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On Musings On Iraq How The Islamic State Has Fought The Battle For Mosul, Interview With Horizon Client Access’ Alex Mello
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6. The Islamic State is eventually going to lose Mosul. What do you predict will happen to the group afterward?


That’s difficult to say. After 2011 I was reasonably confident we were going to see a gradual resurgence of the insurgency, though the timeline moved a bit faster than anticipated and I failed to predict the spectacular, wide-scale collapse of the ISF in northern Iraq in June 2014. After Mosul and the remaining ISIL-controlled urban areas in Tal Afar and Hawijah are cleared I think we’ll begin to see a gradual increase in overall insurgent activity. The post-Mosul insurgency is likely to be far more localized and dispersed. As I noted in an article I coauthored in late 2016, in Diyala the insurgency has already fully recovered thanks to the poor performance of provincial security forces and Badr control of the provincial government, though the ceiling for overall insurgency activity in the province is still quite low. A more recent uptick in insurgent activity has occurred in the western Baghdad belts around Fallujah and Ramadi and north around Tarmiyah, though in Baghdad itself the BOC is doing a good job of keeping VBIED attacks to minimum. In the longer term the trajectory of the insurgency will depend on the progress of reconciliation at the local and national level after the 2018 elections and how large a residual presence Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF) is going to maintain in Iraq to support the ISF as the fight moves into the next phase.
Goes over IS's tactical adaption to defending such a massive and still populated urban space.
 
On War On The Rocks MINI-HIZBALLAHS, REVOLUTIONARY GUARD KNOCK-OFFS, AND THE FUTURE OF IRAN’S MILITANT PROXIES IN IRAQ
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There is still time to offset the gains that Iran’s proxies have made in the last three years. The Iraqi state almost lost its monopoly over the use of force during the Iraqi Army’s collapse of 2014. The victories in Tikrit, Ramadi and Mosul, amongst other battles, have created a window of opportunity to rebuild the Iraqi Army and Counter-Terrorism Service as a bulwark against the return of ISIL, and against Iranian-backed militias currently embedded within the PMF. Iraq is too populous, resource-rich and centrally positioned to be surrendered to Iran’s domination. Placing Iraq — the world’s fourth largest energy producer – under the effective control of Iran — the third largest producer — would be an unprecedentedly destabilizing event. This very predicament — preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon that controlled most of the region’s oil — is what drew the U.S.-led coalition to use force against Saddam’s regime when he invaded Kuwait. And Iraq — thanks to its location — is the geopolitical lynchpin of efforts to prevent the emergence of a Shiite crescent controlled by Iran in the heart of the Arab Middle East. This prospect should alone give pause and should encourage all major nations to support Iraq’s government in reducing the risks posed by Iranian-backed militias.
Knights on Iran's hand in Iraq. Sensibly he doesn't underrate the popularity of the Hashd.
 
In The National Despite heavy losses, ISIL’s structures remain resilient
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"Taking territory away from them is such a temporary activity," Craig Whiteside, professor at the Naval War College Monterey, told me. "It is no way to measure success against an insurgent group that can easily move back to an earlier stage of activity and organisation."

Dr Whiteside added that cooperation at all levels among international and local powers is the only way to dismantle the organisation. "[ISIL] will be strong until they are dismantled, in a more thorough way than the fantasies we have about 2008-2010."

The counterarguments would also miss a point. The group’s continued ability to run a full-fledged urban insurgency without signs of operational fragility means that its organisational structures remain resilient. The enormous damages to its finances, cadres and mobility over the past three years have little impact on its ability to function as an organisation, something that will ensure its long-term durability if it is not duly challenged. The group is aware of the need to maintain organisational leadership to ensure ability to fight effectively on several fronts. In fact, ISIL touched on this aspect in one of its releases last week: a commentary by the group claimed that well executed hit-and-run operations in Tikrit and in an area between Haditha and Bayji in Iraq proved that the organisation still operates in the same way its founders led it and that the campaign has not altered that.

And that is largely true. Numerous examples in recent months indicate that the group can still plan simultaneous attacks or launch hit-and-run operations to reduce pressure from hotspots.

According to a high-ranking US officer, such attacks demonstrate the group’s enduring abilities to coordinate and manage an expansive battlefield.
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Hassan Hassan also points out no major IS urban stronghold has fallen without extensive external support.

I'd note in the case of the Syrian regime it's hold on territory often appears fragile when faced with determined Salafi-Jihadi adversaries. Really it's Iranian assets that provide the steel. Syrian rebels have proven pretty hopeless adversaries unless supported by militant beards or the TSK. The SDF coalition is also weaker than its barrage of well crafted PR would suggest and suffers badly from Turkish enmity. It's really only Baghdad and Irbil that have promising military capacity to hold back the likes of IS.

Unlike the Syrians the Iraqis have large supportive populations many of whom are inspired by nationalist causes. Both have oil reserves to fund services and viable relations with their neighbours. Damascus is by far the worst but all of these actors have a pretty poor record on providing the kind of governance that's liable to lead to eventual stability. Both Irbil and Baghdad operate flawed and very corrupt democracies but improvements are possible given time.
 
On ISW ISIS Sanctuary: May 10, 2017
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ISW reckons IS's campaign increasingly resembling that in 2013.
 
On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: April 29-May 11, 2017
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) surged in northwest Mosul in a bid to clear the city prior to Ramadan, anticipated to begin on May 26. Emergency Response Division (ERD) and Federal Police (FP) units joined 9th and 15th Iraqi Army Division units in northwest Mosul on April 28. The combined forces recaptured the neighborhoods of Mushairfa and 30 Tamouz, and are fighting to seize the denser neighborhoods of Harmat, 17 Tamouz, and Hawi Kanisa as of publication. Meanwhile, Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS) recaptured three neighborhoods in western Mosul. ISF are unlikely to clear the city prior to Ramadan. ISIS claimed to launch attacks to retake two Old City gates, Bab al-Jadid and Bab al-Toub. ISIS will also continue to defend the Old City by conducting suicide attacks and attempting to draw fire on civilian gatherings. ISIS will concentrate its defenses around al-Nuri Great Mosque, where ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publicly in 2014.
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On Brookings Shiite militias in Iraq: Why context matters
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SA: After the liberation of Mosul, how should the international community deal with Iraq’s Shiite militias? What role will they have in Iraq and the region?

RA: To understand and deal with Shiite militias in Iraq, it is first important to look at these groups beyond the militant, criminal, Iranian proxy paradigm often used to define and characterize them. This framework does not only lead to misplaced analyses but also exaggerates Iranian influence in a way that serves Iran. Any movement forward would require a holistic approach that appreciates the communal, grassroots dynamics within the Shiite community.

Put in simple terms, there are good militias and bad militias. The former should be empowered. They are often weaker than the bad militias that tend to be aligned with Iran and disregard human rights and international norms. I will discuss this in length in my forthcoming policy briefing.
Our attitude to Iraqi Shia militias always seemed to be shaped by Gulfie hostility to any manifestation of Iraq's new Shia led nationalism. It would have made sense to be supportive of Najaf's militias if only to counter Iranian influence.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 207 May 11 2017
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Al Monitor talked with Iraqi security analyst Hisham al-Hashimi who was extremely critical of the government’s portrayal of the Mosul battle. First, he noted that captured Islamic State documents show that the group was no longer using names in its personnel files, but numbers, which means it will be much harder for the security forces to track them down. Many either got out before Mosul was surrounded or have melted into the population. Second, the Iraqi command always claims the militants are fleeing, which he refuted. The seven month battle for Mosul would prove that official line false. Third, he said the daily releases by the security forces were pure propaganda rife with exaggerations. For example, the ISF constantly gives kill numbers for IS fighters which are far beyond the group’s total membership. Fourth, Hashimi claimed that many of the insurgent leaders the government says it killed are still alive. Since 2014 Baghdad has been pushing a victory narrative with one success after another, both real and imagined. Hashimi was only stating what has been obvious over all those years.
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The Baghdad Bob effect.
 
On Reuters Iraq's Shi'ite paramilitaries squeeze Islamic State toward Syria border
Iraq's Shi'ite paramilitaries launched an offensive on Friday to drive Islamic State from a desert region near the border with Syria as security forces fought the militants in the city of Mosul.

Spokesman Karim al-Nouri said the target of the operation was the Qairawan and Baaj areas about 100 km west of Mosul, where U.S.-backed Iraqi forces are advancing in their campaign to rout the militants from city.
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Baaj is SW of Sinjar. Al Nouri talks of this move assisting the Syrian regime.
 
In Der Spiegel Iraq's Challenging Path to Reconciliation
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The Iraqi government issued an anti-terrorism law in 2005 following the overthrow of former dictator Saddam Hussein. Under Article 4 of the law, which now also serves as the basis for verdicts against IS supporters, acts of terror are punishable with life in prison or death. The problem with this law is that these penalties apply not only to the perpetrators, but also to helpers and accessories.

In order to prevent abuse, an amnesty law was enacted in 2016. Since then, anyone who can prove that he joined IS or another terrorist group against his will and did not commit any serious crimes is set free. Some 800 prisoners have benefited from the amnesty rule since the middle of last year.

"Almost all the prisoners I interrogate will soon be free again," says Judge Yami.

There is as still no clear strategy for how to account for IS's atrocities, and there have been few efforts to lead Iraqi society toward reconciliation, as was done in Rwanda under orders from the government. Although Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has spoken of establishing a special tribunal for IS criminals, it has failed to materialize thus far. The government is busy with the fight for Mosul, and the country's economy is in shambles. In this context, justice feels like a luxury.
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Iraqi justice system not really able to process large numbers of IS suspects.
 
On Niqash.org Planning For The End: Iraq’s Final Fight Against Extremists Will Be In The Deserts Of Anbar
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The biggest problem though is what happens to the extremist fighters once they are pushed toward the border of Iraq and Syria.

Retired Iraqi major general, Abdul Karim Khalaf, a military analyst and former government spokesperson, told NIQASH that the Syrian military are not ready to cooperate on this job. “The Iraqi forces are ready to clean out the valleys and plains of the Anbar desert that have become safe havens for the extremists,” Khalaf told NIQASH. “But the Syrian side is not.”

Commander Riad Jalal visits troops in Anbar in May.

Fighting on the long borders, stretching around 600 kilometres, between Iraq and Syria would be useless if there is no plan to control the extremist fighters as they cross them. If there’s no way to stop them, the Iraqi security forces will simply continue to be attacked as the extremists make forays back and forth across the borders, Khalaf argues. This happened recently on the border of Jordan, he says.

There had been attempts to try and clean up the borders in this area recently. But this has proved difficult and there has been a recognition that a lot of manpower will be needed to make a success of this kind of operation.

At the same time, the IS group too realizes the strategic significant of this area. Thousands of fighters who escaped from other areas the extremist group used to control, such as Mosul, Salahaddin and others parts of Anbar, are stationed here now. Analysts say that this is also where the IS group has established factories for manufacturing improvised explosive devices and other bombs and it is now where it receives volunteer fighters.

Ahmad al-Mahlawi is a tribal leader from the Qaem district currently living in Haditha where he leads a brigade of tribal fighters supported by the Iraqi government and US forces; his group work from out of the Ain al-Asad military base In Anbar.

“The extremists have started to plant mines in the desert, between Qaem and Albu Kamal and they are preparing hiding places along that road too, so that they can stop the Iraqi army when it launches the attack on them that everybody expects,” al-Mahlawi says. “They are going to fight very, very hard here,” he notes. “They know that this - not in Mosul or Raqqa - is where they are going to end.”
 
For the United States, ISIS Trumps Turkey

US President Donald J. Trump’s decision to arm Kurdish rebels in Syria, despite objections from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, indicates that the new administration’s Turkey policy is secondary to winning the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), according to an Atlantic Council analyst.

This decision “would suggest to me that Trump really doesn’t have a Turkey policy,” said Aaron Stein, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. “Turkey policy is secondary to the need to prosecute the war against ISIS quickly,” he added.

My bold, well going by other stuff going on with Trump & co this should not be a surprise. :D
 
On Lawfare Can the Islamic State Survive Financially?
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Which path are we most likely to see? A combination of the first and third scenarios seems the most likely bet. Our recently released study on the Islamic State’s financing summarizes the workshop and concludes that although coalition and partner efforts to degrade Islamic State finances have and are likely to continue to limit its ability to govern large swaths of territory and major population centers like Mosul and Raqqa, it will likely still retain sufficient funding to persist for years as an insurgency in Iraq and Syria, much like the Taliban has in Afghanistan and various al-Qaeda offshoots in places like North Africa, Yemen, and elsewhere. As long as it does, it will remain a premiere terrorist threat to the rest of the world.

As the Islamic State comes under further pressure in Mosul, it will continue to lose money from taxation, extortion, and the sale of oil—fundraising activities directly related to the group’s control of territory. Yet, the defeat of this threat is no fait accompli. The Islamic State can still finance its organization. For one thing, reductions in territory and recruits decrease the costs of administration, governance, and salaries paid to members. The shrinking caliphate means less territory to rule and fewer constituents. Many people to whom the group previously provided basic services have either fled or died. The effect on its organization has been a significantly diminished number of fighters, and thus, even as it becomes less powerful it simultaneously becomes easier and cheaper to manage and control. Despite the significant gains that have been made in attacking the Islamic State’s cash and diminishing its ability to finance high-frequency attacks in Iraq and Syria, the group may well retain enough money in its war chest to support sporadic external attacks in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.
A downsizing that concentrates the resources of a larger concern.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 210 May 14 2017
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are closing the noose on the last areas of west Mosul held by the Islamic State. The Iqtisadin neighborhood was freed, Ureibi was attacked, and there was on going fighting in Bab al-Tob, Farouq, Bab al-Jadid, Tamuz 17, and Zinjali. A general from the Golden Division said that the insurgents were spent and exhausted, while the Federal Police commander General Shakir Jawadat estimated that the entire city would be freed by the end of May or the start of June at the latest. That sounded like a more realistic timeframe than the army chief of staff who talked about the end of the campaign in a few days to two weeks at most. Iraqi statements are always full of propaganda, so they need to be taken with a big grain of salt. What is undisputed is that the new attack upon northwest Mosul has gained huge results and the area under IS control is quickly shrinking.
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 212 May 16 2017
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The Hashd were still gaining more ground in western Ninewa. They took four more villages in Sinjar and had a fifth surrounding. The goal is to take Qayrawan, then go to Baaj, and finally reach the Syrian border. The move into Sinjar brought criticism from Kurdish President Massoud Barzani who claimed there was an agreement to keep the Hashd out of the district. Spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi saidthe Hashd wouldn’t respond to Barzani’s comments, and that they were cooperating with the Peshmerga. Prime Minister Haider Abadi added that Baghdad didn’t know about the Kurds’ concerns and a delegation would be sent to work things out. Sinjar was under Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) authority before 2014. It abandoned the area before the Islamic State arrived leading to the massacre of the Yazidis who lived there. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) entered from Syria and rescued the locals. That has made it all the harder for the KDP to re-establish control over the area. Now it is worried that the Hashd will enter the equation. Barzani can either have his Peshmerga take the Yazidi towns before the Hashd reach them or continue to complain to Baghdad in the hopes that it can convince the Hashd to pull back. This could quickly turn into a flashpoint.
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Irbil will be under pressure from Ankara to act there.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 213 May 17 2017
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were closing in on the last neighborhoods held by the Islamic State in Mosul. The July 17, Iqtisadin, and Rifai areas were all liberated during the day. The July 17 was said to have been freed on May 13, Iqtisadin on May 14, and Rifai on May 15. There was fighting on going in Siha, Najar, Zinjali, Bab al-Tob, Mekawi and Bab al-Jadid. The militants only hold roughly 10% of the city. The ISF routinely claim it has taken areas that are still contested or sometimes before they even arrive. The battle for the city is nearly over, and these places will eventually fall. The Iraqis can’t help themselves however from overstating their progress. That is an unfortunate result of the victory narrative the government has pushed since 2014.
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 215 May 19 2017
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The Hashd took another village in western Ninewa. It also announced that a tribal force that had worked with the Peshmerga switched to its side. Nayef Jassim Qassim took his unit form the Mindikan tribe and joined the Hashd in the Sinjar district on May 18. This is exactly why the Kurds have complained about the Hashd’s presence in Sinjar. They are already competing with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and Yazidi groups for hegemony over the area, and now the Hashd have entered and are freeing towns, and turning locals to their side further complicating things. That could lead to a military confrontation with the Peshmerga if the Kurds decide to seize areas to block the Hashd or a political controversy or both.

Rudaw talked with the brother of the Ninewa governor who was filmed in an Islamic State video giving it baya and denouncing anti-IS forces. Sheikh Faisal Hamadi appeared in an insurgent film on April 7 attacking his brother the Ninewa governor and the Peshmerga, and giving allegiance to the Islamists. He claimed he would have been killed if he didn’t cooperate. He now lives in Irbil. The fate of individuals like the sheikh will be a big issue after Ninewa is freed. There are many that would want to arrest Hamadi and put him on trial for instance. So far there is no government reconciliation program or ideas on how to deal with pro-IS individuals or collaborators.
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Two problems of legitimacy with how this corner of Iraq is governed.
 
On ISW Iraq Situation Report: May 6 - 20, 2017
Iran-backed Shia militias set conditions to disrupt or deny U.S.-backed forces freedom of maneuver near the Iraq-Syria border. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) forces began clearing territory in western Ninewa Province toward the Syrian border. Iran-backed PMU forces also conducted offensives against ISIS in northern Diyala and Salah al-Din provinces, and defended positions north of the Makhoul Mountains and southwest of Tuz Khurmatu from ISIS ground assaults. ISIS remains operational in eastern Iraq, particularly in Diyala Province, despite clearing operations led by the Badr Organization since late 2014. ISIS also launched attacks in and around Baghdad in the week prior to its annual Ramadan campaign, anticipated to begin on May 26.
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On SpyCast The Black Hand: An Interview with Stephan Talty
SPY Historian Vince Houghton sat down with Stephan Talty, author of two previous books on intelligence, Agent Garbo and The Secret Agent: In Search of America’s Greatest World War II Spy. They discuss his newest book, The Black Hand: The Epic War Between a Brilliant Detective and the Deadliest Secret Society in American History.
A podcast interview that draws interesting parallels to the Islamic State and the current hysteria about Muslims to the Mano Nera movement and a generalised fear Italian Americans in the 1900s.
 

Like something out of a Ridley Scott film but in a good way.

I was just talking to a friend of mine, a dam safety engineer for Welsh Water, about the Mosul dam yesterday.
AFAIK no remedial work has been done since we were informed months ago that it could give way at any moment with anticipated casualties of 600k +. Not surprised that the Bersaglieri and their rather rakish capercallie feathers have been deployed to protect it but would I be right in thinking that we're still a small crumble away from catastrophe whether man helps it along or no.
 
I was just talking to a friend of mine, a dam safety engineer for Welsh Water, about the Mosul dam yesterday.
AFAIK no remedial work has been done since we were informed months ago that it could give way at any moment with anticipated casualties of 600k +. Not surprised that the Bersaglieri and their rather rakish capercallie feathers have been deployed to protect it but would I be right in thinking that we're still a small crumble away from catastrophe whether man helps it along or no.
On VOA News Mosul Dam No Longer on Brink of Catastrophe
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'No significant signs of distress'

Italian company Trevi started repairs in October 2016. Carlo Crippa, the project manager, said the dam structure now shows no significant signs of distress. However, constant maintenance will be necessary, as "the rocks of the foundations are prone to dissolution due to the circulation of water."

The five waterways that control the flow of water into the dam are open, after being closed for over 12 years, and Minister Janabi said water levels are now at the highest level since 2005.

Despite these assurances, experts who have studied the dam structure say it remains far from safe.

"There is always a chance that water is going to migrate," said Azzam Alwash, an Iraqi-American civil engineer who has served as an adviser on the dam. He said 24 sinkholes remain in the dam's reservoir, making it vulnerable to pressure from water flows.

"This is a dam tantamount to a nuclear bomb," Alwash said. "Are you going to take the risk of keeping your family in a place where it can sink under as much as 15 meters of water in a matter of hours? I'm not."
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I recall reading it's just fundamentally flawed.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 218 May 22 2017
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The liberation of all of Mosul is at hand. The Najar area along the Tigris River was the latest to fall to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). There was fighting going on in Rifai as well. Colonel Patrick Work, commander of the 2nd Brigade, 82 Airborne Division, which is advising the Iraqi army in the battle warned that as the last sections of the city were reached the fighting would reach a crescendo. The ISF were building a bridge across the Tigris to connect the east and west to allow people to flee the conflict. Another span was already put up in the northern section of the city for the same purpose. There are only four neighborhoods left in west Mosul under Islamic State control. Iraqi generals and politicians are still talking about freeing the city before Ramadan, which is only a few days away. That is unlikely to happen, but the final date is still close at hand.
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