UK Inquiry Module 2: Decision-making & political governance

[elbows]

The evidence sessions for this module start today, with remarks from the chair, another likely harrowing video, and then opening statements.

The timetable of whose giving evidence is published one week at a time, and can be found here: Module 2 public hearings timetable - UK Covid-19 Inquiry

Live streams on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/@UKCovid-19Inquiry

I havent got much time at the moment, unsure how much I can cover things, and this will probably vary a lot by day/week.

 

[elbows]

The opening video included two families who have children that have ended up with profound disabilities as a result of long covid.

The lead counsel is now going through an overview of what happened. Included a bunch of death and hospitalisation figures, some of which I will quote later. And an overview of the sequence of events and their timing back in those early months of 2020 - stuff that will be too long for me to quote. Simply no way I can cover all this stuff comprehensively since it wil end up including so much of what we discussed as events unfolded and I cant repeat all of that again. I will still cherrypick some particualr bits though.

He also mentioned some of the witnesses we will hear from in this module for various reasons, including Gove, Badenoch, Patel, Sunak, Johnson.

 

[elbows]

The lead counsel has provided all sorts of snippets of evidence we will hear in this module. There will be no shortage of explosive quotes. It will take weeks to hear all these in their proper context but I will still quote many of these initial snippets later, once the transcript is available for today.

Themes will include London lockdown, Johnsons attitude and flip-flopping as well as his undesirable traits when dealing with a viral pandemic, SAGE being used as a human shield. Cummings chucking grenades around, Vallance diary entries, a shitload of Whatsapp messages including plenty that feature Sunak. Number 10 chaos, at war with itself. Herd immunity. Hancock held in low regard. The role of the treasury.

 

[elbows]

They will dedicate plenty of attention to what difference earlier lockdowns could have made, as well as the various downsides of lockdown. The theme of having to lockdown for longer because we were late has already been mentioned in todays opening remarks, as has the difficult balancing act. I'm not sure how neatly I'll be able to discuss these themes this time, especially given how much time I spent going on about that stuff at the time. If I cant cover it properly during these sessions due to time constraints and the amount of more sensational and political evidence, I guess I'll have to go back months later to review this side of the evidence, and I might not get round to that till 2024.

The hideous misjudgement of how many weeks behind Italy we were has also come up in a few times in the lead counsels opening remarks today. Thats another one that I went on about rather a lot at the time, but this time we'll get more of an inside view as to the extent that them eventually realising they had got those timing estimates all wrong led to policy u-turns on certain days in March 2020.

Today has already included far more quotable things than I had expected.

As with the previous module, I'm not going to be able to quote all the stuff from bereaved families properly, and reducing it to soundbites doesnt seem right, so people will have to read that stuff directly for themselves.

 

[two sheds]

I've been trying to find sites that do transcripts of youtube videos - would that help (if you don't actually use one)? Youtube themselves show transcripts in the right hand column (three dots just below bottom right of the video>show transcript) but I don't seem to be able to c&p them.

 

[elbows]

Cheers but I'd rather use the official transcripts anyway. And unlike the last module where I had time to watch all the streams, I'll often have to resort to skimming the transcripts this time.

 

[two sheds]

Ah of course sorry.

 

[elbows]

Todays quotes from evidence to come included the words bollocks, shit and fucked.

The bollocks one was Johnson calling long covid bollocks in October 2020 and comparing it to gulf war syndrome.

 

[elbows]

Transcript: https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/w...3442/2023-10-03-Module-2-Day-1-Transcript.pdf

Pages 19 & 20:

Covid has been compared by some to seasonal flu in its effect. In a bad flu year, around 30,000 people in the United Kingdom die from flu and pneumonia, with a loss of around 250,000 life years, and that's in a context, of course, in which there are few or no social restrictions or non-pharmaceutical interventions put into place to control transmission.
That figure is one sixth of the 1.5 million life years lost to Covid in the first year of the pandemic, despite the extensive non-pharmaceutical interventions which were, as we know, put into place.
Those figures expose the underlying reality. Once infected, death was, for that desperate minority, inevitable. But infection was not inevitable. The figures show a massive difference in mortality rates between the United Kingdom and, for example, South Korea. The overarching question for you in this module will be whether the massive casualties of the first and second waves were the direct result of a plain and obvious failure to put in place proper infection control across the country. Why was that so, if that is what you conclude?

 

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Pages 28 & 29 mention an email from Woolhouse on January 25th 2020 to chief medical officers:

"If you were to put those numbers into an epidemiological model for Scotland (and many other countries) you would likely predict that, over about a year, at least half the population will become infected, the gross mortality rate will triple (more at the epidemic peak) and the health system will become completely overwhelmed. We can formalise those predictions (and there are many caveats to them) but those are the ballpark numbers based on information from [the World Health Organisation]. Please note that this is NOT a worst case scenario, this is based on WHO's central estimates and currently available evidence. The worst case scenario is considerably worse. "There are very good reasons to suppose it might not be as bad as that, but we need additional evidence ...to move the dial on those predictions."

 

[elbows]

It appears that Hancock has used 'we didnt know about asymptomatic transmission' as an excuse for some of his big failings, but they have already found a few examples of evidence that demonstrated some knowledge of asymptomatic transmission well before the periods he uses it as an excuse for.

One such example is the Diamond Princess cruide ship, and the following is from page 39:

Of the some 2,600 passengers and the 1,000 crew, over 500 people became infected, but the significance of the Diamond Princess for these purposes is that early reports showed that around 18% of the people who had become infected had showed no symptoms.

More on Hancock later.

 

[elbows]

Vallances diary is going to come up plenty. Here are some initial snippets as disclosed in the lead counsels opening statement:

Pages 45-46:

Professor Vallance, the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, wrote evening notes every night or most nights during the pandemic in which he set down his thoughts from those extremely difficult and troubling days. He's provided a copy of those notes, his diary, quite properly to this Inquiry. In his notes for 7 May 2020, he makes this observation:
"Ministers try to make the science give the answers rather than them making decisions."

A diary entry from 10 June 2020 from Professor Vallance records:
"I am [worried] that a 'SAGE is trouble' vibe is appearing in No 10."
It may even be the government selected on occasion from SAGE what it wanted.
There is a: "Paper from No 10/[Cabinet Office] for 1[metre]/2[metre] review. Some person has completely rewritten the science advice as though it isthe definitive version. They have just cherry picked. Quite extraordinary ..."

Page 48:

The diaries of Sir Professor Vallance speak of SAGE and the CMO and the CSA being positioned as human shields.

 

[elbows]

It was obvious to outsiders at the time that March 12th-March 16th type time period marked a turning point. The original 'do little' plan and timing went down the toilet during that period. It appears that there will be plenty of evidence from that period. The first thing that came up is:

Page 53:

At a meeting on 13 March, at a meeting of SAGE, in fact, at the offices of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the director of BIT wrote in his notebook: "WE ARE NOT READY."
A Number 10 adviser, equally concerned, leaned over, crossed out "NOT READY" and wrote "Fucked!".
The issue for you will be whether, using different terminology, that was a fair reflection of the government's position.

 

[elbows]

Press reporting that Sunak wasnt able to hand over his Whatsapp messages due to switching phones several times has come up on the Sunak thread, so I stuck the quotes from the lead counsels opening statement about that over there: #669

 

[elbows]

I'm not going to be able to do the timeline for the crucial period justice, or the opening remarks about herd immunity and whether it was policy, proper justice without quoting far too much of it to sensibly put here. So please forgive the somewhat disjointed cherrypicking in the next few posts.

There is mention on page 59 of the traditional shit pandemic plan (a big focus of inquiry module 1), and how it lead to a March 3rd document about this "Contain, Delay, Mitigate, Research" strategy.

On page 60:

We all recall the expressions "flattening the curve", "reducing the peak", "squashing the sombrero", a phrase used by Mr Johnson on 12 March, but they all meant the same thing: trying to reduce the very worst ravages of the virus, as opposed to trying to retain or get back control. Was this publication a reflection of that attempt just to manage the virus, as opposed to trying to achieve a rapid reduction of the reproduction rate to suppressing the virus?

Later some opinions of that document is mentioned on page 64:

On 3 March, the report -- the publication to which I've referred you -- was published. An adviser in Number 10, Ben Warner, who was provided with a draft, asked:
"This is a comms plan, where is the real plan?"
A member of the DHSC press group sent a WhatsApp saying:
"What are we doing to contain, what are we doing to delay, what are we doing to research, what are we doing to mitigate?"

 

[elbows]

Pages 63-64:

On Sunday, 1 March the EFL Cup Final was played Wembley and 82,000 people attended. On 2 March, the Prime Minister chaired a COBR meeting for the first time. The World Health Organisation raised its alert to "very high". The total number of cases in England is 37.
Mr Cummings texts Lee Cain, the Director of Communications in Number 10. The text reads: "The PM doesn't think it's a big deal; [he] doesn't think anything can be done, and his focus is elsewhere; he thinks it will be like swine flu and thinks his main danger is taking the economy into a slump."
My Lady, is that simply an egregious piece of opinion hearsay or was it, albeit through the distorted lens of a text, a fair reflection of the Government's thinking at that time?

Page 66, Hancock and his bullshit about asymptomatic cases:

On 11 March, Liverpool played Atletico Madrid at Anfield, 52,000 supporters were in attendance. According to Mr Johnson, in his witness statement, the Secretary of State for the Department of Health and Social Care, Mr Hancock, briefed Cabinet that:
"... without symptoms [it was] highly unlikely someone was suffering from coronavirus."

 

[elbows]

Page 67 and 68. On 12 March WHO declares a pandemic. And Cummings evidence says that on this day:

Downing Street was, according to Mr Cummings, distracted by reports in the press concerning Mr Johnson's personal life.

And then the next day (a day I always go on about because it was clear at the time that the traditional approach was falling apart, even though fucking Nick Triggle of the BBC was telling us to keep calm and carry on):

At a tense and heated 13th meeting of SAGE on Friday, 13 March, National Health Service England representatives are asked whether there is any way the NHS could cope with the number of hospitalisations being envisaged under any of the mitigation scenarios falling short of a lockdown, previously reviewed by SAGE.
There's division as to whether suppression is viable because, as soon as lockdown is lifted the virus will come back like the uncoiled spring. But the minutes record SAGE's view that owing to a five to seven-day lag in data provision for modelling, it now believes there are more cases in the United Kingdom than it previously expected at this point and we may, therefore, be further forward on the epidemic curve.

A senior Cabinet official comes through to Number 10 from the Cabinet Office to tell officials:
"... I think this country's [headed] for a disaster, I think we're going to kill thousands of people."

That evening a discussion takes place between a number of Number 10 officials and advisers. One of them, Ben Warner, argues that the strategy is required to be changed from one of mitigation to one of suppression, because the modelling shows that, unless the Government changes course urgently, the NHS will be overwhelmed. On a whiteboard, the Prime Minister's Chief Adviser, Mr Cummings, writes:
"Must avoid NHS collapse. To stop NHS collapse, we will probably have to lock down."
That meeting agrees that the Government has to be advised to introduce a national lockdown as a matter of urgency.

 

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Pages 75-76:

A final issue in relation to lockdown is whether it should have been imposed earlier. Evidence of the possible collapse in the NHS appears to have started becoming available from around 9 March, but lockdown wasn't imposed until the 23rd, allowing for the necessary time to put appropriate arrangements into place. The issue for you is whether there was avoidable delay.

On 12 March a text from Mr Cummings read: "We've got big problems coming. The [Cabinet Office] is terrifyingly shit. No plans. Totally behind the pace. We must announce today, not next week 'if you feel ill with cold or flu, stay home'. Some around the system want to delay because they haven't done the work. We must force the pace. We're looking at 100 to 500,000 deaths between optimistic and pessimistic scenarios."

The then Cabinet Secretary wondered on 12 March whether the Prime Minister should "go on [television] tomorrow and explain to people the herd immunity plan and that it's like old chickenpox parties". The then Prime Minister was heard to wonder whether the virus should just be allowed to "let rip".

I've still got plenty left to quote, I will continue on Wednesday.

 

[elbows]

Much later, on page 158 when the bereaved families Scotland representative was giving their opening remarks, they quoted the same 'cabinet office is terrifyingly shit' text from Cummings but made it clear that this was a text Cummings sent to Johnson at 7.48am on the 12th March.

Then on page 159 they mention that:

On 14 March Dominic Cummings said to the Prime Minister, "You're going to have to lock down but there is no lockdown plan, it does not exist, SAGE haven't modelled it, the Department of Health and Social Care don't have a plan".

 

[elbows]

Page 80 of yesterdays transcript:

The disharmony between Number 10 and the Department of Health and Social Care is apparent from the WhatsApps and diary entries.

Pages 85 & 86:

A significant number of WhatsApp and diary entries refer to Mr Hancock. It appears to be the case that the Prime Minister and a number of officials and advisers held him in low regard, in particular on account of an apparent tendency, to use their words, to get overexcited and then "make stuff up". The WhatsApps and diary entries contained multiple references to Mr Johnson's loss of confidence in Mr Hancock and to a general belief that he was less than candid when informing Number 10 and the Cabinet of progress that he and his department were apparently making.

What of the Department of Health and Social Care? It was the lead government department. Was it equipped for such a role in the far-reaching crisis that Covid presented? Was there adequate leadership? Did it try to hold onto too many responsibilities. Was the department, as Dominic Cummings has suggested publicly, a "smoking ruin" and in crisis itself?

 

[elbows]

The Cabinet Office....

Page 82:

What about Cabinet? Mr Cummings -- and his general level of objectivity will be a matter that you'll have to determine -- observed that it was not the place for serious discussion or decisions. It was a rubber-stamp, the main function of which was to function as political theatre. Perhaps more importantly, he says Cabinet committees were scripted. Ministers were given scripts to read out and conclusions were drafted in advance so problems were simply not grappled with.

Ironically, you may conclude that Mr Cummings was himself a source of instability and contributed to the undermining of that very same Cabinet. After he left, one regular attendee at Cabinet, though not a minister, observed:
"Cabinet is more effective post [Dominic Cummings]." You will have to assess the truth of these claims.

Page 84:

Mr Cummings suggests in his written statement that the Cabinet Office was bloated at senior levels with poor lines of responsibility, huge numbers of comms and engagement staff but too few civil servants who could drive priorities.
The Cabinet Office, he says, was effectively replaced by the 8.15 am meeting between officials and Special Political Advisers in Number 10. At the same time, he says, the private office of Number 10 was too small to compensate for the shortcomings of the DHSC and the Cabinet Office. He says the Cabinet Office was a failure. But perhaps he would say that, as the Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister.

Pages 84-85:

In any event, the WhatsApp messages between Messrs Johnson, Cummings and others portray a depressing picture of a toxic atmosphere, factional infighting and internecine attacks on colleagues.
A text from Simon Case, then a senior civil servant, yet to become Cabinet Secretary, to Matt Hancock on 29 April reads:
"The Cabinet Office is a totally dysfunctional mess at present, so not a great place to be!"

Mr Cummings' emails on the 13 July:
"The current [Cabinet Office] doesn't work for anyone -- it's high friction, low trust, and [obviously] many good parts but overall low performance ... friction is [built] into the system including institutional friction between [Number 10] and the [Cabinet Office]."

Sir Patrick Vallance notes in his evening notes: "[Number 10] chaos as usual.
"On Friday the [2-metre] rule meeting made it abundantly clear that no one in [Number 10] or [the Cabinet Office] had really read or taken time to understand the science advice on [2 metres]. Quite extraordinary."
On 11 November, reporting in his diary something said by the then Cabinet Secretary, he says: "... Number 10 is at war with itself -- a Carrie faction (with Gove) & another with SPADs downstairs. PM is caught in the middle. He [the Cabinet Secretary] has spoken to all his predecessors as [Cabinet Secretary] and no one has seen anything like it."

Pages 86-87:

The attitude within Government towards a public inquiry may also be of relevance. Sir Patrick Vallance's diary records the Cabinet Secretary as saying that any:
"Inquiry should go on for a decade or more [he] wants someone like Saville to chair it and keep it going forever", a reference obviously to the duration of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.

 

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Johnson. Pages 87-90:

You will also need to consider the issue of leadership. The evidence of some witnesses may show that the character and operating style of Mr Johnson and his team created instability and exacerbated some of the pre-existing structural and cultural issues and tensions. Some of this may have been deliberate, perhaps even beneficial. But some of it, it's a matter entirely for you, stemmed perhaps from Mr Johnson's own character. Was his decision-making style antithetic to effective and speedy decision-making?

He has already in the press, notoriously, been described as a trolley, liable to career off in unexpected directions. Witnesses and texts and WhatsApps and diary entries speak repeatedly of flip-flopping, of him ignoring problems then U-turning, of poor and delayed decision making and of oscillation.
Some witnesses will say he had a tendency to say different things to different people, to reverse settled decisions and to be heavily influenced by pressure from parts of the media.
These are perhaps, my Lady, undesirable traits to have when dealing with the demands of a viral pandemic. They are matters for you.

Sir Patrick's diary contains entries such as:
"This flip-flopping is impossible, one minute do more, next do nothing.
"He doesn't seem to push actions or resolutions.
"Morning PM meeting, wants everything normal by September and only deal with things locally and regionally. He is now completely bullish about opening everything -- as [another person] said it is so inconsistent. It is like bipolar decision-making."

Then this, on 19 September, the crux or the time when the argument over circuit breakers was raging:
"He is all over the place and completely inconsistent. You can see why it was so difficult to get agreement to lock down first time.

His ability to manage those around him may also be an issue. Could he build -- did he build a high performance team? Did he take the role in which he was placed seriously enough? Witnesses cite his ignoring of advice not to shake hands, his failure, due perhaps to his libertarian tendencies, to restrict mass gatherings and the obvious continuation of Government business in person. Was he in those terrible early days overly dismissive of the threat faced by the United Kingdom?

Although he was not obliged to chair COBR, which was and was just as easily chaired by Matt Hancock MP as the Secretary of State to the lead government department, the Prime Minister did not chair the COBR meetings of 24 and 29 January and 4 and 12 and 18 February. Was an opportunity to demonstrate leadership lost? He first chaired COBR on Monday, 2 March, just three weeks before the national lockdown was imposed.

Moreover, there's the difficult issue of whether, as one witness suggests, his attention in February, that most crucial of events, was diverted elsewhere. Brexit Day, the resignation of Sajid Javid MP and the reshuffle that followed, Storm Dennis, his personal issues concerning half-term holiday, the finalisation of his divorce, the announcement of Carrie Symonds' pregnancy on 29 February, and the IOPC investigation into allegations made against him by another have all already been publicly ventilated. To what extent, if at all, is any of that relevant to his leadership of our country in those weeks?

 

[elbows]

Public Health England, page 90:

Turning to, finally, some of the other important Government bodies, what of the Public Health England agency? It's been described by witnesses as leaderless and totally dysfunctional. A 3 June entry by Sir Patrick records:
"Quad call [that's a ministerial quad call] exposed the massive internal operational mess inside DHSC and PHE. Getting something done is almost impossible."

Sunak and the treasury, page 87:

You will need to explore the role of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury in relation to decision-making. Did it carry out and share sufficient economic analyses? Did it balance its approach with other trade-offs? How far, to what extent, did it push Downing Street beyond that which the analysis would support?

More on Sunak later.

 

[elbows]

Schools, pages 95-97:

the issue of school closures and the obvious impact on schools and educational prospects of the lockdowns will be addressed in detail in a later module, but it's necessary to look briefly at how the decision on schools came to be considered and decided by Number 10. This is because, from a relatively early stage, the possibility of closing schools was discussed by SAGE and civil servants. It was discussed repeatedly at SAGE and SPI-M-O meetings in February, and the possibility of shutting schools was contained in the "Contain, Delay, Mitigate" plan of 3 March. The Department of Education had been represented at the SAGE meetings and had had access to the papers. It's a matter for you whether proper plans or impact assessments were drawn up.

Very late in the day, however, around 16 March, the Department of Education was asked to consider closure and to write an advice overnight for the Prime Minister. Gavin Williamson MP, in his written statement, describes that process as discombobulating. He did agree with closing schools but disagreed when the date for introducing attendance restrictions was brought forward to 23 March instead of from the end of the Easter holidays.
There is an issue for you as to the extent to which guidance was properly prepared and published. That, as I say, is for a later module. But why was there a sudden change in Downing Street around 16 March, and why was more advance thought not given to this possibility?

Schools were not closed during the second lockdown. The Department of Education was, it seems, very resistant in mid-December to letting schools close early for the holidays. Mr Williamson advised that schools should remain open, which increased testing, and the issue was vigorously debated, but in the very early days of January there was what was described by him as "a panic decision". There was a very late decision, as you'll recall, to close schools. Some pupils returned for the first day of term and were then sent home.

So in this module, what was the thinking in Number 10? The material shows that some officials sought to dress up the change of position between 29 December and 1 January as being the result of new evidence and data, despite the fact that the two decisions, diametrically opposed as they were, had been taken just two days apart.

 

[elbows]

I'm still catching up with quoting from the opening statements, let alone the evidence sessions which began thereafter. Will try to catch up to the current state of play by the end of Monday. There are no 'big name' political etc witnesses scheduled for this weeks evidence sessions, they have started off with various experts and advocates.

So, still on day ones transcript:

Page 98:

Turning to the exit from lockdown 1 and back to the chronology and Eat Out to Help Out, restrictions were eased over late spring and the early summer of 2020, but there was a growing political and press pressure for a complete lifting of restriction, and the order and timing of the lifting of restrictions became ever more a political decision.

A divide opened up between the advice from SAGE and the preparedness of government to keep restrictions in place. On 21 March Sir Patrick's diary recorded:
"SAGE position maintained and clear but [Chancellor of the Exchequer] really pushing for more ... Simon Case [who was then still a very senior civil servant not yet Cabinet Secretary] commented it was like children pushing their parents to see how far they could go without being smacked. Totally inappropriate way for the politicians to go on and puts SAGE in a terrible position."

Page 99:

Sir Patrick's diaries reflect a growing level of concern at the government's approach. 9 July:
"PM cancelled the big announcement and has gone more cautious ... PM is simply not consistent. (as he wasn't at the beginning)."
13 July: "The ridiculous flip flopping is getting worse ..."
28 July: "[The Chief Medical Officer] and I are both worried about the extreme inconsistency from [the Prime Minister]. Lunching from open everything to panic."

 

[elbows]

Then Eat Out To Help Out. They are going to cop out on the matter of whether the inquiry itself can conclude that this scheme increased infections directly (although this will still come up), so instead will focussing more ont he angler of whether it sent mixed messages in terms of public health communication efforts and resulting public behaviour.

Pages 100-101:

The Inquiry will be hearing from the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Sunak MP, on this. Treasury advance a number of arguments.

A second wave, they say, was always anticipated and it is unfair and wrong to attribute blame for that second wave from Eat Out to Help Out.

Most importantly, perhaps, the Treasury argues that the scheme and the re-opening of the hospitality sector did not have any noticeable impact on the rates of infection. The evidence on this is not clear. Some other evidence suggests there was an increase. But the conflict may not be easier to resolve and we don't invite you to do so. The lack of clear evidence one way or the other means that you'd only ever have quite a weak foundation from which to draw any conclusions and recommendations. But there is a wider important point: did the scheme send out the wrong message to the public, with the consequence that other ongoing measures were indirectly weakened?

On 24 August Mr Hancock sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Case, still then the Second Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office:
"Just want to let you know directly that we have had lots of feedback that Eat Out to Help Out is causing problems in our intervention areas. I've kept it out of the news but it's serious. So please please let's not allow the economic success of the scheme to lead to its extension."

So in relation to the aftermath of the first national lockdown, was the lockdown lifted in the most appropriate way? How effective were the local restrictions that were introduced in England? Were the local restrictions and differences between them the most effective way of managing the virus? What was the impact in terms of messaging of the Eat Out to Help Out scheme?

 

[elbows]

Sunak continues to feature as they move on to the rise of the second wave.

Page 102:

At a Cabinet meeting on 8 September there was a robust debate over segmentation, that's to say shielding for segments of the population and allowing the virus to move through the population otherwise, also the merits of the rule of group of six and red teaming and herd immunity. Some ministers stated that things should be opened up, in particular the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Chief Medical Officer noted that if the government waited for deaths to increase before it took action, that would inevitably result in a substantial number of deaths.

The Prime Minister's view was that the government had known for a long time that a second peak was coming and was as well placed as it could be.

The rule of six was introduced on 9 September. It's unclear to what extent SAGE was sighted on the merits of that proposal.
Professor Vallance noted: "What a week - feels like Feb/March...strikes me that the delay in introducing the new rules until Monday is exactly what they did in March. Why delay??"

 

[elbows]

And then the meeting which deliberately included some contrarian shitheads. A meeting which I believe sections of the press said was encouraged by Sunak. But apparently he doesnt recall much about it, funny that.

Pages 103-104:

By the 16th it was noted that infections were doubling and admissions to hospital had gone up by 100% since the beginning of September. The Prime Minister indicated he wanted to explore, however, a range of views from different scientists before final decisions were taken. A meeting was set up for the following Sunday, 20 September.

On 18 September, Mr Case told Mr Hancock "the firebreak idea is gaining traction" with the Prime Minister, but later in the day he advised: "[The Prime Minister] wants to double down [instead] on present strategy ... tougher local lockdown/enforcement, warning [measures] about what happens if people don't follow the rules."

On Sunday 20 September the meeting to which I've referred took place, chaired by Mr Case and attended by the Prime Minister, the CMO, the CSA, and Professors Edmunds, Gupta and Heneghan, Dr Anders Tegnell, from Sweden, and Professor Dame Angela McLean, the Deputy Government Chief Scientific Adviser, also attended. The Chancellor also attended, but he says in his written statement he doesn't have strong recollections of that precise discussion.

Professor Edmunds' evidence is that he tried to point out that the epidemic was increasing exponentially and harsh measures would have to be introduced soon to stop the NHS from being overwhelmed. He says for him the decision was not not to lock down or not, but to lock down now or be forced into locking down later. His arguments were not accepted.

Mr Johnson says in his own written statement that whilst he greatly respected Professor Edmunds' views, he had always put him at the gloomier end of the spectrum and he had wanted to give the Rule of Six a chance to work and to hear some alternative views.

Then we had the spectacle of Whitty and Vallance having to do their own press conference without Johnson, so I dont find Johnsons evidence about that period very convincing.

Page 105:

At a presentation on 21 September, the CMO and CSA warned that at the current estimated rate of doubling, there could be 50,000 cases a day by mid-October.

The 58th SAGE meeting on that day considered a paper addressing the effectiveness and harms of different non-pharmaceutical interventions. It noted that the incidence of Covid was increasing across all the country and that the effect of opening schools had only just begun to affect that increase. A package of stringent interventions would be needed to be adopted. In his written statement, the Prime Minister suggests that the advice in that meeting was "not pushed on me very hard".

In a statement to Parliament on 22 September, he instead set out new national restrictions, including working from home, table service extensions in pubs, bars and restaurants, a closure of hospitality venues at 10 pm, extended requirements on face coverings and a maximum of 15 at wedding ceremonies and receptions. There is a debate about the extent to which SAGE would ever have recommended a 10 pm curfew, because it was of the view that it would be likely to have, in any event, only a marginal impact.

 

[elbows]

Concluding that 2nd lockdown buildup stuff...

Pages 105-106:

On 8 October, the Prime Minister gave a press conference at which the three tier system was announced, and one issue for this module is the practical wisdom of those measures. They were complex, politically divisive, and they led to considerable public confusion.

A WhatsApp from Mr Cummings read: "This is a shitshow. We should have gone a month ago as we said."

At a meeting on 25 October, an argument began before the Prime Minister, to use the words of the proponents of one side of the argument, "let it rip - they have had a good innings", and the contrary argument was put that a democratically elected government's primary obligation was to save lives. The Prime Minister acknowledged that it was "a complete shambles" but that he really didn't want to have to enter another national lockdown. He was told that if he went down the route of not imposing a lockdown, he would need to tell people that he was going to allow them to die.

I havent had a chance to check but it would make much more sense if the 'September' in the following was supposed to read 'October':

On 30 September, Sir Simon Stevens, head of the NHS, reported that hospitals would be overrun in every part of England. The decision to lock down was made but the decision leaked and the announcement was brought forward. There would be a lockdown from 5 November.

 

[elbows]

The rest of the lead counsels opening remarks arent especially quotable because specific evidence isnt quoted from. Alpha (Kent) variant and the third lockdown is mentioned, along with whether they delayed that decision too much. Barnard castle and partygate and the extent to which these undermined public confidence and adherence to measures are other themes.

The question of how fairly the rules were enforced is mentioned, and there are some quotable figures on that theme:

Page 111:

There is some evidence that the majority of fixed penalty notices were given to men. Three-quarters of them were issued to white people, but proportionately people from ethnic minorities were 2.3 times more likely than white people to receive one in England and 2.8 times more likely to receive one in Wales.

Fines were also issued more frequently to people living in disadvantaged communities. Fixed penalty notice recipients were 7.2 times more likely to be living in one of the most economically deprived areas of England and Wales than one of the least disadvantaged areas during the first lockdown. So an issue for you is: how fairly were the rules enforced?

At times there are also obvious signs that inquiries like this are still very much part of the establishment. I already mentioned the Eat Out to Help Out cop out, but theres other 'generous framing' near the end of the opening remarks too. eg:

Pages 112-113:

no government is expected to be or can be perfect in its response. No amount of skill, resource or judgement guarantees that mistakes will not be made. Was there a limit -- it will be a matter for you -- to what this government, any government, could do in the face of an organism, a virus, that exists only to infect, spread, maim and kill?
This was doubly so when one considers the evidence that you've heard in Module 1 as to the lack of preparedness. Different elected leaders may also have drawn different conclusions as to how to balance the extremely complex ethical, public health, social and economic challenges posed by a lethal pandemic.
Some countries comparable to the United Kingdom imposed lockdowns yet suffered lower levels of death. Other countries fared worse. So comparison may therefore only be drawn with caution. Some may say the United Kingdom was probably in the middle of the pack. But that brings no solace to the bereaved.

In any event, your task is surely to ensure that the government does better next time. The Inquiry also does not intend to enquire through the distorted lens of hindsight. As Anthony Hidden Queen's Counsel, later Mr Justice Hidden, remarked in the Inquiry into the Clapham rail disaster inquiry: "There is almost no human action or decision that cannot be made to look more flawed and less sensible in the misleading light of hindsight."
So, of course, in the particular context of the lockdown decision-making, counterfactual scenarios must be treated with particular caution.

Yuck. All the same, they are still going to ask some of the difficult questions. Including some big questions which frankly it wasnt that hard to know the answers to at the time, with no hindsight or insider info required:

Pages 114-115:

Was there a failure to appreciate the early reports from China, of the Diamond Princess, of the medical journal reports? Were the consequences of the likely lack of any control adequately understood? Was there a failure to direct the putting into place on a crisis basis of mass testing and surveillance systems? Was there a general failure on the part of government to appreciate until 13 and 16 March the true nature of the likely explosion in cases and deaths and that this would lead to the collapse of the NHS? Was there a mistaken assumption that delaying and suppressing the peak would have the collateral benefit of bringing about herd immunity?

Was there, as a result, no early consideration given to how to suppress the virus and to try to keep or regain control? Was there a failure of process?
Ministers claimed to be following the science, but did they probe and analyse it sufficiently? Did they allow themselves to believe that the pandemic could be withstood and contained without more urgent action? Was there a failure to obtain and consider specialist non-scientific advice along with the advice from SAGE? Was there a sufficiently effective and robust system for decision-making? Was a proactive strategy adopted and pursued?

Finally, was there a failure of leadership and decision-making? Was there an absence of leadership?
The Inquiry will enquire into whether the government demonstrated sufficient leadership when it came to the events of March 2020, the first lockdown, the reemergence of the virus in September to October, and the second lockdown in November 2020. The question for you will be whether any of those lockdowns became necessary as a result of any earlier failures, if you find them to be established. And also you will need to examine the timings of those lockdowns. Were they the result of prevarication by government?

The various bereaved families groups legal representatives opening statements for this module do include some quotable parts, so I shall move on to those later today.