The Rational Proof of God's Existence

[ItWillNeverWork]

Yes you do

No I don't. Please get the fuck on with it.

 

[phildwyer]

You need to get a room and obsess about Pickman's alone in it, where others are not.

Incıdentally, just ın case thıs strange person has any plans to defy my ban, let me state very clearly that I shall not contınue wıth my proof untıl ıt has left us alone.

So ıf ıt chooses to persıst ın ıts dısruptıon, ıt wıll be spıtıng the boards as a whole.

Same goes for Pıckman's.

I'm sorry but there ıt ıs.

 

[ATOMIC SUPLEX]

It's back.

And now Dwyer is 'banning' people.

 

[5t3IIa]

Thank you Phil. With great power comes great etc. I'll use it wisely, believe.

 

[Sesquipedalian]

Don't waste your time. Srsly.

I made it to the end of page 4.
(before taking you advice,i'll just watch from here )

 

[phildwyer]

And now Dwyer is 'banning' people.

Not you though. You have to stay. In fact, you have to post at least two contributions every single day.

We need some light entertainment around here.

 

[ItWillNeverWork]

I give up.

[/will to live]

 

[Knotted]

Can we agree that human beıngs ınevıtably ımpose a value or meanıng on sense data ın the act of experıencıng ıt?

I disagree fundamentally.

Value and meaning are what we articulate. The act of making sense of sense data does not require the ability to articulate the act of making sense of sense data. A dog makes sense of his world. A dog can even know facts about the world. But a dog cannot articulate what they know. They do not intellectualise using abstract concepts.

We don't always attach value or meaning to sense data. Not everything is of interest. If I were to discuss something I am seeing then I would discuss it in meaningful terms, but I don't always discuss what I am seeing, not even as a mental note to myself.

At the same time, we do not simply experience raw sense data. We always subconsciously put some order onto what we see or hear.

You conflate making sense of the world with conceptualising the world.

And that the ımposıtıon of thıs value or meanıng ıs the defınıtıve characterıstıc of human conscıousness?

Is the meaning and value imposed? Do we even know what meanings and values we attach to events until we articulate them? The meanings and values that we attach are related to our interests which can change with context. The meaning and the value are not bound up with the act of observation.

For example you can observe a masked man accross the road. You could perhaps relate this fact because the man worried you and what was significant to you was the distance between you and the man. But then again you might relate that the man was standing in front of the bank this time and you relate this because you are now concerned about a possible bank robbery. So there are two different but non competing conceptualisations and there are perhaps more which you have not even conceived of yet. The way you conceptualise is not determined by the observation and the observation is not determined by the sense data.

In short, concepts relate to description and language, not to the mechanics of knowing about the world. The simple proof is that if the two were the same then animals would either possess the ability to talk or lack the ability to make sense of anything.

 

[kyser_soze]

Does this make a 'keypad' a particular of the 'keyboard' universal?

 

[goldenecitrone]

Oh God, it's been resurrected.

 

[5t3IIa]

Oh God, it's been resurrected.

stop being disruptive

 

[Brainaddict]

What silly twunt revived this shite then?

*calls in air strike*

 

[Brainaddict]

 

[Hocus Eye.]

Let's just waıt to see ıf anyone objects to what we have establıshed so far.

Remember our aım here ıs to convınce everyone (except the banned ıdıot Pıckman's), and to convınce them completely, so that there ıs absolutely no room for doubt left.

:

Oh dear, what an ego this man has. Come back Billy Graham all is forgiven.

 

[Knotted]

I think Phil thinks he is applying Kant's philosophy, but he is mistaken about Kant's philosophy. He conflates Kant's concepts with Kant's intuitions. For Kant our observations require a priori intutions of time, space, causality and number not a priori concepts of time, space, causality and number. Intuitions are singular representations, not families of representations like concepts. Kant's synthetic a priori knowledge is not knowledge of concepts and he is not asserting that concepts exist prior to observation. Indeed he states that, "a concept without a percept is empty". What Phil is presenting us with is, is Plato's theory of forms not Kant's transcendental idealism and this has even less to do with Hegel or Marx who rejected Kant's philosophy anyway.

Phil's argument is unconvincing to everyone because it is just a bad rendering of Kant. Phil needs to argue his basic Platonic point in Platonic terms. He needs to argue for the existence of ideal forms, not just assert them as a corrollary of Kant's theory of a priori intuitions.

 

[5t3IIa]

What silly twunt revived this shite then?

*calls in air strike*

Pickman's did! Head for N1!

 

[ATOMIC SUPLEX]

I think Phil thinks he is applying Kant's philosophy, but he is mistaken about Kant's philosophy. He conflates Kant's concepts with Kant's intuitions. For Kant our observations require a priori intutions of time, space, causality and number not a priori concepts of time, space, causality and number. Intuitions are singular representations, not families of representations like concepts. Kant's synthetic a priori knowledge is not knowledge of concepts and he is not asserting that concepts exist prior to observation. Indeed he states that, "a concept without a percept is empty". What Phil is presenting us with is, is Plato's theory of forms not Kant's transcendental idealism and this has even less to do with Hegel or Marx who rejected Kant's philosophy anyway.

Phil's argument is unconvincing to everyone because it is just a bad rendering of Kant. Phil needs to argue his basic Platonic point in Platonic terms. He needs to argue for the existence of ideal forms, not just assert them as a corrollary of Kant's theory of a priori intuitions.

Kant or no kant. His 'facts' that he has based this whole thing on simply don't stand up from the first (or second statement I can't remember or be bothered to go back and look), anyone can pretty much see that. Phil's repost to anyone who challenges him is to simply call them an idiot, hence this thread just goes on and on as a sort of self created shrine to Phil's ego.

There is no god Phil, it's a silly idea. I can't prove there is no god, but there is no proof of his existence either. I also can't prove that unicorns don't live in secret underground bunkers on mars.

Anyway looks like you have frightened him off now (or he is looking it all up in his books).

 

[8ball]

The first statement seems to work to a qualified degree.

 

[Pickman's model]

Actually Pıckman's, I'm goıng to have to ban you from thıs thread.

You have demonstrated many tımes that your only purpose here ıs to dısrupt our dıscussıon. Nobody fınds you amusıng. And basıcally you are an ıdıot.

You are welcome to read along wıth the rest of us. But you are forbıdden from postıng on thıs thread untıl further notıce.

 

[phildwyer]

I think Phil thinks he is applying Kant's philosophy, but he is mistaken about Kant's philosophy. He conflates Kant's concepts with Kant's intuitions. For Kant our observations require a priori intutions of time, space, causality and number not a priori concepts of time, space, causality and number. Intuitions are singular representations, not families of representations like concepts. Kant's synthetic a priori knowledge is not knowledge of concepts and he is not asserting that concepts exist prior to observation. Indeed he states that, "a concept without a percept is empty". What Phil is presenting us with is, is Plato's theory of forms not Kant's transcendental idealism and this has even less to do with Hegel or Marx who rejected Kant's philosophy anyway.

Phil's argument is unconvincing to everyone because it is just a bad rendering of Kant. Phil needs to argue his basic Platonic point in Platonic terms. He needs to argue for the existence of ideal forms, not just assert them as a corrollary of Kant's theory of a priori intuitions.

Now hang on a second, I mentıoned neıther Plato nor Kant, so ıt ıs a bıt prevıous to accuse me of mısreadıng eıther of them. If anyone has ınfluenced my argument thus far ıt ıs Saussure, wıth hıs dıvısıon of the sıgn ınto sıgnıfer and sıgnıfıed.

A thread of thıs ımportance and complexıty wıll soon degenrate ınto chaos ıf we do not take thıngs one step at a tıme. I therefore awaıt any objectıons to what I have saıd about conceptualızatıon beıng the defınıtıve characterıstıc of the human mınd. Hearıng none (and ın the absence of dısruptıon from the banned baldıe Pıckman's) we shall proceed to the next stage thıs afternoon.

 

[phildwyer]

I disagree fundamentally.

Value and meaning are what we articulate. The act of making sense of sense data does not require the ability to articulate the act of making sense of sense data. A dog makes sense of his world. A dog can even know facts about the world. But a dog cannot articulate what they know. They do not intellectualise using abstract concepts.

But that ıs precısely my poınt. I am agruıng that the abılıty to conceptualıze ıs the defınıtıve characterıstıc of the human mınd. It necessarıly follows that anımals lack that abılıty, as you say.

 

[phildwyer]

Is the meaning and value imposed? Do we even know what meanings and values we attach to events until we articulate them? The meanings and values that we attach are related to our interests which can change with context. The meaning and the value are not bound up with the act of observation.

For example you can observe a masked man accross the road. You could perhaps relate this fact because the man worried you and what was significant to you was the distance between you and the man. But then again you might relate that the man was standing in front of the bank this time and you relate this because you are now concerned about a possible bank robbery. So there are two different but non competing conceptualisations and there are perhaps more which you have not even conceived of yet. The way you conceptualise is not determined by the observation and the observation is not determined by the sense data.

I say nothıng about the content of concepts at thıs stage. I agree that the content wıll vary wıth culture, hıstory and language. At thıs stage however I am concerned wıth the mere fact of conceptualızatıon ın the abstract.

 

[phildwyer]

I don't think concepts are general ideas, by that I mean I don't think the formation of concepts is a matter of generalisation. A keyboard can be the board of keys of letters, numbers and symbols that you use to input data into a computer. It can also be a musical intrument. But we wouldn't call the control panel in a aeroplane's cockpit a "keyboard". How do we know how the generalisation works? We don't. It is partly down to human convention to see how to apply a concept. Concepts cannot be seperated from human understanding and human convention. We do not know all the applications of a concept when we apply it. Suppose a keyboard-like device is invented, how do we know whether it is a keyboard? When we decide, when the convention becomes fixed. Concepts are not seperable from their application. You could say a concept is a very particular thing with as much sense as saying that a concept is a general thing.

I don't see how the last sentence follows from the rest of what you say here. I use 'concept' ın the technıcal sense of Begrıff. To say that ıt ıs a generlızatıon ıs sımply a tautology ın thıs sense.

But anyway, I would argue that all concepts are necessarıly generalızatıons, and I see nothıng ın your example to refute thıs. If we subsume the cockıpt's control panel under the concept of 'keyboard' that ıs one generalızatıon, ıf we call ıt a 'pıano' that ıs another generalızatıon. Both are generalızatıons.

It's nonsense to say we apply concepts to sense data.

Faır enough. I should have saıd that we experıence sense data through concepts.

 

[Knotted]

I don't see how the last sentence follows from the rest of what you say here. I use 'concept' ın the technıcal sense of Begrıff. To say that ıt ıs a generlızatıon ıs sımply a tautology ın thıs sense.

But anyway, I would argue that all concepts are necessarıly generalızatıons, and I see nothıng ın your example to refute thıs. If we subsume the cockıpt's control panel under the concept of 'keyboard' that ıs one generalızatıon, ıf we call ıt a 'pıano' that ıs another generalızatıon. Both are generalızatıons.

The problem is that in order to generalise you have one particular generalisation. But you can "generalise" in different ways simultaneously. If you don't know the rule for generalising do you know the concept? No, not in total, but you can still use the concept. So concepts are not generalisations, they have certain particular uses which are connected in various ways.

Faır enough. I should have saıd that we experıence sense data through concepts.

But that's not true either. We don't need to conceive in order to perceive. The example I gave of the masked man across the road should show this. The act of conceiving is related to the act of articulating and this is relative to your interests eg. in what you wish to bring out about the facts. The act of perceiving is not dependent on the act of conceiving. You aren't always interested in conceptualising what you perceive - animals do this all the time and yet they can still make sense of the world. Perception is possible without conception.

 

[Knotted]

To be honest phil, the objections that I raising might not be important for your argument. There is a much more basic error in the OP. You suggest that (economic) value must be perceptable in a cow. Here you assume that concepts are related directly to percepts.

 

[ATOMIC SUPLEX]

Now hang on a second, I mentıoned neıther Plato nor Kant,

What? Not even in the second sentence of your opening post?

 

[camouflage]

I beleive in the god that doesn't exist.

*obscure refference to the overwise quite boring book The God delusion*

 

[phildwyer]

To be honest phil, the objections that I raising might not be important for your argument. There is a much more basic error in the OP. You suggest that (economic) value must be perceptable in a cow.

Not necessarily a cow. Could be any object of exchange. The basic point is to prove that human beings do not perceive the world as it actually is, but rather their own ideas about the world.

Once that has been proved, the rest should be fairly straightforward.

 

[phildwyer]

What? Not even in the second sentence of your opening post?

Buffoon.

See--I knew it was worth keeping this guy around.

 

[Hocus Eye.]

Not necessarily a cow. Could be any object of exchange. The basic point is to prove that human beings do not perceive the world as it actually is, but rather their own ideas about the world.

Once that has been proved, the rest should be fairly straightforward.

phildwyer

You are a complete fraud. You have no understanding of philosophy, the world of perception or even the world of ideas and the meaning of words. You are a confidence trickster and if you really do earn your living teaching philosophy, then you have pulled off a scam. Perhaps in America where there are lots of colleges with seats that need bums on them you can get away with it, but don't continue with your laughable nonsense on this four year old thread. I am amazed that people are willing to engage with you. I have to admit though, that you are the most successful troll on these boards, and I myself am a victim thereof in that am responding. No more however. Life is too short to give time to internet charlatans.