But scientifically they can't exist. That's why Dennett and his ilk must simply deny them--in the face of incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. This is the point at which the pretensions of science to objectivity become ludicrous.
Zizek: seems like a nob
- Thread starter el-ahrairah
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But scientifically they can't exist. That's why Dennett and his ilk must simply deny them--in the face of incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. This is the point at which the pretensions of science to objectivity become ludicrous.
No, this is the point at which science fails and history must be introduced.
Specifically, we must answer the question of why consciousness has come to seem implausible (to science) at this particular historical juncture. And that is a question that science can't even ask, let alone answer.
Mad4ziz
Member
Interesting. I would say not. Perhaps one could conceive in principle of a complete description of at least the melody up to just before the note in question, and then perhaps there is some form of Bayesian evolved predictive coding aspect in the subject's mind to predict what may come next. The quale would then be influenced by both the specific melody to date and the degree of error in the prediction. X remains, even after subtracting the past history and the Bayesian prediction moment to moment.
You're alright you are.
There is this debate and it get more and more bogged down with qualifications and contextualisations about qualia. I don't see the need for the concept, though. Do we really have units of experience which are then interpreted in a certain way? I think it's something more subtle than that. I don't think that what we perceive is some sort of definite thing which is then modified. Believing in qualia is a bit like believing in the geocentric model in astronomy - you have to add in epicycles to make it work.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
I think this is just a definitional problem. I don't conceive of qualia as some kind of preexisting qualities that appear in my consciousness. However, there is such a thing as 'redness' and 'blueness'. Now with musical notes, I think mad4ziz's idea about Bayesian predictive coding is very likely to be happening in some form or another, but also, the qualia of musical notes for anyone who does not have perfect pitch are relative - we hear 'higher'/'lower', but we do not have in our heads the quality 'Cness' or 'Asharpness' in the same way that we have the quality 'blueness' in our heads. This is different for people with perfect pitch, who do experience different notes as others would experience different colours.
As for the idea of 'believing in' qualia, that's not necessary. I would say that we cannot not believe in them. Sometimes I think some people - such as Dennett - think the word means more than it actually does. It is a problem associated with the hard problem of consciousness, certainly. Some people would deny that problem exists too.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
No. We always perceive colours, shades, shapes, everything in terms of its context.
But I don't see the problem with that. Could you not think of 'redness' as something like Wittgenstein's idea of a 'family' of things that conform to different words. I can sit here, close my eyes, and conjure up the idea 'redness'.
However, I don't have perfect pitch, so I cannot sit here and conjure up the idea 'Cflat'. I can only conjure up intervals between notes.
But I don't see the problem with that. Could you not think of 'redness' as something like Wittgenstein's idea of a 'family' of things that conform to different words. I can sit here, close my eyes, and conjure up the idea 'redness'.
However, I don't have perfect pitch, so I cannot sit here and conjure up the idea 'Cflat'. I can only conjure up intervals between notes.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
I think we're at crossed purposes, and defining qualia somewhat differently. I don't see the concept as an explanation of anything. It is simply a description of something - a part of the phenomenology of consciousness. So taking your cosmology analogy further, qualia are the observation - the phenomenon - that there are celestial bodies moving around. The explanation for that movement, whatever it may be, is something further.
You don't observe qualia, you experience them and given that we are trying to work out what consciousness and experience are, then surely qualia are supposed to be the building blocks of what constitute some sort of theory.
What is gained by talking about qualia? We can say we have experienced the qualia corresponding to a red dot on a blue background or we could just say that we have seen a red dot on a blue background. Are these two different observations?
What is gained by talking about qualia? We can say we have experienced the qualia corresponding to a red dot on a blue background or we could just say that we have seen a red dot on a blue background. Are these two different observations?
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
Yes, indeed. And that's where ideas such as those of Bjorn Merker come in. We construct our experience, generate it ourselves - but that includes the construction of the observer as well as the observed. We actually do observe qualia in our experience - because that's how our experience is constructed: with an observer and that which the observer is observing. Without both those elements, we wouldn't be able to do anything with our consciousness - we need to place ourselves in the scene as the one observing that cannot be observed - and the crucial point is that the whole thing is a self-generated construction, including the observer.
So, qualia are simply a part of the phenomenology of consciousness, and I defy anyone to come up with a phenomenology of consciousness that does not include them. You can't. They're there. We know they are there.
8ball
Maximum Facepalm
(that's all I have to say on that, though it's nice to see a philosophy thread that doesn't revolve entirely around silly word games)
8ball
Maximum Facepalm
No, and musicians make plenty of use of this, such as repeated phrases in solos that seem to vary when it is just the bass note on another instrument that is changing (cheap musical trick for making it sound like you're better at playing something than you really are
).
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
It's been highjacked by the scientistic types, that's why.
8ball
Maximum Facepalm
It's been highjacked by the scientistic types, that's why.
Empiricist bastards!!
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
Indeed, and here we need to remember that all the qualia in our experience are not 'out there' at all. They only exist 'in here'. They are self-generated. I actually think Knotted may be forgetting this. It's an easy thing to do.No, and musicians make plenty of use of this, such as repeated phrases in solos that seem to vary when it is just the bass note on another instrument that is changing (cheap musical trick for making it sound like you're better at playing something than you really are
TruXta
tired
Consciousness does not seem implausible to science at this juncture. Some people, like Denett and Churchland, want to define their way out of empirical questions. They are in the minority, besides, they're not scientists, they're philosophers. I know many scientists who study human consciousness for a living, through both experimental/quantitative and discursive/qualitative means, often in combination. You're spouting your usual mad, uninformed drivel as usual.
TruXta
tired
Forget about that hard constructionist stuff. It doesn't conform to what we know about the embodied/extended/materially grounded way that cognition works. Constructionism is a trivial consequence of our neurology (limited attention spans and senses) that simply means we have an incomplete picture of the world - we don't sense magnetism very much for example, so we leave that bit out of our experiential sphere. Doesn't mean that the world we experience is in any important sense NOT THE REAL WORLD. It's the only world we've got. Even if a convoluted theoretical argument can be constructed to claim that the really real REAL is not our real, it means the square root of fuck all to any reasonable attempt at finding out how things work i.e. science and social inquiry. It's a sideshow.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
What do you mean by 'materially grounded way that cognition works'? There is no way of telling from inside that what we're experiencing is really in response to input from our senses or an entirely self-constructed hallucination. The experience may be identical in both cases. That we generate our own models of reality and these models constitute experience is empirically important. That's not a sideshow at all. It's central.
How and where is this model constructed? That's a big question, imo, and Merker gives a possible solution, far from the usual idea - in the brainstem, in an area in which experience is built up in a topographically layered shape, specifically in the superior colliculus. IMO this kind of investigation is only made possible because Merker is thinking about consciousness in the right way.
How and where is this model constructed? That's a big question, imo, and Merker gives a possible solution, far from the usual idea - in the brainstem, in an area in which experience is built up in a topographically layered shape, specifically in the superior colliculus. IMO this kind of investigation is only made possible because Merker is thinking about consciousness in the right way.
TruXta
tired
You're already positing that all we experience is from inside our own Cartesian theatre. Begging the question in other words. And if the experience was identical, why this ontological posturing? It's like saying we could be the dream of a god, well yes, but why would it matter?
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
The point about the Cartesian theatre, imo, that is often missed is that both the play and the audience are our own constructions. I think sometimes theorists about consciousness underplay the importance of the actual lived experience that being conscious is and the phenomena of that experience.
An example of how this can help me at least to think about things: multiple personality disorder, or dissociative identity disorder. Recent research has shown that this can be far more than merely pretending to be different people, and a common trait to people exhibiting this very rare phenomenon is that they were abused before the age of 4. In other words, they were abused before the age at which the 'I' part of their experience had been fully constructed. In order to make sense of, say, 'dad the abuser' and 'dad the loving dad', two different, separate 'I's are constructed to deal with the different situations. This only makes sense when you think of both the observer and the observed in consciousness as constructions generated by us.
8ball
Maximum Facepalm
And the stage.
TruXta
tired
And right there you step right into Ryle's regress. You're taking the classic cognitivist stance that thought precedes action. I'm saying that not only can thought stem from action, but thoughts are actions taking place in the only reality there is. Thoughts are material actions taking place in a single commonly knowable world.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
Thoughts are actions. Sure. I agree with that. Consciousness doesn't require thoughts, though. Thoughts appear in consciousness, or at least representations of thoughts appear in consciousness, just like all the other phenomena there.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
Yes, and the stage. The whole damn theatre and everything in it.
TruXta
tired
See, I think this is a category error, pure and simple. Consciousness too is an action, a process, not a static entity. We sleep, we dream, we hallucinate, we become psychotic, entranced, what have you. These are all materially grounded events. It's not one unchanging thing called consciousness to which other things happen. Thoughts and the event of being conscious are on the same causal, epistemological and ontological level. Which isn't to say that there aren't varieties of consciousness or that it can't vary in strength and complexity. Like all matter, consciousness has phases - more or less solid, more or less durable and ordered, more or less at rest.
littlebabyjesus
one of Maxwell's demons
I agree. And finding out how the materially grounded event of consciousness occurs requires you, imo, to first understand what consciousness is and what it is for, and, crucially, what it is not and what it is not for. Consciousness of a thought is not thought. It is a model of 'thought'. Same goes for everything that appears in consciousness, including the subject of consciousness, the observer, itself. It is a story we tell, if you like, the first layer of memory. And that is what consciousness is for - no consciousness, no story.
TruXta
tired
I think if you replace "consciousness" with "metacognition" in your post there, lbj, that's all you need conceptually to start a reasoned inquiry into how consciousness works. As I see it what you are on about is our ability to think about thoughts, to be reflective, to recursively and purposively model states of affairs in our minds. That's a neat trick for sure, but it's just one among many neat tricks that evolution has produced. No need to accord it some kind of exalted metaphysical status and have the universe literally revolve around it.
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