DotCommunist
So many particulars. So many questions.
all about the feelingse voters feeling of being marginalised
Regional economic disparities grounded in successive rounds of uneven development and biased official policy are not peculiar to Britain. As David Harvey has written, ‘capitalism is uneven geographical development’—and, if anything, becoming more so. The era of neoliberal globalization multiplied opportunities for ‘the uneven insertion of different territories and social formations into the capitalist world market’. [55] As regulatory powers are stripped away, wealth is becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of the opulent few. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, mouthpiece for free-market economies, notes that ‘while gaps in GDP per capita across OECD countries have narrowed over the last two decades, within their own borders countries are witnessing increasing income gaps among regions, cities and people.’ Such is the common pattern. Davos is looking nervously over its shoulder as the popular backlash intensifies. [56]
Yet Britain is indeed a special case of uneven development within the Europe on which its voters were invited to express their verdict in 2016. The astonishing fact is that the UK is more lopsided economically than Italy, despite its notoriously incomplete Risorgimento; than Spain, with its historic polarity of Catalan–Basque industry and Andalusian latifundia; than Germany, where a quarter of a century after reunification GDP per head in the East was still only two-thirds of that in the West; than France, enshadowed by a metropolis great enough to warrant comparison with its cross-Channel neighbour. At sub-regional level, output per head is eight times higher in inner west London than in west Wales and the Valleys, the largest difference to be found in anyEU member state from Bantry Bay to the Dniester. [57]
So it is that a former regional-policy advisor at the European Commission can observe that ‘the economic geography of the UK nowadays increasingly reflects the patterns typically observed in developing or former-transition economies rather than in other advanced economies.’ In several peripheral European states—Ireland and Portugal in the far west; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to the east—only the capital-city region achieves output per capita above the EU average. [58] The UK is richer, but its long-run development, aside from the short Victorian interlude of factory capitalism, has been similarly monocentric. Northwards redistribution of economic activity from London and the South has never featured high on the list of national political priorities. Today just 2 per cent of households in the North East feature in the top decile of wealth, set against 22 per cent in the South East and 18 per cent in London. Under the Cameron coalition, median household wealth in London increased by 14 per cent, while it fell 8 per cent in Yorkshire and the Humber. [59] The real average jobless rate was last clocked at over 11 per cent in the two most northerly English regions, rising above 16 per cent in the worst blackspots, compared to just 3 or 4 per cent in large parts of the South. At the bottom end of the income ladder, very high deprivation looms largest in a quintet of northern boroughs: Middlesbrough, Knowsley, Hull, Liverpool and Manchester. The South East, of course, has problems of its own. Gentrification is taking the edge off the poverty statistics for east London, but out in the sticks, forgotten Jaywick on the Essex coast is England’s single most destitute neighbourhood. [60] Nevertheless, the phenomenal amount of wealth sloshing around the capital does much to shield the London commentariat from the degradation of outer regions, flattering to deceive that government economic policy is working for the country at large. ‘I’ll tell you what’s at stake’, warned George Osborne, a millionaire Londoner, as the referendum loomed: ‘the prosperity of the British economy, people’s incomes would be hit, the ability to provide for their families would be hit. We’ve not even talked about unemployment.’ [61] His parliamentary seat was a Tory constituency in leafy east Cheshire, one of only four out of 38 areas across northern England where household income per head is above rather than below the national average.
Tom Hazeldine: Revolt of the Rustbelt. New Left Review 105, May-June 2017.