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And next, Syria?

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog Suqur al-Furat: A Pro-Assad Sha'itat Tribal Militia
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The existence of Suqur al-Furat further illustrates the importance to the regime of retaking Deir az-Zor province. While much attention is drawn to the participation of Iranian-backed groups in the offensives pushing towards the province and the concept of the Iranian 'land-route' should be taken seriously, it does not follow that they will constitute the vast majority of the forces participating in the operations. The regime also has its own interests in reclaiming the territory, as do groups like Suqur al-Furat, driven by desires to return home but also to exact revenge for the fate that befell the Sha'itat. In the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, much concern has been raised about sectarian abuses committed by forces from one sect/ethnicity against populations of another sect/ethnicity. Yet the concept of revenge- both in the general sense and tribal one in particular- also needs to be taken into account here. Just as a number of extrajudicial killings and acts of brutality in Iraq have actually been intra-Sunni and driven by desires for revenge, so we will likely see this phenomenon in Deir az-Zor province if tribal fighters of Suqur al-Furat and other formations aligned with the regime help retake the province from the Islamic State.
Points out members of the Sha'itat tribe joined IS and then participated in punitive massacres of their own kin. Not unusual, that was a common IS highly divisive MO in managing tribes. In Iraq this has often resulted in vengeful parts of Sunni Arab tribes fighting alongside Shia Hashd against IS remnants. Atrocities have been common in such situations. There's sometimes a danger of a cycle long running feuds across kinship networks if blood money isn't paid.
 
On Syria Deeply Idlib Residents Split Over Support for Al-Qaida-Linked Militants
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“[HTS] is the strongest and only group capable of managing the province,” Mohammad al-Salim, a resident of the town of Hass in the Maarat al-Numan district, told Syria Deeply. “They are our best option.”

The 53-year-old engineer criticized HTS’s main rival, Ahrar al-Sham, for “lacking a vision,” and for being a weak and disorganized force.

Ahrar al-Sham is a paper dragon and not a real fighting body,” he said.

Unlike Ahrar al-Sham, HTS is a much more cohesive fighting force, according to al-Salim, who argued that the group’s staggering success in overtaking Ahrar al-Sham’s positions last month demonstrated its capabilities.

Although some residents have rallied behind HTS, the extremist group’s crackdown on its opponents and its intolerance of dissent has led to a sense of unease among many who live under its rule.

Since last month, a series of protests have erupted against the group in the town of Saraqib, which was previously held by Ahrar al-Sham, and in several villages and towns in the FSA stronghold of Maarat al-Numan, an area with an established history of resistance to the extremist group.

HTS responded by cracking down on dissent: it fired on protesters and detained a number of people who oppose its rule, according to the Jabhat al-Nusra Violations Group, an activist-run monitor that tracks and records HTS abuses in Syria.

Rami, a 33-year-old media activist from the town of Saraqib, which is currently controlled by a brigade of local fighters known as the Saraqib Revolutionary Front, described al-Qaida’s ascendancy in Idlib as a “danger to all areas freed from government control.”

“We are now living under surveillance and fear … we are reliving the [same fear] we had during the 2011 uprisings against President Bashar al-Assad,” he said.
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With Assad eventually coming to burn the country and Ahar in a shambles it's not surprising some look to AQ.
 
On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog The Life of Abu Qasura Kanakari of Jaysh Khalid bin al-Waleed
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For most of the details of Abu Qasura Kanakari's life, I am reliant on what I have been told by his father, who is an IS supporter and currently resides in the Yarmouk Basin.

Abu Qasura Kanakari was born in 1992 in Kanakar. He completed secondary education and studied for the first and second year at the Shari'a College in Damascus University. While he was studying in the college, the demonstrations against the regime began (i.e. 2011), and Abu Qasura Kanakari participated in the demonstrations and was arrested. Detained for around 4 months, he was released and then decided to abandon his studies.

It appears that Abu Qasura Kanakari was a jihadist from the outset, influenced by his religious background. At some point in 2012, he joined Jabhat al-Nusra in the Khan al-Shih area that lies to the north of Kanakar along the highway connecting Damascus and Quneitra. Unlike Khan al-Shih, there was no Jabhat al-Nusra presence in Abu Qasura Kanakari's home town. Abu Qasura Kanakari took up a role as a Shari'i official in the organization. During his time there, he apparently played a founding role in the Tajammu' Khan al-Shih operations room and the first Shari'i court for the area.

Around mid-2013, Abu Qasura Kanakari was wounded and left for Jordan to receive treatment. He suffered a spinal injury and thus became partly paralysed. Having left for Jordan, he did not return to join Jabhat al-Nusra. One question that may arise here though is how Abu Qasura Kanakari got into Jordan, which from the time of the establishment of the MOC in Amman to provide support for vetted factions aimed to block jihadists from being able to traverse the borders for reasons such as medical treatment and maintained tight supply lines (in contrast with the Turkey-Syria border in the north). The answer is that in that time, a lot of the rebels with origins in Kanakar belonged to the al-Furqan Brigades, whose founder and leader is from Kanakar, and would enter Jordan in the name of this group. Abu Qasura Kanakari appears to have done the same thing, shedding light on the debates regarding whether Israel and Jordan deliberately let jihadists into their territory to receive treatment: it is possible for rebels to misrepresent their affiliations, with outsiders unable to verify the truth.
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Revealing revolt biography of a prominent Salafi-Jihadi active in the Yarmouk Basin. Illustrates how difficult it could be to distinguish such people early in the rising especially as many rebel groups rapidly adopted Islamist ideas and for various reasons as the revolt militarised the Salafist look spread even to groups that on closer contact appeared distinctly lacking in piety. Note the kinship recruiting.
 
The Syrian Arab Army have now taken the city of Sukhna . Barely a year ago even a few twats on here were pointing to eastern Syria as a completely lost cause . President Assads promise to restore every last inch of Syria back under the control of Syrian sovereignty is being fulfilled . Government controlled territory has been restored to something like 250 % in the past few months , and now the winds at their back . The liberation of suknha leaves the door wide open to Deir Ez Zor , besieged by the beards for years now but holding out tenaciously and on the cusp of being relieved by SAA....as Assad promised years back . Daesh have thrown the Islamic kitchen sink at DEZ umpteen times, for years, but every time they broke Daeshes back . They slaughtered them with a rigorous defence on behalf of civilisation .over and over again despite years of siege Daesh are finished now once DEZ is relieved

From Sukhna it's all flat terrain to DEZ relief and victory is at hand . Massive, massive, morale boost coming the Syrian Army's way . This will be huge...properly huge . 9 months ago this would have been thought imposssible . But now thanks to putins air power and Syrias resilience Daesh are fucked .






Daesh are properly fucked now
 
Saa morale in flat out mode, thundering through what was unassailable Daesh heartland only a few months ago . Today the Syrian Army are strolling through . The relief of Deir Ez Zor is at hand. And with that eastern syria...the lost cause..And it shows in the troops morale

watch



Daesh are fucked, well and truly
 
So no evidence to back up your claim from the other day then? I suppose I shouldn't be surprised really, it's not like you haven't got form for that sort of shit is it?
 
On War Is Boring Not Every Civil War Is a Guerilla War
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“Conventional civil wars” are those that feature equally matched combatants utilizing heavy weaponry such as tanks, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and artillery. These wars feature distinct front lines, and both the rebels and the government have the ability to seize and hold strategically important territory.

Four of the most intense and consequential ongoing civil wars—Iraq, Yemen, Ukraine and Syria—are conventional civil wars.

Let’s look at Syria. Certain areas of Syria are fought in a primarily guerrilla style. This was especially the case in the beginning of the war, but some of the most consequential battles during the war have featured force-on-force battles.

For instance, in October 2016, rebels in Aleppo mounted a counteroffensive using “tanks, armored vehicles, bulldozers, make-shift mine sweepers, pick-up trucks and … motorcycles, ” according to Reuters. These are not the actions of a guerrilla army.

The second type of civil war, “guerrilla wars,” has already been described.

Still, there are a number of civil wars that don’t fit into either the “conventional” or “guerrilla” categories. For instance, the Liberian civil war largely featured clashes between similarly powerful combatants able to take and hold significant territory. And yet, combatants on all sides mainly carried light weaponry, such as assault rifles and mortars.
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Article looks at classifying civil wars into types.

I often compare Syria with post-Saddam Iraq's first insurgency. The latter was a guerrilla war fought by lightly equipped mess of groups with very heavy use of brutal terrorist tactics against civ-pop most notably an atrocious campaign of suicide bombing Shia Markets that shocked even AQ. Such terrorist tactics do feature in Syria but aren't typical. Syria has more been a war of company sized conventional battles and protracted sieges. Syrian rebels are much better armed, well funded, often have access to heavy weapons and have controlled quite large areas of urban territory. The Syrian state has proven resilient but rather weak militarily with an advantage in airpower and artillery not compensating for limited manpower and low loyalist morale. Assad would probably have fallen without HA and the Iranians. Groups like Jaish al Islam even had a pretty sophisticated military industrial complex in some ways superior to that of IS. Sunni Arab Iraqi insurgents melted into the population putting non-combatants at far less risk than Syrian rebel warlords who could hold territory but had no real means of defending the population from regime air attacks and artillery that have been a big killer. The main danger Sunni Arab civilians faced in the first phase in Iraq was being ethnically cleansed by Shia militias. The Syrian Sunni Arab rising against Assad militarily looks more like the second Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq that kicked off properly in 2013 which IS dominated though Syria's rising shares the political fragmentation that doomed the first one in Iraq. The political conditions for a second rising in Iraq were baked in despite a fairly inclusive democratic Baghdad/Irbil and large powerful domestic security force in the ISF/Peshmerga. And then the Arab Spring hit producing mostly messy failures but it would be foolish to dismiss its root causes as resolved. If anything Assad's family lands in Syria look far more vulnerable to future unrest than Iraq did in 2011.
 
On War On The Rocks LONG IGNORED: THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AGAINST INSURGENTS
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The Syrian Example

Like the Iraqi chemical weapons program, Syria’s interest in chemical weapons began after the Egyptian use in Yemen in the 1960s. However, Damascus did not adopt a full-fledged chemical weapons program until its military inferiority was unmasked by the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The sense of inferiority — and the perceived unwillingness of Arab neighbors to rise to Syria’s aid — resulted in Damascus’ adoption of chemical weapons by the mid-1980s. Chemical weapons were the most expedient means of protecting the Assad regime from catastrophic defeat at Israeli hands. Similarly, the Rhodesian chemical and biological effort began out of an increasing awareness of the deteriorating security situation in the face of international isolation.

Even though Damascus’s interest in chemical weapons first arose in an international/regional context focused on deterring Israel, the utility of the weapons for the Syrian regime has been, like Rhodesia, in countering its internal insurgency. The Syrian attack on Khan Sheikhoun demonstrates the utility of chemical weapons in the counterinsurgency. According to the declassified assessment by the U.S. intelligence community, released on April 11, 2017:

The Syrian regime maintains the capability and intent to use chemical weapons against the opposition to prevent the loss of territory deemed critical to its survival. We assess that Damascus launched this chemical attack in response to an opposition offensive in northern Hamah Province that threatened key infrastructure.

On the same day, a senior U.S. official elaborated on the threat posed by the rebel offensive in Hamah. The official stated:

The regime we think calculated that with its manpower spread quite thin, trying to support both defensive operations and consolidation operations in Aleppo and along that north-south spine of western Syria, and also trying to support operations which required it to send manpower and resources east toward Palmyra, we believe that the regime probably calculated at that point that chemical weapons were necessary in order to try to make up for the manpower deficiency.

These assessments clearly illustrate that Damascus resorted to the use of chemical weapons to compensate for inadequate conventional military resources as it sought to counter an imminent threat to a key population center and a vital air base. The U.S. intelligence assessment even emphasized these regime assets as “critical to its survival.”
...[/QUOTES]Article explores the rather frequent use of Chemical Weapons in COIN campaigns including an interesting example from Rhodesia. Notes Syria developed it CW capability to deter the Israelis as it was realised the SAA was no match for the IDF. Reckons pariah states facing internal unrest are rather prone to resort to CW despite "international norms".
 
From Chatham House Why Ahrar al-Sham couldn't stand up to HTS's attack in Idlib
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A double-edged sword

Ahrar’s size and structure are a double edged sword. On one hand they increase the group’s resources and manpower and allow it to control different strategic locations. But at the same time, they make its structure loose, which increases the power of local leaders at the expense of the central command and turns Ahrar into different local groups coordinating together instead of being one unified body.

The localized nature of the Syrian conflict has significantly shaped the way local communities and factions perceive themselves and their interests, which has limited them largely to their own towns or villages. Ahrar's inability to create a disciplined central force able to operate and be swiftly deployed across regions has limited the group’s ability to mobilize its forces to counter HTS attacks. According to the Syrian analyst Ahmad Abazeid, Ahrar’s central force only includes around 800 fighters, based at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey.

Ahrar also missed the chance to build alliances. Ahrar’s was stripped of reliable partners by its decision to stay on the sidelines when HTS antecedent Jabhat al-Nusra was eliminating the Free Syrian Army groups (FSA), as Nusra gradually picked off these moderates. Then in January, when some groups decided to merge with Ahrar in the face of an assault from Nusra’s next incarnation, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Ahrar did not use its forces to protect its new members who were under attack. Instead, it waited until a ceasefire was agreed with HTS, newly formed out of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and other groups.

Moreover, Ahrar attacked the military bases of two groups that joined it – Fastaqim Kama Umirta and Jaish al-Islam, in Baskaba village in Idlib – in order to prevent HTS, which questioned the sincerity of their merger with Ahrar, from capturing the area. These incidents not only made it easier for HTS to capture those areas, but they also sowed distrust of Ahrar in some rebel groups, including factions within Ahrar. Additionally, due to the group’s unwillingness to fight HTS, Ahrar did not try to build alliances with local communities and factions that view HTS as a common enemy.
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Ahar's weaknesses echo those of the revolt in general. A diverse localised rising that could agree on fighting off Assad but with large ideological splits over Islamist issues. Ahar ending up captured by the national interest of a powerful neighbour that's lost interest in regime change.
 
Isn't it time London/UK stopped hosting these fairs where we and many others sell all sorts of horrendeous weapons, sometimes even outlawed arms are traded, where a number "countries of concern" and other corrupt regiemes are invited along. The trade is corrupt, immoral and inhumane.

The next big DSEI ( a London company ) arms fair is in September and the big day of protest is Saturday the 9th. Even if you can't make it along, there are still plenty of other ways you can get involved.

Big Day of Action - Stop the Arms Fair

Campaign Against Arms Trade - Wikipedia
 
On IRIN News New order on the border: Can foreign aid get past Syria’s jihadis?
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Private donors fear jihadis, and being seen as jihadis

The activist was more hopeful about the prospect for support from non-state donors. “Privately-funded aid won’t cease to work,” he told IRIN. “It is implemented by local actors on the ground who act and work in spite of the circumstances.”

In many cases, that is probably true, but private aid groups are worried too. Even some Islamist aid groups seem deeply concerned by Tahrir al-Sham’s growing dominance, either because they fear being shut down by the jihadis or because they’re afraid that Tahrir’s terrorist designation will rub off on them.

“Of course, it is very hard having them there,” said Karim Ben Daher, a member of the Sweden-based Islamic Charity Center, which funds a privately run hospital in Idlib Province. “Before, the other groups in that area, like the Islam Army or Ahrar al-Sham, provided a kind of security,” he told IRIN in a recent interview. “You could have them as protection when you were there. But now we don’t know what’s going to happen.”

The hospital backed by Ben Daher’s group is located in Aqrabat, near the Turkish border. “It’s in this little village that has its own local council and the armed groups never ran things there,” Ben Daher said. “But it is close to Saraqeb and Sarmada, where they were fighting recently. It is also close to the Bab al-Hawa crossing, which was previously controlled by Ahrar al-Sham. Now I guess it is controlled by Tahrir al-Sham, even though it is a little unclear at this point.”

Ironically, although Ben Daher opposes the jihadi militants on both religious and political grounds, he fears that Western governments will lump him in with Tahrir al-Sham. “If you work in an area controlled by a terrorist-listed group, you will be branded suspicious,” he told IRIN. “We can try to wave this problem away as much as we like, but that’s unfortunately how things are.”
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Lund on the post Ahar al Sham dilemma in Northern Idlib.

Quotes Brent McGurk: “Idlib Province is the largest al-Qaeda safe haven since 9/11,” US gone very cold on the place under Trump. Heller wrote a long paper on Idlib a year ago pointing out the whole economy relies on foreign aid. Now HTS doesn't just benefit indirectly but controls the supply lines aid moves along. Western donors like the UK who've supported rebel groups running honourable civil councils probably will abandon them. Lund thinks private Gulf donors may get queasy as well.

Though I'd point out their support to the Taliban has never really dried up since 9-11 and in fact we have some parallels to the situation in bumpy Idlib. The Taliban was much admired by some Ahar figures and its emirate is presented as a model for Syria by AQ. Both AQ and IS are currently operating in Afghanistan despite the attention of a large NATO presence for the best part of this century. It's perhaps worth considering the Quetta Shura Taliban faced strategic defeat after 9-11 far more decisive than that of Ahar recently. It survived only to become even closer to the Pakistani ISI and is currently resurgent.
 
From The Atlantic Council Reaching Agreement on al-Qaeda: An Option for the US and Turkey
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In the short term, the two sides need to manage relations, while the war against ISIS remains the key focus of the US national security establishment. The trajectory of the war in Syria may give the US some options to do this. The focus of the US military effort is now in eastern Syria, reducing flight times from Jordan, where the US is now flying missions in support of the SDF. Incirlik Air Force Base continues to play a key role in the air war, but as the war has moved away from the Turkish border, it is no longer critical for certain missions. This could give the US and Turkey some flexibility to expand the scope of the air war to include al-Qaeda targets in Idlib, a short flight from Turkey.

At Incirlik, the United States should consider a model based on Joint Task Force Proven Force, the agreement reached to allow US strikes from Incirlik against Iraqi targets in 1991. The Task Force was under the operational command of EUCOM, but under the tactical control of US Air Forces, Central Command. This approach would levy greater authority to a combatant command that has a history of working closely with Turkey, and better equipped to manage the relationship. The air strikes would focus on striking al-Qaeda leaders and support infrastructure in Idlib. It would also shift the burden of support for the SDF to Jordan, thus removing a key point of irritation. This proposal is meant to be the start of a conversation, and thus could expand to include international effort to address the likely humanitarian aspects of any increased military campaign in the area. It would also have to discuss a potential role for Turkish ground forces, most probably on the Turkish side of the border to help deal with outflows of people.

The constraints on such an approach are numerous. On the US side, key elements fighting the Islamic State may resist efforts to expand the scope of the campaign. The bureaucratic and logistics may also pose problems, ranging from staffing a new Task Force to CENTCOM - EUCOM cooperation. On the Turkish side, this approach could leave Ankara vulnerable to the mass movement of people out of Idlib, once airstrikes start. This approach would also force Turkey to have to seriously contemplate their role in a military campaign, independent of a broader effort to unseat Bashar al Assad. Russia, too, remains a wildcard and could seek to extract pledges to cooperate with the coalition, which would violate current American law, and raise ethical questions about joining with Russian pilots that use indiscriminate bombing to take territory. The regime could exploit the chaos to expand territory, undermining Turkish-led efforts to ensure that the non-al-Qaeda linked opposition abide by any broader agreement with the Russians to not take territory beyond current front lines. As a result, this broader agreement could simply devolve into a dedicated effort to conduct high-value targeting of al-Qaeda leaders in Syria from Turkish territory.
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Mattis headed to Ankara soon. The above does seem like a likely direction.
 
From Atlantic Council Raqqa’s Water War
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The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the three biggest dams in Syria (the Euphrates, Baath and Tishrin dams) which together supply around seventy percent of the country’s water and electricity needs. According to the World Bank and the Syrian regime’s Ministry of Water Resources, the SDF controls around eighty percent of the irrigated agricultural land in the country’s northeastern Jazeera region (the riparian zone around the Euphrates).

The Tabqa Dam, fifty km (thirty miles) west of Raqqa, is some 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles) long, with a width of twenty meters (sixty-six feet)at the top and sixty meters (197 feet) at the base. Also known as the Euphrates Dam, it contains electricity generators and restrains a lake containing some ten billion cubic meters of water. At the northern entrance to the dam is the al-Balikh channel, used to balance the flow of water and ease pressure on the dam as well as channeling off water for irrigation. Also attached to the dam is an electricity transformer which produces some 2.5 billion kw a year. The dam also provides irrigation water for more than 640,000 hectares of agricultural land.

The area north of the lake has seen intense fighting between SDF and ISIS forces. It has also been hit by international coalition airstrikes which targeted the dam’s main control room, cutting off the self-feeding mechanism that operates its gates, halting all its equipment, taking its electricity generators out of service and turning it into nothing more than a basic dam.

The Baath Dam, the third-biggest in Syria, lies between Raqqa city and al-Thawra, holding back ninety million cubic meters of water. It is a regulating dam, three km long (1.86 miles), sixty meters (196 feet) wide at its base and ten meters (33 feet) high. It also serves an electrical generator that puts out 375 million kilowatts a year. It has played a major role in boosting agriculture in the Jazira region or present day al-Hasakah province.

The Tishrin dam, in Minbej city (ninety km/fifty-six miles east of Aleppo) generates power for towns and villages across eastern Aleppo countryside. Its six massive generators produce six billion kilowatts per year, while behind the dam lie 1.8 billion cubic meters of water.

Several power stations are attached to the dams and elsewhere on the Euphrates River and its tributaries in Syria, all of which are under SDF control. As part of a re-stabilization program in areas seized from ISIS, the US is supporting maintenance efforts on many of the generators. But the plan currently in place, which depends on basic renovation operations aimed for the most part at providing drinking water, fall short of the main goal of re-stabilization in an area that relies heavily on agriculture. The deterioration of that sector has caused hundreds of thousands of residents to lose their jobs and pushed many to immigrate or take up arms.
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Another Phase IV element that seems pretty neglected: Rojova's impressive water resources in a very dry country.
 
On ISW Russia's Syria Mirage: July 17 - August 13, 2017
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Iran and the Assad regime are already exploiting nascent U.S.-Russian cooperation to expand their control into Eastern Syria at the expense of the U.S. and its partners. Russian airstrikes primarily targeted ISIS-held areas from July 17 - August 13 in support of Iranian and Assad regime advances. Pro-regime forces backed by Russia and Iran recaptured Sukhna, which sits on the Palmyra - Deir ez Zour Highway, from ISIS on August 13 following a wave of ISIS counterattacks against the city from August 8 - 10. Russian airstrikes also targeted villages along the southern bank of of the Euphrates River in southeastern Raqqa Province, allowing the recapture of al Numaysah, al Jaber, and al Kumaysah towns by pro-Iranian and regime forces. These gains were facilitated by manpower freed from recent de-escalation zonesbrokered by Russia in Southwest Syria, the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus, and northwestern Homs Province. Russia, Iran and Assad seek to leverage these gains to constrain the freedom of action of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Syria. Pro-regime positioning along the Euphrates River could block the advancement of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) southeast from Ar-Raqqa City after the completion of Ar-Raqqa City clearing operations. Russia’s gains against ISIS in Syria’s East will ultimately embolden Iran and the Bashar al Assad regime, rather than constrain them.
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ISW notes the R+6 is galloping towards Deir along apparently not doing clearing operations carefully and lacking enough holding forces. In these things it's not how much of the map you rule but how completely. Balanche a few weeks ago anticipated further slow careful progress this time as a previous R+6 offensives East of Palmyra have collapsed disastrously when IS counter attacked.

ISW's probably right here that the imperative is to throw out a screen to stop US backed forces capitalising on IS's well conducted fighting withdrawal to the lower Syrian Euphrates. The heavily anti-Russian tone is perhaps a bit off. Russia may genuinely want to use Syria to create relationship of peers (i.e. gain a huge increase in geopolitical status for a parsimonious price) with a very dangerous vastly more powerful US hyper-power that hysterically overestimates terrorist threats in a way the geopolitical game playing Russians simply don't. Such a screening action benefits the Kremlin as it means they own Syrian ground approaches to IS's last territorial redoubt and that entangles US anti-IS operations with the R+6. US/Russian airpower can conquer but finally infantry must capture, clear and hold. That will probably be a future joint Damascus-Baghdad operation.

Revolutionary Iran on the other hand having greatly eroded US influence in Iraq really does want to press the Great Satan out of Syria and what the R+6 is doing will probably serve Iranian objectives better than it does Russian. Assad meanwhile also wants the Yankee menace gone, his family's lucrative hydrocarbons recaptured and the same trade/supply lines out to Diyala and beyond that Teheran Iran covets.
 
From The Washington Institute The Race for Deir al-Zour Province
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RUMORS AND REALITIES

In recent months, the Syrian army has advanced in the Tadmur (Palmyra) desert and southern Raqqa province, and in the coming weeks it will turn its attention to lifting the Islamic State (IS) siege of Deir al-Zour, continuing a years-long quest to reconquer the city as a means of taking back the entire province. In particular, if the Syrian army succeeds in capturing Deir al-Zour city, it will then focus on the rich al-Omar oil fields, which account for 50 percent of Syrian production, located to the north of the Euphrates between Mayadin and Abu Kamal. At both the local and national levels, these fields will be crucial in helping Syrian president Bashar al-Assad secure allegiance from area tribes. Logically, the regime forces would then advance to the Iraqi border and join with Shia militias somewhere in the southern Sinjar Mountains. The largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and U.S.-backed Arab rebels would thus be denied access to the lower Euphrates Valley, between Deir al-Zour and Abu Kamal, as previously occurred at al-Tanf in June 2017, when the Syrian army and Shia militias reached the Iraqi border from Tadmur.

A limited SDF offensive, however, is possible in northern Deir al-Zour province. Yet the Syrian regime and its allies will work assiduously to prevent the SDF from reaching the al-Omar oil fields, because such a development would cut off the route between Deir al-Zour city and the Iraqi border, complicating Iranian plans to create their land corridor to the Mediterranean.

This scenario runs counter to the rumors circulating in Washington about a future U.S.-backed rebel offensive in Deir al-Zour province. According to such rumors, the Arab rebels and SDF will advance on the northern shores of the Euphrates, up to Mayadin, then cross the river and travel until Abu Kamal before seizing the Iraqi border area. Thus, the Syrian army will be limited to taking Deir al-Zour city and its nearby surroundings. Such a development would allow the United States to block the planned Iranian corridor and maintain pressure on the Assad regime. On the other side of the border, the Iraqi army, not the Shia militias, would eliminate the IS presence. The Sunni Arab tribes on both sides of the border would thus be under a U.S. protectorate and the Iranian corridor project rendered moot. Even excepting geopolitical considerations not discussed here, this rosy situation is unlikely to play out, as evidenced by various clues on the ground.
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Balanche points out that the PKK appears to have little interest in supporting an SDF thrust further South to thwart the Iranians. In doing so they might just empower a future rebel competitor in Eastern Syria. The US has very pointedly demonstrated bad faith by dropping the Northern rebels. Rojova's better longterm options may lie with the enemy of their Turkish enemy the Russians though he doubts this will be made overt. There are some incentives here to drag out the fight with IS and maintain reliable US support.

Ironically I'd point Trump's South Western ceasefire also freed up R+6 resources to enable Iran's move towards Deir and the Iraqi border. Though those still look pretty sparse for the task in hand.

Nice map:
MilitarySituationDeirZour-US-FINAL-560x888.jpg
 
On Newsweek WHAT DOES ISRAEL WANT FROM THE CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA?
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Dissolution: A Balkanized Syria

Exhausted by a bitter stalemate and with no clear clear victor, the combatants lay down their arms and a patchwork of Balkanized states emerges in Syria. In Tel Aviv, satisfied ministers court potential client nations rest assured that their divided neighbor will never again threaten Israel over its northeastern border.

For Lovatt, the best outcome Israel could hope for in Syria would be a peace settlement creating any number of federated or independent states divided on ethnic or religious lines.

“The best case scenario in terms of what it would like to see would be a decentralized or even [a] fractured Syria where you see the emergence of a number of so-called proto-states,” he says.

Over the last decade, Israel has consistently looked to forge ties with non-Arab Muslim entities as well as other minorities. Lovatt points to Israel’s cultivation of the Druze, a distinct ethnic and religious Arabic speaking group, and Christian Maronites in Lebanon as well as increasingly good relations with Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria.

General Amidror thinks Israel would be able to forge strong ties with an Alawite state isolated from Iran. Ultimately he sees a weakened Syria as one less likely to attack Israel.

“The disintegration of Syria is not the worst situation from our point of view. If the Kurds and the Sunnis and Alawites, each had their own area of control they will not be in a position to harm Israel maybe as Syria did in the past or Hezbollah and Iran might try in the future,” he says.
Article looks at a number of outcomes in Syria from an Israeli perspective and sees Balkanisation as the best. Not being exactly focused on regional stability they often had a similar view on post-Saddam Iraq.

Russia's carve up of Syria's borders in foreign zones of influence might approach de facto partition but hasn't been that well received in Tel Aviv. That's mainly because the Israelis don't see it lasting.

Unfortunately for the Israelis as in Iraq the likely outcome is a greatly enhanced sphere of Iranian influence. Having a far more bulky set of Shia militias eventually at a loose end on the other side of the Golan isn't good. The good old days of a passive aggressive Bashar effectively policing that border for the IDF are probably gone.
 
On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi blog The Iranian Land Route to the Mediterranean: Myth or Reality?
...
Thus, in the case of the Tanf border crossing, the American presence would be set to be stuck there indefinitely, likely subject to harassment by Iranian-backed forces falling short of all-out war. The only alternatives are either to try to pressure the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently assaulting the Islamic State's de facto capital of Raqqa to launch a major offensive to take all of Deir az-Zor province (an unlikely prospect) and maintain a permanent U.S. presence and substantial economic commitment to SDF areas, or unilaterally deploy thousands of U.S. troops to take Deir az-Zor, only to face an insurgency that will either bolster the Islamic State or take on a different form. After all, the province was a source of fighters who ended up going to Iraq to fight the American presence there during the Iraq War.

In sum, the notion of confronting Iran in the east of Syria and blocking a supposed Iranian land-route may sound tough rhetorically but lacks a basis in reality. The idea of claiming a U.S. stake in the east of Syria and thus somehow being able to push for a political transition in the long run away from the Assad regime is fantasy. The Trump administration should resist calls to engage in a major escalation for a poorly defined objective that does not actually reverse what my colleague Kirk Sowell of Inside Iraqi Politics describes as "Iran's position as the pre-eminent player between Iran and the Mediterranean." Any U.S. policy-making should focus instead on dealing with the reality as it is and deterring threats that arise from it: that is, making clear that any actual attacks on U.S. assets and allies will be met with severe retaliation.
Points out Iran is doing pretty well at supplying its Levantine allies by air and a land supply route probably would be subject to harassment by the likes of IS long after they've lost territorial control. Both the regime and Iran's Iraqi Hashd allies have their own motivations for securing routes across to Iraqi border turf.

Looking at the way Iran's spread its influence in Iraq commerce and pilgrims were perhaps more important than the military aspects. Reducing Damascus's isolation and creating a relationship with Baghdad are goals they'd share with Assad. Iranian policy tends to lay in infrastructure that may or may not be fully developed decades in the future. Though poking the Great Satan in the eye is always gratifying for the IRGC.

What I do notice is the Israelis don't seem to be as obsessed with the Teheran-Beqaa Valley GLOC as some US commentators. They focus more on developments on their border. After all the route existed before the Caliphate and the IAF can always bomb the shit out of it if it becomes annoying. The Russians will look the other way as they've no interest in an Iran-Israeli war derailing their Syria strategy.
 
On The Intercept SYRIAN CIVILIANS BRACE FOR HUMANITARIAN DISASTER IN A FINAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ASSAD AND JIHADISTS
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When the battle for Idlib does come, it may be the biggest humanitarian catastrophe in a civil war that has already claimed over 400,000 lives.

“The situation is really a disaster because there are a lot of people in Idlib who have no connection to Al Qaeda — including some rebel factions, many civilian residents, and nearly a million [internally displaced people],” said Heller.

Some of the most vulnerable people in the province are the many Syrian political activists who were deported or fled to Idlib in the wake of government offensives elsewhere in the country. “Many people who were unwilling or unable to reconcile themselves to life under the regime have been sort of funneled into Idlib,” Heller added. “There there are a lot of people — good people — who are going to be trapped in the crossfire when this attack happens.”

Housam Mahmoud, another Syrian activist in Idlib who was deported from Madaya, told The Intercept last week that the situation has become increasingly difficult of late, as HTS battled other rebel groups to cement its place as the main armed force in the province.

“When I was first sent here I expected that Idlib would be something like Afghanistan, but it turned out not to be the dark place I was expecting,” Mahmoud said. “But now, after the recent infighting by HTS, the situation is very frightening. The people are afraid of ending up as another Mosul,” he said, referring to the Iraqi city where Kurdish officials estimated that 40,000 civilians died during a U.S.-backed Iraqi government assault on ISIS.
...
Interesting the comparisons reached for there. Some in Idlib have seen the stern Taliban as a model for governance but the reality of many rebel enclaves is more diverse. The feared future fate of Idlib being that of Mosul not flattened nearby East Aleppo or Raqqa, once a common rebel place of refuge in this war, now being precision bombed into submission.

Mosul certainly was the largest most intense regional battle since the Iran-Iraq war but the estimate above of civilian dead in Mosul is extremely dubious. A more realistic one would be a quarter of that. About 30K people got killed in the far longer battle of Aleppo; ~70% of them civilians.
 
Torture and Sexual Violence Against Women in Assad’s Detention Centres - A 36 page report by Syrian NGO 'Lawyers and Doctors for Human Rights'

http://ldhrights.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Voices-from-the-Dark.pdf
Bumping this for those interested in this area.

The book Behind The Disappearances by Iain Guest details the campaign by the Argentinian dictatorship, backed by the Reagan administration, to wreck any attempts at investigations by international bodies into its abductions, torture and murders of opponents. The Assad regime, backed up by other states, is using a similar strategy.
 
In The National What ISIL's rise in 2014 tells us about Al Qaeda's potential in Syria today
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In unresolved conflicts, an insurgency base does not easily go away. The Islamist insurgency against Hafez Al Assad in the 1970s and 1980s was wiped out but some of it came to life when the Syrian uprising turned into an armed conflict. Syrian groups like Ahrar Al Sham and Jabhat Al Nusra could even be regarded as the second generation of the 1970s militancy.

So, to answer the original question, ISIL’s rise in 2014 could be attributed to its exploitation of the hidden energy of a defeated insurgency. That opportunity may not necessarily exist today for ISIL. The Iraqi government has the ability to capitalise on the military gains and the popular awareness of what ISIL stands for to move the country forward.

In Syria, though, the potential to inherit and absorb an insurgency exists, and Al Qaeda is better positioned than ISIL to do so.
...
Hassan Hassan speculates that AQ in Syria may be left holding the banner of a just anti-Assad struggle. Much as IS gathered the fragments of the post-Baath Iraqi insurgency into a new rising that they dominated. These things can smoulder on bitterly for generations. It's recognised in Irish Republican families that the direct force cause often passed from grandfather to grandson. The Hama Massacre in 1982 left a clear imprint on the international Salafi-Jihadi movement and then that infected the Syrian rising as it militarised thirty years later. AQ will still seek to capitalise on that even as it is forced underground.
 
Bumping this for those interested in this area.

The book Behind The Disappearances by Iain Guest details the campaign by the Argentinian dictatorship, backed by the Reagan administration, to wreck any attempts at investigations by international bodies into its abductions, torture and murders of opponents. The Assad regime, backed up by other states, is using a similar strategy.

Thanks. Unfortunately this is a thread that I don't usually look at, which is a shame given the complexity and importance of the subject.
 
Bumping this for those interested in this area.

The book Behind The Disappearances by Iain Guest details the campaign by the Argentinian dictatorship, backed by the Reagan administration, to wreck any attempts at investigations by international bodies into its abductions, torture and murders of opponents. The Assad regime, backed up by other states, is using a similar strategy.
This story has finally received some attention from a mainstream publication.

Beatings and gang rape: the horrors facing women in Syria's jails revealed
 
Syrian activist and daughter murdered in Istanbul home: Turkish police

...Turkish media reports said Orouba Barakat was investigating alleged torture in prisons run by the Syrian government. It said she had initially lived in Britain, then the United Arab Emirates before coming to Istanbul.

“The hand of tyranny and injustice assassinated my sister Doctor Orouba and her daughter Halla in their apartment in Istanbul,” Orouba’s sister Shaza wrote on Facebook, adding that they were stabbed to death....
:(

i wonder if this has anything to do with the recent torture report posted by copliker ?
 
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