Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

And next, Syria?

bimble said:
Well that was kind of inevitable wasn't it, sooner or later, seeing as Bannon and Kushner were never going to be friends. "“He is surrounded by weak, foppish, left-wing New York socialites..”
Click to expand...
It's amazing Bannon has kept his ideological purity given all the toadying to billionaires he's been forced to do since failing to make Partner at Goldman. Must be the diet of Wild Turkey and chainsaw lubricant.
 
bimble said:
hashtag Fire Kushner is trading well on twitter today, with the foaming 'anti-globalists'.

"The hashtag #FireKushner became the top trending topic on Twitter Friday night, thanks to outraged Donald Trump supporters who blamed Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and top adviser, for the decision to strike Syria.."
Click to expand...
Weird as Kushner's basically cut from the same Real Estate tycoon cloth as Trump and was clearly part of the God Emperor package. He's also rather religious and a staunch Zionist. He's not a "nationalist" like Bannon and Gorka. A pair who often trade in antisemitic memes. For some of these white nationalist guys "globalist" is just a code for Jewish. Their paranoid fears of a US MB conspiracy are just a version of the same hogwash. They can simultaneously be very supportive of Israel and very suspicious of any Jewish influence. I've noticed this with alt-right trending Republican friends.

Trump's clearly moving on Assad's CW capability at least partly on behalf of the Israelis. Trump left some ambiguity but it was increasingly clear he was going to be a very pro-Israeli President. It's not just the Blob. The Israelis are genuinely popular with the US public with 71% favourability in general and 81% with GOP voters. Israel's security is one of the three traditional US ME priorities along with energy and terrorism. Trump's turning out to be a fairly traditional US leader in that respect.

One of the pressures for Trump to act was it was not unlikely the Israelis would and they really don't fuck about. They've been quite willing to kill Russian advisors to the Syrians in the past and their patience with the Kremlin has been wearing thin. A weak but rising Assad, a strong HA and Sarin are a bad combination for the Israelis. Bibi is in trouble with corruption scandals and being hit from his right. That's just the conditions that could cause him to lash out. That could have got out of control as well and Trump would have back the Israelis. Obama would have been pushed hard to do something about Assad retaining Sarin as well.
 
Incendiaries all over idlib today. Probably from the bombed airbase. Revenge for the temerity of being attacked by chemical weapons.
 
Last edited:

...
"I would consider it fair for President Bashar al-Assad to resign and leave power, allowing the dear people of Syria to avoid the scourge of war and terrorist oppression," he said in a statement.

The United States fired a barrage of 59 cruise missiles at Shayrat airbase in Syria early on Friday to push Damascus, despite its denials of responsibility.

Sadr, who led a militia that fought the U.S. occupation of Iraq, also condemned the American missile strike, urging all foreign parties involved in the Syria conflict to pull out.

"I call on all sides to withdraw their military assets from Syria so that the Syrian people take things into their own hands. They are the only ones with the right to decide their fate – the alternative will turn Syria to rubble," he said.
...
Click to expand...
Moqtada is a wee bit late here.
 
On AirWars America’s shadow war in Syria
...
During the past 30 months, Airwars researchers have tracked more than 30 apparent unilateral American strikes, almost all in the rebel-held northwestern Idlib province. Using the lowest estimate for each incident, these strikes have likely killed at least 91 civilians. The real strike and overall casualty numbers are probably far higher. First, while the United States does publicize some unilateral strikes — as it did for six strikes in January — others have gone unreported, including drone attacks apparently carried out by the CIA. Secondly, it is difficult to properly attribute some strikes, such as a February 7th strike in Idlib city that reportedly left two dozen civilians dead but has also variously been blamed on Russia and the Syrian regime. The Airwars data set includes all strikes publicly acknowledged by US officials, as well as other strikes that we believe are likely to have been carried out by the United States.

Nevertheless, the trend is clear: The United States is escalating its unilateral air war in Syria. More than half of the 35 likely US strikes that we have been able to clearly source have occurred in the past six months. Though these operations have been largely obscured by the ongoing and massive military campaigns in Mosul and Raqqa, they also seem poised to increase in the weeks and months ahead.
...
Click to expand...
For those insisting the US is backing AQ in Idlib. What is true is the US hit AQ very little until Russia intervened and started to degrade a lot of the rebel groups the US did support and who often worked with AQ. Of course this corresponds with a rapid rise in AQ's reach within the revolt after the Russian intervention. The likes of ISW were getting increasingly alarmed about this over 2015 and would assert causation from that. The Russians have also been hitting AQ targets but as with the Americans without having much impact on the groups's success. In Yemen there's some evidence AQ HVT hunting has been counter productive. Attacks can have a rallying effect and speed Salafi-Jihadi groups evolution. The same may be true in Idlib; AQ is certainly rather popular. It's also Obama last November who grants the Pentagon a wider brief to hunt AQ HVTs. As with a lot of things Trump's been on a similar escalating trajectory to Obama in Syria and Iraq.
 
Stop the war really need to get a grip on themselves imo. They could have been protesting about the horror that is Syria years ago but the only thing that seems to bring them out on the streets is when the likes of the US get involved. Some weird cognitive dissonance going on there.

 
On TNI The Su-22: The Plane That Dropped Chemical Weapons in Syria?
...
The U.S. missile strike on April 4 was intended to hit the Su-22 squadron at Al Shayrat, which also hosts Syrian MiG-23 fighters and Russian attack helicopters. However, it’s not yet clear if the Sukhois were hit: Washington informed Moscow in advance of the attack to avoid killing Russian personnel, which may have given the Syrian Air Force time to move its valuable jets. Initial reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense claim the strike killed six Syrians and destroyed six Syrian MiG-23s in their hangers but failed to hit the runway or any of the parked Su-22s. If the claim is true, the old attack plane may finally have dodged a bullet.
Click to expand...
That would be 3% of Assad's 200 airframes if you believe the Russians.
 
On ISW Syria Strike Opens Doors for U.S. Strategy
...
The pro-regime axis—Assad, Iran, and Russia—reacted in different but complementary ways. The Assad regime and Iran initially responded with caution. Their reactions indicate shared intent to avoid additional U.S. responses. The Assad regime downplayed the impact of the strike and resumed normal operations. Iran portrayed the U.S. as a regional aggressor but did not take military action. Iran’s initial reaction reflected a desire not to provoke the U.S. to escalate against Assad. Iran’s proxies also displayed discipline and did not escalate above previous levels of anti-American rhetoric. Iran’s response indicates that Iran seeks to avoid drawing the U.S. further into the region. The lack of immediate escalation by Iran or its proxies does not indicate that Iran will fail to respond if the U.S. takes additional action against Assad. Iran will undertake a sophisticated and possibly offensive strategy against U.S. interests and personnel in theater if it perceives further U.S. action against Assad is likely. Iran will also attempt to develop a joint response with Russia.

Russia’s initial response was reactionary. Russia focused first on repairing Vladimir Putin’s strongman image and the perception of the strength of Russian aerial defensive capabilities by condemning the strike and undertaking a show of force. Russia deployed a missile frigate to the Mediterranean Sea, conducted massive domestic military exercises, halted use of the aerial deconfliction mechanism with the U.S. in Syria, and stated it would bolster the Assad regime’s air defenses to deter further U.S. action. Russia later stated that it will speed up development of the S-500 system for domestic air defense. Russia shifted its narrative approach after 24 hours to cast President Trump as reckless. Russian rhetoric and propaganda portrayed the U.S. as an irresponsible aggressor in an effort to deny popular support for further U.S. intervention in Syria.
...
Click to expand...
Note the contrast. Clear escalatory signals from Russia not so much from Iran and the Regime. ISW on the money about not to read this as fearful Iranian passivity.

Expectations here were different. Russia hoped for some sort of meek detente and expected better of two gun Trumpski and complains of treachery while Iran always assumes The Great Satan is spinning webs of deceit.

When regime positions in Deir where hit accidentally by a Coalition strike in contrast Iran and Assad went crazy. The regime was even suspected to be exaggerating the Company level carnage caused by the air strike on this critical IS besieged position. This may have been because they were intent on derailing peace talks or it may have been US outrage. Of course they could not know if Obama had actually tilted to attacking the regime. The real story was Coalition targeting apparatus appear to have been faulty and the Russians appeared to have fumbled deconfliction over Deir. Always keen to play down US democracy they hinted a US military coup was underway. Assad would get payback by savagely bombing an aid convoy. An act which basically discredited the Russian-US negotiations.

After Trump's strike there may have been a uptick in bombing, burning the country went up a notch but that may be just local commanders reacting. The regimes basically saying they were attacking terrorists so what's the problem. Trump did drone on and on about "Assad killing IS" while he campaigned. Assad had done little of this but Trump isn't worried by facts. Trump was going to go medieval on IS and kill their children. And there has been an escalation in US mass casualty strikes including one in Mosul that may have killed twice as many civilians as Assad's Sarin attack. Then Team Trump announced the days of "Assad must go" were over. They'd dropped Obama's paper thin pretences. Assad had in fact faced an AQ offensive above Hama and was probably short of resources. He's not the brightest of critters and may have taken all Trump's bullshitting at face value. Now Team Trump are resolutely saying that "Assad Must Go!". Oh well that's US Presidents for you it's 2013 all over again in Assad's palace and probably going a little more squittery than usual.

Interesting how the Takfiri reacted:
...
Al Qaeda
  • 07 APR: Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi stated the U.S. strikes are "but a feather compared to" U.S. strikes on Muslim lands. He further condemned praising the strikes as akin to praising "a professional killer." (Twitter)
  • 07 APR: Several pro-al Qaeda Telegram accounts issued anti-American statements warning supporters that the U.S. is still an enemy of Muslims. Pro-al Qaeda Telegram accounts are also claiming that the U.S. coordinated the attack with Russia and Syria to ensure there were minimal casualties. (SITE)
ISIS
  • 07 APR: Failed to make a statement on 07 APR 17.
...
Click to expand...
 
CrabbedOne said:
On TNI The Su-22: The Plane That Dropped Chemical Weapons in Syria?
That would be 3% of Assad's 200 airframes if you believe the Russians.
Click to expand...

I once met a Polish Fitter driver at a Battle of Britain dinner. He said it had some real strengths including a decent ECM fit and very good reliability/availibility. He also said one had to be very physically strong to fly it and if the pilot ever took both hands off the stick it would crash almost immediately.
 
On Syria Comment Russia’s Escalation in Syria: Making It Tougher to Fight ISIS? – By Nicholas A. Heras
...
However, as successful as the American strategy against ISIS in Syria has been up to this point, a reality that is not widely noted is that this success is the product of the general freedom of action that is enjoyed by the U.S.-led Coalition as result of Assad and Russia’s apathy. Preoccupied with the civil war raging in western Syria, where the chemical weapons attacks occurred, the Assad regime and its partners have allowed the U.S. to focus on ISIS, which is more of a long-term threat to the rule of Bashar al-Assad. However, as the Obama administration often argued, was always the threat of Assad and Russia beginning to care about eastern Syria, and the growing American military presence there, looming over the U.S. counter-ISIS campaign in Syria.

A Proxy for a Proxy

President Trump is generally following the same counter-ISIS strategy is Syria as his predecessor, which means that the Trump administration is relying on local proxy forces to reduce total number of U.S. forces required to be inside of Syria. This strategy aligns with Trump’s campaign pledge to destroy ISIS and to keep the United States out of another costly occupation of a Middle Eastern country. Yet, this strategy is only as effective as the local partners that the U.S. must work with, and the freedom of action that American aircraft have to provide the vital air support that these partners need to overcome ISIS’ fierce resistance.

Assad and Russia do not need to attack U.S. forces inside of Syria, or shoot down American warplanes, which could start a chain of escalation that could result in a larger, regional or global conflict. Simply put, Bashar al-Assad and his allies can instead turn their fire on America’s partners on the ground inside of Syria, which would be a major setback, perhaps even a mortal blow, to the restrained but effective strategy the U.S. has been pursuing against ISIS.

There is already a model for how Assad and Russia could respond like this: both have conducted airstrikes either “accidentally,” or purposely, on America’s local, Syrian partner forces over the last year. In three incidents, in June 2016, August 2016, and last month, Assad and Russia have directly attacked counter-ISIS, Syrian partners, prompted a U.S. air force response to warn off further attacks. Without a reliable de-confliction channel, these one-off strikes by the regime and Russia could become part of a systematic campaign against the best Syrian counter-terrorism partners the U.S. military has fought and shed blood next to.
...
Click to expand...
The campaign against IS is their main interest in Syria and a big US vulnerability here.

I'd not trust the PKK to be a particularly loyal friend to the US or vice-versa after a declaration of victory over IS. If Trump get's into a face off with the Russians Turkey again rises in importance.

It's not just sticks the R+6 also has carrots it can offer the Apoists. The defence of Afrin, the GLOC to Afrin, trade. Demanding fealty from local power brokers with bribes and menaces is very much the Baathist way.

The Pentagon is now planning a light but longterm security presence in Eastern Syria. That's probably OK with the Russians but not acceptable to the regime or the Iranians. There's a long game and a short game here. Splitting the Syrian PKK away from the US is exactly what the Iranians will want to do. The Iraqi Hashd have shown signs of aligning with them in Sinjar ready for a push towards Deir. Baghdad supports PKK backed groups up there. Assad is every bit as untrustworthy as Trump but Trump will be gone in eight years Assad may not. The Assad's are an old (unreliable) PKK ally as are the Russians. How long will Qandil be happy as mercenaries taking the salt of Yankee imperialists?

It seems Rojava will be cash poor, increasingly short of water, surrounded by and in some cases ruling hostiles. The PKK will probably try to sustain US support by not entirely extinguishing an in any case hard to get rid of IS threat. This is rather a pattern with local US allies in the wider Middle East GWOT. Consider Pakistan or Yemen who both have milked US fears of AQ. Baghdad balancing the US and Iranians. Qandil will do its GWOT schtick while horse trading with Assad over territory won with the assistance of US arms and selling him hydro-carbons. It's a delicate balance but it can be walked.
 

It's a bit cold hearted to just call it emoting when being bold here may stoke up even more carnage without actually getting rid of Assad.

Because very little has changed beyond US rhetoric slinking back to the confident predictions of 2013. That's not even consistent as yet. Haley was saying Assad is toast while Tillerson says that IS is the priority and he'll scuttling off to Moscow which rather does look like making nice. This is very far from the sort of Assad first strategy that Lister etc have advocated for. As for Trump he'll be led by the seat of his pants, vanity and it seems McMasters and Mattis.

To change much Trump has to be willing to go to war with Russia over Syria. The risk of that happening accidentally got greater.
The US just very carefully avoided slapping Russia down and that's really what Trump would have to embrace doing in a way Obama did not. Trump's shown willing to strike at very specific threats to Israeli security under dense AD while deconflicting with the Russians. Bibi has been doing that regularly almost since the start of the Russian intervention. Does Bibi actually have much leverage with the Russians? Judging by the growing number of Iranian assets milling about in Useful Syria I'd say no. Trump's word being wind isn't exactly news either.

It's not a binary choice of living with IS or Assad. But there are path dependancies and at a policy level a priority must be set. A real move on Assad really can queer US efforts to bundle up IS's Syrian rear area. It can provide opportunities for IS and AQ that'll be hard to explain to US voters who appear rather easily sacred of Syrian refugees rather than deeply sympathetic. The Assad's horrible regime may be a jam pot attracting Takfiri like wasps but it has patchy popular support that dominates Syria's capitals. The mainly rural, religiously conservative Sunni revolt has not found much love in these places. It's led by Salafists in the North with AQ heading the half that's most fiercely attacking Assad. Many Syrians are as repelled by even by the moderate Islamists that the US has tended to back.

The Islamist loathing Trump administration will struggle to find any palatable alternative to Assad remaining and expanding. Tillerson when he said before the Sarin attack who rules Syria is up to the Syrian people was echoing years old Iranian rhetoric and reflecting a reality. Syrians may well chose Assad's corrupt oppression out of fear of a not much better alternative and that his supporters and allies will go on burning country if it does not submit.
 
butchersapron said:
Sort of thing not posted on here for age:
Click to expand...

There are a lot of things that ought to be scoffed at in this.

First up - the idea that the regime's "sectarian strategy" contributes to escalation and radicalisation. This idea appears in the rhetoric of the Syrian armed opposition to deflect from its own sectarian strategy and has become part of the received wisdom for commentators on the Syrian conflict. The rhetoric itself serves a sectarian purpose - the idea that the regime is part of some sort of minority (meaning Alawite) rule against the majority (meaning Sunni) population. And of course it is a cute way of pretending that getting rid of Assad means that ISIS will whither away and die.

Let's be clear the regime may have gradually shed its secular principles over the years but it simply does not have a sectarian strategy. The regime's rhetoric is anti-terrorist and occasionally anti-imperialist, but not anti-Islamist or anti-Jihadi or anti-Salafi nevermind anti-Sunni. The regime has always enjoyed support from sections of the Sunni population.

Secondly the contention that McMaster is trying to get buy in from the Sunni majority in order to take on ISIS. That's just a guess based on nothing. I think it is unlikely that this action from the Americans will lead to any strategic policy change. Where would that new policy go? The priority for the US remains ISIS not the regime, and the regime is currently the strongest player and is likely prevail. This article is far too excitable (to be fair a lot of other commentary is as well).

Thirdly complaining about the US bombing non-ISIS opponents of the regime is an example of my enemy's enemy is my friend (unless you are making a case against military intervention). We are talking about Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Ahrar al Sham here.

Fourthly the claim that "more than 90%" of civilian casualties are committed by the regime. The figures are taken from statistic gathered by two utterly obscure human rights organisations. More mainstream organisations admit that they don't have a handle on the number of civilian casualties nevermind who to attribute them to. It's very easy to accidently count rebel fighters as civilians by the way. Why repeat figures that lack any credibility? Do we need them to prove the brutality of the regime or the relative harmlessness of the rebels?

And finally I don't have a problem with Phylis Bennis or others expressing scepticism over the chemical weapon attacks. I think its a balance of probabilities that the regime is responsibility, but its worth emphasising that we don't know. That's not an example of the problems of the "anti-imperialist left", it's just caution.
 
On War Is Boring How Will Russia Respond to Trump’s Tomahawk Strike?
...
At the time of the strike on Shayrat, Russia had advanced S-300 and S-400 air defense systems in Latakia and Tartus, and the Syrian regime has its own robust Russian-built integrated air defense system [IADS]. Although these systems have an advertised capability to counter cruise missile strikes, there is no reporting today of any IADS response. Why?

The Times of Israel offers two plausible answers: “The Russian S-400 air defense battery — considered one of the best in the world — apparently did not strike down a single US missile, either because it couldn’t or because the Russian military opted not to intervene.”

As the second largest arms supplier (after the United States), perhaps the Russians were loath to risk Tomahawks leaking past the Russian systems and thereby harming future sales. Off-axis shots are difficult and Tomahawks are extremely formidable weapons. However, it is unlikely that one of the most advanced SAM systems in the world would be unable to shoot down at least one of the Tomahawks, which fly subsonically.

The more logical and likely explanation is that the Russians chose not to escalate the situation. Although Moscow and Damascus recently signed a 49-year lease that provides for the expansion of Russia’s naval facilities at Tartus, where it has had a naval base since 1971, Russia and Syria do not have mutual defense treaty like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Moreover, while Russia has longstanding ties to Syria, would Russia be willing to have open hostilities with the United States over Syria?

Maybe the message got through to Moscow that this was a limited strike. If Russian leaders are not interested in escalating conflict with the United States over this attack, in the short term we would not expect anything more than what Russian leaders have already done.

The harsh rhetoric plays well with the Russian domestic audience and reassures Moscow’s allies that it is a committed and reliable partner. In fact, the more limited nature of the Tomahawk strike—when there were other escalatory options—shows Russia’s deterrent value and in no way diminishes Moscow’s role in the region.
...
Click to expand...
The Russians have not acted when the Israelis struck targets they viewed as a threat to them either. I imagine they saw this as a similar if more surprising situation. Standing aside as a limited attack they'd been informed of took place. They'd only have been able to a portion of the Tomahawks anyway. The difference being their deconfliction arrangement with the Israeli acknowledges their need to hit HA supply and that has remained in place.
 
Knotted said:
There are a lot of things that ought to be scoffed at in this.

First up - the idea that the regime's "sectarian strategy" contributes to escalation and radicalisation. This idea appears in the rhetoric of the Syrian armed opposition to deflect from its own sectarian strategy and has become part of the received wisdom for commentators on the Syrian conflict. The rhetoric itself serves a sectarian purpose - the idea that the regime is part of some sort of minority (meaning Alawite) rule against the majority (meaning Sunni) population. And of course it is a cute way of pretending that getting rid of Assad means that ISIS will whither away and die.

Let's be clear the regime may have gradually shed its secular principles over the years but it simply does not have a sectarian strategy. The regime's rhetoric is anti-terrorist and occasionally anti-imperialist, but not anti-Islamist or anti-Jihadi or anti-Salafi nevermind anti-Sunni. The regime has always enjoyed support from sections of the Sunni population.

Secondly the contention that McMaster is trying to get buy in from the Sunni majority in order to take on ISIS. That's just a guess based on nothing. I think it is unlikely that this action from the Americans will lead to any strategic policy change. Where would that new policy go? The priority for the US remains ISIS not the regime, and the regime is currently the strongest player and is likely prevail. This article is far too excitable (to be fair a lot of other commentary is as well).

Thirdly complaining about the US bombing non-ISIS opponents of the regime is an example of my enemy's enemy is my friend (unless you are making a case against military intervention). We are talking about Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Ahrar al Sham here.

Fourthly the claim that "more than 90%" of civilian casualties are committed by the regime. The figures are taken from statistic gathered by two utterly obscure human rights organisations. More mainstream organisations admit that they don't have a handle on the number of civilian casualties nevermind who to attribute them to. It's very easy to accidently count rebel fighters as civilians by the way. Why repeat figures that lack any credibility? Do we need them to prove the brutality of the regime or the relative harmlessness of the rebels?

And finally I don't have a problem with Phylis Bennis or others expressing scepticism over the chemical weapon attacks. I think its a balance of probabilities that the regime is responsibility, but its worth emphasising that we don't know. That's not an example of the problems of the "anti-imperialist left", it's just caution.
Click to expand...


1) There has been and is a regime sectarianisation plan. It was there from 20012 when the shabihia hundrrds of killed men and women in an attempt to make it a a sectarian war - the easier for the regime to sell itself.


2) whatever

3) What?

4)What other figures do you have?

Your caution is anothers opportunity.
 
On LWJ Analysis: Syria policy must reflect the complex reality on the ground
...
The limited air strikes ordered by Trump may be enough to dissuade Assad from using banned agents of mass murder once again. But Assad has other ways to kill civilians, and he has used them since the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. He could have easily killed just as many men, women, and children in Khan Shaykhun using indiscriminate, but conventional, ordinance.

It is for that reason, among many, that some will once again push to remove Assad from power. The moral case against Assad is overwhelming. He is also a key ally of the Iranian regime, which is the main sponsor of Hezbollah. Assad has increasingly relied on Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed Shiite militias for manpower. Naturally, America’s most valuable ally in the region, Israel, sees this as a threat multiplier. Iran relies on its proxies to threaten Israeli security and its expanding footprint north of Israel’s border is a gathering storm, one that could rain down even more deadly rockets and missiles on Israel than in the past.

America cannot and will not work with Bashar al-Assad. And perhaps the US should push for his removal from power, along with many of his worst minions. But when some look at Syria, all they see is Assad and Iran. They pretend that vanquishing Assad will have some sort of domino effect, necessarily leading to a more stable country. But the groups fighting him—and one another—present their own challenges. And the policy debate should reflect this simple reality. There are multiple bad actors on the ground in Syria today, including the two most dangerous Sunni jihadist groups on the planet.

Conspiracy-minded commentators portray Assad as an evil genius, manipulating ISIS and al Qaeda as part of some diabolical, yet convoluted (and nonsensical) scheme to portray himself as Syria’s only reasonable ruler. Bashar Assad is evil, but he is no evil genius. He is not the wizard of Syria, using cheap parlor tricks to secretly control perceptions from behind a curtain.

While Assad has certainly made use of the fact that the Syrian opposition is riddled with jihadists, this doesn’t make that observation false. It is certainly true. He has suffered significant losses at the hands of the jihadists since the beginning of the war.

The two sides fought around Palmyra for months. Assad’s fighters, Iranian-backed irregulars, and Russian forces recaptured it in March 2016. Then, in December 2016, ISIS overran Palmyra once again. ISIS celebrated its Russian-made spoils in one of its propaganda videos, claiming that more than 350 Syrian soldiers and Shiite militiamen were killed during the battle. Even if that figure is exaggerated, there is no question that the two sides incurred significant losses.

In March 2017, Assad’s army claimed it had retaken Palmyra from ISIS for the second time in a year. In the months leading up to the regime’s surge, American warplanes destroyed a massive fleet of ISIS oil tanker trucks and also repeatedly targeted ISIS’s tanks and other military vehicles. Meanwhile, the Israelis detected a shipment of advanced weapons delivered to Hezbollah at the nearby T4 military base. Israel’s jets were scrambled to bomb arms depots a short distance from Palmyra.

Therefore, America and Israel were effectively bombing opposite sides in the fight, with the US focusing on Assad’s Sunni jihadist enemies and Israel striking Assad’s Shiite jihadist boosters.
...
Click to expand...
This is a more nuanced piece than I'd expect from neocon LWJ. It probably reflects Israeli ambiguity about Assad. That Assad (and Iran) winning in Syria would be bad but his ouster could be worse. There is a school of thought that this war only really becomes a problem for Israel once it stops and this is not wrong.
 
On Politico McMaster: U.S. eager for regime change in Syria
White House National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster says that while the U.S. would push for regime change in Syria, “We’re not the ones who are going to effect that change.”

“What we’re saying is, other countries have to ask themselves some hard questions,” McMaster said in an interview on "Fox News Sunday." “Russia should ask themselves, ‘What are we doing here?’ Why are we supporting this murderous regime that is committing mass murder of its own population and using the most heinous weapons available?’”

McMaster characterized Thursday’s U.S. airstrike of a Syrian airfield as an opportunity for Russia to reevaluate its continued support for Syrian President Bashar Assad, adding that addressing both Assad’s actions and routing ISIS could be done simultaneously.

“I think, as you saw with the strike, that there has to be a degree of simultaneous activity as well as sequencing of the defeat of ISIS first,” McMaster said. “What you have in Syria is a very destructive cycle of violence, perpetuated by ISIS, obviously, but also by this regime and their Iranian and Russian sponsors.”
...
Click to expand...
My bold, IS first again, note the odd language. Sounds to me this is a complicating bolt on on existing policy not the US intending to win the war for the rebels.
 
Trying to get a post in edgeways from CrabbedOne's relentless post odyssey...

teqniq said:
Stop the war really need to get a grip on themselves imo. They could have been protesting about the horror that is Syria years ago but the only thing that seems to bring them out on the streets is when the likes of the US get involved. Some weird cognitive dissonance going on there.

Click to expand...


Picked up by the Beeb here:
Syrian refugee 'felt oppressed' by Stop the War protest - BBC News.

Beeb said:
A Syrian refugee who was shouted down at a Stop the War demonstration says he "felt oppressed" by the group.

The protest in Downing Street on Friday evening was against the American attack on a Syrian airbase.

Hassan Akkad, from Damascus, asked why the group was not protesting against President Assad instead, but was drowned out.

He said: "British people not letting a Syrian say something about Syria in a protest about Syria. It's mad."
Click to expand...
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Similar threads

teqniq
Huge earthquake in Turkey and Northern Syria 05-06/02/23
2 3
Replies
83
Views
3K
JimW
JimW
P
The next American Civil War
7 8 9 10 11
Replies
321
Views
15K
pbsmooth
P
MrCurry
After Ukraine, what’s next?
2 3
Replies
76
Views
5K
Dogsauce
Dogsauce
T
Hong Kong: what next?
65 66 67 68 69
Replies
2K
Views
82K
Yossarian
Yossarian
H
Syria, attack on Conoco gas plant in Feburary 2018
Replies
1
Views
348
yield
Y
Back
Top Bottom