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War propaganda, 'Realists' and neocons, and the denigration of the war sceptics

That still isn't an explicitly stated aim. And your second sentence seems to contradict what you've previously said.

Putin stating that Russia didn't intend to occupy Ukraine without fleshing it out, tells everybody what to expect from the invasion? I'd say it does the opposite (which might have been the intention.) And Putin and others might consider Ukraine to be a mere territory, but this isn't the official line they've taken so far, and the development of the war up to now suggests that it's going to prove irrelevant.

I wouldn't negotiate peace any more than you would. Our views are of no consequence. However, I've already made clear that I think a flawed peace or a frozen conflict situation is better than hundreds of thousands of dead and an outcome that, a few years down the line, hardly anybody will be satisfied with anyway. History is, sadly, littered with unhappy outcomes built on the blood and agony of those who were steamrollered into fighting on behalf of the minority who reap the real rewards (who also find themselves dissatisfied when the dust has settled.)
No, you just have trouble understanding how things work. To Putin and some others, Ukraine is only a territory. Very few countries in the world are sovereign according to Putin. It's a good idea to keep this in the back of one's mind when negotiating for eventual peace. You said you believed that "negotiation, and eventual peace, is better than war". You brought up negotiation. How would that work for Ukraine?
 
No, you just have trouble understanding how things work. To Putin and some others, Ukraine is only a territory. Very few countries in the world are sovereign according to Putin. It's a good idea to keep this in the back of one's mind when negotiating for eventual peace. You said you believed that "negotiation, and eventual peace, is better than war". You brought up negotiation. How would that work for Ukraine?
You seem to be rambling a bit now, and making little sense.

Nobody on here knows how negotaitions to end this war would work, but they will come, as in all wars.
 
You seem to be rambling a bit now, and making little sense.

Nobody on here knows how negotaitions to end this war would work, but they will come, as in all wars.
Don't talk about rambling when you go on and on about things you've imagined in your head like there being no statements on the intentions of the invasion which you claimed had "never been explicitly stated" when certainly it had. You just have to read up on it. In fact, there's a lot out there of what Putin and his cronies have said over the years on things related to how they see Russia, Europe, the US, this war, how they see Ukraine and lots else. It gives good insight on how things may pan out.
 
A fairly brief outline of current western scepticism at the higher levels, and how it clashes with Ukraine's perspective on things.


'For Kyiv, the war aim is clear — total victory, the restoration of all Russian-occupied Ukrainian land, including illegally annexed Crimea. Negotiations may well end the war, but there can be no Russian conditions and the peace terms will be dictated by a victorious Kyiv. That’s the Ukrainian view. Zelenskyy and his aides have vociferously ruled out compromises over territory or sovereignty in keeping with the Ukrainian leaders’ ten-point plan released last November. But the West would settle for a partial win — maybe Russia can keep Crimea and parts of the Donbas. Total victory can only really come if the Ukrainian army marches to Moscow — and that’s just not happening. In short, what we are seeing is a clash between practicality and idealism.

The mismatch between rhetoric and action gnaws at Ukrainian officials and adds to their fright that the West eventually will try to foist a deal on them. Hence the intensifying and incessant demands for more weapons and ammunition, for warplanes and missiles — it is testimony to their alarm that their sacrifices and suffering, the blood already split, will be in vain.'


 
A fairly brief outline of current western scepticism at the higher levels, and how it clashes with Ukraine's perspective on things.


'For Kyiv, the war aim is clear — total victory, the restoration of all Russian-occupied Ukrainian land, including illegally annexed Crimea. Negotiations may well end the war, but there can be no Russian conditions and the peace terms will be dictated by a victorious Kyiv. That’s the Ukrainian view. Zelenskyy and his aides have vociferously ruled out compromises over territory or sovereignty in keeping with the Ukrainian leaders’ ten-point plan released last November. But the West would settle for a partial win — maybe Russia can keep Crimea and parts of the Donbas. Total victory can only really come if the Ukrainian army marches to Moscow — and that’s just not happening. In short, what we are seeing is a clash between practicality and idealism.

The mismatch between rhetoric and action gnaws at Ukrainian officials and adds to their fright that the West eventually will try to foist a deal on them. Hence the intensifying and incessant demands for more weapons and ammunition, for warplanes and missiles — it is testimony to their alarm that their sacrifices and suffering, the blood already split, will be in vain.'


What we're seeing is a country who were told they'd have support asking for that support from the people who helped put Ukraine in the unfortunate position they're in now.
 
What we're seeing is a country who were told they'd have support asking for that support from the people who helped put Ukraine in the unfortunate position they're in now.
The 'west' wants to see a weakened Russia. Ukraine wants its land back. But a look at us support for governments in South Vietnam and Afghanistan shows that despite great aid for a period, such support is on Washington's terms and the support will last while it suits the agenda of the occupant of the oval office. Fine, if Ukraine manages to win within that time frame. Not so good for Ukraine if they don't.
 
The 'west' wants to see a weakened Russia. Ukraine wants its land back. But a look at us support for governments in South Vietnam and Afghanistan shows that despite great aid for a period, such support is on Washington's terms and the support will last while it suits the agenda of the occupant of the oval office. Fine, if Ukraine manages to win within that time frame. Not so good for Ukraine if they don't.
It's interesting watching the US who believes in the combined arms formula for battlefield wins refuse to supply Ukraine with what they need to attempt combined arms. The piecemeal support seems calculated and I'd believe it to be had there not already been the display of ineptitude in exiting Afghanistan.
 
Trump says he's going to end aid for Ukraine when he gets elected, so that should shake things up. Mind, he had been caught out on the whole Ukraine/Biden thing before.
 
An interesting contribution towards explaining what's currently going on? I don't know, as I'm not an amateur military enthusiast/fount of knowledge on the subject.


'One might have hoped for a better outcome from the geo-economic confrontation between the heavily-sanctioned Russian economy and the much richer Western coalition that supports Ukraine — especially because things started so well. Early fears that Germany and Italy would not tolerate the loss of their Russian markets and Russian natural gas supplies proved unfounded. Instead of defections, the coalition that economically supports Ukraine has expanded across Europe and now includes Japan and even South Korea, which sent a token $150 million this year.

But initial hopes that Russia could be seriously pressured, perhaps all the way to the negotiating table, by stalling both their oil exports and their imports of Western goods soon faded. Unlike China, Russia is self-sufficient in both food and fuel, and can manufacture all it needs, except for micro-processors and other high-tech items that are easily smuggled.

Turkey, while ostensibly a close American ally, is still the transit point for many high-technology exports to Russia, and Turkey’s traders and traffickers have plenty of competition in other countries. As for the Russian economy, the news is gloomy but not gloomy enough. A meagre 1.5% growth will be achieved this year, but that still exceeds the German growth rate (which is expected to be zero). Russia’s inflation rate of 3.3% is also around half the Euro average. The war will not end because of Russia’s economic capitulation.

There is, then, only one route forward: to fight the war in earnest, as befits a struggle of national liberation. Ukraine’s population has declined but still exceeds 30 million, so that the total number in uniform could be as much as 3 million (Israel’s 10% ratio in 1948) or at least 2 million (Finland’s reservists as a percentage of the population). With those troops, Ukraine could win its battles and liberate its territory in the same way as most of Europe’s wars of independence — by gruelling, attritional warfare.'



 
An interesting article, albeit a month old, from the pro-war New Statesman.

'Eighteen months into the war in Ukraine the breathless hype that characterised early media coverage has curdled into doom. This is the deepest trough of despair that the wartime media has entered yet: the past month of reporting has given us new admissions about a war that increasingly appears to be locked in bloody stalemate, along with a portrait of Ukraine and its leadership shorn of the rote glorification and hero worship of the conflict’s early days. The deadlock has increasingly resembled brutal, unabating, First World War-style combat, with the Ukrainian army rapidly depleting artillery ammunition supplied by the West. Distant audiences, who always treated the war as a team sport, and Ukraine as an underdog defying the odds against a larger aggressor, are thinning out; surely many will soon turn their attention to the partisan conflict of the forthcoming US presidential election. Optimists say the change in the media’s tone is indicative of little more than the inevitable pendulum swings of war and that Ukraine may yet emerge victorious. But such a view elides a host of unavoidable realities.'

'Compounding the disillusionment is the fact that the early shock of the war has worn off, meaning it’s lost some of its initial sense of urgency – especially as war takes its toll far beyond Ukraine. “There was the initial widespread feeling of revulsion; then, people were naturally drawn towards ‘we must not compromise’, and moral and strategic maximalism,” Porter said. “That’s easier to hold when you’re not yet feeling the pain. Now, materially, there are costs everywhere.” And while the immediate convulsion of fear that accompanied the full-scale invasion was so strong that it prompted Sweden and Finland to apply to join Nato, the initial panic has since faded, and evolved into a more ambient dread about a long war of attrition, rising inflation, recession and food insecurity.

Recently, Ukraine itself has also been depicted in a more complicated light. On 19 August the New York Times published a story about Kyiv’s wartime policy of jailing conscientious objectors. Meanwhile, Zelensky’s new proposal to equate corruption with treason, transferring cases from anti-graft agencies to the security service, was met with unusually harsh condemnation in Politico. And this summer both the Guardian and BBC have published articles about Ukrainian deserters and men employing other means to avoid conscription, including barricading themselves inside their homes and using Telegram channels to warn other men about the location of roving military recruitment officials. On 24 February 2022 a presidential decree imposed martial law which forbade men aged between 18 and 60 from leaving Ukraine. But according to a BBC report in June this year, tens of thousands of men have crossed the Romanian border alone, and at least 90 men have died attempting to make the perilous crossing, either freezing to death in the mountains or by drowning in the Tisa River.

Further, the Economist recently published an article about the Ukrainian public’s waning morale. Most men eager to defend Ukraine joined the armed forces long ago, and many are now dead. The country now recruits among those effectively forced. Individually, stories about conscientious objectors, deserters, those hiding from conscription, and a war-weary public can appear anecdotal, but taken together, they begin to undermine one of the foundational tenets of the war: that Ukrainians want to fight, in the words of Joe Biden, the US president, “for as long as it takes”. And as expectations are dramatically scaled back, one cannot help but ask: for as long as it takes to do what?'

 
The mainstream media in the US and the UK do seem to be edging towards admitting defeat. The problem they now face is that they have been assuring us that Russia was rubbish at fighting, that Ukraine was winning, or at least was likely to win if given endless amounts of money and weapons etc. It will be interesting to see whether the realization that they have been lying engenders a broader skepticism that applies to other issues.
 
Regarding some of the fantasies underpinning western enthusiasm for the war, and the real reasons behind the fantasy, this is perhaps the most interesting passage from the article linked to above.

'As a more sober reality sets in, it’s worth asking why Western governments and the media were such effusive boosters of Ukraine’s war effort. The writer Richard Seymour has suggested that part of it was about identity formation, wherein Ukraine is emblematic of an “idealised Europe” or even democracy itself, while Russia represents Oriental despotism and authoritarianism. The war thus embodies the supposed civilisational struggle theorised by Samuel Huntington between democracies and autocracies, promoted by the Biden administration through initiatives such as its Summit for Democracy. That annual event aims to “renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad”, underlining the continuity between liberal opposition to the putative authoritarian affinities of Donald Trump and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

But beyond the merely symbolic there was a practical rationale for the kinds of coverage we saw in the war’s early months: the conflict in Ukraine has revived a waning Atlanticism – a long-sought aim of proponents of Nato enlargement. Just a few years ago Emmanuel Macron, the French president, declared Nato “braindead”; the war in Ukraine has brought it back to life. Finland and Sweden applied to join. Critics say that the governments of both countries used “shock doctrine” tactics to convince their respective populations to abandon their policy of neutrality, making the decision to apply for membership while the war was top news and the public was still afraid.'
 
Regarding some of the fantasies underpinning western enthusiasm for the war, and the real reasons behind the fantasy, this is perhaps the most interesting passage from the article linked to above.

'As a more sober reality sets in, it’s worth asking why Western governments and the media were such effusive boosters of Ukraine’s war effort. The writer Richard Seymour has suggested that part of it was about identity formation, wherein Ukraine is emblematic of an “idealised Europe” or even democracy itself, while Russia represents Oriental despotism and authoritarianism. The war thus embodies the supposed civilisational struggle theorised by Samuel Huntington between democracies and autocracies, promoted by the Biden administration through initiatives such as its Summit for Democracy. That annual event aims to “renew democracy at home and confront autocracies abroad”, underlining the continuity between liberal opposition to the putative authoritarian affinities of Donald Trump and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

But beyond the merely symbolic there was a practical rationale for the kinds of coverage we saw in the war’s early months: the conflict in Ukraine has revived a waning Atlanticism – a long-sought aim of proponents of Nato enlargement. Just a few years ago Emmanuel Macron, the French president, declared Nato “braindead”; the war in Ukraine has brought it back to life. Finland and Sweden applied to join. Critics say that the governments of both countries used “shock doctrine” tactics to convince their respective populations to abandon their policy of neutrality, making the decision to apply for membership while the war was top news and the public was still afraid.'

Seymour's analysis sounds excellent. Trump's opposition to NATO seems to have seriously scared them, and the Ukraine war is an effective riposte. They've clearly been attempting to make "democracy" the brand linking their fights against Putin and Trump, burbling on about it in forums, conferences and op-eds. I suppose some people may also have genuinely believed it was possible to spark a domestic revolt against Putin. But perhaps we're asking the wrong kind of question here--I'm not sure that American foreign policy is guided by rational considerations these days.
 
Seymour's analysis sounds excellent. Trump's opposition to NATO seems to have seriously scared them, and the Ukraine war is an effective riposte. They've clearly been attempting to make "democracy" the brand linking their fights against Putin and Trump, burbling on about it in forums, conferences and op-eds. I suppose some people may also have genuinely believed it was possible to spark a domestic revolt against Putin. But perhaps we're asking the wrong kind of question here--I'm not sure that American foreign policy is guided by rational considerations these days.
Sorry but it is simply a fact that Trump attempted to overturn the 2020 election result and is a threat to democracy.

Democracy is in trouble. A genuinely left view would be to analyse why this is the case - imo it is related to the atomisation of society and decline of public political life, so the cornerstones of liberal democracy (and social democracy) of the 20th Century are waning as a result of the victory of neoliberalism, this is also linked to why economic shock therapy failed to bring liberal democracy to Russia. A left view would be to oppose the direct threats to it while using it as an opportunity to advocate for democratic reforms. This is essentially what the anti-fascist left of WW2 did and resulted in western European social democracy.

Cheering for the rise of post-modern dictatorships like Putin, Orban and what Trump surely aims for just to "own the libs" makes you a fascist, for all intents and purposes.
 
Sorry but it is simply a fact that Trump attempted to overturn the 2020 election result and is a threat to democracy.

Democracy is in trouble. A genuinely left view would be to analyse why this is the case - imo it is related to the atomisation of society and decline of public political life, so the cornerstones of liberal democracy (and social democracy) of the 20th Century are waning as a result of the victory of neoliberalism, this is also linked to why economic shock therapy failed to bring liberal democracy to Russia. A left view would be to oppose the direct threats to it while using it as an opportunity to advocate for democratic reforms. This is essentially what the anti-fascist left of WW2 did and resulted in western European social democracy.

Cheering for the rise of post-modern dictatorships like Putin, Orban and what Trump surely aims for just to "own the libs" makes you a fascist, for all intents and purposes.

Thought this post was going quite well until the last sentence.
 
Thought this post was going quite well until the last sentence.

I don't think we should be shy about using the f word these days. If we can't use the f word, we need another one that encapsulates basically the same meaning, but shorn of its specific association with the 1930s incarnation of similar social and political phenomena to today.
 
There is clearly a distinct phenomena of a decline in political engagement replaced by cheerleading for a strongman hero, a post-truth politics of conspiratorialism in which nothing can truly be known, social isolation and decline of community ties finding solace in nationalism, and a resigned cynicism which passively or actively engages in this.

This same phenomena is how the most thoughtful commentators of the time described the social roots of fascism so that is the natural word to describe it. If we are shy about this word we need another word that encapsulates that kind of phenomenon. "Post-modern dictatorship" which I used above is a bit of a mouthful.
 
I don't think we should be shy about using the f word these days. If we can't use the f word, we need another one that encapsulates basically the same meaning, but shorn of its specific association with the 1930s incarnation of similar social and political phenomena to today.

I'm not trying to police words here, I just think your post worked better where it was playing the ball rather than the man.

Maybe we do need a better word for certain recent political tendencies, though, since you mention it.
 
A left view would be to oppose the direct threats to it while using it as an opportunity to advocate for democratic reforms. This is essentially what the anti-fascist left of WW2 did and resulted in western European social democracy.
I don't think the disoriented left liberals huddling in the hollowed out shells of neoliberalised parties and institutions can draw too much encouragement from the gains of a workers movement capable not only of imposing and defending reforms but of far more radical threats. The situation is too different.
 
There is clearly a distinct phenomena of a decline in political engagement replaced by cheerleading for a strongman hero, a post-truth politics of conspiratorialism in which nothing can truly be known, social isolation and decline of community ties finding solace in nationalism, and a resigned cynicism which passively or actively engages in this.

This same phenomena is how the most thoughtful commentators of the time described the social roots of fascism so that is the natural word to describe it. If we are shy about this word we need another word that encapsulates that kind of phenomenon. "Post-modern dictatorship" which I used above is a bit of a mouthful.

This bolded bit is interesting. Do you have any links pertinent to that (I don't mean the strongman stuff so much as the social isolation and decline of community ties - which piques my interest especially given Fascism's roots in Italy, which I always think of as a very "connected" society).
 
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I don't think the disoriented left liberals huddling in the hollowed out shells of neoliberalised parties and institutions can draw too much encouragement from the gains of a workers movement capable not only of imposing and defending reforms but of far more radical threats. The situation is too different.
Sure, but what is the solution?

I think there is at least a possibility of a left party portraying itself as the defender of a democracy in decay winning enough support from liberal elements of the elite who will tolerate it taking power without throwing the kitchen sink at them like they did with Corbyn.

Often new things succeed by packaging themselves as a kind of revival or conservation movement. E.g. the Reformation presented itself not as revolutionary but as a return to true Christianity, the French Revolution packaged itself as the revival of Greece or the Roman Republic, etc. Maybe socialism can become a player by presenting itself as a democratic renaissance.

It is worth a try I think. The left clearly needs to try a different approach at least.
 
This bolded bit is interesting. Do you have any links pertinent to that (I don't mean the strongman stuff so much as the social isolation and decline of community ties - which piques my interest especially given Fascism's roots in Italy).
Basically The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt, but also a more careful reading of Orwell shows he is far more concerned with the "post truth" thing than he is with a surveillance state.

I think Ur-Fascism by Umberto Eco toys with similar themes in an Italian context too.
 
I'm not trying to police words here, I just think your post worked better where it was playing the ball rather than the man.

Maybe we do need a better word for certain recent political tendencies, though, since you mention it.
Yeah fair enough
 
Basically The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt, but also a more careful reading of Orwell shows he is far more concerned with the "post truth" thing than he is with a surveillance state.

I think Ur-Fascism by Umberto Eco toys with similar themes in an Italian context too.

One thing I've read about in terms of the roots of Fascism was a strong theme of civilisation being "in crisis" in the years leading up to the First World War (when the background philosophical ideas were brewing).
This seems to be very much resurgent as a subject of right-of-centre podcasts and YouTube videos.

Thanks for the links. I've been meaning to read the first one for a while.
 
There is clearly a distinct phenomena of a decline in political engagement replaced by cheerleading for a strongman hero, a post-truth politics of conspiratorialism in which nothing can truly be known, social isolation and decline of community ties finding solace in nationalism, and a resigned cynicism which passively or actively engages in this.

This same phenomena is how the most thoughtful commentators of the time described the social roots of fascism so that is the natural word to describe it. If we are shy about this word we need another word that encapsulates that kind of phenomenon. "Post-modern dictatorship" which I used above is a bit of a mouthful.

Yes. I've warballed on about this enough on here so won't again.

Also, what's the future of the boring but at least somewhat "thinking" and open to debate tories. I am sure I will get flack for this. I know you think they should all be first up against the wall etc, and you're probably right. But you know, the John Major's, the hesseltines, the ken clarks, the portillos. People who had that sort of old fashioned, protect the countryside, the church, the family unit, kind of outlook, but who were also deeply well read, deeply cultured. Ya know, your average old fashioned tory intellectual, who loves his Plato and his garden and his church. Read teh spectator, church fairs, and knew their poetry and philosophy and politics. When I was growing up they seemed the heart and soul of the party, for better or worse. I don't think there is much of a place for them them in teh post-truth future. Too measured, too boring. Not enough endless digs at wokism and the like. Can you imagine John Major sitting across from Andrew Tate or Trump and agreeing with them or relating to them? I can't. There's breaks like that going on across democracy all over the place.
 
can't remember who it was, but someone in teh labour party when asked who was the cleverest person in parliament, he said without missing a beat "john major". there are such tories that you could sit in a pub with and explore thoroughly for hours and hours, with proper debate, proper insight, proper conceding or opening up new ground, things like feminism or immigration. It is that sort of tory that i don't think will have any sort of meaningful public presence at all. Of course tories like that own much of the pwoer in the world anyway, but I am talking here abnout democracy. Whether it's broken or not. Where it's going, etc.
 
Sure, but what is the solution?

I think there is at least a possibility of a left party portraying itself as the defender of a democracy in decay winning enough support from liberal elements of the elite who will tolerate it taking power without throwing the kitchen sink at them like they did with Corbyn.

Often new things succeed by packaging themselves as a kind of revival or conservation movement. E.g. the Reformation presented itself not as revolutionary but as a return to true Christianity, the French Revolution packaged itself as the revival of Greece or the Roman Republic, etc. Maybe socialism can become a player by presenting itself as a democratic renaissance.

It is worth a try I think. The left clearly needs to try a different approach at least.
Maybe talk of solutions comes from a view of politics as a sort of game of tactics and I don't think it works like that. It is technically possible that a vaguely left wing party might achieve some kind of breakthrough but to have any real prospects it would need to be accompanied by much deeper shifts in the balance of social forces than the superficial level of parliamentary politics.

You're right about revivalist aspects of radical movements, but what would a democratic renaissance really mean, particularly in the absence of social democracy, and who would actually be invested in it? Without mass political parties and mass labour organisations what can it amount to except a limp defence of a status quo that drives the undermining of democracy such as it is and the rise of radical reactionaries. I think the demobilising experience of both post war capitalism followed by neoliberalism has dispelled much of its progressive aura, I can't see it being an effective banner to rally round.
 
Yes. I've warballed on about this enough on here so won't again.

Also, what's the future of the boring but at least somewhat "thinking" and open to debate tories. I am sure I will get flack for this. I know you think they should all be first up against the wall etc, and you're probably right. But you know, the John Major's, the hesseltines, the ken clarks, the portillos. People who had that sort of old fashioned, protect the countryside, the church, the family unit, kind of outlook, but who were also deeply well read, deeply cultured. Ya know, your average old fashioned tory intellectual, who loves his Plato and his garden and his church. Read teh spectator, church fairs, and knew their poetry and philosophy and politics. When I was growing up they seemed the heart and soul of the party, for better or worse. I don't think there is much of a place for them them in teh post-truth future. Too measured, too boring. Not enough endless digs at wokism and the like. Can you imagine John Major sitting across from Andrew Tate or Trump and agreeing with them or relating to them? I can't. There's breaks like that going on across democracy all over the place.

Did you see the Novara debate with Rory Stewart BigMoaner? He says he's very much from that tradition and comes across well, tbh I think I like him (yes, yes, I'll shoot myself come the revolution).
 
Maybe talk of solutions comes from a view of politics as a sort of game of tactics and I don't think it works like that. It is technically possible that a vaguely left wing party might achieve some kind of breakthrough but to have any real prospects it would need to be accompanied by much deeper shifts in the balance of social forces than the superficial level of parliamentary politics.

You're right about revivalist aspects of radical movements, but what would a democratic renaissance really mean, particularly in the absence of social democracy, and who would actually be invested in it? Without mass political parties and mass labour organisations what can it amount to except a limp defence of a status quo that drives the undermining of democracy such as it is and the rise of radical reactionaries. I think the demobilising experience of both post war capitalism followed by neoliberalism has dispelled much of its progressive aura, I can't see it being an effective banner to rally round.

Stewart discusses that a bit early on in his interview, he talks about how his voting record says nothing about what he thinks and just that's he's in the Tory party, as to get any positions you have to just toe the government like, so it effectively becomes a game of with the government and maybe get some power/cabinet position or vote against and be forever a backbench protest MP. I'm not sure it's that simple, but I think he makes some good points that it's structurally very conservative on all sides of the house.
 
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