Cosmological proof of God's existence

[bhamgeezer]

Im so sick of hearing about nonsense bullshit proofs that never materialise, thought would be good to demonstrate exactly why these proofs are bullshit.

P1. Every being is either a dependent being or an independent being
P2. It is false that every being is a dependent being
C3. Therefore there exists an independent being
C4. Therefore there exists a necessary being

1. Every thing is either P or Q
2. ||(hidden) Assumed – Every thing is P
__||If (Every thing is P) then not (Every thing is P or Q)
__||Therefore not (Every thing is P)
3. Not every thing is P
4. Some thing is Q
5. (hidden) (If Q then R)
6. Some thing is R

Being - the scope of “being” is those things that could cause other beings to exist, and those things that themselves could be caused to exist by the causal efficacy of another being. Very simply we only include causal things, not mental objects like numbers.

Dependent Being - a being that has the reason for its existence in the causal efficacy of another being (caused by something else)

Independent being - a being that has the reason for its existence within its own nature (self causer)

P1. - The principle of sufficient reason. Everything is either self caused or caused by some other thing. Therefore no thing is uncaused. Therefore every thing has a reason/cause.

P2. - Why accept this premise?

Within a finite set, if every member of the set is caused by some other member, that set is necessarily causally circular. If a finite set is not circular then the first cause is an independent being and self caused rather than caused by another member.

However, if we dismiss the notion that universe had a first cause, and dismiss the notion that universe is causally circular, then we must hold the universe to be infinite set consisting entirely of dependent beings (non-self caused things).

Why is this a problem? I don't think it is, but what has traditionally been claimed is that every member of an infinite set of dependent beings could have been otherwise. If we consider for a moment what type of beings would be amongst this set, we see it includes things like people, stars and material objects. Those things everybody is happy to accept exists.

However, the problem lies in that these things are contingent, they happen to be the way that they are, but they may not have been that way, and this would involve no form of logical contradiction. Any individual may not have existed, a star may have been of a different type and any object might have placed in some other location.

This being the case, the question the theist asks is, what reason or cause is available to explain there existing this infinite set of dependent objects as opposed to nothing at all. Why is there something rather than nothing? If we return to P1. The principle of sufficient reason, we see every being must have some reason/cause. The theist brings the infinite set of dependent beings under the scope of P1. and thus concludes an infinite set of solely dependent beings to be inconsistent with it. (hidden 2.)

Consequently the theist concludes that if P1. then P2. Giving priority to P1. and concluding P2. rather than rejecting P1. The conjunction of P1. and P2. allows for an obviously valid move to C3. the conclusion that some independent (self-caused) being exists. Given that the theist is committed to the untenabilty of a entirely contingent universe, he concludes that whatever independent being has been shown to exist must also be a necessary being (hidden 5.) and concludes C4.



K well that's the argument, I don't buy it but I'd like to know if you think we can maintain P1. and still refute the theist. Or if you think the only way is giving up P1. or if you think P1. is a load of bollocks and mere anthropological bias and I shouldn't even try to be maintaining it.

Here's what other people have said

Hume - “Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.”

Edwards - “If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained”

This is great, but in normal cases, we always expect a set of objects to have some greater explanation as well as immediate explanation. e.g. Arsons caused the fire, but planetary formation created the conditions that created the arsons. Is it wrong to expect this for the universe as a whole? If so why not? Are we really breaking P1. if we exclude the universe from this? If not why not?

 

[ivebeenhigh]

x = its all made up bollocks

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Our understanding of existence is necessarily limited by our being part of existence.

That's it.

There is no more to say on the matter.

So yes, you should gladly abandon P1. It is not a statement that we are qualified to make.

 

[bhamgeezer]

Our understanding of existence is necessarily limited by our being part of existence.

That's it.

There is no more to say on the matter.

So yes, you should gladly abandon P1. It is not a statement that we are qualified to make.

Without P1. to me its seems we're in murky territory, causal notions being so ingrained in our psyche that thought practically falls apart without them

 

[littlebabyjesus]

So for the sake of thought, you accept it as probably true, or apparently true if you like, or 'true as far as I can tell'.

We work on heuristics like that all the time. Just because you can't prove something, that doesn't mean you shouldn't have a working assumption that it is true.


It's a bit like questions of morality: Without an outside justification, a god to give you morals, how can you know what is right and wrong.

Well, to tell the truth, I'm not entirely sure how I do know what is right and wrong. But I do know what is right and wrong nonetheless. I don't actually need to know how I know to know.

You then start examining this idea that you know because it's a god's law, and you realise that this doesn't actually help at all, as Plato pointed out.

 

[bhamgeezer]

So for the sake of thought, you accept it as probably true, or apparently true if you like, or 'true as far as I can tell'.

We work on heuristics like that all the time. Just because you can't prove something, that doesn't mean you shouldn't have a working assumption that it is true.


It's a bit like questions of morality: Without an outside justification, a god to give you morals, how can you know what is right and wrong.

Well, to tell the truth, I'm not entirely sure how I do know what is right and wrong. But I do know what is right and wrong nonetheless. I don't actually need to know how I know to know.

Not necessarily true no, but still it seems reasonable considering we find all things we experience to be causal to infer the nature of the world is causal independently of us. Unless we have some good reason not of course. We might infer colour (at least the experience of it) is not in the world because of instances of colourblindness, but we do not have a similar reason to infer causation is not in the world.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

It is reasonable. It is a reasonable working assumption.

That's all. No need (nor indeed possibility) to prove that it is true in order to act as if it were true.

It's the problem of attempting to infer something about what you can't know from what you can know, which is a logical mistake.

 

[bhamgeezer]

I don't see what your point is, if something is reasonable working assumption, why not assume it to be objectively true until you have some reason not to. Obviously we can't claim to have complete certainty, but we never can anyway.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

why not assume it to be objectively true until you have some reason not to.

Why make that assumption.

That's an arbitrary decision. I might not be being clear, but tbh I don't see the problem here. The concept 'first cause' is meaningless. You might as well say that the universe caused itself, that existence caused itself. And why shouldn't it? The answer to the question 'why is there something rather than nothing?' is, simply, 'why wouldn't there be?' Both questions are equally valid.

Until you can provide a meaningful answer to the question 'How could the universe not exist?', you're in no position to ask how the universe exists.

 

[bhamgeezer]

Why make that assumption. That's an arbitrary decision. I might not be being clear, but tbh I don't see the problem here.

Doesn't seem arbitrary to me, if I walk around my whole life and see nothing but green grass, its not arbitrary to infer all grass is green, even though it may not be so. Thus when I experience causation, it doesn't seem arbitrary to infer the universe is that way less I find some counter example.

The concept 'first cause' is meaningless.

Not in an ordinary sense. I guess you mean the concept self-caused (independent) being, which I guess you could argue. I wouldn't go so far as claim it to be meaningless.

You might as well say that the universe caused itself, that existence caused itself.

That may well be considered the admission of a independent being and thus a necessary being, or of circularity.

The answer to the question 'why is there something rather than nothing?' is, simply, 'why wouldn't there be?' Both questions are equally valid.

I agree, I suspect the fault in the argument lies there rather than with P1. P1 is true merely because it is a disjunction, there are no independent beings.

 

[Santino]

Our understanding of existence is necessarily limited by our being part of existence.

You got an argument for that?

 

[EastEnder]

Our understanding of existence is necessarily limited by our being part of existence.

Specious rhetoric, imho.

 

[Knotted]

I think it is a mistake to assume that the question is strictly logical one. The terms in premises are not as clearly defined as you might think. What is a cause? What is a thing? You need to go to the physics before you can be clear. How does causality work when you have extreme gravitational forces such as in a black hole or presumably at the big bang?

Also is a thing the same thing from one moment to the next? If then the assumption of a finite number of things is surely false. How do we count "things"?

 

[Knotted]

Also be careful not to confuse a mechanistic cause with an explanation. The latter is not necessarily an example of the former.

 

[Knotted]

Our understanding of existence is necessarily limited by our being part of existence.

I'll join in the chorus of scepticism at about this. But I would add that even if you are right, it doesn't follow that the limits to our understanding affect this particular question. It might be rather that our understanding is necessarily limited when it comes to understanding high level constructions like the human brain but we are still fine at understanding low level questions of fundamental physics and cosmology.

 

[phildwyer]

The only proof of God's exıstence I'll accept ıs the ratıonal one.

 

[bhamgeezer]

I think it is a mistake to assume that the question is strictly logical one. The terms in premises are not as clearly defined as you might think. What is a cause? What is a thing? You need to go to the physics before you can be clear. How does causality work when you have extreme gravitational forces such as in a black hole or presumably at the big bang?

Also is a thing the same thing from one moment to the next? If then the assumption of a finite number of things is surely false. How do we count "things"?

I guess I would tend to simply define causation with a counterfactual where if A caused B then if not A then not B. I think it is strong inclination towards thinking about causation this way, and even in instances were this can't be established we presuppose some form of counterfactual dependence. I don't think it really matters if division of the finite set is arbitrary, I would happy to admit arbitrarily is the only way to divide things into causes and effects.

 

[Knotted]

I guess I would tend to simply define causation with a counterfactual where if A caused B then if not A then not B. I think it is strong inclination towards thinking about causation this way, and even in instances were this can't be established we presuppose some form of counterfactual dependence.

Three problems with this definition.

1) A quibble. You were talking about things and now you appear to be talking about truth statements. Not big problem, but it still needs sorting out.
2) Your definition is time independent, you could just as well have events in the future causing events in the present as you could have events in the past causing events in the present. Maybe you are happy with that, but then you should be careful about talking about "first causes".
3) Implicitly you are looking at all logically possible universes and checking whether not A is true and then checking if not B is true. How do you go about this? Counterfactual causality is seriously problematic.

I don't think itt really matters if division of the finite set is arbitrary, I would happy to admit arbitrarily is the only way to divide things into causes and effects.

I think it does matter if the set is infinite. But I'm not clear on what a "thing" is, so it's not clear if the set is finite or not.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

You got an argument for that?

Yes.

To begin with, I believe that Godel's incompleteness theorem is relevant here.

If you accept that mathematics is the best, most truthful way we have to describe the universe, which I would hope that you would, then you might also accept that Godel's theorem applies to our explanations of existence as much as to mathematics.

So, what is it in our systems of explanations of existence that are true but cannot be proved to be true with reference only to the system? What is the 'godel statement of existence'? It is, simply, that we know we exist, but we cannot prove it. We cannot know 'why' we exist. We cannot conceive such a thing as a 'first cause'. Or at least, we cannot say anything about it at all. We can know that such a thing must be true in order for existence to exist, but there is only silence when we attempt to talk about it, to say, for instance, whether or not the universe 'caused itself'. That would require knowledge from outside the system.

This renders all consideration of 'god' necessarily entirely empty. Applied to the principle of sufficient reason, it means that the only way we can make sense of such a principle is to accept that there has to be one cause that is true but we cannot prove to be true and work from there.

 

[Knotted]

Yes.

To begin with, I believe that Godel's incompleteness theorem is relevant here.

If you accept that mathematics is the best, most truthful way we have to describe the universe, which I would hope that you would, then you might also accept that Godel's theorem applies to our explanations of existence as much as to mathematics.

I don't think that mathematics is necessarily the best way to describe the universe. An historian describing the Napoleonic wars will not give a mathematical description of the Napoleonic wars. But the historian is nevertheless trying to describe the universe in some way. Mathematics is a tool for a certain purpose.

Further to that Godels theorem does not necessarily apply to all applications of mathematics (nor to all pure mathematics for that matter).

So, what is it in our systems of explanations of existence that are true but cannot be proved to be true with reference only to the system? What is the 'godel statement of existence'? It is, simply, that we know we exist, but we cannot prove it. We cannot know 'why' we exist. We cannot conceive such a thing as a 'first cause'. Or at least, we cannot say anything about it at all. We can know that such a thing must be true in order for existence to exist, but there is only silence when we attempt to talk about it, to say, for instance, whether or not the universe 'caused itself'. That would require knowledge from outside the system.

You've given an informal (non-mathematical) Godel statement after insisting on mathematics being the best description. Further to that your Godel statement is not even an informal version of a Godel statement but a parallel to an informal characterisation of what Godel's theorem states.

In short you need to construct a formal system that describes the universe and then construct a Godel statement within that formal system.

If you manage to do that, it would still not be clear why the incompleteness of our formal descriptions has anything to do with the fact of our existence.

This renders all consideration of 'god' necessarily entirely empty. Applied to the principle of sufficient reason, it means that the only way we can make sense of such a principle is to accept that there has to be one cause that is true but we cannot prove to be true and work from there.

I don't believe that any consideration of 'god' or the supernatural needs to be empty. If you have a hypothesis about god and god's affect on the world, then you can empirically test this hypothesis like any other. It is only the fact that god's supposed existence is shielded from empirical testing by the faithful that makes the god hypothesis entirely empty.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Further to that Godels theorem does not necessarily apply to all applications of mathematics (nor to all pure mathematics for that matter).

It applies to mathematics itself. That is the important point.

I think one actually could construct a formal system with the Godel statement as the 'first cause'. In fact, I am convinced of it.

I may give it a go at some point. My ability to do such things is limited unfortunately.

 

[southside]

Does this mean were all doomed and on our own, wondering around in a stupor for no reason?


I Think I'm finding myself drawn towards the religion of Christianity in an attempt to find inner peace and strength. I've bought a bible this morning and I'm turning to god to help me find the answers and to give me faith that one day will lead me into the everlasting light. I want to help people who are less fortunate than myself so I'm in the process of setting up a travelling music therapy class for disabled people and suffers of severe learning difficulties. Its time for me to step back from my selfishness and give something back.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I don't believe that any consideration of 'god' or the supernatural needs to be empty. If you have a hypothesis about god and god's affect on the world, then you can empirically test this hypothesis like any other.

As soon as you start testing a hypothesis empirically, you are no longer considering 'god' or 'supernature'. That is the whole point. You are bringing the cause into the natural realm, including your 'god' in the natural realm, if you like.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

If you manage to do that, it would still not be clear why the incompleteness of our formal descriptions has anything to do with the fact of our existence.

It's as close to the 'fact' of our existence as we can get. You're confusing reality with our consideration of reality. All we have access to, all we can actually talk about, is our consideration of reality.

 

[Knotted]

It applies to mathematics itself. That is the important point.

Strictly speaking, the original theorem applies to formalisations arithmetic ie. formal systems for describing statements about whole positive numbers such as the Peano axioms. (If I remember correctly).

I think one actually could construct a formal system with the Godel statement as the 'first cause'. In fact, I am convinced of it.

Personally, I see no reason to even have this as a hunch.

I may give it a go at some point. My ability to do such things is limited unfortunately.

The proof of Godel's theorem is constructive. You construct the Godel statement. I'm not seeing even an outline of how this construction works.

 

[Knotted]

As soon as you start testing a hypothesis empirically, you are no longer considering 'god' or 'supernature'. That is the whole point. You are bringing the cause into the natural realm, including your 'god' in the natural realm, if you like.

I don't think that follows at all. It's perfectly reasonable to posit supernatural explanations in some form or other. There is no particular reason to assume the universe is causally closed. You could hypothesise a god who intervenes in a certain way and you could say that there is no access to stuff that god is made of, and yet insist that this stuff nevertheless has certain effects on the stuff of our universe.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

Strictly speaking, the original theorem applies to formalisations arithmetic ie. formal systems for describing statements about whole positive numbers such as the Peano axioms. (If I remember correctly).
.

I'd need to go back to it to explain exactly how, but it is much more generalisable than that. It's something I'll have to refresh myself on, but Penrose talks about this in The Emperor's New Clothes.

 

[littlebabyjesus]

I don't think that follows at all. It's perfectly reasonable to posit supernatural explanations in some form or other. There is no particular reason to assume the universe is causally closed. You could hypothesise a god who intervenes in a certain way and you could say that there is no access to stuff that god is made of, and yet insist that this stuff nevertheless has certain effects on the stuff of our universe.

Nope. You're getting your terms confused here. By hypothesising this 'god', you are extending the universe to include it.

 

[Knotted]

It's as close to the 'fact' of our existence as we can get. You're confusing reality with our consideration of reality. All we have access to, all we can actually talk about, is our consideration of reality.

I don't think I'm making that confusion. The point that I am making is that just because 1+1=2 is a fact does not mean that this fact is a Godel statement.

Even worse there is the point that the Godel statement is dependent on the formal system that you use. The Godel statement may not be a Godel statement in a different formalisation. You can even include the Godel statement as one of your axioms (or an oracle if in the computational halting problem version) and it will thus become trivially true and provable.

 

[Knotted]

Nope. You're getting your terms confused here. By hypothesising this 'god', you are extending the universe to include it.

That depends on your definition of "universe". The point is rather that those who believe in the supernatural will have a different conception of what the universe is.