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The Trump presidency

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"but the massive state investment and potential tariff's are very much not"
Depends on how they are 'tailored'
infrastructure? The perfect vehicle to hand over zillions to the construction industry ( PPI, anyone)
tariffs? Bit more difficult, but not unreasonable to assume they could be 'marketed' as protecting US jobs but used in such a way as to line the 1%ers pockets.
Of courses state investment can be channelled via private companies. But that doesn't really make any fundamental difference. Any state intervention marks a failure of the market. Neoliberalism isn't the only system that benefits the ruling class, that's the very nature of capitalism itself.
 
And there you go ska invita, exactly what I was talking on the French election thread liberals finger wagging at non-voters and 3rd party voters.

EDIT: Of course it's particularly silly in this case as only in one of Nebraska's three districts would third party voters have made a difference. And even in that case Green party voters alone would not have changed the result.
I've been getting a lot out of this conversation but I'm flagging a bit now... It's more complex than it seems at first and it's taking up too much of my time.... Not sure I can get into another round of it.... However... One last go...

first off, no two voting scenarios are the same, there's always different factors to consider and weigh up. I don't think le pen and trump situations are exactly equal, despite some big similarities.

As a rule I don't begrudge voting none of the above, but I agree with Chomsky that there's a moral dimension to this that people need to deal with. Though there is also a tactical one, which weighs up the outcomes of a possible abstention or what not. That needs to be fully considered, what the outcome is and even if it doesn't negatively affect you too badly, what affect it will have on others. Hard to do.

My biggest objection with you is that your argument seems to go that if people don't vote for a far right candidate and there is any kind of campaign afoot that asks them to hold their nose to vote to keep that candidate out that it has the opposite effect and in fact drives people to support that far right candidate over time.... In this case people refusing to vote Hilary being pushed towards the politics of trump.

I just don't see the evidence for that.

as to finger wagging and other patronising behaviour, that is always to be avoided, and is a subject of it's own. Politics is by it's nature divisive, and it's hard to not get tribal and angry. How to keep winning arguments and building unity is a problem all of it's own.
 
Of courses state investment can be channelled via private companies. But that doesn't really make any fundamental difference. Any state intervention marks a failure of the market. Neoliberalism isn't the only system that benefits the ruling class, that's the very nature of capitalism itself.
Agreed, but consolidator states will only intervene with investment funded from debt. Trump's administration will only act as 'project manager' to the real 'developers' of financialised capital. In macro-economic terms the state merely acting as the conduit through which wealth is transfered from the ("little people") taxpayers to the fin-corps excused from taxation.
 
and just seen your edit rs, and I agree completely... As I said it's not really comparable to the French presidential election... No two elections are
 
out of curiosity, is anyone keeping a timeline record of when trump's tweets appear?
because it seems to me that over time such a timeline might offer interesting insights into what trump is doing: and what he isn't. someone who is tweeting about shitty judges clearly isn't doing a wide range of other things which one might expect them to. i don't know whether there's a white house press release saying 'today trump did / will do x y z', but when someone's tweeting bollocks you can be fairly certain they're not doing presidential things.
 
On MEI Monday Briefing: Trump’s Executive Orders Don’t Reveal a Coherent Strategy
President Donald Trump’s numerous executive orders and National Security Council statements indicate the direction of official passions, but still do not coalesce into a coherent and discernible strategy.

The travel ban is intended to protect the homeland against terrorists, but weakens the United States in the war against terror. In countries targeted by the travel ban, such as Iraq, it limits America’s ability to maintain troops and influence in the fight against ISIS. In countries not included, some are openly reacting against the anti-Muslim language of the ban, such as a necessary ally like Turkey; others, like Egypt and most G.C.C. countries, have diplomatically stayed quiet. However, if Trump’s anti-Muslim trend continues, America’s Arab allies will face serious pressure from their populations to respond. Predictably, it also feeds into the jihadi narrative, and strengthens anti-American hardliners in Iran, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere.

The hardline policy on Iran is welcome by many, but it is not yet a coherent strategy. How can the United States confront Iran if Trump simultaneously wants to work with Iran’s ally, Russia, in Syria, and with the Iranian-aligned Baghdad government and Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq?

Trump’s repeated insistence that he “will absolutely do safe zones in Syria” also hangs in a strategic vacuum. A U.S.-imposed safe zone, with American air and ground forces, against Russian wishes seems highly unlikely; will the zones be areas agreed upon between the United States, Turkey and Russia? Will they even be in Syria? An early draft of the executive order mentioned that they could be in Syria or the “surrounding region.”
...
Trump inherits Obama's ME policy which was pretty incoherent and falling apart in Syria.

However Trump brings a set of new expectations almost certain to not survive contact with reality.

Wishing to tilt against Iran while adoring a Russia whose Syria policy hinges on IRGC support. Apparently fervently Likudnik but with Israeli's interests often diverging from US ones while also being stridently for putting America First. The Israeli security establishment have engaged in detente with Russia making clear they have red lines with Russia's new ally HA but are in fact rather leery about having the RuAF setting up shop next door.

Elements in Team Trump are set on a great civilisational clash with the virus of Islam actually an idea Shinbet see as plain nuts. The Trump administration is keenly committed to fighting a global war with Radical Islamic Terrorism but obtusely steadily alienating the only allies that matter in that: Muslim states. Particularly GWOT casualty Iraq of which Trump stupidly brags he would have kept the oil.

The GWOT is a so far pretty counter productive war Israel while vigilant isn't really much interested in provided the new generation of Beards don't attack them or stir up the Pals. The Israelis in fact were rather more comfortable with AQ on the Golan rather than an bulked up HA they correctly see as far more dangerous to them. AQ may be just as rabidly anti-semitic but does not have a huge battery of rocketry pointed at Tel Aviv or a vast auxiliary of well armed militiamen. A war is coming between the IDF and HA it's just a matter of when. Ambiguous about there being any victor in Syria at times the Israelis tepidly helped Syrian rebels fighting HA. The Israeli security establishment even rather likes the nuke deal with Iran that Trump like Bibi would dismantle. Where they agree with Trump is mainly in securing their own borders. Safe behind high walls was their thing first.
 
That's a fair question.
FWIW here's my take on the evolution of neoliberalism and Trump's role.
Whilst I'd agree that globalisation was a key element of neoliberalism I think there are newer, more important elements to advanced neoliberalism.
Firstly, I'd say that the processes that Streeck sums up as those of the consolidator state are key to understanding modern political economy. Put simply, financialised capital refuses to pay tax to nation states, preferring to profit from usury; making good the fiscal deficit by extending loans to debt states. As creditor, capital can simultaneously use the state as some sort of 'sub-contracted' wealth extractor, exert leverage over policy programmes (via bond market/capital strike threats) and use the growing public debt as a pretext for austerian shrinkage of the state. This last process facilitating the transfer of public/state owned assets into the private ownership of financialised capital. Trump's populist promises of massive state investment in infrastructure would seem to be entirely consistent with these processes with the additional benefit of increased corporate welfare/subsidy.

Secondly, I'd highlight the importance of the oligarchic class produced by neoliberalism. The obscenely rich economic elite who, pre-Trump have been happy to delegate their wealth defence to a professional political elite, appear to have lost faith in globalised institutions, especially any with supra-national aspiration to tax harmonisation or coordination. Both Brexit & Trump could easily be interpreted as an attempt to secure 2 national 'citadels' of wealth defence from which tax dodging can continue to be co-ordinated. Trump's EOs regarding renewed deregulation of financial services and promises of slashed corp taxes would indicate his determination to secure the USA as a bastion of oligarchic wealth defence.

Thirdly, I'd suggest that advanced neoliberalism could be characterised as post-juridical. The post-war consensus of interventionist governments, managed economies and welfare states relied on professional elites with defined jurisdictions within which they were expected to make judgements of political-economy. Planners, civil servants, economists, lawyers, journalists, educators etc. were all essential experts to the management of an efficient and productive economy. For neoliberalism's true believers of the power of markets to decide upon allocation, any 'expert' group entitled to make judgements wrt resource allocation are now seen as a threat to un-restrained accumulation and wealth defence; hence the antipathy towards and de-legitimisation of these groups. Trump's campaign and administration, (& the 'high priests' of Brexit) thus far, would suggest that this trend against elites will continue.

Added to which, I'd imagine that much of Trump's more protectionist hysteria will prove to be as real as the £350m/week for the NHS.
we've discussed this before, I remain unconvinced by the idea that 'financialised capital' is a monolith that (other than basic profitability of course) has a) an identifiable overarching interest; and b) an intentional direction of travel. Especially when groping towards an outline of post-globalisation politics/economy with, as ever, lots of different interests in dynamic combat and continually adjusting to changing external conditions.

Let's not forget that vast swathes of our economy are owned by us, the ordinaries, through our savings, pensions, homes, assets etc. We may have no control but we are collectively stakeholders and can remember what happened when banks were located in Iceland. Our cumulative household debt matters too, and there's an awful lot of it.

So finance capital has geographic imperatives: why else are banks etc trying to decide whether to relocate from London to Frankfurt or Paris? They recognise that both the nation state that collects their taxes and the legal jurisdiction in which they are based actually matters, to those who control the capital, to the shareholders who trouser the profits, to the stakeholders who save and borrow.

No-one knows to what extent globalisation may implode. If Greece crashes out of the Euro, Le pen wins, Merkel loses and Trump ups the ante, a central plank of the whole basis for global neoliberalism collapses to dust. Including Irish type tax shelter arrangements where it's beneficial for individual states to collaborate with tax refusal: watch Apple etc repatriate. Although it may currently sound farfetched, reimposition of exchange controls is not impossible, dominoing here and elsewhere as nation states attempt to protect themselves, from each other and from 'the markets'.

I'll take your word for it that your gods-eye-view is an accurate description of pre-2017 economics, but it says little or nothing about our potential future. We wouldn't be having this conversation if Remain and Clinton had won and le Pen's support withered to a rump. If the prevailing political mood decides that it matters whether the mop is owned by British, American or Chinese capital, and takes steps to prevent tax refusal and global economic penetration, the changes will be immense. You seem to imply that the markets, the oligarchs, their capital and their corporations are stronger than nation states. That may be so if the states are picked off one by one by gamblers with larger accumulations of global capital than such national finance capital as the state can rally in its support. It's not necessarily the case if there's a global trend towards imposing tariffs and differential trading arrangements.
 
So finance capital has geographic imperatives: why else are banks etc trying to decide whether to relocate from London to Frankfurt or Paris? They recognise that both the nation state that collects their taxes and the legal jurisdiction in which they are based actually matters, to those who control the capital, to the shareholders who trouser the profits, to the stakeholders who save and borrow.
they're thinking of moving because of access to the single market not because france or germany but eu :facepalm:
 
because it seems to me that over time such a timeline might offer interesting insights into what trump is doing: and what he isn't. someone who is tweeting about shitty judges clearly isn't doing a wide range of other things which one might expect them to. i don't know whether there's a white house press release saying 'today trump did / will do x y z', but when someone's tweeting bollocks you can be fairly certain they're not doing presidential things.
He's a reality tv star who uses twitter more effectively than anybody else in the world, and keeping his supporters onside is a presidential thing.
 
in which case it doesn't matter where in the EU they're located. this week! this time next year however...
yeh but you're not engaging brain. if there might be a move to e.g. frankfurt or paris best to do it early before the price of offices goes through the roof.

next.
 
we've discussed this before, I remain unconvinced by the idea that 'financialised capital' is a monolith that (other than basic profitability of course) has a) an identifiable overarching interest; and b) an intentional direction of travel. Especially when groping towards an outline of post-globalisation politics/economy with, as ever, lots of different interests in dynamic combat and continually adjusting to changing external conditions.

Let's not forget that vast swathes of our economy are owned by us, the ordinaries, through our savings, pensions, homes, assets etc. We may have no control but we are collectively stakeholders and can remember what happened when banks were located in Iceland. Our cumulative household debt matters too, and there's an awful lot of it.

So finance capital has geographic imperatives: why else are banks etc trying to decide whether to relocate from London to Frankfurt or Paris? They recognise that both the nation state that collects their taxes and the legal jurisdiction in which they are based actually matters, to those who control the capital, to the shareholders who trouser the profits, to the stakeholders who save and borrow.

No-one knows to what extent globalisation may implode. If Greece crashes out of the Euro, Le pen wins, Merkel loses and Trump ups the ante, a central plank of the whole basis for global neoliberalism collapses to dust. Including Irish type tax shelter arrangements where it's beneficial for individual states to collaborate with tax refusal: watch Apple etc repatriate. Although it may currently sound farfetched, reimposition of exchange controls is not impossible, dominoing here and elsewhere as nation states attempt to protect themselves, from each other and from 'the markets'.

I'll take your word for it that your gods-eye-view is an accurate description of pre-2017 economics, but it says little or nothing about our potential future. We wouldn't be having this conversation if Remain and Clinton had won and le Pen's support withered to a rump. If the prevailing political mood decides that it matters whether the mop is owned by British, American or Chinese capital, and takes steps to prevent tax refusal and global economic penetration, the changes will be immense. You seem to imply that the markets, the oligarchs, their capital and their corporations are stronger than nation states. That may be so if the states are picked off one by one by gamblers with larger accumulations of global capital than such national finance capital as the state can rally in its support. It's not necessarily the case if there's a global trend towards imposing tariffs and differential trading arrangements.
I don't think we'll agree on much if you claim that (financialised) capital has 'no over-arching interests' or a desired 'direction of travel'. I'm afraid to say that most commentators who prefer to imbue capital with such benign, pragmatism tend to be those seeking to obfuscate on their behalf.
 
This is an alternative fact. He really doesn't. he makes an absolute arse of himself every time, and reveals the extent of his delusions for all to see.
selective misreading. he's used it effectively enough to become president of the usa, as did Obama before him. It's hard to think of anything that might demonstrate effective use more clearly.
 
atmSo why aren't they there already?
because geographic location matters for the reasons I gave in my long post. London has been beneficial to them till now, in the future they need access to the EU/single market but they have to have an eye on what happens if that collapses.
 
On CMEC All Quiet in the Eastern Palaces
...
But the Arab uprisings momentarily broke that comfortably unpopular approach to foreign policy, as suddenly frightened regimes had to more seriously weigh the potential costs of popular challenges. The renewed disregard for public anger against Trump is a potent example of how many Arab leaders now believe that the threat of popular revolts has passed and that they can revert to pre-uprising practices. It is no accident, then, that the regional order has begun to resemble that of the 2000s, when most Arab regimes cooperated with the Bush administration on counter-terrorism and confronting Iran, despite public displeasure over the war on terror, the occupation of Iraq, and U.S. support for Israel.

That pre-uprisings foreign policy had costs, though. Protests against the Iraq war and in favor of the second Palestinian intifada laid the foundations for the domestic protest movements that would evolve during the first decade of the century into domestic challenges. Contempt for official Arab impotence contributed to the broader crisis of legitimacy afflicting most Arab regimes.

Anger over the Trump immigration order will not alone spark new uprisings, but the return to traditional Arab foreign policy patterns will contribute to ever-growing popular anger. The security of most regimes is largely illusory in the face of rapidly accumulating economic and political discontent and the diminishing returns of repression. The new autocracies are still on high alert, ruthlessly policing dissent and forcefully repressing any signs of protest. Trump is counting on the ability of these regimes to keep their publics under control, but is likely to only to make their problems worse.

There is one other element of the immigration order worth considering. The anger over Trump’s order was offset somewhat by the considerable attention to the anti-Trump airport protests. The protests were widely described as the best face of America, offering a potent counterpoint to a hostile White House. To be sure, pro-regime voices echoed conspiracy theories familiar from American conservative circles, such as questioning whether the airport protests were organized by the Muslim Brotherhood. But the size, diversity, and empathy of the airport demonstrations, the volunteer legal support offered to threatened immigrants, and the outpouring of critical commentary elicited perhaps the most positive views of America in a long time. That, if nothing else, offers some hope.
My bold, let's not start calling it the "American Spring".

It may be the soft bigotry of low expectations but a lot of Americans appear to have been radicalised by conspiracy theorists and rather eager for the whim filled rule, rule of a petulant, gilded furnishing loving strongman.
 
I'll take your word for it that your gods-eye-view is an accurate description of pre-2017 economics, but it says little or nothing about our potential future. We wouldn't be having this conversation if Remain and Clinton had won and le Pen's support withered to a rump.
My point is that we would/could/should have been having this 'conversation' regardless of recent electoral outcomes. I'm not quite sure what you mean by "gods-eye-view", but with respect, if you read what I wrote in
post #2477 I did attempt to predict, albeit in broad brush-strokes, what trajectory advanced neoliberalism may take.
 
He's a reality tv star who uses twitter more effectively than anybody else in the world, and keeping his supporters onside is a presidential thing.
Meh, appears as an ill-informed buffoon more often on social media compared to just about any-one else...
 
I don't think we'll agree on much if you claim that (financialised) capital has 'no over-arching interests' or a desired 'direction of travel'. I'm afraid to say that most commentators who prefer to imbue capital with such benign, pragmatism tend to be those seeking to obfuscate on their behalf.
I don't think we will, especially if you pretend i'm supporting finance capital against everyone else.

Apart from profitability- which all fincap entities seek to gain at the expense of rivals- what other unifying objective or direction do they follow? Some finance sectors benefit from war, or from stability, or from inflation or from subsidy or from tax shelters or from globalisation while others are caused to go bust. Can you support the notion that there is something all fincap benefits from?*

* exploitation of labour and resources, yes we know that, that's what profitability is.
 
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