And next, Syria?

[coley]

Looks like the SDF is falling apart.

ARAB FIGHTERS DEFECT FROM US-BACKED SDF

Who is this 'south front' that you linked the article from?

 

[coley]

I'm sorry, but this is so cartoonish I can't believe you expect a serious answer.

Roughly translates as 'you' have no problems with the use of barrel bombs.

 

[coley]

Pictures and stories. Truth died in this thing long ago. Perhaps one day the historians will be able to give as a clue about what that truth is. I don't hold out much hope we'll ever know. Cities have been destroyed, many many dead, that's all we know.

All due to a megalomanic dictator determined to cling onto power.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
n June, I warned on this page that the Southern Front has been facing four-way pressure that could lead to its demise. The US-led military operations command seems to have focused on the growing threat of ISIL in southern Syria and has pressed the rebels to root out the group in their midst. A third source of pressure was the coordinated campaign against the Southern Front’s supposed inaction, while the last point of pressure came from local families who support truces and de-escalation.

The coordinated campaign against the Southern Front is also framed in dangerous terms. In mid-July, 54 clerics, including Al Qaeda-affiliated figures but also mainstream Syrian clerics, issued a fatwa prohibiting membership of a rebel faction whose commander refuse to initiate a battle against the regime.

The fatwa specified the Southern Front, albeit such dynamics also exist in the north; activists near Damascus, in response, have asked rebels in the north to focus on regime strongholds within their firing range, such as Foua and Kefraya near Idlib.

Propaganda against the coalition is boosted by the legitimacy of concerns of prioritising the fight against ISIL against the regime, and the risks of the breakdown of the Southern Front are real.

Extremist forces have tried to establish a foothold for themselves in the area, but they often faced tribal, factional and social resistance. Steps have to be taken to prevent extremist forces in their current campaign to buy loyalty where they failed to sell their extremist views.

Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror.

Two very different poles of the revolt(s):

• In the North backed out of Turkey it remains mostly focused on toppling the regime and radical Salafi are commoner. Up here the Turks backed by Qatari and lately Saudi money aren't so picky about the beards they work with. Well they took Idlib
• The MOC in Jordan on the other hand has been fearful of backing Islamists and has sought since Russia intervened to deconflict with the regime. The Southern Front coalition of rebel groups they back has been directed to keeping radical Salafi aligned with IS away from Jordan's border

The latter is more like the priorities we'd like the rebels to have but unsurprisingly isn't really going so well in terms of being a Syrian rebellion. It's more like it has become rented Jordanian strategic depth. A policy more aimed at mitigating the blowback from Jordan reluctantly backing the revolt in the first place. By some counts thousands of Jordanians went to fight in Syria many for AQ and IS.

 

[teqniq]

US and Russia fail to reach Syria ceasefire deal

 

[butchersapron]

Who is this 'south front' that you linked the article from?

The are a politically moderate coalition. Their fighters are just about to have had enough and go elsewhere. They're funded via MOC - so through jordan.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Turks syphoning Aleppo area rebels off to make war on the PKK. Bit of a mirror image thing going on here with Jordanian policy. Proxies redirected to serve their nation state backer's interests. Not that it'd be hard to find Syrian rebels just as opposed to the PKK's goals in Syria as Turkey.

 

[camouflage]

just to go through the motions...

Further to the above...

Western Corporate Media ‘Disappears’ over 1.5 Million Syrians and 4,000 Doctors | Black Agenda Report

 

[CrabbedOne]

On war On The Rocks DECISIVE MILITARY DEFECTIONS IN SYRIA: A CASE OF WISHFUL THINKING

...
The Regime and the Alawite Community: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Early on in the uprising, Alawite communities (especially in the coastal region, where the regime enjoys unwavering support) criticized what they considered a “lenient” response by Assad against protestors. Many demanded an escalation of repression to put an end to what the regime had convinced them was a foreign conspiracy, instead of advocating for reconciliatory measures to reach a political compromise. A slogan quickly gained popularity amongst these communities, who are infatuated with the mystical cult of the president’s brother Maher: “Bashar to the clinic and Maher to the leadership.” This was a stark reminder that the regime’s brutality was not just condoned by its support base but even seen as insufficient to subdue the uprising, which was largely peaceful in the first year.
...

The laager mentality of a minority brought up with a fear of pogroms not uncommon across this region. Similar to what motivates retaliatory incursions of another Levantine minority into Gaza but the IDF's regular bloody mowing of the lawn are at least brief.

In Syria regime atrocities mount year by year and that reinforces the minorities fears of retaliatory genocide. A not infrequent threat from the opposition which has killed an awful lot of their young men. This creates a kind of post-butchery glue that kept the staggering Wehrmacht fighting on the Eastern Front in WWII long after hope was gone. You could also consider IS's junk yard doggedness in retreat.

I've heard the above sentiment in the snip again and again. Bashar in that first year was seen as just too soft by his base. He was just not a patch on his brutal father. They may have been right; another abrupt Hama massacre that crushed the revolt in the 80s would perhaps have been the smart move. Half a decade of carnage and population displacement on it would have perhaps been more merciful than steady reactive escalation.

"Never do any enemy a small injury for they are like a snake which is half beaten and it will strike back the first chance it gets." - Niccolò Machiavelli

Then in 2012 comes the call to Jihad and rather violent protest morph in outright civil war with multiple foreign backers facilitating a rapid escalation. A move some rebels now regret as the attrition just goes on with no end in sight and the reformist intent of the Arab Spring got largely lost along the way. Neither side able to deliver the killer blow after half a decade. Both rather bent out of shape and full of rival warlords.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Syria Comment The Druze in the Syrian Conflict – By Talal El Atrache

...
But with the internationalization, the militarization and the islamization of the crisis, many opponents viewed the conflict as a struggle for power and turned against the jihadists. Fewer Druze dissidents voiced their support for the Islamist militias. Most of those who did were either expatriates, Facebook activists, or employees on the Gulf sheikhdoms’ payroll. They claimed that rebel attacks against the Druze were either individual mistakes or a plot from the government to scare minorities and to provoke tensions between the Druze and the freedom-loving rebels. For them, the chaos and sectarian cleansings that took place in so-called Free Iraq, Free Libya, Free Afghanistan, in Lebanon during the civil war and in the “liberated” areas in Syria, should not worry the Syrian population in case of a regime change. Even though some of them argue that Deraa and Qunaitra are safe for the Druze, they strictly remain in government-held areas in Syria, and do not dare crossing over to the “liberated areas” – a behavior which casts doubt over their claims.
However, the general mood among the Druze is that the government does not need to discredit the opposition or to scare the minorities because the opposition is already doing a good job in this regard.
...

Highly partisan anti-opposition piece but it can't really be denied the Druze have been treated badly by the rising and have therefore tended to side with a regime they've not much love for. It's sometimes a tense relationship; there have been riots in Druze areas protesting about SAA conscription for instance.

Like some Christians and Alawites, some Druze did support the Arab Spring protests but did not like the Sunni revanche direction it began to take. In taking Idlib city I recall some Druze clans back Jaish al Fateh but the article mentions later AQ staged forced mass conversions and at least one well reported sectarian massacre of Druze.

I recall Balanche writing in general minority groups have mostly fled non-regime held areas. There are two exceptions: conservative Kurds under IS who that group saw as correctable Sunni Muslims despite their fierce war with the PKK and some pockets of Druze who were benefiting from an old KSA relationship with Walid Jumblatt, a veteran Lebanese player.

Gives a useful potted history of the sect being duffed up in the Levant. The Druze were key movers in the 20s revolt against the French Mandate. That rather explains their attachment to the multi-confessional Syria that created. The author is not at all keen on Druze state as an alternative. That is something the Israelis have occasionally floated.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On MEI Turkey Tests Iran Ties with Syria Intervention

...
Despite the common interests in thwarting Kurdish autonomy, persisting differences over the Syrian conflict is cause for suspicion on Turkey’s intervention on the part of the Iranians. On August 30, Iran toughened its language, and called for Turkey to “end its Syria intervention immediately.” Iran’s new stance directly followed a harsh statement from its ally in Damascus: “The government of the Syrian Arab Republic condemns, with the strongest terms, the repeated crimes, violations, aggression and massacres perpetrated by the regime in Ankara against the Syrian people, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,” read a letter sent by Syria’s foreign ministry to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the U.N. Security Council.

There are serious fears in both Damascus and Tehran that the Turkish intervention will not end anytime soon, and could empower Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces directly fighting Syrian government and Iranian forces on the ground. According to an Iranian official, “[there are] obviously no agreements reached between Iran and Turkey over Syria,” despite the recent goodwill shown by both sides. The fear on the Iranian-Syrian front is boosted by the fact that the Turkish intervention is in northern Aleppo, in short distance to where the Syrian government, Iran, Hezbollah and Russia have re-imposed a siege on the rebel-held parts of eastern Aleppo.
...

Of course it was the threat of aggressive Russian airpower attacking an incursion by the TSK in Syria that caused it to be delayed for so long once the PKK crossed the Euphrates. IRGC ground assets were not in proximity to cause trouble. The Persians and Turks have long had a understanding on Kurdish autonomy. On the Assad clan the Russians maintain useful ambiguity. The Islamic Republic will stick by their oldest ally. They're wise to be wary of Erdogan with a wider set of post-mutiny options in Syria.

Teheran also can't really trust Moscow as they are far apart over Israel. Iran's main strategic interest in Southern Syria is the supply to its Lebanese ally HA and the deterrence that offers. All those new IRGC backed militias developed in Syria just augment that. Whereas Russia courts Israel a potentially powerful obstacle to its pivot back into the ME best held close. As the US attempts to pivot out of the ME towards East Asia it's not inconceivable Russia might develop a deeper relationship with Israel.

For the moment the actual effect of the TSK incursion is to drain the already depleted Aleppo counter siege of rebel reserves. The Turks are very likely to be stuck East of Aleppo they've only got an inadequate holding force of a couple of thousand rebels that IS could easily bite back at if they lose their stiffening regular military backing. They'll likely have to reinforce that.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War On The Rocks THIS IS HOW TURKEY’S INCURSION INTO SYRIA COULD GET BOGGED DOWN

...
The risk of Turkey getting more deeply involved and perhaps bogged down in Syria has implications for the United States, a treaty ally, the ultimate guarantor of Turkish security, and the leader of the anti-Islamic State coalition. In the shorter term, the main threat to Turkish forces is the mass proliferation of ATGMs and IEDs in the Syrian conflict. In the longer term, Turkey runs the risk of taking territory, but not being able to leave because the forces fighting alongside it cannot be trusted to hold territory. In this scenario, the Turkish military may have to remain in Syria until ISIL is defeated or a political solution is reached and the fighting stops. A push as far south as Al Bab would lengthen supply lines, increasing the risks to Turkish convoys sent to resupply advancing armor and infantry. A key element in Turkey’s decision and the potential for its success on the ground will be how it deals with the IED and ATGM threat to Turkish armor and the “day after” goals of the Turkish intervention force. This, in turn, will have policy implications for the United States as it continues the air war against ISIL and managing its relationship with Turkey. The ousting of ISIL from the border is a good thing for the war, but a bogged down Turkish ally is not.
...

Worth reading in full, Stein's stuff usually is.

Forty tanks is a pretty fat logistical tail if they start pushing any distance into Syria. IS might make a mess of that armoured brigade of M60s and its supply trucks. More than one of the bigger tougher successor MBT to the M60 M1-Abrams got flipped by Iraqi IEDs. Armour can prove vulnerable in an urban fight.

Al Bab is a slightly bigger town than Manbij. It's got a depleted population of 20-60K according to the above. They probably should be planning for a 1:20 population counterinsurgent ratio. The Turks have got just a few thousand rebels to hold this band of pretty empty territory. That's falling far short of the ideal even before you start adding fair sized urban areas. Worse these guys don't really have a unitary command and have a history of losing ground to IS. The PKK may be overstretched but when it has US CAS IS has difficulty counter attacking successfully. This also might raise the hackles of the regime and its allies; it's getting a bit near to Aleppo.

The other closer more modest objective is Dabiq. The symbolic site of IS's prophesied Armageddon style battle with the mighty forces of Rom in which the IS forces will nearly be destroyed. "Rom" is the Eastern Roman Empire from the time of The Prophet; a superpower of the day. Both Turkey and Russia could claim some descent from Byzantium.

 

[CrabbedOne]

It's usually the regime side that does most of the killing of civilians in Syria. Rebels nearly killing as many civilians as the regime in Aleppo (178 V 218 in August) which is pretty impressive as they are relying on improvised weaponry to some extent. Jaish al Islam have a big industrial arm and produce some surprisingly capable kit.

Though I have seen pictures of trucks carrying Katyusha style multiple rocket launchers coming in from Turkey to the Aleppo fight. You know the type Qaddafi used to rocket risen civilian areas much to our outrage. Not actually a weapon that's very precise either.

That the rebels are killing more children I'd put down to kids not having been evacuated from West Aleppo as its been relatively peaceful.

Just for comparison indiscriminate HA rocketry killed about 150 Israeli civilians in their last month long tussle with the IDF back in 05. Mostly well hidden single tube Katyushas that even the IAF could not silence.

 

[Casually Red]

To all intents and purposes the Allepo siege is back on. In fact was never really lifted despite initial rebel gains , because whatever they overran was still within easy hitting distance of syrian weaponry in a narrow corridor also under constant aerial bombardment . Basically a killing zone the Syrians and Russians seemed happy to let the rebels flood into en masse and sit there right in the open for a bonanza of concentrated targets . Despite whatever limited gains they made they weren't going anywhere . The strength of Syrian opposition on the ground was way too strong . The jihadis just created their own cauldron for the Syrians and Russians to cook them in . I'm not suggesting for a minute it was a clever trap or anything like that but it soon became apparent it had turned into one and that has been exploited to the full by the Syrian forces .

The jihadists splurged thousands of their best troops and armour for the sum of fuck all squared . What's left is now trapped in a narrow kill zone nothing can move through and being ground down piecemeal by aerial assault, artillery and constant unrelenting ground assault . Cut off , kettled and surrounded . that's a pretty huge blow . The kitchen sink was lobbed in and despite initial Syrian wobbles and loss of territory...some in an embarassingly scandalous fashion..the strategy of in depth defensive lines ultimately held firm we're it really counted , containing the spearhead of the offence, as the bombardments of their exposed supply lines choked off any ability to go further. Or even back .

The massive elite jihadi force they sent in is now...what's left of it..trapped, going nowhere and a bunch of dead men walking pretty much . The best they can hope to do is somehow break out ..some of them . But that would be under a gauntlet of concentrated aerial and artillery assault by forces very much hoping they'll be stupid enough to concentrate their strength in one spot again for another turkey shoot . And pretty unlikely looking . The only result of their massive offensive is likely to be the loss of even more territory , along with massive casualties and loss of resources. In particular resources such as armoured vehicles and tanks which they definitely can't replace either easily or quickly . if at all .

The fight in Allepo is far from over but the result now looks to be a foregone conclusion . Only a matter of time .

 

[Casually Red]

On war On The Rocks DECISIVE MILITARY DEFECTIONS IN SYRIA: A CASE OF WISHFUL THINKING
The laager mentality of a minority brought up with a fear of pogroms not uncommon across this region. Similar to what motivates retaliatory incursions of another Levantine minority into Gaza but the IDF's regular bloody mowing of the lawn are at least brief.

Except in this case the Syrian army itself is largely Sunni Arab in make up . And definitely not a minority . Neither are the vast majority of Syrias population, who live in government controlled areas . And a host of globalised jihadis from the 4 corners of the earth, supported to the tune of billions by a superpower, western states, Turkey and gulf states DO pose an actual existential threat to Syria itself, and indeed Lebanon . And can in no way imaginable be compared to a tiny little overcrowded , beseiged, blockaded and dreadfully impoverished gaza strip versus one of the most advanced and resourced militaries on the planet .

The fears of Syrias minorities also turned out to be completely justified . Their destruction was on the cards, no doubt about that. Despite that Assad and his government refused to go all out in suppression mode and introduced numerous reforms . None of which of course were acceptable either to the jihadis or their foreign backers who were and are engaged in geo political chess games . And who then escalated this thing into all out war .

 

[Casually Red]

That the rebels are killing more children I'd put down to kids not having been evacuated from West Aleppo as its been relatively peaceful.

They've long concentrated on the indiscriminate shelling of the Kurdish district of sheikh maqsoud in Aleppo. They've besieged it and there's no way ..and nowhere..for children to be evacuated. Surrounded and bombarded on all sides that area will will comprise a large amount of the civilian casualties as well.

One Kurdish Neighborhood in the Crossfire




Unsurprisingly rebel supporters on here don't mention it. Even when cheer leading both the rebels and the Kurds simultaneously.

 

[DownwardDog]

To all intents and purposes the Allepo siege is back on. In fact was never really lifted despite initial rebel gains , because whatever they overran was still within easy hitting distance of syrian weaponry in a narrow corridor also under constant aerial bombardment . Basically a killing zone the Syrians and Russians seemed happy to let the rebels flood into en masse and sit there right in the open for a bonanza of concentrated targets . Despite whatever limited gains they made they weren't going anywhere . The strength of Syrian opposition on the ground was way too strong . The jihadis just created their own cauldron for the Syrians and Russians to cook them in . I'm not suggesting for a minute it was a clever trap or anything like that but it soon became apparent it had turned into one and that has been exploited to the full by the Syrian forces .

The jihadists splurged thousands of their best troops and armour for the sum of fuck all squared . What's left is now trapped in a narrow kill zone nothing can move through and being ground down piecemeal by aerial assault, artillery and constant unrelenting ground assault . Cut off , kettled and surrounded . that's a pretty huge blow . The kitchen sink was lobbed in and despite initial Syrian wobbles and loss of territory...some in an embarassingly scandalous fashion..the strategy of in depth defensive lines ultimately held firm we're it really counted , containing the spearhead of the offence, as the bombardments of their exposed supply lines choked off any ability to go further. Or even back .

The massive elite jihadi force they sent in is now...what's left of it..trapped, going nowhere and a bunch of dead men walking pretty much . The best they can hope to do is somehow break out ..some of them . But that would be under a gauntlet of concentrated aerial and artillery assault by forces very much hoping they'll be stupid enough to concentrate their strength in one spot again for another turkey shoot . And pretty unlikely looking . The only result of their massive offensive is likely to be the loss of even more territory , along with massive casualties and loss of resources. In particular resources such as armoured vehicles and tanks which they definitely can't replace either easily or quickly . if at all .

The fight in Allepo is far from over but the result now looks to be a foregone conclusion . Only a matter of time .

This reads like Edward R. Murrow reporting on the Battle of the Bulge.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Except in this case the Syrian army itself is largely Sunni Arab in make up . And definitely not a minority . Neither are the vast majority of Syrias population, who live in government controlled areas . And a host of globalised jihadis from the 4 corners of the earth, supported to the tune of billions by a superpower, western states, Turkey and gulf states DO pose an actual existential threat to Syria itself, and indeed Lebanon . And can in no way imaginable be compared to a tiny little overcrowded , beseiged, blockaded and dreadfully impoverished gaza strip versus one of the most advanced and resourced militaries on the planet .

The fears of Syrias minorities also turned out to be completely justified . Their destruction was on the cards, no doubt about that. Despite that Assad and his government refused to go all out in suppression mode and introduced numerous reforms . None of which of course were acceptable either to the jihadis or their foreign backers who were and are engaged in geo political chess games . And who then escalated this thing into all out war .

The IDF's management of its Gaza Correctional Facility seems like a quaint irrelevance beside the far larger butchery in Syria. I'd not excuse Bashar Assad's brutal incompetence in anything but his clan's survival but a portion of blame can be spread around all parties meddling in Syria. His great achievement has been to make Arab-Israeli peace a side issue via great deal of inconclusive carnage.

While the SAA cannon fodder maybe mostly conscripted urban Sunni kids the officer corps is overwhelmingly Alawite and promoted for loyalty to the Assad clan. There are senior Sunni officers but these are mostly reliable loyalists as well. And they are bunch of corrupt parasites funding themselves off rackets. This is the core of the Syrian state and there's plenty there to inspire revolt. It's not surprising given its makeup most of the SAA is a flabby check point force. The units that do the offensive fighting are most often heavily Alawite. Recent fighting often saw the SAA in a fire support role with militias led by IRGC officers to the fore.

I wasn't saying the minorities paranoia was baseless any more than that of the typical Israeli in 48. Round these ways everybody remembers the Armenians and genocidal threats are pretty commonplace amongst some opposition groups some of which we have backed. While you could accuse the opposition of driving out minorities from the fairly small bits of Syria they rule large scale massacres have not been so common. But then they rarely end up owning areas were Sunnis didn't predominate. Sunni urban elites also may have little in common with the rural Salafi that make up part of the revolt. In a poll a while back even a majority of opposition supporting women had real fears about what victory might bring. Swapping an oppressive rapey Baathist state for Taliban style rule some of the big rebel groups favour isn't that popular and Mullah Omar's crew were actually less sectarian than the typical Syrian Beard.

 

[Casually Red]

The IDF's management of its Gaza Correctional Facility seems like a quaint irrelevance beside the far larger butchery in Syria. I'd not excuse Bashar Assad's brutal incompetence in anything but his clan's survival but a portion of blame can be spread around all parties meddling in Syria. His great achievement has been to make Arab-Israeli peace a side issue via great deal of inconclusive carnage.

While the SAA cannon fodder maybe mostly conscripted urban Sunni kids the officer corps is overwhelmingly Alawite and promoted for loyalty to the Assad clan. There are senior Sunni officers but these are mostly reliable loyalists as well. And they are bunch of corrupt parasites funding themselves off rackets. This is the core of the Syrian state and there's plenty there to inspire revolt. It's not surprising given its makeup most of the SAA is a flabby check point force. The units that do the offensive fighting are most often heavily Alawite. Recent fighting often saw the SAA in a fire support role with militias led by IRGC officers to the fore.

I wasn't saying the minorities paranoia was baseless any more than that of the typical Israeli in 48. Round these ways everybody remembers the Armenians and genocidal threats are pretty commonplace amongst some opposition groups some of which we have backed. While you could accuse the opposition of driving out minorities from the fairly small bits of Syria they rule large scale massacres have not been so common. But then they rarely end up owning areas were Sunnis didn't predominate. Sunni urban elites also may have little in common with the rural Salafi that make up part of the revolt. In a poll a while back even a majority of opposition supporting women had real fears about what victory might bring. Swapping an oppressive rapey Baathist state for Taliban style rule some of the big rebel groups favour isn't that popular and Mullah Omar's crew were actually less sectarian than the typical Syrian Beard.

The Syrian army is around 80 percent Sunni . Being a reliable loyalist is pretty much what anyone would want with their military. Being an unreliable disloyal type would be pretty shit. There's no doubt that Alawites get promoted due to loyalty but it's because of the loyalty....as well as the impoverished Alawites traditionally dominating in the Syrian military as far back as the French mandate... and not their religious background. Assad doesn't really give much of a shit about Alawites as an identity. Its not something they promote as an identity and as a group they get no special treatment in Syrian society . Sunnis are generally much more better off in Syria than Alawis. Because its that group who Assad ultimately depends on to stay in power . There simply aren't anywhere near enough Alawis to keep in control of Syria. That's why any voices emanating from the Alawi community to go all out against protestors were simply ignored . Simply put the Alawis have no other choice but Assad as a guarantor for their survival. Assad however has other choices apart from them .

 

[camouflage]

The IDF's management of its Gaza Correctional Facility seems like a quaint irrelevance beside the far larger butchery in Syria. I'd not excuse Bashar Assad's brutal incompetence in anything but his clan's survival but a portion of blame can be spread around all parties meddling in Syria. His great achievement has been to make Arab-Israeli peace a side issue via great deal of inconclusive carnage.

While the SAA cannon fodder maybe mostly conscripted urban Sunni kids the officer corps is overwhelmingly Alawite and promoted for loyalty to the Assad clan. There are senior Sunni officers but these are mostly reliable loyalists as well. And they are bunch of corrupt parasites funding themselves off rackets. This is the core of the Syrian state and there's plenty there to inspire revolt. It's not surprising given its makeup most of the SAA is a flabby check point force. The units that do the offensive fighting are most often heavily Alawite. Recent fighting often saw the SAA in a fire support role with militias led by IRGC officers to the fore.

I wasn't saying the minorities paranoia was baseless any more than that of the typical Israeli in 48. Round these ways everybody remembers the Armenians and genocidal threats are pretty commonplace amongst some opposition groups some of which we have backed. While you could accuse the opposition of driving out minorities from the fairly small bits of Syria they rule large scale massacres have not been so common. But then they rarely end up owning areas were Sunnis didn't predominate. Sunni urban elites also may have little in common with the rural Salafi that make up part of the revolt. In a poll a while back even a majority of opposition supporting women had real fears about what victory might bring. Swapping an oppressive rapey Baathist state for Taliban style rule some of the big rebel groups favour isn't that popular and Mullah Omar's crew were actually less sectarian than the typical Syrian Beard.

You've spoken about mostly Sunni 'cannon fodder' in the SAA, and then went on to say the units that do most of the fighting are Alawite. Can you clarify?

 

[CrabbedOne]

On CMEC Will Darayya Normalize the Expulsion of Civilians?

...
As demonstrated in places such as Yarmouk, Madaya, and now Darayya, sieges and the collective punishment of civilians are among the most effective tactics of the Syrian war. They allow the attacking forces to contain an area with a minimal likelihood of incurring casualties, while extracting financial and political concessions for what would normally be seen as basic human decency: giving trapped civilians food to eat. If the perpetually undermanned Syrian army is to expand further without becoming dangerously overstretched, it is likely that it will increasingly rely on Darayya-style solutions—including by ordering the expulsion of civilians from areas that would be costly to control and police.

For the opposition, this amounts to a strategy of political and sectarian cleansing. While Darayya was a complex affair—many of its inhabitants were allowed to stay in government-held territory, though not in their hometown—it is easy to see how expulsions officially motivated by military factors could be influenced by the war’s ever-present sectarian dynamics. In some areas, the distinction will likely be academic.

Though it has not yet been implemented, a similar deal has already been agreed with the starved-out and jihadi-controlled Yarmouk area in southern Damascus. The Waer suburb of Homs is also negotiating a separate agreement with the government, which, less controversially, would reportedly lead to the expulsion of fighters while leaving the civilian population in place. Should the army continue to advance, such tactics could also be applied to rebel-held towns around Rastan, north of Homs, and in the Eastern Ghouta. In addition, Assad and his Russian allies are already promoting the idea of civilian evacuations from besieged Eastern Aleppo, though without much hope of gaining UN blessing.
...

You could stack this up against siege conduct in Iraq.

I recall before the USMC stormed Fallujah the population were advised to depart and most took the opportunity. Those that did not stood a fair chance of becoming collateral damage. This is more in the nature of an humanitarian evacuation away from danger. If the UN had strongly objected they would have been accused of facilitating the insurgency. In the end the insurgents including AQI mostly filtered out with the population only to set up house in part of Mosul. The situation of the East Aleppo pocket might be rather similar even if a final assault is deferred.

The last wave of sieges in Iraq have also relied on displacing the population. Many fled IS held Fallujah after a long starvation siege fearing retribution. It fell fairly quickly to an assault at the end. Some Hashd units were accused of disappearing hundreds of men. Escaping IS convoys were wiped out by Iraq, US and British air despite the presence of woman and children. It's now back in ISF hands and being ringed with a berm and moat with a single exit to stop it being a car bomb factory for Baghdad. In some cases civilians have been prevented from returning; something the Pesh are prone to not just Baghdad's forces. In Tikrit people were allowed back but known IS sympathisers were only allowed to reside in orbital villages. In Ramadi the city had 75% of it's structures damaged. It remains strewn with IEDs. Folk returning to this deathtrap have been killed by them in quite large numbers. Yet Anbari politicians continue to encourage returns. Pre-planning for Mosul anticipates a million IDPs flowing out of the city. There are fears the already bulging IDP camps won't be able to cope. So I'd have to see IDPs fleeing sieges as just part of what the defenders losing looks like.

The UN in Syria is in an awkward spot. The humane thing is to get civilians out of such combat zones as is done in Iraq but politically this does not serve the Syrian revolt's cause but the regime's. Encouraging pragmatic surrenders rather hopelessly protracted hold outs like Darayya also runs into the same dilemma.

It occurs to me Damascus probably sees Darayya much as Baghdad sees Fallujah; a menacing hinterland city that must be defanged. All the more threatening as the original spirit of the Arab Spring seems to have lived on there. The use of protracted sieges is a symptom of lack of regime manpower. Unlike the USMC which lost over a hundred men taking Fallujah the regime often can't afford many direct assaults. A permanent expulsion of a risen population when there is no intention to storm the place just accept its surrender is a little different from Iraq. Perhaps Darayya as a wrecked ghost town is symbolic and also symptomatic of lack of regime resources as Lund suggests. Some besieged areas in Syria have surrendered only to find they can barely subsist on what supplies the regime allows in; that may be a worse fate than being emptied out warning that it's Assad or we burn the country.

 

[CrabbedOne]

The Syrian army is around 80 percent Sunni . Being a reliable loyalist is pretty much what anyone would want with their military. Being an unreliable disloyal type would be pretty shit. There's no doubt that Alawites get promoted due to loyalty but it's because of the loyalty....as well as the impoverished Alawites traditionally dominating in the Syrian military as far back as the French mandate... and not their religious background. Assad doesn't really give much of a shit about Alawites as an identity. Its not something they promote as an identity and as a group they get no special treatment in Syrian society . Sunnis are generally much more better off in Syria than Alawis. Because its that group who Assad ultimately depends on to stay in power . There simply aren't anywhere near enough Alawis to keep in control of Syria. That's why any voices emanating from the Alawi community to go all out against protestors were simply ignored . Simply put the Alawis have no other choice but Assad as a guarantor for their survival. Assad however has other choices apart from them .

I think you are overestimating the enthusiasm Sunni youth have for Assad. The SAA is like the Red Army: once press ganged if you don't fight they beat you to a pulp and if you still don't they shoot you. Over 100K SAA conscripts have been killed in this war they were indeed mostly Sunni and mostly very reluctant soldiers. They are often seen running away from the enemy across open desert God help them. I noticed biggest worry of some families fleeing the heavily bombed Hell of the Aleppo pocket recently was their boys would be conscripted into the SAA meat grinder. It's often a death sentence given the high attrition rate. Young men with any resources often bribe their way out of serving in the SAA.

You have to distinguish the mercantile Sunni elites which have traditionally despised and avoided military service. These are often bought and paid for regime loyalists who were doing very nicely. It's true Alawites remain pretty downtrodden like the Southern Iraqi Shia. The Alawites always saw the military as a meal ticket. A very badly paid one with slum accommodation but in senior ranks essentially a license to steal from the population around your Divisional HQ. The officer corps was always dominated by them but has become increasingly Alawite as the civil war progressed. The main staff college relocated to Latakia a few years ago and that's were most of the new brass come from. A terrifying Stasi like police state also ensures loyalty.

Minorities successfully ruling repressively is far from abnormal. Consider classical Sparta, the very narrow ruling class of Norman England or the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. Like Saddam Bashar isn't out to promote his sect but his clan and he'll co-opt other groups. You could compare the Alawite minority in Syria to Sunni Arabs in Saddam's brutally repressed Iraq: ~11% V 19%. About 15% of Iraqis were Baath party members mostly but not all Sunni. Add the Syrian Christians(6%), Shia(2%), Druze(3%) who have little choice but to support the regime and very conservatively 10% or of the Sunni population and the regime numbers look rather more adequate. It isn't numbers that really count in these things it's being able to divide your enemies. And Sunni Arab Syrians may be 75% but can be sliced and diced into a lot of interest groups along tribal, class and devotional lines. That's the main problem with the rising, it's multiple groups with mutually incompatible goals and actually probably not much more popular than the regime.

 

[Casually Red]

I think you are overestimating the enthusiasm Sunni youth have for Assad. The SAA is like the Red Army: once press ganged if you don't fight they beat you to a pulp and if you still don't they shoot you. Over 100K SAA conscripts have been killed in this war they were indeed mostly Sunni and mostly very reluctant soldiers. They are often seen running away from the enemy across open desert God help them. I noticed biggest worry of some families fleeing the heavily bombed Hell of the Aleppo pocket recently was their boys would be conscripted into the SAA meat grinder. It's often a death sentence given the high attrition rate. Young men with any resources often bribe their way out of serving in the SAA.

You have to distinguish the mercantile Sunni elites which have traditionally despised and avoided military service. These are often bought and paid for regime loyalists who were doing very nicely. It's true Alawites remain pretty downtrodden like the Southern Iraqi Shia. The Alawites always saw the military as a meal ticket. A very badly paid one with slum accommodation but in senior ranks essentially a license to steal from the population around your Divisional HQ. The officer corps was always dominated by them but has become increasingly Alawite as the civil war progressed. The main staff college relocated to Latakia a few years ago and that's were most of the new brass come from. A terrifying Stasi like police state also ensures loyalty.

Minorities successfully ruling repressively is far from abnormal. Consider classical Sparta, the very narrow ruling class of Norman England or the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland. Like Saddam Bashar isn't out to promote his sect but his clan and he'll co-opt other groups. You could compare the Alawite minority in Syria to Sunni Arabs in Saddam's brutally repressed Iraq: ~11% V 19%. About 15% of Iraqis were Baath party members mostly but not all Sunni. Add the Syrian Christians(6%), Shia(2%), Druze(3%) who have little choice but to support the regime and very conservatively 10% or of the Sunni population and the regime numbers look rather more adequate. It isn't numbers that really count in these things it's being able to divide your enemies. And Sunni Arab Syrians may be 75% but can be sliced and diced into a lot of interest groups along tribal, class and devotional lines. That's the main problem with the rising, it's multiple groups with mutually incompatible goals and actually probably not much more popular than the regime.

So an Alawite population is downtrodden and oppressed by an Alawite regime ...that has a Sunni army . Run by downtrodden Alawites . That Assad refused to use to annihilate the downtrodden Sunnis with, to the anger of the downtrodden Alawites . And it's the Sunni elite who eschew military service that explains why poor Sunni conscripts comprise the bulk of his armed forces ? And let's just ignore the tens of thousands of Sunnis who opt for voluntary NDF militias as a means of protecting their own districts from the rebels .

Have to say your analysis is getting a bit confusing at this point .

I'd say rather than dividing the Syrian sects Assad is pretty much the only political figure currently on the scene who can demonstrably keep them united . And has done in the face of an existential threat hell bent on dividing and cleansing them . And that's why his mostly Sunni army supports him. Because unlike westerners with their penchant for dividing the natives into sects as opposed to national identity , they're Syrians first and foremost . And they want their country to remain united . And not some medieval , caliphate type shithole with no place for minorities , diversity, women or even a fag and a pint of beer at the weekends . Which is all the various rebel groups have to offer when they aren't slaughtering each other over no reason at all .
Without the support of his people Assad would have been gone long ago. They don't support these lunatics, they support him . Time people wished up to that and stopped categorising Syrians by their confessional status as opposed to their national . They're human beings with a national identity of their own, not some bunch of fuzzy wuzzies that can be divided and conquered piecemeal as the empires of old did. And they've proven that time and again.

 

[CrabbedOne]

So an Alawite population is downtrodden and oppressed by an Alawite regime ...that has a Sunni army . Run by downtrodden Alawites . That Assad refused to use to annihilate the downtrodden Sunnis with, to the anger of the downtrodden Alawites . And it's the Sunni elite who eschew military service that explains why poor Sunni conscripts comprise the bulk of his armed forces ? And let's just ignore the tens of thousands of Sunnis who opt for voluntary NDF militias as a means of protecting their own districts from the rebels .

Have to say your analysis is getting a bit confusing at this point .

I'd say rather than dividing the Syrian sects Assad is pretty much the only political figure currently on the scene who can demonstrably keep them united . And has done in the face of an existential threat hell bent on dividing and cleansing them . And that's why his mostly Sunni army supports him. Because unlike westerners with their penchant for dividing the natives into sects as opposed to national identity , they're Syrians first and foremost . And they want their country to remain united . And not some medieval , caliphate type shithole with no place for minorities , diversity, women or even a fag and a pint of beer at the weekends . Which is all the various rebel groups have to offer when they aren't slaughtering each other over no reason at all .
Without the support of his people Assad would have been gone long ago. They don't support these lunatics, they support him . Time people wished up to that and stopped categorising Syrians by their confessional status as opposed to their national . They're human beings with a national identity of their own, not some bunch of fuzzy wuzzies that can be divided and conquered piecemeal as the empires of old did. And they've proven that time and again.

The SAA isn't a volunteer army like the ISF. They grab any youth they can find on regime turf and that's mostly Sunnis. Sunnis serving in the SAA is not a metric of regime support but its oppressive power. The NDF has become a means of avoiding SAA service and another license to predate on the local population. It tends to be much more sectarian than the SAA. Urban Sunni are often trapped between a dysfunctional rentier state and alien Salafi revolutionaries who actually have a point. The Baathist system is rotten by design it's just that their utopian vision promise only fitna in Syria.

A more isolated Saddam only fell because we foolishly invaded. He never had wide support even amongst Sunni Arabs. It's better to be feared than loved and a torture gulag fed by a Stasi style state will do that for you.

It's not really confusing it's just not as black and white as you are painting it.

 

[Casually Red]

Why is the regimes turf mostly Sunni to begin with ? Why haven't they joined " the revolution " ? it's only a matter of skipping over to the other side. A side actively supported by numerous western and gulf states and a superpower . For years now . Yet you maintain Assads grip is such that he can prevent his people from rising against him in the face of that massive level of opposition. An impoverished , isolated and sanctioned country like Syria standing against the might of the USA, France Britain, Turkey Israel and the immeasurable wealth of the Gulf states..without the support of its people ? ?? For 5 years ???Come on now . That doesn't stand up to any level of scrutiny .

The black and white of it is the Syrian people simply don't want to. They support their state, their army and their president. The British army relied very heavily on conscription in world war 2 . They'd have been stuffed without it . Doesn't mean the average Brit would have been happy for Hitler to win . Conscription in Syria is no different .

 

[Humberto]

You are backing strong men. e.g Putin. There is nothing more interesting to your
posting atm.

 

[Casually Red]

You are backing strong men. e.g Putin. There is nothing more interesting to your
posting atm.

Oh shut up . Dreary fucking non entity of a post .

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musing On Iraq Iraq’s Prime Minister Abadi Continuing Maliki’s Syrian Policy

...
Maliki is one of Abadi’s main opponents, but the two leaders have maintained the same path when it comes to Syria. While Maliki was inspired by Iran and the growing jihadist presence in Syria, Abadi has another set of issues driving his stance towards Assad. Abadi came into office in a very weak position. For one he lacked a base and didn’t even control his own Dawa Party. He has also had a difficult relationship with the pro-Iranian Hashd factions that have often criticized his policies. With those and other problems putting pressure on him the prime minister chose to pick his battles and decided to leave Syrian policy as is.

Bit of a no brainer really.

To do otherwise would piss off Teheran. If Damascus fell Shia Baghdad would probably be next on the international Salafi-Jihadis list. Coping with IS is enough of a problem. Fighting them over there so we don't have to fight them over here isn't just a pretext for Syria Shia neighbours. He's following a bit of a regional policy tradition: export your Jihadis. After all if the popular Hashd were prevented from going off on "shrine defence" it's only likely cause problems domestically.

 

[CrabbedOne]

...
The black and white of it is the Syrian people simply don't want to. They support their state, their army and their president. The British army relied very heavily on conscription in world war 2 . They'd have been stuffed without it . Doesn't mean the average Brit would have been happy for Hitler to win . Conscription in Syria is no different .

Conscription in regime ruled Syria is very different and often the source of rioting. The regime's been reduced to just grabbing boys at checkpoints. The British weren't fleeing conscription in large numbers the way Syrian lads are which should tell you something about support for the regime. The level of enthusiasm on the opposition side is questionable as well.

The odds are a good deal worse the WWII as well. Combatants have about a one in three chance of getting killed. Being a SAA conscript is both demeaning and particularly dangerous. They're usually badly led and often deployed to a distant front to be butchered. The NDF units are safer as they mostly remain on home turf. Some are rather profitable criminal enterprises like Loyalist paramilitaries in N.Ireland. Another mob of thugs that have to be paid off by the civilians.

Regime support is substantial but narrow, polling suggests about 30%. For comparison Trump is at 37% favourability in the US. It's clustered in the big cities and areas like Latakia which has been relatively prosperous under Bashar. A lot of Sunnis have fled rebel areas to reside in regime held territory but this isn't out of affection for Bashar it's just that the small parts of Syria the rebels hold are not exactly child safe as they are shelled and bombed rather a lot by the regime. A chap may get dragged off to the SAA or the torture gulag but your kids are relatively safe. Parts of the revolt also don't really match up with the original reformist agenda of the rising. Some are basically bandits others too like the Taliban. The only paid employment on offer in rebel areas is often fighting. Deserted SAA officers serving on the rebel side often cite economic motives. This is really a rock and a hard place situation apt to produce despair.

From what I've heard most Syrians want no part in the fighting they just want it over. They were generally delighted by the recent cessation of hostilities. In Idlib they were out in the streets ineffectually protesting for Bashar to stand down just like in the Arab Spring. That is a genuinely popular cause. Living under Idlib's corrupt Sharia courts with their own torture facilities isn't what a lot of them were hoping for. A new system of coercion really not much more popular than Baathist ways. Revolutions often disappoint.

 

[Humberto]

Oh shut up . Dreary fucking non entity of a post .

was past my bed time tbh