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Peak Oil (was "petroleum geologist explains US war policy")

5-majors-total-oil-output-by-MATTHIEU-AUZANNEAU-blog-LE-MONDE-en.png


IOC's have peaked.

http://www.theoildrum.com/node/9946
 

The London offices of BP and Shell have been raided by European regulators investigating allegations they have "colluded" to rig oil prices for more than a decade.
The European commission said its officers carried out "unannounced inspections" at several oil companies in London, the Netherlands and Norway to investigate claims they may have "colluded in reporting distorted prices to a price reporting agency (PRA) to manipulate the published prices for a number of oil and biofuel products".
The commission said the alleged price collusion, which may have been going on since 2002, could have had a "huge impact" on the price of petrol at the pumps "potentially harming final consumers".
Lord Oakeshott, former Liberal Democrat Treasury spokesman, said the alleged rigging of oil prices was "as serious as rigging Libor" – which led to banks being fined hundreds of millions of pounds.
He demanded to know why the UK authorities had not taken action earlier and said he would ask questions of the British regulator in Parliament. "Why have we had to wait for Brussels to find out if British oil giants are ripping off British consumers?" he said. "The price of energy ripples right through our economy and really matters to every business and families."
Just four months ago the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) ruled out an investigation into petrol price fixing after finding "very limited evidence" that pump prices rise quickly when the wholesale price goes up but fall more slowly when it drops.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/may/14/bp-shell-oil-price-rigging
 
The IEA is a government sponsored institution that is required to provide policy advice to governments on Peak Oil. Peak oil poses an existential threat to the continuity of government. The IEA hires good guys, and is flashing the red warning light like fury.

<snip>

Worth saying again. In 14 years, investment must replace 60 million barrels of *production* - 75% of current capacity - using a finance system that implodes if energy doesn't grow and is sustaining plateau production levels with synthetic debt. That requires the immediate discovery and mobilisation of the equivalent of 150% of what is taken to be Saudi's current reserves. The combustion of 20% of existing reserves consumes the last of our emission budget - this is the hypothesis that those reserves might be increased by another one third.

That is the argument Free Spirit is unwisely pursuing with his charts of rig rates and seismic vessel activity.

and fast forward to May 2013 for the IEA's latest assessment, which seems to back up my assessment that oil supply hasn't peaked and won't peak for some years yet.

While geopolitical risks abound, market fundamentals suggest a more comfortable global oil supply/demand balance over the next five years. The MTOMR forecasts North American supply to grow by 3.9 million barrels per day (mb/d) from 2012 to 2018, or nearly two-thirds of total forecast non-OPEC supply growth of 6 mb/d. World liquid production capacity is expected to grow by 8.4 mb/d – significantly faster than demand – which is projected to expand by 6.9 mb/d. Global refining capacity will post even steeper growth, surging by 9.5 mb/d, led by China and the Middle East..
IEA MTOMR

Personally I'm hoping that world oil demand won't increase that much as that would be a disaster in climate change terms, but the take home point from this would be that peak oil isn't here yet, so energy is still available to fuel the needed renewables revolution, but also that we can't sit back and just rely on peak oil to deliver us from the worst excesses of climate change.
 
That increase isn't from oil though: it's manufactured from natural gas, fermented vegetable matter or tar.

The most recent number (December 2012) was 89.3 million barrels a day, 4 mb/d higher than where it had been in May 2005, and 12 mb/d below the levels that Yergin had expected we'd be capable of by 2010.
But more than half of that 4 mb/d increase has come in the form of natural gas liquids-- which can't be used to make gasoline for your car-- and biofuels-- which require a significant energy input themselves to produce. If you look at just field production and lease condensate, the increase since May 2005 has only been 1.7 mb/d.
link

This stuff has a much lower EROI.
 
That increase isn't from oil though: it's manufactured from natural gas, fermented vegetable matter or tar.
sure of that?

IEA oil predictions 20013-18.JPG





1/3 of the increase predicted is crude, nearly as much is light, tight oil, so a lot more than half isn't any of that.


This stuff has a much lower EROI.
not so much of an issue with the majority of that increase, the efficiency of the fracking process for the light tight oil production has apparently increased a lot since the original EROI calcs were done on it.

Obviously the EROI figures are significantly lower on most of this increase, but probably not so much that it won't result in significant overall increases in energy available, which effectively was what you and falcon have been disputing for years.

Even if we just look at crude production though, production has been called as having peaked in 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011... and yet it keeps defying the predictions and rising again.

world_oil_apr_13.gif
 

I recommend you have look at the excellent Al Jazeera three parter documentary on the "7 Sisters" oil cartel. The concluding part shows clearly that the almost total domination of the world oil market by the Seven sisters during the 20th century is now completely OVER - due to the emergeance of the state owned oil companies of China, Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and a couple of others, which has dramatically squeezed the old cartel companies out of most of the big oilfields with growth potential. That's why the old guard 7 Sister companies' oil production has dramatically fallen - NOT because of a final "Peak Oil" crisis. In other words the conclusion you draw from your misleading diagram is junk. As with most of the supposed "proofs" of the Neo Malthusian " the final , unsolveable, energy crisis is upon us NOW " theory.
 
Even if we just look at crude production though, production has been called as having peaked in 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011... and yet it keeps defying the predictions and rising again.

I dont really think its fair to use that simplified narrative, even if there are a couple of regular posters to this thread who like to describe things along those sorts of lines.

A more nuanced narrative that speaks of the end of cheap oil, and quite a period of stagnant conventional oil production is still reasonable and important. And whats happened in those years you mention and the ones in between is quite compatible with the concept of a plateau.

It is quite true that stories which brought an intense sense of immediacy to peak oil have increasingly gone out of whack with present reality. Conventional oil production has not declined at significant pace, stagnant years have been 'dealt with' on the demand side via economic woe, and oil sands etc cannot be ignored. We are now firmly in the midst of a period where the impressive rise of US & Canadian production via sands etc gets a chance to increase total production notably. And where conventional supply from sources like Iraq also get a chance to show whether they can increase.

Even if some of the forecasts are overly optimistic, we should not be surprised if much of what is forecast for the next few years comes to pass. Assuming it does and that one of the 'oh shit' moments for important conventional oil fields does not happen in this period, then some of the simplified versions of peak oil are indeed in for some stick for a few years at least.

Anyway I will be watching the next few years with interest to see if the anticipated increases happen to the extent forecast, how long they can maintain production, and whether anything interesting happens to any old fields in the meantime. This post would have been quite different if Ghawar had fallen off a cliff, as opposed to having had further extensive work done to prop it up for a while longer. How long the 'while' will be remains an important question that I can no more precisely answer now than I could ten years ago.
 
I dont really think its fair to use that simplified narrative, even if there are a couple of regular posters to this thread who like to describe things along those sorts of lines.
I was responding to one of those posters, one who I specifically remember making out last year that it actually had peaked in 2011, so it's entirely fair to point out how they and those they follow have been consistently wrong in their predictions for nearly a decade now.

A more nuanced narrative that speaks of the end of cheap oil, and quite a period of stagnant conventional oil production is still reasonable and important.
yes, as evidenced in my probably hundreds of posts on the subject over that decade or more.

Sorry if I don't put the full nuance into every single post I make on the subject, but I'm mostly assuming that those I'm mainly interacting with have some prior knowledge of my wider position on the subject given that we've been debating this for a long time now.

And whats happened in those years you mention and the ones in between is quite compatible with the concept of a plateau.
Well if it's a plateau, then it's like walking up Wernside, where what looks like a plateau at the top of the peak turns out to be nothing of the sort and you end up thinking the top's going to be just over the next rise for a good mile or 2 before you actually reach the top.

Besides, I think I should be due at least a little credit for having called this correctly so far, in the face of lots of stamping of feet and waving of oil industry credentials by falcon.

Not that this is all good of course, as it means we actually have to take the active decision to make the switch to renewable energy and energy efficiency if we're to tackle climate change, rather than being forced into it by plummeting oil supplies.
 
I recommend you have look at the excellent Al Jazeera three parter documentary on the "7 Sisters" oil cartel. The concluding part shows clearly that the almost total domination of the world oil market by the Seven sisters during the 20th century is now completely OVER
The graph you have quoted shows their combined anual production lower than ARAMCO.

I think I could fill in the rest for myself
That's why the old guard 7 Sister companies' oil production has dramatically fallen
- NOT because of a final "Peak Oil" crisis. In other words the conclusion you draw from your misleading diagram is junk. As
Fucking moron.

Keep out of the grown ups threads in future. I am pretty aware of the role of the nationalisation of oil has had on those companies. I have often enough talked about the IOCs vs the NOCs. Your post is chock full of errors and fuckwittery.

But very well done on having watched a tv program. Bully for you.
 
Well if it's a plateau, then it's like walking up Wernside, where what looks like a plateau at the top of the peak turns out to be nothing of the sort and you end up thinking the top's going to be just over the next rise for a good mile or 2 before you actually reach the top.

Data so far is well within my idea of a plateau. However it seems quite likely that this will be tested over the coming years, and attention will need to be paid as to whether someone is talking about conventional oil or the whole picture. It is perfectly possible to look at the conventional picture with much interest even if not in the camp of those who try to pretend that all the unconventional oil & oil equivalents are utterly irrelevant.

Besides, I think I should be due at least a little credit for having called this correctly so far, in the face of lots of stamping of feet and waving of oil industry credentials by falcon.

Nothing I said is supposed to affect your credit rating. Not that I would characterise either your stance or mine as being along the lines of having made great predictions and been proven right. More like being willing to look at present data and acknowledge recent realities and upcoming estimates. I will take such estimates seriously although I'm not sure I have quite as much faith in them as you do. Anyway my point is that I certainly dont expect to get any credit for things panning out in a way that roughly matches what I say. Thats because I tweak my stance based on how the story evolves, so it would be surprising if I strayed too far from reality. I will continue to attempt to maintain a deep interest in peak oil without becoming totally imprisoned by dogma.

Not that this is all good of course, as it means we actually have to take the active decision to make the switch to renewable energy and energy efficiency if we're to tackle climate change, rather than being forced into it by plummeting oil supplies.

Well its certainly not the first time people thought we'd be forced into something only to find out that such change will remain voluntary for a few years, a decade or a generation. Given that the relationship between peak oil and climate change is messy, with some counterproductive fault-lines, this is not necessarily a bad thing, as you pointed out in a previous post with reference to having the available energy to build stuff fit for a transition.

I guess we will have to watch the price of oil & other fuel carefully to see what possibilities remain unlocked by events of the last decade. Personally I think what happened when oil supply entered a period of, to say the least 'hampered growth' is a good reason not to focus too exclusively on the positive alternative developments and efficiency. Sure these things are a part of the mix that cannot simply be dismissed, but we have also seen quite vividly the ugly ways things are managed on the demand side when supplies are constrained, and the environmentally damaging fossil fuel endeavours that are unlocked at the same time.

I do not wish these lessons and how fascinating and impactful the last decade of oil production has been, to be overshadowed too much by the fact that the most immediate of the peak oil doom prophecies fell on its arse. Especially as its impossible to know when such a tale may make a comeback. In the meantime I dont know what will happen to climate change agendas and positive energy progress, although I suspect the latter will not fall into anything like as much of a rut as it did after the 1970's oil shocks subsided and price collapsed. But I will have to revise that thought if the giddiest of estimates for things like alternative oil & gas production comes true and crucially is maintained over a fairly lengthy period.
 
Data so far is well within my idea of a plateau.
yeah, the summit of Wernside is fairly similar, false summits, dips, rises, but relatively flat for quite a long time til you get to the top after a last brief rise, then the downhill is fairly sudden and steep. tbh I suspect we're probably going to stay within a few percent of where we are now for the rest of the decade or so, probably peaking a bit higher than now, beyond that point is hard to tell though the risk of hitting the downward slope obviously increases the further out we go from now.

I suspect that even if production could increase, it will be maintained at just above what's required to keep the price around current levels by OPEC - unless the US really are able to increase their production to the sorts of levels that diminish OPEC's ability to control price in that way.

Little doubt that peak oil is coming at some point in the not too distant future mind, or that we're hovering somewhere around the peak at present, and urgently need to make the switch to alternative energy sources and dramatically improve efficiency before we do end up on the downward slope wondering what went wrong.

Also - climate change... personally I predict that the full melting of the arctic icecap will cause the turning point in public and political opinion that really causes a proper concerted effort to be made on carbon reduction. Nuts that it's going to take that to convince people, rather than the science of the subject.
 
and fast forward to May 2013 for the IEA's latest assessment, which seems to back up my assessment that oil supply hasn't peaked and won't peak for some years yet.
You - like the politically- and special-interest compromised IEA - are conflating light sweet crude - the substance which (unsubstitutably) maintains the current arrangement, with the freak show of fluids with which we are now trying to prop the system up - bituminous refinery precursors cut with benzene, liquidised peasant food, etc.

And of course, the distinction between "oil" peaking and "energy" peaking has therefore always eluded you on these boards.

If I replaced the dwindling supply of guinness in your glass with sewage, you wouldn't claim that the supply of guinness hadn't peaked. But that is because you can tell the difference between guinness and sewage. Unfortunately, you can't tell the difference between "oil" and its attempted substitutes, and that is why your assessment of its trajectory is uninteresting.

You can't run an advanced industrial global economy - you know, that thing that you assume exists when you talk about its products, like solar panels and wind turbines - on the energy equivalent of sewage.

Which is why it is shutting down, right in front of the IEA's politically compromised eyes.
 
You - like the politically- and special-interest compromised IEA - are conflating light sweet crude - the substance which (unsubstitutably) maintains the current arrangement, with the freak show of fluids with which we are now trying to prop the system up - bituminous refinery precursors cut with benzene, liquidised peasant food, etc.
er no, no I'm not, and neither are the IEA.

2.8mbd extra crude + 2.3mbd extra US light tight oil is shown right their in the graphs I quoted, yet you repeat the same myth that Jon tried out up thread.

And of course, the distinction between "oil" peaking and "energy" peaking has therefore always eluded you on these boards.
oh right, so it's me that's missed the distinction between peak oil and peak energy is it?

really? You don't remember a fairly long argument we had on this very subject with me pointing out to you that it was peak energy that really mattered, not just oil in isolation?

Or are you referring to the net energy content of oil in isolation from all other energy forms?

If so, then I think we've been there before as well, and it resulted in you admitting that there was no metric available in which to actually measure the net energy available from oil, leaving you to make wild stabs in the dark as to what the actual net energy picture for oil might be.

If I replaced the dwindling supply of guinness in your glass with sewage, you wouldn't claim that the supply of guinness hadn't peaked. But that is because you can tell the difference between guinness and sewage. Unfortunately, you can't tell the difference between "oil" and its attempted substitutes, and that is why your assessment of its trajectory is uninteresting.

You can't run an advanced industrial global economy - you know, that thing that you assume exists when you talk about its products, like solar panels and wind turbines - on the energy equivalent of sewage.
no they're not, the more valid comparison would be between neat vodka and ale.

Both are capable of getting a person severely pissed, it's just that ale lasts longer, tastes better, and is far harder to actually give yourself full on alcohol poisoning with.

Which is why it is shutting down, right in front of the IEA's politically compromised eyes.
rubbish. That's down to extreme political and economic incompetence, and the ridiculous decision to experiment with a continent wide programme of austerity / severe government cut backs at the wrong point in the economic cycle the likes of which have not been see since the 1930s depression period.

Had European governments not adopted such an insane strategy, we'd have been well into a sustained economic recovery by now, with GDP significantly higher than before the 2008 crash. If they'd actually stimulated the economy via massive investments in renewables and energy efficiency, then we'd be even further into recovery, with much lower unemployment, and in much better economy shape to cope with higher energy costs and proportionally more energy imports.

Peak oil is at best a minor actor in all this globally, though in UK terms the impact of reducing north sea output, and increased imports hasn't been properly incorporated into government thinking / planning, and has IMO been pretty significant in our economic woes.
 
2.8mbd extra crude + 2.3mbd extra US light tight oil is shown right their in the graphs I quoted, yet you repeat the same myth that Jon tried out up thread.
Yup. As I said.

"Extra crude" : Synthetic crude. Sour crude. Heavy crude. Deep water crude. Arctic crude. Anything but the sweet stuff that actually runs things.

"Tight oil" : Oil which requires colossal quantities of energy to manufacture the order of magnitude more surface equipment and energise the perpetual refracturing process.

In neither case has any deduction been made for the colossal additional processing energy these categories require.

"Production has gone up - as long as you ignore the additional energy processing energy". Compare with "My income has gone up - as long as you ignore my additional food and heating costs".

The economics of the naive.

I haven't time for you. The garden is blooming, and much more interesting. Please accept my apologies.
 
Yup.

"Extra crude" - syncrude. Synthetic crude.
no just crude, I added the word 'extra' because it's additional to current levels.

love the way you hold up the IEA as being beacons of truth one year, and a compromised organisation the next when their report doesn't match your views.
 
Graph showing the dramatic reductions in cost per Wp for solar PV over the last 30 years.

price-of-solar-power-drop-graph.jpg


Prices are for the panels only, for reference installed costs at commercial scale are currently below £1 per Wp, rising to around £1.30-£1.80 per Wp for domestic size systems in the UK.

When we started installing in 2010 average was £4 per Wp for domestic.

the graph shows that solar panels now are below 1% of their cost per Wp in 1977, but also only about 25% of the cost they were just 5 years ago.

Just as a graphical explanation of why the old assumptions about solar being too expensive actually aren't really true any more.
 
Well I am usually left with the impression that Falcons argument is mostly about trying to convince us that the EROI for many alternatives is actually 1 or less. While really accurate EROI estimates are tricky to pull off, I dont buy that level of pessimism for many of the alternatives. Ethanol etc do seem to suck badly, but wind seems pretty good and solar has been improving.

Obviously this isnt the only factor, we have to look at what other factors may affect the ability of alternatives to scale up, the rates we can produce and install them, and the time period that the energy is returned over. But even so, the detail in all of these areas beats the rhetoric any day of the week.
 
Well I am usually left with the impression that Falcons argument is mostly about trying to convince us that the EROI for many alternatives is actually 1 or less. While really accurate EROI estimates are tricky to pull off, I dont buy that level of pessimism for many of the alternatives. Ethanol etc do seem to suck badly, but wind seems pretty good and solar has been improving.

Obviously this isnt the only factor, we have to look at what other factors may affect the ability of alternatives to scale up, the rates we can produce and install them, and the time period that the energy is returned over. But even so, the detail in all of these areas beats the rhetoric any day of the week.

I'm not sure that's quite his argument. More that the overall system that allows for industry to exist takes up a certain amount of energy, which must be taken into account before you get your real EROI figure. ie. you can't have a global industrial machine that only manufactures solar panels, wind turbines and tractors, the economics don't allow it.

I think.
 
That certainly appears to be one of his arguments, which is why it is necessary to make out that we are already in a phase where there is not a lot of spare capacity to be making these things.

Dont get me wrong, I agree with this logic to a point, but thats also why I get upset when it is stretched out of proportion, in terms of timescale if not eventual impact. Personally I suspect we have very little chance of putting in alternatives that really scale up to the extent that they completely replace what we have enjoyed for many decades. My default assumption has to be that we if we make it through without utter human stupidity and destruction, we will be left in a world where consumption of energy still does not resemble todays picture, though I dont know exactly what the fraction will be. I sometimes use the carbon reduction 'goals' for 2030 and 2050 to attempt to get a vague sense of where they think we might end up, and that picture certainly does not resemble business as usual by any stretch.

Put it this way, I dont even think Falcon liked me calling this stuff a long emergency, so its hard to stay on the same page as him when its already pretty clear this story is unfolding slowly, not over a few years. And if there are a dramatic few years to come where the oil supply picture starts to change radically in a short space of time, we cannot accurately predict when these years are actually going to happen. For example we know that Ghawar is getting old, and they are running out of props for it, but we still dont know when exactly it will peak or quite how dramatically the decline slope will be angled.

In the meantime, some alternative capacity is being put in place. Quite how much we get in place and whether it is sustainable under new conditions is where the action is if you ask me, and thats why I dont find Falcons attempts to describe it all as sewage or tepid bath-water to be helpful. If it actually shook up those who suffer from utter denial and complacency then I suppose it would have some value, but it doesnt seem to manage to do that either.
 
He argues more than that, I think. He argues that high-tech products such as solar panels and wind turbines can only be produced by a global manufacturing system, and that said global manufacturing system is unsustainable. Of course, you can't just make stuff for renewable energy with the gms, but if you were to, the eroi figures would be vastly inferior as the current figures rely on the fact that they are made within a system that also makes other things - as a simple eg, the cost of transport is very low because they are carried on huge container ships that also carry all kinds of other things.

I think his logic is very often flawed, and it is here to an extent. He argues that producing solar panels and other hardware for renewables is not worth it - that even in the current system, it is not effective use of resources. But the eroi is what it is given the other things that are being done - and no matter how destructive those other things may be, you are still doing something that will contribute towards future sustainability. That this doesn't in and of itself solve the problem on its own doesn't make it not the right thing to do.
 
Indeed. Faced with a giant, unsustainable system that presently cannot be stopped, may as well use some of its capacity to make stuff that returns energy over time.

One of the key things I really want to find out is how much of that system can be propped up, and for how long, under circumstances where the economics that drive it have gone very wonky and it breaks down. I am certainly not in denial about how elaborate and fragile the system is, but this tells us little about how much useful aspects of it could be preserved under circumstances very different to the market driven realities of today. I see several sane reasons why at various times they have shouted about how tackling climate change requires a 'war-like' effort. But until we end up in a situation where there is no alternative but to try to centrally direct efforts in order to turn remaining capacity towards a much smaller set of manufacturing priorities, we wont really get to find out how it works out. It wont be easy and some of the side-effects of such an effort could result in utter failure. But I suspect it will be hard to do this stuff justice via conversation at the moment, especially given the way the world has gone for so many decades, with a variety of fundamentals somewhat abstracted out of common consciousness in many countries.
 
Just to expand a little on the flawed logic, falcon has already decided that the gms is unsustainable. This means that he starts from a position in which high-tech goods cannot be part of the solution. But the unsustainability of complex manufacturing processes isn't simply a given - it must be demonstrated, and alternative ways of organising complex processes to the current way must be considered.

This is in addition to his often mistaken use of statistics to prove an already-decided-upon conclusion.
 
I am certainly not in denial about how elaborate and fragile the system is, but this tells us little about how much useful aspects of it could be preserved under circumstances very different to the market driven realities of today.
Exactly. Exactly this. Most people here are at pains not to deny the scale of the problem - certainly, neither you nor I do - but I think it shows a lack of imagination not to even consider other ways of organising high-tech industry.
 
fwiw, I completely disagree with the notion that complex structures are inherently unsustainable and prone to collapse vs simple systems being inherently sustainable and not prone to collapse.

That's the complete opposite of reality - for example, it's totally at odds with the theory on which the internet works, and by which the internet has been made so incredibly robust.

Or in energy terms, it's the equivalent of putting all your eggs into one basket vs ensuring security of supply via diversity of supply. Or the reason we stand a chance of coping with the loss of current levels of oil supply is down to the complexity of the system and the inherent redundancy that creates, and the range of alternative options available to ramp up to cope with the loss of oil.

On a simplistic level, if you have a village that's entirely dependent upon local wood for cooking and staying warm, if there's a disease or forest fire that wipes out most of the local wood supply then the whole village would basically be fucked. Compare that to a village that's interconnected to the global trading system, with electricity, coal, oil, LPG, Kerosene, solar cookers etc etc all as options as well as the local wood, and the chances of them ending up entirely without fuel for heating and cooking is far far lower.
 
Conversely though, as I'm sure you're aware, if you have a village that's entirely dependent on the global economy, it can (and very often does) get fucked just as thoroughly by events beyond its control.

The diversity point, which is an excellent one, cuts both ways.

In the world economy, only a very limited range of activities is commercially feasible in most communities because of the intensity of competition from outside. We must therefore build independent, parallel economies if we are to fill more of our needs for ourselves.

The last chapter attempted to make two important points.

One was that a large part of the world's population has lost the means and the ability to provide for itself and has become dependent on a single, highly unstable economic system which has no use for a growing proportion of it.

The second was that for the next few years unless there is a trade war, politicians are unlikely to be willing or able to protect their citizens from being damaged by the world economic system even though it is actually running backwards and making life worse almost everywhere.

http://www.feasta.org/documents/shortcircuit/contents.html
 
Assumptions about inherent redundancy can be a problem. Claims of such redundancy need careful checking, since there can be all sorts of connections between systems that may on the face of it be independent. Many an IT system has fallen over despite claiming to have redundant layers, due to unnoticed failure point convergence, and cascading problem potential that was not spotted.

In any case I did not make any claim about how inherently stable simple systems are. I welcome diversity and am not afraid of complexity, but I certainly do question the amount of genuine redundancy built into the current system. But there isnt much point in me exploring it further since what actually happens will depend on the detail of the problem and the human & international reactions at the time, and the prospects for patching up parts of the system that no longer function when circumstances change. I've long been fascinated by the way the ultra-doomers imagine scenarios where we suddenly have a complete void, whether it be a political power void or a void in our ability to harness resources, almost overnight, whereas the reality is bound to be far messier than that. Certain things could collapse quite quickly, but many of the collapses will leave plenty of time for people and forces to react, although that too works both ways and the reaction may cause more harm than good at times.
 
I think one frequent habit of what you call the 'ultra doomers' is a bit of a tendency to assume that both the risks and possible mitigations affect everybody in roughly the same way, whereas in practice shortages are always mediated by the global economy, social class systems and so on, and hence hit some people much harder and faster than others.
 
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