminality. Parts of the SRF that once pushed IS back across East Aleppo Province come to mind.

Supporting such folk was always a hard thing to sell to a Western public easily scared by even flows of innocent Syrian refugees. Not that the Assad's clan continued reign will be without negative security consequences. That's liable to be a far bigger problem than the shaky young democracy in Baghdad.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEI The Danger of Conflict Between the Syrian Regime and Y.P.G.

...
No Room for Compromise: Iran, the Regime and the Y.P.G.

To preclude the possibility of a regime-Y.P.G. conflict, the United States could push for negotiations between the two. However, negotiations would need to surmount significant odds with both sides entrenched in their opposing views The regime is unwilling to compromise on Kurdish autonomy, a de facto Y.P.G. precondition for any sort of peace agreement.

Russia, hoping to ensure peace between its allies, the regime and the Y.P.G., facilitatednegotiations between the two in 2016. In pursuit of these goals, a political party, known as the Syrian National Resistance, was formed as a dialogue channel between the regime and the Y.P.G. By March 2017, negotiations had completely fallen apart, as the regime refused to accept any form of compromise that involved giving the Y.P.G. autonomy. In the same month, the Syrian National Resistance dissolved, citing fundamental differences in outlook between the Y.P.G. and the regime. The United States, with less leverage over the regime than Russia, is unlikely to have more success, should it embark on a similar approach.

In addition to the regime’s unwillingness to reach a compromise with the Y.P.G., Iran sees the Y.P.G. as a serious threat to its interests. Iranian government-affiliated Fars News even declared any attempt to create autonomous regions in Syria—a reference to the Y.P.G.’s autonomous region—to be a U.S. plot. In response, the Y.P.G. has shifted toward espousing anti-Iranian and anti-regime rhetoric, possibly in an attempt to woo outside support from Saudi Arabia.

This hostility extends beyond just rhetoric. Iran has created a tribal militia for retaking Y.P.G. territory in eastern Aleppo Governorate around Manbij. The fact that the Y.P.G. does not fight the regime, only ISIS, does not necessarily keep the group out of Iranian crosshairs. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly attempted to attack U.S.-backed fighters in southeastern Syria that, like the Y.P.G., only fight ISIS and not the regime.
...

Afrin could be vulnerable but I think a regime-PKK clash is not inevitable as Assad might treat them as a power broker in Eastern Syria and maintain their hudna. Taking a Pentagon backed protectorate in Eastern Rojava head on would be a prohibitively expensive proposition. Damascus tolerating a little autonomy and undermining that insidiously while nibbling at the edges would be much more parsimonious. Trump can probably be suckered into this by his new chum Putin. Iran though will want to steadily squeeze the US out and won't take the PKK snuggling up to the Gulfies well. The PKK has proved rather agile in these things and will probably keep its options open.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Bloomberg Confident Assad Sabotages Putin’s Outreach to Trump in Syria

...
The Russian stance, aimed at reinforcing its efforts to establish so-called de-escalation zones to strengthen a cease-fire in Syria, is creating a growing rift with Assad, according to the officials. At the same time, they said the strategy to secure the zones may come unstuck amid spiraling political tensions with the U.S., which has so far backed Russian peace moves as part of an international focus on defeating Islamic State in Syria.

Almost two years after President Vladimir Putin rescued Assad from defeat and tipped the war in his favor by ordering an air campaign against rebel forces, he’s faced with the dilemma of pressing the Syrian leader into accepting a symbolic power-sharing deal to end the six-year conflict and legitimize Russia’s military presence. As Assad’s grip on power has tightened, he’s grown more reluctant to make any concessions to opposition groups at United Nations-led peace talks that resume in Geneva next month.

‘Tense’ Relations

Russia’s relations with Assad are “tense now” because he’s suspected of deliberately blocking the long-stalled negotiations in Geneva, said Andrei Kortunov, head of the Russian International Affairs Council, a Moscow-based research group set up by the Kremlin. “Russia isn’t ready to allow Assad to wage war until victory,” he said.
...

A basic problem, Assad isn't really interested in compromise as anything other than a tactical ruse. As he's repeatedly said he'll reconquer all his family's lands. The Russians have only a small presence on the ground and really can't control him let alone the Iranians they both increasingly rely on for offensive manpower. The stupid thing here is DC continuing to believe Russia really holds the reins in Syria.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Reuters Exclusive: Russian losses in Syria jump in 2017, Reuters estimates show

...
In It for the Money?

One private contractor whose death in Syria was not officially acknowledged was 40-year-old Alexander Promogaibo, from the southern Russian town of Belorechensk. He died in Syria on April 25, his childhood friend Artur Marobyan told Reuters.

Promogaibo had earlier fought in the Chechen war with an elite Russian paratroops unit, according to Marobyan, who was his classmate at school.

He said his dead friend had struggled to get by while working as a guard in his hometown and needed money to build a house to live with his wife and small daughter.

Last year he decided to join private military contractors working closely with the Russian Defence Ministry in Syria and was promised a monthly wage of 360,000 roubles ($6,000), about nine times higher than the average Russian salary.

According to multiple sources, Russian private military contractors are secretly deployed in Syria under command of a man nicknamed Wagner.

Private military companies officially don't exist in Russia. Reuters was unable to get in touch with commanders of Russian private contractors in Syria through people who know them.

"I told him it was dangerous and he wouldn't be paid the money for doing nothing, but couldn't convince him," Marobyan said, recalling one of his last conversations with Promogaibo.

According to Marobyan, he got the job offer at a military facility belonging to Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU) near the village of Molkino. The agency is a part of the Defence Ministry and does not have its own spokesperson.

The Kremlin did not reply to requests for comment.

Promogaibo went there for physical fitness tests and failed twice. He was accepted only after showing up for the third time having losing 55 kg after seven months of training.

"He left (Russia) in February," said Marobyan, who only learnt that his friend had been killed in Syria when his body was delivered to his hometown in early May.

One more person who knew Promogaibo said he died in Syria.

Reuters was unable to find out where in Syria Promogaibo was killed.
...

Note the age and epic slimming, Belorechensk is an old Cossack settlement.

 

[Casually Red]

On MEI The Danger of Conflict Between the Syrian Regime and Y.P.G.
Afrin could be vulnerable but I think a regime-PKK clash is not inevitable as Assad might treat them as a power broker in Eastern Syria and maintain their hudna. Taking a Pentagon backed protectorate in Eastern Rojava head on would be a prohibitively expensive proposition. Damascus tolerating a little autonomy and undermining that insidiously while nibbling at the edges would be much more parsimonious. Trump can probably be suckered into this by his new chum Putin. Iran though will want to steadily squeeze the US out and won't take the PKK snuggling up to the Gulfies well. The PKK has proved rather agile in these things and will probably keep its options open.

I think the pkk openly courting the Saudis will come back to haunt them big style . Even worse than being backed by the yanks . For a Marxist , feminist anti imperialist outfit these aren't good clothes to be wearing . Goes without saying both backers not only would happily burn them once theyve served their purpose, they'll actively seek to . Hamas fucked up big time in this conflict by backing the wrong horse . It'll happen again here.

 

[camouflage]

More Casually Brown lies via whatever joos joos joos loon youtube channel he has wired into his veins.

MSF operates 4 facilities directly in Syria, and supports about 150 more across the country. The regime denies access to government controlled areas and supply convoys are routinely ransacked at checkpoints. They cannot operate in IS areas, and their facilities are hit by airstrikes regularly.

Syria: Al Quds hospital death toll rises to 55
Airstrikes destroy MSF hospital in Syria and leave 13 people dead
Syria conflict: Air strike destroys MSF-supported hospital - BBC News

Spoiler: Forensic Architecture investigate the bombings of hospitals in Ma'arat Al Numan

Remarkably, MSF staff (who aren't in Syria) responded to April's gas attack (which didn't happen, false flag, child actors etc) at Khan Sheikoun.

MSF haven't made any claims regarding who attacked those facilities, and you're using publications that are biased to back up your claims, neither the Guardian nor the BBC can be considered impartial in the conflict. I hope the Syrian government or the Russians aren't the ones responsible for the attacks, but your post here is basically meaningless. The MSF link speaks for itself and doesn't lend any particular support to your opinion.

 

[rekil]

MSF haven't made any claims regarding who attacked those facilities

Syria: Hospitals hit repeatedly by Russian and Syrian airstrikes, condemning hundreds of wounded to certain death

Russia and Syria must stop this carnage now.

Spoiler

I know what the response to this will be as well. I don't think there's any seam of idiocy that loons like this won't mine, and for some reason I suspect that they're perfectly ok with those outlets when they report on MSF facilities that have been bombed by the US in Afghanistan or by the Saudi coalition in Yemen.

 

[teqniq]

Pretty much. They also like to conveniently 'forget' or overlook the fact that the regime was a willing participant in the US's extraordinary rendition program. This has also been done many times before and camouflage has previously described the MSF reports as 'compelling'. Not so much compelling for the people on the receiving end as terminal.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Syria Institute TSI Syria Update: August 2, 2017

...
Takeaway

The US Special Envoy for Syria, Michael Ratney, released a statement warning armed opposition groups (AOGs) in northern Syria against associating with the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). HTS is a coalition led by the core elements of Jabhat al-Nusra, which has rebranded several times in the last year in an attempt to distance itself from al-Qaeda. The US statement – which was released only in Arabic – said that HTS is just a front for al-Nusra and the group will continue to be treated as al-Qaeda in Syria regardless of what name it chooses. In the statement Ratney acknowledges that some AOGs joined HTS for “tactical reasons and not ideological or intellectual ones,” but says that any faction in HTS will also be considered al-Qaeda, and therefore a designated terrorist organization. The statement warns that if HTS takes control of Idlib “it will be difficult for the US to convince international parties not to take necessary military actions.” This US statement comes as HTS consolidates control of new parts of Idlib governorate after it reached a deal to end weeks of feuding with Ahrar al-Sham. For background on the rebel infighting see TSI Syria Updates from 19 July, 20 July, 21 July, and 24 July. (@USEmbassySyria)

(Analyst Note: The threat of possible military action against Idlib is vaguely worded. When it refers to “international parties,” it is unclear whether this means the US-led anti-ISIS Coalition, Turkey, or even Russia – whose policy the US is increasingly falling in line with in Syria. This statement is different from other US Syria Embassy/Envoy statements in several ways that suggest that it is targeted specifically at Syrian opposition groups. In addition to being published only in Arabic, the statement is phrased in colloquial terminology used by revolutionary Syrian opposition groups and civilians: calling HTS the “Jolani Gang,” and referring to Idlib as “the liberated north.” In this context, “Liberated” is a reference to the area’s liberation from Assad, not ISIS.)
...

I'd guess "international parties" means the Russians.

 

[camouflage]

Syria: Hospitals hit repeatedly by Russian and Syrian airstrikes, condemning hundreds of wounded to certain death

Spoiler

I know what the response to this will be as well. I don't think there's any seam of idiocy that loons like this won't mine, and for some reason I suspect that they're perfectly ok with those outlets when they report on MSF facilities that have been bombed by the US in Afghanistan or by the Saudi coalition in Yemen.

12 days after Kunduz, MSF come out and say this. Yup... makes sense.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW Iran and Al Qaeda Exploit Syria Ceasefire

...
Russian build up along the frontline stands to deepen the Russo-Iranian coalition’s penetration in Southern Syria. The deal lacks a legitimate, neutral enforcement mechanism and primarily relies upon Russian, Chechen, and Ingush forces to guarantee the agreement along the line of contact between regime and opposition forces. Russia cannot and will not restrain Iran and Assad. Russia deployed hundreds of military police including Ingush units to man observation points along the line of contact. The Russian force is positioned to protect -- not push back -- Iranian positions within this zone.

The ceasefire deal allows al Qaeda to preserve its strength and expand its influence in Southern Syria. Al Qaeda had begun to reinvigorate its campaign to transform the Syrian opposition in its own image prior to the declaration of the de-escalation zone. Al Qaeda dispatched approximately thirty senior officials to Southern Syria in May 2017. Al Qaeda likely seeks to replicate its recent success in Idlib Province in the South. The ceasefire deal will provide Al Qaeda with time and space to further network itself within the opposition, including through local governance and security structures. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to halt some covert support to vetted opposition groups in Western Syria will only accelerate al Qaeda’s potential rise in the south. Syrian rebels have expressed dissatisfaction over U.S. demands to abandon the fight against President Assad and decreased U.S. support to rebels. Al Qaeda will exploit these grievances and attempt to fill the vacuum. Al Qaeda will position itself to eventually spoil the agreement, but will do so in a timeframe that supports its own interests.

ISW unhappy with South Western de-escalation zone.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CNN First on CNN: Russia & Syrian regime seeking to poach US-backed fighters

...
He added the regime's recruitment effort was assessed to have two objectives, building a force of local fighters and driving the coalition out of key real-estate in southern Syria.

The first objective is fulfilling the regime's need for a "hold-force" of Sunni Arabs capable of securing areas the regime captures from ISIS.
US officials have said some 80% of the regime's effective fighters are Iranian-backed Shia militias and the pro-regime forces near At Tanf consist primarily of Iranian-backed Shia groups. The coalition has said publicly that many of its allied fighters at At Tanf hail from the Middle Euphrates River Valley, a key ISIS-held area where US officials believe the terror group has relocated its leadership and based some 5,000 to 10,000 fighters.

The second objective involves an attempt to weaken the coalition's rationale for occupying At Tanf, allowing Moscow, Damascus and Tehran to pressure the US and its allies to leave the strategically valuable area.

By poaching leaders of the rebel group, the regime and its Russian and Iranian allies would be able to better pressure the US and coalition troops to vacate the strategic tri-border area near At Tanf, a US official familiar with the development told CNN.

"Assad and his allies realize that the best way to undermine the coalition campaign in Syria is to target the local Syrian partners that the coalition is working by, with, and through," Nick Heras, a fellow at the Center for New American Security who focuses on Middle Eastern security, told CNN.

"Some of the Syrian fighters at the Tanf garrison have decided to cut the best deal with Assad now, and be part of his armies, rather than to fight with the Americans, be labeled as 'traitors,' by the regime, and then have to deal with Assad's wrath." Heras added.
...

Note the R+6's desire for a Sunni Arab holding force out in the East. The regime does have supporters from this area but coopting rebels who sometimes have effectively become Jordanian/US anti-IS mercenary forces would make sense.

The US reliance on Kurds in Syria with their drawbacks as a holding force in Arab territory has been criticised but they are at least mostly Syrian, Arabic speaking and with a fairly respectable record in governance. The R+6's equivalent are the Iranian's Shia militias that make up a large part of Damascus's offensive capability. Judging by casualties up Palmyra way these are heavily Afghan Hazara, Lebanese and Iraqi. The former are Dari dialect speaking and really alien. As for the latter some tribes from the Syrian East sent men to fight in the early Iraqi insurgency and aren't exactly friends of the new Rafida regime in Baghdad. Bearing in mind the IRGC trained Iraqi Badr Brigade is currently doing an awful job holding mixed Diyala in Eastern Iraq these militia men would be very unsuitable occupiers.

 

[rekil]

Pretty much. They also like to conveniently 'forget' or overlook the fact that the regime was a willing participant in the US's extraordinary rendition program. This has also been done many times before and camouflage has previously described the MSF reports as 'compelling'. Not so much compelling for the people on the receiving end as terminal.

Previously...on Loonosphere, Russia was a baddie and the headchoppers were plucky anti-imperialist heroes.

Death of Chechen Leader - Indymedia Ireland



I'm sure spammer of indymedia ireland "Barry" is known to a few people here.



("Barry" and co are now the thin loon line - Putinbots and 110% beardfighters)

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks MAKING SENSE OF TURKEY’S SYRIA STRATEGY: A ‘TURKISH TRAGEDY’ IN THE MAKING

...
The protracted civil war has also resulted in around three million refugees ending up in Turkey, they were quite literally invited by Erdogan and Davutoglu in the first place. While less visible to outside spectators at the moment, Turkey is on the path to an internal refugee crisis. A haphazard and weakly-monitored injection of three million displaced and therefore economically disadvantaged foreigners into the Turkish society is fueling anti-Syrian xenophobia, which will likely lead to tensions and even instability in the country. To add to this, Turkey has also had diplomatic and military crises with Russia, and relations between the United States and Turkey relations are almost certainly bound to deteriorate further over the YPG debacle. Last but not least, Ankara buried its reputation as a “model for the Middle East” in Syria and will never be able to recover it.

So, what to expect from Turkey as of July 2017? Expect Turkey to act as a risk-accepting brinkman, with a lot at stake vis-à-vis the rise of the YPG. To be precise, the challenges posed by the YPG are independent of Erdogan. In a parallel universe where Erdogan magically loses elections tomorrow, and is replaced by the country’s old secular guard, Turkey’s threat perception as of July 2017 would not change a bit. Some might even argue that Erdogan, as of 2017, is acting almost exactly like Turkey’s old secular guard would act if facing the same challenges, but with a twist. The old secular elites would most likely have never had Turkey facing such impossible odds and, good or bad, would have remained painstakingly aloof with regards to the Syrian crisis, even if that meant denying millions of refugees access to Turkish territory.

In this context, Turkey is like the protagonist in a horror movie who, due to some plot device, embarks on a strategic sleepwalk somewhere around 2011. Only to “wake up” and find itself in the last third of the movie around 2016, panicked, yet finally restored of its senses and reason. If nothing else, Erdogan finally let go of his obsession to topple Assad. At least since the summer of 2016, Ankara is focusing on the real threat to Turkish national security, the rise of the YPG. The problem is Ankara discovered its geopolitical realism a little too late to achieve victory, no matter how victory is defined. Yet, it is still determined to do its best by using all all of the leverage Turkey possesses, for effective damage control.
...

Looks at the strategic dilemma the Turks have got themselves into in Syria.

 

[teqniq]

 

[CrabbedOne]

On BuzzFeedNews The US Is Far More Deeply Involved In Syria Than You Know

...
In many months of fighting ISIS, Shir claims he has never lost a man. Despite numerous and sometimes catastrophic injuries along a fragmented and constantly shifting front line, not one of his men has yet died. It is a record he wants to keep. And unlike other commanders, Shir strayed from the party line that the war against ISIS was going well.

Faced with overeager troops — and perhaps pressure from senior leaders of the SDF — other commanders were sending too many insufficiently trained and inexperienced fighters into battle, he said, and it was causing too many casualties.“They are becoming martyrs because they are not protecting themselves and not following orders,” he said. “They are not trained well and are not even adults. Some of them are 18 years old. How can an 18-year-old fight? They should have training for years or at least months before going into battle. They are sacrificing too much. You are not even 18 and you show up to fight. This is how we lose so many people. And the commanders bear some responsibility.”

Syria’s Kurds have already made enormous sacrifices in the war against ISIS. And each death has a political cost. Dreay Hussein, a 58-year-old taxi driver, and his wife and children were among hundreds of families gathered to honor the dead at a mid-July candlelight ceremony at the martyrs’ cemetery in Kobane, about 100 miles northwest of Raqqa near the Turkish border. His wife dried her tears as she placed a candle at the grave of their 19-year-old son Mazloum, who died two years ago in battle. Hussein demanded that his family’s loss not be in vain. “We hope to have something from our father Trump,” he said, reflecting a surge of support Syria’s Kurds feel towards the president who has increased US involvement in the war against ISIS. “We hope that the West, especially our father America, will allow us to have a state, an independent state.”
...

Trump's unleashing of the Pentagon making him friends in Rojava.

In the Obama era the Pentagon only admitted to having a few hundred guys on the ground. Article has 2K US Army Rangers and Marines now deployed there in addition to Special Forces. Still much smaller than the US deployment in Iraq currently but a big increase.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blog Syria: Assessing the CIA Program

...
In short, therefore, the common points of debate such as whether the CIA-supported groups were really "moderate," or whether the Trump administration's decision to end the program was a concession to Russia, are misplaced. In the northwest in particular, now the main epicenter of the insurgency against the regime, the relations of power on the ground meant the program could not act as a bulwark against the jihadists. More broadly, the CIA program failed to achieve the original objectives.

Nonetheless, simply cutting off the CIA program with no thought as to an alternative is a mistake. In the south, management of relations with the rebel groups through the Pentagon, as has now become the new status quo, is the way forward. Rebel-held Idlib on the other hand is likely going to be subject to a major offensive by the regime and its allies. If the desire is simultaneously to counter Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's influence while preventing a new humanitarian crisis and more large scale refugee flows into Turkey and Europe, then a Turkish intervention on the model of the "Euphrates Shield" project in the north Aleppo countryside pocket is the only viable option at this stage. Though the situation in the north Aleppo countryside pocket is far from perfect, the Turkish presence has broadly helped keep out Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, which refuses to cooperate with the Turkish army, while creating a de facto safe zone for the native civilian population and large numbers of IDPs. The same benefits could be conferred to Idlib in the event of a direct intervention.

Points to AQ's routing of the SRF in Idlib back in 2014 as a very worrying sign.

In retrospect the subsequent advance of Jaish al Fateh to take Idlib city and threaten Latakia in 2015 is what I'd pick as a tipping point. Celebrated as providing leverage over Assad by some commentators it in fact led the IRGC to bring the Russians in and seriously compromised the revolt. The CIA program was unable to separate more moderate groups from Salafi-Jihadists the US obsessed on elsewhere. Al-Tamimi's contention that the program had misguided goals is correct; Assad was never going to compromise. It either needed to aim at his ouster or deescalation.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Direct In displacement camp along Syrian border, ‘the strong devour the weak’ as rule of law fades

...
But Rukban’s tribal social dynamics also pose a threat for those unable to defend themselves from camp-wide tensions. Residents hailing from small tribes and families are the most vulnerable, with few others willing—or brave—enough to stand up for them amid violent disputes.

For Abu Omar, the father of four, that means there is little he can do to demand justice from the Usud a-Sharqia fighter who assaulted him last month. “I’m from one of the many minority tribes here,” he said. “Nobody is able to right this wrong for me in the camp.”

“Someone here who doesn’t belong to a large tribe, or who doesn’t have anyone in their tribe who belongs to an armed faction, has their rights vanish in the jungle that we are living in.”

To fight the feeling of helplessness among those like Abu Omar, a group of the camp's tribal leaders convened in February to announce the formation of a civil administrative council. The goal, officials told Syria Direct at the time, was to bring “a halt to this chaos and lack of security.”

The council established a police force, passed a decree banning all weapons inside the camp and called on armed groups to leave. Those caught bearing arms inside camp grounds were ordered to pay a fine.

For a time, relative calm did seem to hold. Gunfire diminished, and violent crime appeared to slow down, residents say.

But only four months later, “the gunfire started once again—even in broad daylight,” and a sense of lawlessness returned, said Umm Khaled, a resident of the camp and a mother of three. In February, she was shot in the hand by gunfire from an unknown source.

“There are no laws to protect civilians here in the camp.”

Justice and rule of law within Rukban, Ramzi told Syria Direct, “vary based on the resident…there is no authority to protect those who have no tribe.”

“The strong devour the weak.”

Today, Abu Omar says his most urgent need is safety—more so than “daily necessities or medicine.”

“Who knows—perhaps we will die here before returning back to Syria.”

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IRINNews Black flags over Idlib: The jihadi power grab in northwestern Syria

...
A bleak outlook

Idlib’s future is now one of containment and ostracism, a cage for civilians trapped between al-Assad’s ruthless regime and the jihadi extremists that lead the insurgency against him.

The American Syria expert Sam Heller has described Idlib’s future prospects as “a jihadist-run mountain Gaza,” with civilians exposed to bombing and sporadic ground attacks, dwindling aid, failing public services, and predatory jihadi rule.

In the long run, however, Idlib seems less tenable as an Islamist enclave than Palestine’s Gaza Strip, which is run by the much more pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood offshoot Hamas – terrorist-listed in the West, to be sure, but also tacitly tolerated as part of a regional conflict.

But whenever the Salafi-jihadi school to which Tahrir al-Sham belongs has planted its flag in a country – be it in Libya, Mali, Yemen, or Somalia – it has triggered an international military response of some sort. The international community is unlikely to feel differently about Syria and simply accept Idlib’s consolidation as an outlaw haven for extremist foreign fighters and jihadi training camps.

That’s why no major power is likely step in the way of an attempt by al-Assad to cut a path back to the opposition strongholds of northwestern Syria, if or when he musters the resources to start attacking Idlib again. There will certainly be a lot of tut-tutting over human rights, but nothing that would stop a bullet – and although the regime is too weak to storm the whole region at once, it has every reason to try to nibble its way in from the edges.

Western diplomats cringe at the thought. A regime takeover of this region, where thousands of extremists have embedded themselves for an apocalyptic last stand among civilians who fear and hate al-Assad’s government, is likely to be a drawn-out and brutal affair that could easily spiral into atrocity.

If at that point aid has dried up or cannot be distributed due to the militant stranglehold on local communities, and if borders remain shut, the resulting fighting and displacement – which for many will not be the first flight – will have a punishing effect on civilian well-being.

For now, jihadi-ruled Idlib remains uncomfortably contained and, thanks to foreign aid, barely functional. Since May, all sides have purported to respect the convenient fiction of Idlib as a “de-escalation zone” subject to a ceasefire, even though Tahrir al-Sham was explicitly excluded from that deal. Depending on developments elsewhere in Syria, this charade could go on for some time, and, in theory, Idlib’s front lines may remain frozen for years.

Yet the jihadi factor undermines any hope for containment as a stable end state, or even as an interim solution, and with two million civilians trapped in the line of fire, the situation reeks of future menace and disaster.

Lund on Idlib. Now AQ dominated, still very hostile to Assad, losing the international funding that is the basis of its war economy with the regime more liable to nibble at it than attempt to swallow it whole. Some Hellish combination of Gaza and noughties Chechnya probably haunted by a US drone war.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On IRINNews Black flags over Idlib: The jihadi power grab in northwestern Syria

...
A bleak outlook

Idlib’s future is now one of containment and ostracism, a cage for civilians trapped between al-Assad’s ruthless regime and the jihadi extremists that lead the insurgency against him.

The American Syria expert Sam Heller has described Idlib’s future prospects as “a jihadist-run mountain Gaza,” with civilians exposed to bombing and sporadic ground attacks, dwindling aid, failing public services, and predatory jihadi rule.

In the long run, however, Idlib seems less tenable as an Islamist enclave than Palestine’s Gaza Strip, which is run by the much more pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood offshoot Hamas – terrorist-listed in the West, to be sure, but also tacitly tolerated as part of a regional conflict.

But whenever the Salafi-jihadi school to which Tahrir al-Sham belongs has planted its flag in a country – be it in Libya, Mali, Yemen, or Somalia – it has triggered an international military response of some sort. The international community is unlikely to feel differently about Syria and simply accept Idlib’s consolidation as an outlaw haven for extremist foreign fighters and jihadi training camps.

That’s why no major power is likely step in the way of an attempt by al-Assad to cut a path back to the opposition strongholds of northwestern Syria, if or when he musters the resources to start attacking Idlib again. There will certainly be a lot of tut-tutting over human rights, but nothing that would stop a bullet – and although the regime is too weak to storm the whole region at once, it has every reason to try to nibble its way in from the edges.

Western diplomats cringe at the thought. A regime takeover of this region, where thousands of extremists have embedded themselves for an apocalyptic last stand among civilians who fear and hate al-Assad’s government, is likely to be a drawn-out and brutal affair that could easily spiral into atrocity.

If at that point aid has dried up or cannot be distributed due to the militant stranglehold on local communities, and if borders remain shut, the resulting fighting and displacement – which for many will not be the first flight – will have a punishing effect on civilian well-being.

For now, jihadi-ruled Idlib remains uncomfortably contained and, thanks to foreign aid, barely functional. Since May, all sides have purported to respect the convenient fiction of Idlib as a “de-escalation zone” subject to a ceasefire, even though Tahrir al-Sham was explicitly excluded from that deal. Depending on developments elsewhere in Syria, this charade could go on for some time, and, in theory, Idlib’s front lines may remain frozen for years.

Yet the jihadi factor undermines any hope for containment as a stable end state, or even as an interim solution, and with two million civilians trapped in the line of fire, the situation reeks of future menace and disaster.

Lund on Idlib. Now AQ dominated, still very hostile to Assad, losing the international funding that is the basis of its war economy with the regime more liable to nibble at it than attempt to swallow it whole. Like Heller he does not see it ending well.

Imagine a Hellish combination of Gaza and noughties Chechnya perhaps haunted by a US drone war.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In The National It's time for the Syrian opposition to realise that its regional backers have moved on

Hassan Hassan on the KSA and Turkish betrayal of the anti-Assad cause in favour of more pressing regional interests.

 

[CrabbedOne]

From The Washington Institute Not Money Alone: The Challenges of Syrian Reconstruction

...
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR

Among the causes of the 2011 Syrian revolt were economic and geographic structural realities that accentuated political and sectarian problems. Indeed, a look at Syria on the eve of the uprising shows a center-periphery imbalance wherein large cities were surrounded by belts riven by poverty. Since Syria gained its independence in 1946, the population has grown rapidly, doubling every twenty years and creating unsustainable overpopulation in areas where agriculture did not offer enough jobs and where nearby urban economies could not absorb the labor influx. In the 2000s, the rural exodus accelerated when desperate populations flocked to informal suburbs, further burdening their already-strained economies.

A spark for this rural flight was the Syrian government's unpreparedness for and failure to respond effectively to the drought that afflicted the country between 2006 and 2011. More fundamentally, Syria's agricultural crisis played out amid intensifying liberalization of the national economy and the corresponding abandonment of regional planning policy. Undoubtedly, the system that emerged from the Hafiz al-Assad period, which ended with his death in 2000, was frayed and needed reforming. But under Bashar, Hafiz's son and successor, the private sector simply could not employ the hundreds of thousands of new workers entering the labor market every year. In the 2000s, rural areas and small towns suffered particularly, with economic growth concentrated in the largest cities -- Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia, and, most of all, Damascus.
...

Bashar really did create perfect revolutionary conditions. Most urban Syrians who rose were rather surprised it happened. In contrast an often Islamist activist minority saw it as inevitable throwing off of a dismal Baathist tyranny gone sourly neoliberal.

Balanche hopes Assad will address some of the structural problems that underpinned the revolt. Create a more decentralised Syria that's less run by the fiat out of the palace. He has Jazira residents yearning for the unfounded promises of 70s Syria when Syrian Baath aspirations still had a residual socialist tinge. Looking back to all those terribly managed irrigation projects of the last century in an era of 21st century droughts. That the long neglect of poor and provincial areas under a "modernising" Bashar Assad will be reversed.

Assad isn't stupid and might even realise he made awful mistakes that led to the revolt but this transformation seems unlikely to me as he's both stubborn and trapped. He'll have to consolidate his support in the reconstruction process which will inevitably be exploited to feather the nests of loyalist elite. You can already see this taking place in areas like Homs and Aleppo. The focus is on rebuilding areas of regime support and often purging wrecked rebel ghettos of the unreliable. The new generation of militia warlords get a license to predate on the population once confined to senior SAA officers. State assets are steadily being "privatised" to fund various security providers be they Syrian or foreign. Even the Caliphate's hydrocarbons the R+6 are currently grabbing back are being mortgaged out. There's not much alternative as the regime being broke can't buy the loyalty of power brokers any other way. The Assad's power base is also in need of reconstruction and that will be a long process.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks A DEADLY DELUSION: WERE SYRIA’S REBELS EVER GOING TO DEFEAT THE JIHADISTS?

...
I am angry at outsiders who affirmed and repeated these sorts of excuses, and particularly government officials and decision-makers. These people should have known better, and they should have communicated the political realities and consequences of the opposition’s extremist links clearly to their Syrian clients. They did the Syrian opposition, and Syrians broadly, a terrible disservice.

The opposition was not, with time, learning usefully, and its backers were not obliging it to learn. When rebels took Aleppo’s eastern half in summer 2012, lazily disguised Syrian al-Qaeda and other unacceptably hard factions assumed control of its governance. When rebels took Idlib in spring 2015, openly avowed Syrian al-Qaeda and other unacceptably hard factions assumed control of its governance, again. When rebels broke the siege of Aleppo in summer 2016, it was the same radioactive, jihadist-led coalition that blazed the path. The same patterns kept playing out, only more intense and worse, and still enabled by opposition sponsors.

In retrospect, optimism among rebel backers about the Jeish al-Fateh (Army of Conquest) coalition’s 2015 offensive in Syria’s northwest — channeled by The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, for example — seems to be where the opposition’s backers really worked themselves into peak delusion. It is mind-boggling that anyone was bullish about the political leverage to be gained from a provincial capital’s fall to a force jointly led by Ahrar al-Sham and al-Qaeda, which then blazed a path south into the regime’s sectarian heartland, massacring Alawite villagers and featuring their children in hostage videos.

The “al-Fateh” in Jeish al-Fateh literally means “open.” Historically, it connotes a Muslim army’s “opening” of new, non-Muslim lands to Islam. A Sunni-supremacist, foreign fighter-laden “Jeish al-Fateh” — reinforced by U.S.-supported Free Syrian Army factions — rampaging through the minority farming villages of Hama’s Ghab Valley should have been deeply alarming. It certainly seems to have alarmed Russia, which directly and decisively intervened in Syria on behalf of the regime months later.

Opposition backers probably should have figured this out. Instead, they repeated their opposition clients’ rationalizations and superstitions, which conveniently flattered those backers’ own policy preferences and analytical misapprehensions. The opposition’s state backers and friendly analysts did not take the problem of jihadist infiltration of the opposition seriously. And in part because they coddled the opposition instead of forcing a real, corrective reckoning, things got out of hand.
...

Heller, who often advocated for the rebels himself.

You can go back even before 2012 to find significant Salafi-Jihadi activity in Syria in some cases tolerated by the regime. Revenge for the Hama massacre and then the new Shia dominated state in Iraq meant the place had been well seeded and was embedded in the movement's imagination. The Sunni Arab rising just never had the unity of revolutionary political purpose and agility of something like IS or the PKK.

 

[teqniq]

I already read that and dismissed it in the first paragraph and subsequently didn't feel the need to post it here.

President Donald Trump’s decision last month to shutter America’s covert program to arm and train Syrian rebels fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad was likely inevitable, and in any case overdue. The program was premised on applying proxy military pressure to realize an unworkable political outcome – a negotiated resolution that removed Assad....

It has never been in US interests to support or push for regime change as outlined in the linked article I've reposted from BA above.

Excellent piece from Michael Karajdis - too late for some, too long for some as well probably:...

US vs Free Syrian Army vs Jabhat al-Nusra (and ISIS): History of a hidden three-way conflict[/QUOTE]

 

[teqniq]

North Homs activists decry ‘clear violation’ of ceasefire

Two recent Russian-backed ceasefire deals in north Homs province and the east Damascus suburbs are crumbling amid “clear violations,” activists tell Syria Direct, as regime forces pummeled rebel-held districts in both areas on Thursday....