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Is Brexit actually going to happen?

Will we have a brexit?


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I see Belgium has gone to shit tonight. Faith in politcal class falling apart.

Macron's gonna love a no deal right now. Even more so Merkel's successor AKK. Great start for her bolloxing their 3rd largest export market. And over what exactly , an Irish what now .. CDU can't afford to give the Greens an open goal.

Even more instability ..
 
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Indeed, peas in a pod:

invasion-of-the-body-snatchers-1978.jpg
 
Final ECJ ruling: UK can revoke A50, with no change to previous EU member status, following "democratic process in accordance with national constitutional requirements."
 
Final ECJ ruling: UK can revoke A50, with no change to previous EU member status, following "democratic process in accordance with national constitutional requirements."

So A50 can be unilaterally revoked at any time until the withdrawal date (or any agreed A50 extension date) but only where no withdrawal agreement has been agreed. So the Brexiteers can remove the possibility of remaining by voting for May's withdrawal agreement?
 
So A50 can be unilaterally revoked at any time until the withdrawal date (or any agreed A50 extension date) but only where no withdrawal agreement has been agreed. So the Brexiteers can remove the possibility of remaining by voting for May's withdrawal agreement?

Yes
 
So A50 can be unilaterally revoked at any time until the withdrawal date (or any agreed A50 extension date) but only where no withdrawal agreement has been agreed. So the Brexiteers can remove the possibility of remaining by voting for May's withdrawal agreement?
Looks that way. Full text of the judgement follows. Para 5 seems to say exactly that. "Deal or (possible) No Brexit".

Court of Justice of the European Union
PRESS RELEASE No 191/18
Luxembourg, 10 December 2018
Judgment in Case C-621/18
Wightman and Others v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union

The United Kingdom is free to revoke unilaterally the notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU
Such a revocation, decided in accordance with its own national constitutional requirements, would have the effect that the United Kingdom remains in the EU under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member State

On 23 June 2016, a referendum of the United Kingdom electorate produced a majority in favour of that Member State’s leaving the European Union. On 29 March 2017, the British Prime Minister notified the European Council of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the European Union under Article 50 TEU. This article provides that following such a notification, the Member State concerned negotiates and concludes a withdrawal agreement with the EU. The EU Treaties then cease to apply to that Member State from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification of the intention to withdraw and any possible extension.

On 19 December 2017, a petition for judicial review was lodged in the Court of Session, Inner House, First Division (Scotland, United Kingdom) by members of the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the European Parliament to determine whether the notification referred to in Article 50 can be revoked unilaterally before the expiry of the two year period, with the effect that such revocation would result in the United Kingdom remaining in the EU. On 3 October 2018, the Court of Session referred this question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, pointing out that the response would allow members of the House of Commons to know, when exercising their vote on a withdrawal agreement, whether there are not two options, but three, namely withdrawal from the European Union without an agreement, withdrawal from the European Union with an agreement, or revocation of the notification of the intention to withdraw and the United Kingdom’s remaining in the European Union.

Because of the urgency of its request with respect, notably, to the fact that the withdrawal agreement can only be ratified if that agreement, and the framework on the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union are approved by the UK Parliament, the Court of Session asked the Court of Justice to apply the expedited procedure, which was granted by the President of that court.[sup]1[/sup] The expedited procedure enables the Court to give its rulings quickly in exceptionally urgent cases by reducing procedural time-limits and giving such cases absolute priority.
In today’s judgment, the Full Court has ruled that, when a Member State has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, as the UK has done, that Member State is free to revoke unilaterally that notification.

That possibility exists for as long as a withdrawal agreement concluded between the EU and that Member State has not entered into force or, if no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period from the date of the notification of the intention to withdraw from the EU, and any possible extension, has not expired.

The revocation must be decided following a democratic process in accordance with national constitutional requirements. This unequivocal and unconditional decision must be communicated in writing to the European Council.

Such a revocation confirms the EU membership of the Member State concerned under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member State and brings the withdrawal procedure to an end.

In its reasoning, the Court begins by observing that, according to the Court of Session, the case before that latter court raises a genuine issue giving rise to a dispute which it is required to resolve and that the judgment of the Court of Session will have the effect of clarifying the options open to MPs who must decide on the ratification of the agreement negotiated between the UK and the EU. Replying to the arguments as to the admissibility of the case brought by the UK government and the Commission, the Court finds that the question referred by the Court of Session, regarding the interpretation of Article 50 TEU, is relevant and not hypothetical, given that it is precisely the point at issue in the case pending before the Court of Session.
As to the substance of the question, the Court rules that Article 50 TEU does not explicitly address the subject of revocation. It neither expressly prohibits nor expressly authorises revocation.

That being so, the Court notes that Article 50 TEU pursues two objectives, namely, first, that of enshrining the sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from the European Union and, secondly, that of establishing a procedure to enable such a withdrawal to take place in an orderly fashion. According to the Court, the sovereign nature of the right of withdrawal supports the conclusion that the Member State concerned has a right to revoke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the EU for as long as a withdrawal agreement has not entered into force or, if no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period, and any possible extension, has not expired.

In the absence of an express provision governing revocation of the notification of the intention to withdraw, that revocation is subject to the rules laid down in Article 50(1) TEU for the withdrawal itself, with the result that it may be decided unilaterally, in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the Member State concerned.

The revocation by a Member State of the notification of its intention to withdraw reflects a sovereign decision to retain its status as a Member State of the European Union, a status which is neither suspended nor altered by that notification.

The Court considers that it would be inconsistent with the EU Treaties’ purpose of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe to force the withdrawal of a Member State which, having notified its intention to withdraw from the EU in accordance with its constitutional rules and following a democratic process, decides to revoke the notification of that intention through a democratic process.

To subject that right to revoke to the unanimous approval of the European Council as the Commission and Council proposed, would transform a unilateral sovereign right into a conditional right and would be incompatible with the principle that a Member State cannot be forced to leave the European Union against its will.

NOTE: A reference for a preliminary ruling allows the courts and tribunals of the Member States, in disputes which have been brought before them, to refer questions to the Court of Justice about the interpretation of European Union law or the validity of a European Union act. The Court of Justice does not decide the dispute itself. It is for the national court or tribunal to dispose of the case in accordance with the Court’s decision, which is similarly binding on other national courts or tribunals before which a similar issue is raised.
Unofficial document for media use, not binding on the Court of Justice.


1 Order of the President of the Court of Justice of 19 October 2018 Wightman and Others (C-621/18)
 
The judgement doesn't really change much as far as I can see: no chance of parliament voting to withdraw notification as things stand...

There's a good piece in the times this morning about Labour's gradually changing position, which I think is probably the thing to watch.

The words Corbyn cannot bear to speak: he’s inching away from Brexit

Pasted here if you're over your free articles limit:

Have you heard the old joke about how to tell when a politician is lying? Answer: their lips move. With Jeremy Corbyn, that rule doesn’t apply. The Labour leader struggles to say things that he does not sincerely believe, even when he has been persuaded of the need to say them.

As far as Corbyn is concerned, the gag needs to be modified slightly. How can you tell when the leader of the opposition is lying to you? Answer: his words are in print. Corbyn’s favoured medium when he has to say something that makes him uncomfortable is the written word.

Perhaps “lying” is a bit strong, but Labour has two leaders: the Corbyn who says the things that he knows he has to, who exists solely in the pages of The Guardian, and the Corbyn who struggles to say them out loud.

The problem is particularly acute on the matter of Europe. In the flesh, Corbyn is at his most impressive and fluent when he is singing from a Eurosceptic hymn sheet. It’s not a coincidence that his most emphatic victories against Theresa May in the House of Commons are the ones in which he criticises the ways that the deal she has negotiated with the European Union falls short of the Brexiteer dream.

When Corbyn is criticising it from a “remain” perspective, he sounds hesitant and less assured. He doesn’t particularly care for a halfway-house Brexit, let alone no Brexit at all. But while Corbyn is a Eurosceptic of long years standing, he is not, as one ally put it recently, “swivel-eyed” about it and knows that his electoral coalition in the country, and the party, is made up chiefly of remainers.

So, while the leader of the opposition largely avoids sounding a pro-remain note when he speaks, telling Sky News’ Sophy Ridge on Sunday programme recently that he did not know how he would vote in another referendum, Corbyn is persuaded of the position that he sketched out in The Guardian on Friday: try to trigger a general election to negotiate Labour’s “better plan”, and, failing that, support another referendum vote.

It’s not just Corbyn for whom the issue is painful. The European question causes Labour in general great discomfort, with the parliamentary party split in several directions and its voters divided, albeit less so. The shadow cabinet tends to deal with the problem in the way many families deal with an awkward topic: by avoiding talking about it.

When the shadow cabinet meets on a Tuesday and Brexit is on the agenda, what usually happens is that Keir Starmer, the shadow Brexit secretary, gives a lengthy presentation and there are a handful of questions, but no real discussion, about what the party should do. Often, creative agenda management limits the time available. At the first shadow cabinet meeting after Dominic Raab’s resignation as Brexit secretary, the first item for discussion was the UN’s damning report on poverty in Britain. What followed was a prolonged session of what one of those present dismissively described as “am dram”, as frontbencher after frontbencher talked about how shocking the findings were. “But of course we all know that — we see it in our constituencies every week.”

The cuts are an easier topic for Labour because its position is settled and uncontroversial. What the party would do about Brexit is uncertain and fiercely contentious. But Labour knows its position will be in the spotlight when May’s withdrawal agreement is defeated. There is no resolution to the Brexit crisis that can pass the Commons without the co-operation of the Labour Party.

The party’s official position draws heavily from “shared market” proposals put forward by the Institute for Public Policy Research think tank. Under the leadership of Tom Kibasi, who became its director in 2016, the IPPR has transformed itself from the intellectual beating heart of New Labour to a laboratory of Corbynism.

Labour’s plans bear the fingerprints of the think tank’s shared market scheme, proposing a heavier degree of alignment with the EU’s rules than is envisaged by May and a greater say in those rules than is enjoyed by Norway, the largest non-EU economy in the European Economic Area.

Privately, most in Brussels know that an accord between the UK and EU will need more shared decision-making than between the EU and Norway because Britain’s financial services are so large. An arrangement in which the UK had no say over financial regulation would come unstuck during the first financial crisis, with potentially disastrous consequences all round.

For Corbyn, it isn’t concern for the future of British banks but his scepticism about the European Court of Justice that makes shared institutions instinctively unattractive. Anyway, the EU dislikes creating new institutions for solely bilateral purposes, which makes the full scope of what the IPPR proposes highly unlikely to fly, although something like it would be needed for financial services.

So what’s left? That’s where the two Corbyns come into play. The remaining outcomes are another vote, which might put paid to Brexit, a result that many of Corbyn’s closest allies think the Labour leader would find hard to countenance, and a Norway-type status in which the UK continues to follow most of the rules of the European club without setting them, including free movement and being subject to the ECJ.

Neither is desirable to Corbyn personally. But on the printed page he is no longer explicitly committed either to ending free movement or to escaping the long arm of European law. However much that might stick in his throat, Labour is slowly but surely easing its way to supporting a close Brexit with the EU — or no Brexit at all.
 
IS BREXIT ACTUALLY GOING TO HAPPEN

No. Everyone both won & lost.

I know nobody falls for that EU globalist Jewish cabal conspiracy bollocks here.

All I know is... I cunted off Dr Jazzz for good reason.

This is what you get for letting cunts have free speech.

Me included.

Edit: that’s my bit for 2018, I hope everyone I know is doing good, or at least making plans to do good. I love you all. Even the cunts.
 
I don't think anything in that article changes the electoral mathematics that's driving Labour policy on Europe.

True, but at some point Labour will need an actual policy if there is a second ref or a GE. The current deal proves you can't keep everyone happy by trying a middle ground fudge.
 
They have a policy though - a renegotiated soft brexit under a Labour government. It might not be the policy you want, but it is a policy.

There is no evidence I can see that the EU is willing to renegotiate, and lots of evidence that says they won't.
 
Cabinet supposedly 'on call' for a meeting/video-conference (grauniad). I've given up trying to understand where things are up to in this madness, but that bit at least suggests a discussion about postponing tomorrow's deal and/or squeezing the tiniest concessions out of Brussels?
 
No, there's a clause about good faith I believe.

It looks like the clause about good faith was in the AG opinion but isn't in the CJEU ruling. It does however require the UK's notice of revocation to be "unequivocal and unconditional" and "in accordance with its constitutional requirements"
 
So in theory could they cancel a50 then immediatly invoke a50 again, thus restarting the 2 year clock?:hmm:
Yes but not exactly, according to the BBC reporter commenting on the ruling. Such cancellation must be triggered by either a Commons vote, referendum or general election. In other words, it cannot be executed on the orders of the Prime Minister. This apparently has been introduced into the ruling to ensure the UK, and any other nation that might trigger Article 50 in the future, don't use the right of cancellation as a negotiating or stalling tool.
 
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