Can you explain your reasoning on that?
This is an analysis that suggests that a state “welshing” on a national debt will cause a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to repay bonds. However, this is to confuse the issue of a possible effect on market confidence of an independent Scotland insisting it has no obligation to shoulder a share of a debt incurred by a separate legal entity, before it existed as an entity. [See posts above: should an entity which is said to be new and not able to inherit any agreements or treaties be expected to inherit any debts?] The argument is that by insisting that the debt was not Scotland’s but the rUK’s, Scotland’s credit rating with the so-called Big Three agencies would be damaged.
This is an assumption. First of all, national debt crises, such as Greece recently or Russia in the 90s, are based on debt those entities entered into themselves. Secondly, the calculations include the ability of a government to, theoretically, repay bonds on reaching maturity by through taxes if necessary. That means the number of bonds due to mature is included in the calculation (ie, not all of them). Furthermore, in reality, bonds work like insurance: they are actually issued against the other bonds in circulation.
In the cases of Russia and Greece, the problems were compounded because international bond holders were concerned that the currency of the bond issuer was declining to fast against their own currency. It’s an exchange rate loss. So, an American who held Russian bonds was concerned because the ruble was being kept artificially high, and worried that market pressure would cause it to plummet in relation to the dollar. An American holding Greek bonds would worry about the stability of the euro as against the dollar.
However, the underlying problems in both cases do not apply to a new Scotland seeking to open its accounts. The root Russian problem, for example, was a fiscal deficit caused by overreliance on the Asian market, which crashed impacting on Russian exports of crude oil and other minerals. This was added to the costs of the Chechen war.
These problems do not apply to the new Scotland. It is doubtful that the Big Three would downgrade the Scottish credit rating as much as that. Furthermore, the market does not slavishly follow these credit ratings, but makes up its own mind. It will take into account, for example, buying at the bottom, or the tax take of the new economy, and its balance of payments etc.
So it’s a consideration, but it really isn’t a case that refusing to accept a share of the UK debt would mean Scotland would be unable to raise bonds.
This is all hypothetical, though. And Salmond’s team do intend to accept a share of the UK debt, but it will – as one might expect – form a part of negotiations.
Anyway, if there are any more questions, I hope an actual SNP supporter, or someone who supports their policies, will take up the case in future. I’ve said quite enough.
Please remember that supporting independence is not the same as supporting the SNP. And furthermore, there is no such thing as a state that does not in some way relinquish or pool some degree of its sovereignty. Seeking to do so over currency does not mean that there would be no sovereignty left worth having. That is a stupid, reductive, and uniformed equation. If that were the case, the current UK may as well throw the towel in, as it pools sovereignty in a number of areas; it is impossible not to.