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The Islamic state

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's blog The Islamic State: Baqiya?
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Nonetheless, presumptions that the Islamic State will vanish with territorial defeat are naïve. While Adnani's reference to the desert may seem vague, there are certainly large desert spaces in the border areas between Iraq and Syria (e.g. the Anbar-Deir az-Zor areas) where the Islamic State's remaining core leadership can operate and manoeuvre even if it loses all towns under its control. Prospects of the Coalition or others clearing out and securing these vast spaces remain very remote, and they thus constitute the true "fallback" for the Islamic State.

As far as the nature of operations is concerned, we already have models for what "post-Islamic State" looks like, which suggests the organisation will not die with loss of territory. In Iraq's eastern province of Diyala, for instance, the Islamic State has not controlled any towns for more than two years, yet there are constant reports of sleeper cells and security incidents like IED attacks, car bombings and attacks on security positions, with some areas having to be cleared out multiple times. In this case, there is no doubt that the Islamic State partly plays on sectarian fault lines in the province, undermining the Iranian-backed Badr-led security order.

Beyond Diyala, reports are emerging of the "return" of the Islamic State to areas where the organisation had lost territorial control such as Tikrit. Many of the problems here stem from general plagues in Iraq's present-day order that transcend sectarian boundaries, such as poor management of security checkpoints that allow would-be Islamic State bombers to pass through as well as widespread corruption, which might, for instance, allow real Islamic State operatives to escape from detention through bribing the local security forces. Though the Islamic State has recruited people from all over the world, personnel records recovered in Iraq show the organisation within that country remains thoroughly local in its manpower base, allowing personnel to blend into the population.
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Shrinking but almost certainly remaining. Maintaining residual support and waiting to rise once more. There remain big problems of governance in the former Caliphate territory in Iraq and Syria. Even if they were eventually well managed IS would be difficult to eradicate. It's an organisation that literally aspires to be almost destroyed but endure till the last great battle of Judgement Day.
 
Far from the middle east...

‘Surgical air strikes’ on militants in besieged Philippine city

Philippine security forces bombed a southern city on Thursday as they battled Islamist militants who were holding hostages and reported to have murdered at least 11 civilians.

An initial rampage by the gunmen, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group, through the mainly Muslim city of Marawi on Tuesday prompted President Rodrigo Duterte to impose martial law across the southern third of the Philippines.

Authorities said ending the crisis was proving extremely hard because, although there were only 30 to 40 remaining gunmen, the militants were moving nimbly through homes, had planted bombs in the streets and were holding hostages....
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 221 May 25 2017
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ABC News had an in depth follow up story to the Der Spiegel piece that accused the Rapid Reaction Division (RRD) of abuse and extra judicial killings of IS suspects during the Mosul campaign. The author of the Der Spiegel story Ali Arkady turned over his photos and videos to ABC. ABC then interviewed the captain who headed the RRD unit that Arkady followed. The officer told ABC that his unit didn’t take prisoners and if what Arkady documented were abuses he was proud of them. Arkady’s videos included torturing of a man and a shooting of a handcuffed suspect. Sarah Leigh Whitson of Human Rights Watch and a former U.S. soldier said the videos didn’t seem to show any cause for the torture. The RRD released its own video to counter the Der Spiegel article, but no details were given as to what that included. The Interior Ministry has created a committee to investigate the report as well. Abuse and torture is institutionalized within the ISF so it should be no surprise that someone discovered it occurring during the current campaign. That’s also the reason why any investigation is unlikely to lead to anything substantive. No previous committees into similar cases has ever led to anything.
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For about a decade the Interior Ministry has been full Badr people backed by Iran. It's units have a particularly bad reputation but this is how things are done across the region.
 
On TDB Forces Fighting ISIS Turning on Each Other as Iran Opens Land Corridor to Syria
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On the grassy plateau of Mount Sinjar, a cluster of tents lines the road traversing the mountain. Several thousand Yazidis remained here after seeking refuge from ISIS in 2014, and one of them is Qasim Shewan, who led a group of Yazidis who took part in the desperate defense of the mountain.

A revered figure in the Yazidi community, Shewan has spurned the advances of the various factions vying for control of Sinjar. His independence allows him to speak freely, and he does not mince his words.

"Different parties are trying to gain influence in Sinjar, and the Yazidis are victims of this. The solution is for no Kurdish parties to be in Sinjar. We don't trust any party any more," he says.
Yazidis caught in the middle.
 
Isis claim responsibility for attack that left 29 Coptic Christians dead

Isis has claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus carrying Coptic Christians which left 29 people, including children, dead.

Egyptian authorities said the victims were travelling through the Minya region towards Maghagha in the north west of the country when they were surrounded by eight to 10 attackers wearing military uniforms and masks who then opened fire, on Friday. ...
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 223 May 27 2017
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The last assault on Mosul finally began. The Army’s 9th, 15th, and 16th Divisions attacked the Shifa neighborhood. The Federal Police and Rapid Reaction Division went into Zinjali, while the Golden Division attacked the first Saha district. The Third Bridge across the Tigris River was reached, and the Mosul Hotel and Tamuz 17 were both taken. This was the fourth time the latter was declared freed. A brigade and a regimental commander in the 16th Division were killed in the day’s fighting. General Abdul Ghani al-Asadi of the Golden Division appeared on television stating that the Islamic State had lost control of the situation. On the other hand, General Haider Fadhil also of the Golden Division saidthat resistance had not lessoned, and remained high. Other Iraqi and American officers thought this would be the toughest part of the entire operation. IS only controls roughly five square miles of territory along the Tigris, but they have put up a determined defense especially in the Old City, which held up the police for months. The layout of the city in this area is especially dense and many streets are too narrow for vehicles or tanks to traverse. There have been several reports of the Iraqi forces having to fight floor to floor inside buildings. The insurgents also have an extensive tunnel network and have dug holes in walls to allow them to fire and maneuver without exposing themselves to air strikes. It’s likely that this final phase will take a few weeks to conclude.
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In this Mattis points to a new policy of surrounding Mosul and wiping out IS. Wing notes there is a whiff of Trumpian BS about this as many IS beards left during the well advertised build up to Mosul. I'd add the announced US plan was to leave the West open so IS could flee to Syria and some US folks were upset when the Iranians interfered by sending the Hashd up to Tel Afar to get in the way. Giving no quarter seems to have been the early French preference as well for dealing with the IS garrison as it appears to include hundreds of French jihadis. This will not end like East Aleppo with green buses out to Idlib.
 
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From The Atlantic Initiative BETWEEN SALVATION AND TERROR: RADICALIZATION AND THE FOREIGN FIGHTER PHENOMENON IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Long detailed paper covering several countries. The section on Kosovo (page 83) is worth reading as a sample with particular reference to Syria.

From the Forward:
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Based on the conclusions, I am deeply convinced that tackling the threat of foreign fighters in the Balkans is vitally important for the Balkans and Europe more generally. Many of the countries in the region are young and have brittle institutions. The fault lines that have emerged from the wars of the 1990s are still present, and can easily be activated. Given how deeply shaken an old and seemingly strong country like France has been by recent attacks, one can only imagine the kind of impact that large-scale jihadist attacks would have in many of the countries in the Balkans. Furthermore, what happens in the region is closely connected to – and almost certain to have consequences for – Western Europe. The reason is not just because the Balkans are close to Western Europe, and often serve as trafficking routes for people and weapons, but also because jihadist recruitment and radicalisation in the Balkans are frequently linked – and in many cases originate with – diaspora communities in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. Those in Western Europe who believe that the solution to problems outside the European Union is to lock down one’s borders and create “Fortress Europe“ are, once again, wrong.

Having travelled to the region in my capacity as OSCE Special Representative on Countering Violent Extremism, the articles in this book confirmed the many personal encounters and conversations I have had in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, and the Former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia. Sadly, the overall picture is very depressing. The countries that are worst affected by the foreign fighter phenomenon also happen to be those that seem to be in a state of political and cultural paralysis, offer few perspectives for young people, and frequently appear not to have moved beyond the conflicts of the 1990s. I am not saying that this is the principal reason – or sufficient explanation – for why people turn to violent extremism. But the widespread lack of hope and opportunity certainly provides a vacuum which radical ideologies seem ready to fill.
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Mrs Trump's homeland Slovenia is covered. Describes IS recruitment of youth as reminiscent of Ottoman's taking boys from the Balkans to be Janissaries. Though it was only three boys from a Catholic background in this case.
 
Thread, contains some dispute on who controls exactly what. Not the only area where Hashd shaping the post-IS picture.
 
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At least 24 killed after Isis bombs Iraq during Ramadan

Two car bombs killed at least 24 people and wounded dozens more in Baghdad streets packed with crowds preparing for the Ramadan fast.

Isis claimed responsibility for the first blast outside a popular ice cream shop just after midnight, which killed at least 15 and wounded 40 in the commercial Karrada district.

A few hours later, a second explosives-laden car went off during rush hour near the state-run Public Pension Office near the al-Shahada (Martyrs') Bridge in the busy Shawaka district, killing at least nine and wounding 30 more....
 
On Syria Comment The End of the PKK in Sinjar? How the Hashd al-Sha’bi Can Help Resolve the Yazidi Genocide

Long openly partisan piece on behalf of the Yazidi by Matthew Barber on the remarkable events in Sinjar. It has the Yazidi rejecting both the KDP and PKK with large numbers joining the Hashd to finally liberate their land from IS. Main reason for this small revolution seems to be a desire to run their own affairs as Iraqis. No great affinity for Baghdad but the government is seen as the best option for having some local autonomy. Points to tensions between the PKK and Hashd. Yazidi units recruited into the Kurdish militias are refusing to fight each other. They don't want to be a pawn in power games with Turkey.

It's the KDP that appears to be marginalised post-IS Sinjar. Coming to the rescue of the Yazidi was an heroic episode for the PKK.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 225 May 29 2017
The third day of the last phase of the Battle for Mosul saw fighting on all fronts, with limited progress. The Federal Police moved 100 more meters into Zinjali for a total of 400 meters. Most of the Islamic State fighters in the neighborhood were said to have retreated to the Old City. There was continued clashes in that district and Saha where reinforcements were sent in. The Iraqi air force once again leafletted the city telling people to flee through safe corridors set up by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Originally, the government told the population to stay within the city because neither it nor aid agencies had the capacity to deal with them. That greatly complicated the battle and has led to huge casualties. Baghdad has finally changed tact and is now telling citizens to leave to make way for the ISF.
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Also mentions Hashd commanders talking up pursuing IS into Syria.
 
On IISS Was the Rise of ISIS Inevitable?
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The US inability to achieve a better governing outcome in 2010 helped set the stage for the second failure: the unsuccessful negotiations for a stay-behind force in Iraq after 2011. The Obama administration subsequently insisted that no stay-behind force was possible due to the diplomatic stalemate over legal protections for US troops. Yet as the journalist Dexter Filkins has written, the leaders of Iraq’s political parties ‘had privately told American commanders that they wanted several thousand military personnel to remain, to train Iraqi forces and to help track down insurgents’.50Maliki reportedly told Iraqi political leaders that he might accept a force as large as 20,000 US troops.51 This being the case, it is hardly unreasonable to believe that different negotiating tactics might have yielded a different result.52

President Obama could, for instance, have kept up with the kind of leader-to-leader diplomacy that had characterised US relations with Maliki under Bush, rather than downgrading the relationship – symbolically, if nothing else – by handing it off to Biden. The president could have personally engaged Maliki earlier, when the negotiations stalemated in 2011, rather than hanging back from the process as it ground to a halt. The Obama team also could have made a stay-behind force more attractive to the Iraqis. As it was, the team was very slow to settle on a realistic post-2011 force posture to propose as its opening bid in the negotiations, deferring the start of the effort until well after the US midterm elections in November 2010, and continuing to debate well into 2011 whether a stay-behind force was even desirable.53 With respect to the size of the force, the Pentagon initially proposed numbers in the range of 20,000 troops, and the White House was initially willing to seek a force of some 10,000 troops – a contingent sizeable enough to contribute significantly to Iraqi security. The White House soon began to retreat from that position, however, and subsequently insisted on extremely low numbers – ultimately, around 3,500 troops – that undermined the security benefit to the Iraqi government without materially lowering the political cost of permitting them to stay.54
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You can focus too much on troop levels. The US in fact retained quite a large presence in Iraq of about 6K and kept on training units like the CTS. There was a covert JSOC base up by Irbil for instance. But Obama largely turning his back on the place like it was finished business was foolish. But then it was all being spun as done and dusted ever since The Surge.

Goes over a number of counterfactuals.

There were clear signs of IS's return in Iraq in 2012. Unlike this piece I'd argue the Obama administration appeared distracted by both the Libyan and Syrian interventions and seemed to view Iraq far too rosily. The militarisation of the Syrian revolt assisted by foreign backers created an opportunity for Salafi-Jihadis in general. IS seizing Raqqa and later AQ becoming the dominant player in Idlib would not have happened without that. We should have been working to deescalate conflict in Syria.

It suggests Obama should have been offering the Iraqis more support before Mosul fell and that's probably right. Fallujah rising in January 2014 with clear IS involvement should have been a big red flag. This also about when IS took full control of Raqqa. It puts too much emphasis on Maliki oppressing "peaceful demonstrators". In fact he was facing a violent sectarian uprising orchestrated not just by IS but JRTN and with some Sunni Politicians playing very shady roles. It's fair to say Maliki handled it badly but Anbari politicians and the likes of Sadr were demanding tougher measures. It wasn't just one man it was a structural problem. For lack of US involvement he was also drifting ever more towards Iran. The focus on Maliki also misses that this was also a revolt against corrupt Sunni Arab politicians who had been empowered partly with US encouragement. Baghdad had a very unhealthy form of sectarian inclusion. Barzani in Irbil also contributed to the mess in Mosul and has made increasingly similar errors to Maliki. US airpower could have made things much more difficult for IS. The SOFA talks had assumed this and other US support would be available if disaster struck. The entirely unexpected collapse of the ISF and IS's great loot of kit that enabled their expansion might not have happened. This appears to have shocked even the Iranians.

I'd also say after Mosul Obama should have been as fast to offer Baghdad significant air support as he was when Irbil was threatened. It was a nonsense to use that as a lever to get rid of Maliki. He was obviously a problematic and failing leader. Najaf finally dismissed him anyway. Not supporting the ISF in desperate conditions only led to the rise of the Hashd and a great expansion of Iran's influence. A lot of Iraqis ended up believing the Iranian conspiracy theory that the US backs IS. That can't be good.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 230 Jun 3 2017
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The war of words over the Hashd operation in west Ninewa was still going on. During the day, the Hashd freed a residential complex south of Baaj and surrounded that town on three sides. The day before the Hashd said they had surrounded all of Baaj. Deputy commander of the Hashd Abu Muhandis declared that they had reached the Iraq-Syrian border and would head towards Riyadh, Saudi Arabia next and hoped the Houthis of Yemen would join them. There are many Iraqi Shiites who blame Saudi Arabia’s Wahabism for helping to give rise to the Islamic State, and decry its military campaign in Yemen. It also reflects pro-Iranian propaganda about the axis of resistance standing up to Riyadh. A pro-Maliki parliamentarian from State of Law told President Massoud Barzani and the Peshmerga they should stop their verbal attacks upon the Hashd. He went on to say that any annexation of territory freed from the Islamic State by the Kurds would be illegal. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Peshmerga have condemned the Hashd’s entrance into western Ninewa and the Sinjar district specifically. The party is struggling to re-establish its control over the area against rival Kurdish and Yazidi factions, and the Hashd are only making it worse by freeing Yazidi villages, getting Yazidi militias to join it, and portraying it rather than the KDP as the areas liberators. Many of the Hashd groups are also opposed to the Kurds’ agenda. If the KDP had freed all of Sinjar this would not have been an issue.
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My bold, Muhandis may be getting a little carried away there.
 
In TAC ISIS Claims Responsibility for Tehran Attacks
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Several people were injured and at least one person died on Wednesday morning in two attacks in Iran, one in the Parliament building and one on the mausoleum of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks, which are believed to be the terrorist group’s first major assaults within Iran’s borders.
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Winter is often sceptical about IS claiming attacks. Not so here.

Think about this. Iraqi Hashd at Syrian border in Nineveh. Itching to cross into Syria but getting no OK from Baghadad. Tribes in lower Syrian Euphrates bugging out about them heading for Deir. IRGC push to al Tanf. Hashd perhaps going for Anbari highway to Jordan as well. Possible Iranian collision with the US looming. Gulfies going a bit mental could be helpful as well.

IS also cleverly hit PKK targets in Turkey triggering unrest in SE Turkey. That in turn complicated the US PKK based strategy in Syria. IS are good at using enemy rivalries to their advantage.

Some Iranian IS fighters are probably headed home as IS loses territory and like other foreign fighters they stand out not being native Arabic speakers. IS Information Operations are stoking things up in Iran.

On RFE IS Propaganda Increasingly Targeting Iran And Its Sunnis

IS is going to earth amongst Sunni Arabs after a war Iran's the main winner in and is often seen as an occupier. War of The Flea innit.
 
On ICCT “Defeating IS Ideology” Sounds Good, But What Does It Really Mean?
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My research has shown that extremist ideology describe an in-group based on race, religion or nationality, and they provide a parallel description of an opposing out-group. A movement becomes extremist when it believes the in-group can never be successful unless it is engaged in hostile activity against the out-group.

Extremists create a narrative justification for their beliefs by linking the out-group to a crisis afflicting the in-group, and linking the in-group to a violent solution against the out-group. The greater the perceived crisis, the more violent and extreme the solution. These linkages are the substance of an extremist ideology, and as such, they are vulnerable to counter-programming.

The sweeping absolutes preferred by politicians are ill-suited to this task, whether the Bush administration’s efforts at democracy promotion, the Obama administration’s efforts to discredit the religious legitimacy of groups like IS, or May’s assertion of the “superiority of British values”. Democracy promotion, in the form of the Iraq war, created a zone of instability that extremists enthusiastically exploited. Simplistic attacks on legitimacy are, at best, ineffective, and at worst, risk fueling an escalation in extremist views (as argued at length here). And asserting a competing identity may enhance the in-group/out-group dynamic, or worse, create competing extremist movement.
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Interesting piece this criticising the tilt of British policy.

I'd say the primary appeal of IS amongst Sunni Arabs is sectarian. Essentially about a new regional sense of Sunni Arab victimhood that emerged as Iraq became a democracy. This was keenly felt outside Iraq which was consumed by a horrifying inter-Muslim terrorist war. Salafism mixing with Islamism is a factor but the resentment goes much wider. IS's ideology or rather their rigid and kooky implementation of Islamic tenets is actually pretty unattractive to most Sunni Arabs but there's a wider paranoia about the Persians and the Shia that IS draw on. For historical reasons they are seen as conquerors and the betrayers. It's even overshadowed a once unifying dilemma Arabs had with another regional minority the Jews.

Despite the PTSD Iraqis are actually poll as a lot less sectarian than their Gulfie neighbours and we should be working to further heal those wounds. Unfortunately Trump seems to set on hiking sectarian tensions at home and abroad. I don't think this will defuse IS or defeat the Iranians; rather the reverse.
 
Here's what Mr Izadi had to say on the matter of the terrorism in Terhan..............................


Foad Izadi, a professor at the University of Tehran, says Wednesday’s terrorist attacks in Tehran should be blamed on Saudi Arabia because the regime in Riyadh supports an ideology which is spreading terrorism across the region.

“We have the Saudi government financing the mentality of Wahhabism that is the root cause of people going to places and blowing themselves up. People don’t do that just for the money, the ideology behind it comes from the Saudi clan,” Izadi told Press TV on Wednesday

Should i foreward this onto Theresa May and Boris Johnson?
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 233 Jun 6 2017
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Activists in Ninewa want justice for IS members and are threatening to go outside the courts if nothing is done about them. People in Hamam al-Alil, the main screening center for people coming out of Mosul, and displaced camps complained that IS members were in their midst and wanted something done about not only them, but their families as well. People said that if the security forces and courts didn’t do something about it they would take matters into their own hands. Again, the justice system in Iraq is currently over stretched. The number of cases it has to go through due to the Ninewa battle is enormous. Even if someone is released or found innocent there are likely others that feel that the suspect is guilty and wants that person to pay. The threat of tribal justice or vigilantism is real in the province, and is probably already happening in some areas. The fact that Baghdad has no reconciliation plan for the province and the rest of Iraq only means these disputes will continue to fester.

On June 4, the International Organization for Migration counted 383,808 displaced since the Mosul campaign started in October 2016. An average of 2,000-7,000 have left Mosul each day since the new operation started at the end of May. As of May 30, 177,483 displaced have also returned to the city. 42,246 went to the western section, and 135,237 to the east. Many people have gone back to be close to their homes, because they did not like living in the displaced camps or because there was no room there. Inside Mosul services are still a problem such as clean water. Much of the city’s water is being trucked in, and there is no money to repair the water treatment plants. Rebuilding will be very slow as there is still fighting going on and the government lacks the funds to do much more than fix and provide the very basics for the citizenry.
The lack of Phase IV&V planning here is really worrying given the history.
 
IS report card rather centred on carnage which says a lot about IS. Governance activities presented as sidelines. Numbers don't look exaggerated to me. As they include injured they may even be low.

Butcher's bill 5* greater in their home in Iraq than in the Syrian colonial enterprise. Previous IS stats have also shown a big disparity of operations with the main focus being Iraq and fighting Baghdad's forces. IS came to dominate the revolt but Sunni Arab Iraqi's are tough and difficult to control. IS mass graves constantly being discovered in Iraq. The fighting there has been intense and urban. IS controlled and disputed a number of large populations centres in Iraq. It's empire in Eastern Syria looked impressive on a map but it was more thinly populated territory the Syrian state abandoned. Regular drum beat of mass casualty terror attacks on government territory in Iraq not really echoed in Syria.

IS's bloody footprint in Syria is actually small (perhaps <10%) compared to that of the regime which has been fighting to control large cities and has an air force. It's also a fraction of those killed by rebel activities. SAA casualties alone are 100K+ and mostly from fighting the rebels. IS in Syria has mainly fought the PKK, rebels and tribal forces less so state forces.

The Syrian end of the Caliphate once established was important in terms of recruitment and training. Not so much in terms of revenues and supply. It gave them strategic depth and loomed large in IS propaganda.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 237 Jun 10 2017
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The Iraqi army started a new operation to take Tal Afar to the west of Mosul. 2 brigades from the 15thDivision seized six villages to the east of Tal Afar. This came at the same time that deputy Hashd commander Abu Muhandis said that they were waiting for Baghdad’s orders to take the village. The Hashd surrounded the town months ago, but were not allowed to attack it due to political pressure from Turkey. Since then the government has gone back and forth on whether it would allow the Hashd a role in the operation or not. For now, it seems they are being kept on the outside wishing to join in.
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Notes June 10th was the 3rd anniversary of the fall of Mosul to IS.
 
Part of an interesting thread comparing terrorism in the 70s to today. Actually things were pretty lethal back then just not always intentionally. It was also localised with most of the killing of civilians being in very specific areas. You could be living a few miles away from a Belfast hotspot and be almost unaffected. Though it did scare people. Masses of Valium were consumed. What might also be forgotten is that The Troubles had deeper societal effects with there being for instance quite a lot of population flight as happens in the ME today. Not something we are seeing in Europe currently.

These days the risks really aren't as high as in Belfast back in the day but a very lethal attack could come anywhere. If your easily scared by terrorism Paris is as dodgy as Istanbul. The current pattern of attacks is more like living with US mass shootings.
 
White phosphorus over Raqqa

n the beginning of June 2017, the international coalition supposedly fighting ISIS, dropped illegal white phosphorus bombs on the civilian areas of Raqqa in Syria. The operation "Operation Euphrates Wrath" spearheaded by US-backed Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their military wing the YPG, has begun to remove ISIS, or Da’esh, from Raqqa. But this onslaught does not come without major repercussions for the local population....
 
So many mistakes in that paragraph... 'supposedly fighting ISIS' ? :hmm:, white phosphorous isn't illegal, it's not being dropped, the SDF aren't Kurdish, nor is the YPG the military wing of the SDF. Quality journalism.
 
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