We may illustrate this general model of the Logic's dialectic by means of the textbook example from the beginning of the Logic. He- gel starts from the category Being, and first tries to show that this contains its contrary, Nothing: "Being, pure being, without any fur- ther determination ... It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in i t . . . Just as little is anything to be thought in i t . . . Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact noth- ing, and neither more nor less than nothing. "l6 Hegel than undertakes to demonstrate the converse containment of the concept of Being in that of Nothing in a similar way. Having thus reached the negative result that these two categories are self-contradictory, Hegel finally tries to show that there is a positive outcome that unites them but in a manner that avoids their self-contradictoriness, because it not only preserves them but also modifies their senses: the category Becom- ing. (To see what he is getting at here, one should reflect on the fact that what is simply in a state of becoming in a sense is or has being and also in a sense is not or is nothing.) Becoming then forms the starting point for a new round of the dialectic - going on to develop a self-contradiction that leads to subsumption under the category of Determinate Being (Dasein).
about the above. It's intended to clarify but leaves me none the wiser as to the insight it is supposed to provide.
