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The Islamic state

On Niqash.org A Reason To Fight: Young Kurds Commit ‘Treason’, Join Iraq’s Controversial Militias
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Kamran Barwari, a professor of political science at the University of Dohuk, believes that the economic problems in Iraqi Kurdistan and the political deadlock that has been going on for over a year, are two factors driving young locals into the Iraqi militias.

Regardless of why they have left the Iraqi Kurdish military, Barwari believes this is sure to cause problems in the near future.

“There is already a lot of potential for the Iraqi Kurdish military to clash with the militias again,” the professor argues. “That potential will be stronger, and the situation will be more complicated, if Iraqi Kurdish citizens are involved in the militias. It is not easy for a citizen to join a force that his government thinks is illegal, when they could be defending their own region.”

This situation is not limited to locals joining the militias. Tribal leaders inside Iraqi Kurdistan have also expressed a desire to form their own militias, and have even contacted the government in Baghdad to get support for doing so.

One of these is Sardar Harki, who is the head of his clan. He said he was able to form a fighting force of about 3,000 men from his own tribe, based in the Soran district of the Erbil province in Iraqi Kurdistan. The salaries of the members would be paid by Baghdad, Harki told NIQASH.

“In terms of Baghdad, the deal is done,” Harki says. “But there are some problems within Iraqi Kurdistan because the Peshmerga Ministry doesn’t allow any other forces to be formed here. I am waiting for this to be resolved.”

Local analysts believe the Iraqi militias are keen to try and further their influence, even within Iraqi Kurdistan.

“The militias are made up of a number of different forces and each one of these has its own ideas about Iraqi Kurdistan,” states Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, the head of an Erbil-based think tank, the Middle East Research Institute. “Many of the militia leaders would like to be able to influence key issues in Iraq, and that includes in Iraqi Kurdistan. The militias will try and strengthen their influence and they will make use of their position in the disputed areas.”
Just to complicate the Alphabet Soup of rival Kurdish factions even further.
 
On SWJ ISIS After Trump
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Conclusion

Trump’s strategy on ISIS fundamentally misunderstands how terrorism works. Terrorism is about communication, provocation, and attrition. Trump’s approach to ISIS will play directly into the group’s strategy and result in overextension in the Middle East, isolation of allies, and the global spread of terrorism. ISIS, after Trump, will be stronger and more global. The next U.S. President may therefore inherit the most deadly and global terror movement to date. Preparations to fix the missteps of the current President should begin immediately.
Article recommends a multi-lateral policing approach developing local capacity not blundering about the region playing Whackamole.
 
In The WSJ U.S. Strikes Against Syria Heighten Iraq’s Difficulty
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Mr. Pence’s office confirmed Saturday that the call had taken place, but offered a different description of what had been said in it.

Mr. Abadi had told Mr. Pence that the chemical weapons attack was “a major escalation to the conflict in Syria, and agreed that those responsible needed to be held accountable,” Mr. Pence’s office said. The Iraqi prime minister also “expressed solidarity with the innocent victims in Syria, and reflected on the horrible chemical weapons attacks the former Baathist regime perpetrated against the Iraqi people.”

Mr. Pence’s office said the vice president had commended Iraqi Security Forces for their progress in western Mosul and thanked Prime Minister Abadi “for the sacrifices of the Iraqi people in our shared fight against ISIS, “ and that both leaders also “reaffirmed their commitment to the long-term partnership between the U.S. and Iraq.”

The White House also said Saturday that President Donald Trump had spoken a day earlier with King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia and that the king “reaffirmed strong Saudi support for the U.S.’ military strike.”

On Friday, Mr. Abadi foreign ministry staked out ground even closer to the Syrian regime. It said Iraq considered the U.S. strikes “a grave escalation.” The ministry also indicated it didn’t support the Trump administration’s assertion that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had launched the chemical attack.
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On Musings On Iraq Next Phase Against The Islamic State Cutting Its Finances, Interview With RAND’s Patrick Johnston
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1. The Islamic State still holds oil fields in Syria, but has lost control of all of the ones it had in Iraq. What will the organization turn to earn money and fund itself in Iraq?

The Islamic State is likely to manage to retain a modest, clandestine presence in and around cities that have been declared “liberated” by Coalition and Iraqi forces. As long as institutions are weak and corruption is rife, preventing IS from making money off of extortion schemes will be difficult. Also, reconstruction efforts tend to generate a lot of contracting opportunities that groups like IS can subvert through intimidation and fraud. In research I conducted with colleagues at RAND on IS’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq, for example, we analyzed financial ledgers captured from the group in 2009 in Mosul—another period in which the group had been degraded militarily. The ledgers showed that ISI still managed to generate substantial income by extorting companies, contractors, and the like. If the past is prologue, reconstruction aid to Mosul and elsewhere will need to be monitored closely to prevent leakage—including into IS coffers.

In addition, as IS retreats into desert areas, the group may be able to gain revenue either through taxing smugglers and informal traders or by engaging in smuggling activity directly.
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Belatedly as I'm sure people who've been following things in Egypt may be aware there were a couple of bombs at Coptic churches a couple of days ago. One just missed the Coptic pope and over 30 people died. IS claimed responsibility and the authorities have declared a state of emergency which gives the security services virtually unlimited power e.g. detention without trial, meanwhile the Muslim brotherhood have claimed it may be a 'false flag' op. :facepalm:

Above is my post on the Egypt thread for a little background and below is an article that goes into some detail:

Palm Sunday bombings: A security failure and the Islamic State’s expansion into the mainland
 
The border at Taba was closed by the Israelis a couple of days ago. Making me think that spectacularly crap holiday I had there last month could've been worse, at least I got to leave.
 
On SWJ Clemency and the Sword: Using Amnesty as a Weapon to Fracture and Defeat ISIL
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Conclusion

Britain’s campaign against the Republic of Pirates demonstrates that amnesty can be an effective weapon and force multiplier when used against an inherently fractious organization and combined with a strong military force. Today, ISIL fits that description. Using amnesty, policy-makers can take advantage of ISIL’s many different constituent groups and wide appeal and use those tools against the organization. Furthermore, a successful amnesty program that draws in many defectors will be a powerful rebuke to an organization that prides itself on its “winning narrative.” Recent battlefield reversals have already shown that ISIL can be defeated in the field. Amnesty is the weapon that can discredit it as an organization and defeat it from within.
Funny really such pragmatic ideas barely get discussed in our hunter killer GWOT even under Nobel Peace Prize winner Obama. Actually something the horrible Assad regime with its siege breaking green buses is more likely to experiment with.

Anybody who followed Black Sails might be interested in reading this as it covers some of the same historic territory. Pirates as being somewhat akin to IS was cunningly exploited by that show.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 178, Apr 12, 2017
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The National talked with teachers from Mosul. They were forced to work when IS controlled the city, and had to use textbooks that used military imagery and terms in the lessons and to teach about Islamic scholars favored by the militants. Few kids attended schools during that period, and when IS started charging fees to attend class enrollment went down even more.
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On CTC Sentinel DEFEAT BY ANNIHILATION: MOBILITY AND ATTRITION IN THE ISLAMIC STATE’S DEFENSE OF MOSUL
Abstract: The Islamic State’s defense of Mosul has provided unique insights into how the group has adapted its style of fighting to dense urban terrain. While the Islamic State failed to mount an effective defense in the rural outskirts and outer edges of Mosul, it did mount a confident defense of the denser inner-city terrain, including innovative pairing of car bombs and drones. The Islamic State continues to demonstrate a strong preference for mobile defensive tactics that allow the movement to seize the tactical initiative, mount counterattacks, and infiltrate the adversary’s rear areas. Yet, while the Islamic State has fought well in Mosul, it has also been out-fought. Islamic State tactics in the final uncleared northwestern quarter of Mosul are becoming more brutal, including far greater use of civilians as human shields.
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A very active aggressive defence with constant counter-attacking and well laid ambushes. Suicide truck bombs used to blunt ISF offensive moves. Innovative use of drones by mobile teams to harry ISF and do recon. Re-infiltration into cleared areas across the Tigris by night raids sometimes to a depth of 5kms. Lack of the usual IS IED fields probably due to heavy presence of civ pop. This is more akin to fighting a Imperial Japanese Army Brigade dug in on Okinawa than what goes on in say in an IDF raid on Gaza.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 179, Apr 13, 2017
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The United Nations has been tracking the damage to Mosul caused by the fighting using satellite imagery. A recent study found that west Mosul was facing extensive destruction, far more than occurred in the east. A survey found 58% of housing damaged. Overall, war damage in the west was 2 ½ times greater than the east. There has been a lot of anecdotal evidence of the impact the battle has had on the city. This was the first hard data available to quantify that.

Types Of Structures Damaged in Mosul, U.N. Report
58% of housing
19% of roads and bridges
13% of commercial/industrial areas
5% of government offices
4% of public facilities
1% of entertainment sites
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I think Ramadi had 78% of its structure damaged. Ramadi is much smaller than Mosul.
 

A small collection of US bombing errors. This happens a lot when you don't have good intelligence and people on the ground confirming targets.
Even when it that all goes well bystanders are often killed. There were a rash of errors last year include a large strike on regime positions at Deir that may have been caused by problems with targeting computer systems. CENTCOM only acknowledge a fraction of the civilians accidentally killed.
 
On SWJ Precision-Guided Diminishing Returns: Why Airpower Alone Can’t Win America’s Small Wars
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In the case of Operation Inherent resolve, the Islamic State has been able to maintain a sufficiently equivalent force size despite the continued air operations against them. Thus, a clear center of gravity – a “source from which the enemy gleans his strength” – is the ability to maintain a sizeable force: recruiting. The US-led coalition has directly attempted to deny ISIL the center of gravity of recruiting power through the attack of banks and other revenue-generating facilities, and through information operations.[31] While ISIL recruiting has reportedly decreased significantly,[32] if there were no further ISIL recruits ever, it would take nearly two years to eliminate the enemy assuming the current rate of attrition. This assumption over-simplifies the situation - as enemy fighters become sparser, they will therefore be harder to find and eliminate.

While Linebacker and Allied Force showed that airpower does have the potential to be successful in coercing state actors under unique circumstances, strategists must avoid the pitfall of comparing apples to oranges when engaging non-state actors in “small wars.” The lessons of Commando Hunt and British Imperial operations in Iraq go hand-in-hand when considering the courses of action for the campaign against ISIL. While the staggering numbers of reported enemy losses at the hand of “precision airstrikes” may sound convincing of progress, experience indicates that the opposite may be true, and a new ISIL offensive analogous to the Easter Offensive of 1972 may well be not far off. Yet for fear of committing appropriate forces to engage and defeat the enemy, which has been shown as a requirement when dealing with an insurgency, coalition forces already show signs of getting stuck in an iterative cycle of increasing sortie rate, increasing ordnance expenditures, and increasing cost to the American taxpayer without any real indication of success. Timeliness is key in stemming the ever-enduring ISIL conflict, and the amount of time it will take to train, organize, and equip host-nation forces is indeterminate. If coalition leadership desires victory, it must weigh the risks of committing troops to a possibly grim and unpopular war, versus the risk of continuing to maintain the politically palpable position of “containment” which has historically failed.

“For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc., I must respectfully say, ‘Not really’: Alexander the Great would not be in the least bit perplexed by the enemy that we face right now in Iraq, and our leaders going into this fight do their troops a disservice by not studying — studying, vice just reading — the men who have gone before us. We have been fighting on this planet for 5,000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. ‘Winging it’ and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of competence in our profession.”

-- General James Mattis, Nov 2003​
Points out that by the CIA's own estimates IS has reconstituted it's fighting strength at least twice. That's not to mention rising from the ashes of AQI's strategic defeat in 08. Very expensive airpower even when combined with some apparent success with local auxiliaries has its limitations. If those auxiliaries don't have a political program that works for the IS base in the population the contraction of the Caliphate may be a bit of an illusion. Reliance on these tools may create an environment that facilitates an IS recovery.

This may be particularly true in the remaining IS territory in Syria where the PKK it appears often isn't much more welcome than the regime. One common observation with using auxiliaries is it is actually necessary to have your own men out amongst them keeping an eye on things. Something the Obama administration was slow to accept. More US ground troops became essential once Turkey launched it's anti-PKK operations in Syria.

In Iraq there are more than one large anti-IS forces: the ISF, KDP Pesh, PUK Pesh and Hashd. The US has a good relationship with at least the first two and has been able to supplement them with maybe a couple of Brigades of"advisors". A large part, maybe half, of the Sunni Arab population traumatised and fragmented by IS appears willing to try being ruled by a very flawed Baghdad again.

There may be some parts of the middle Euphrates were US troops working as peace keepers might even be more welcome than the alternatives. Parts of Anbar that had fought the Marines but came to collaborate with them. I would be cautious though. Iraq as a polity is certainly not receptive to a repeat of the US occupation. Even the current US presence is controversial and only really tolerated as a firefighting force needed to help deal with IS. And some tribes round Raqqa appear not to have forgiven the US for toppling Saddam. It's far from perfect but Iraq endures and the US role is probably best seen as aiding Baghdad toward better governance and being willing to help quickly if it goes to shit again as it may well.

The seemingly endless US presence in Afghanistan hasn't led to stability and that really should be the focus. We perhaps should more look back to the North West Frontier under the Raj where deployments were light, long, led by locally based experts and as reliant on bribery as raiding for maintaining a sort of peace. It's how the Pakistanis still run FATA and as their there's probably going to be some level of Salafi-Jihadi problem that can only be suppressed. This is also probably all the empire maintenance US voters will stand for.

"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is."

T.E.Lawrence 1917​
 
On Al Monitor How Iran's military strategy against IS may backfire
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From 2001, when the US-led invasion forced the jihadis of al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan, and until late 2011, when US forces left Iraq, Iran reportedly turned a blind eye to jihadis transiting its territory in order to bleed the United States and coalition forces in both countries. Salafi jihadis from eastern Iran, near the Afghan border, are said to have traveled freely across Iran’s Sunni heartland. Toleration of jihadis so long as Tehran was not at the receiving end of their violence is reported to have created a mass following for these groups in Iran’s Sunni areas.

For instance, the number of young Kurds adopting Salafi jihadi ideology has greatly increased in western Iran since 2001. Many Iranian Sunnis have traveled through Turkey to join IS and other jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria, often facing IRGC commanders aiding Iraqi and Syrian forces on the front lines.

Some IS supporters in Iran’s Kurdish areas even celebrated IS’ gains in the summer of 2014, as the group swooped across northern Iraq, according to Kurdish media. In the latest IS video, which is labeled as originating from the IS “wilayah” (province) of Diyala in Iraq, four members of the Popular Mobilization Units are seen kneeling down. They are then beheaded by four IS militants, two of whom are apparently Iranian Kurds.

Secular Kurdish activists inside Iran often complain about how parts of Iranian Kurdistan have been turned into battlegrounds where supporters of IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra) settle scores in the streets. Indeed, there have been reports in the Iranian media about a number of clashes between elements that espouse IS ideology and the security forces in Kurdish areas.

As Salafi jihadis become degraded and lose their territory in Iraq and Syria, some of the Iranian Sunnis who have honed their military and intelligence skills over the years will inevitably survive the battlefield and pose a threat to the Iranian state.

Tawhid Qoureishi, an Iranian Sunni religious scholar, traveled to northern Syria via Turkey to join IS along with two other Iranians in the fall of 2013. Prior to that, he engaged in religious studies near the Afghan border and then became a preacher in a Sunni village in the northern Iranian province of Gilan. Qoureishi, who was 30 when he joined IS, stayed with the group for over six months, roaming around northern Syria and meeting many high-ranking IS members. However, he later came to question some of the brutal methods IS deployed, which created division among Salafi jihadis. He participated in the first battles between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, but soon afterward, he became disillusioned with the group and returned to Iran in the spring of 2014, where he was arrested upon arrival. “The main reason [I left IS] was the crimes that were committed there [in Syria], such as killing people. … I went there to defend people and confront oppression,” Qoureishi said from an Iranian prison when asked why a young man from a village in northern Iran would go to Syria to join IS.

He is now serving a seven-year prison term in Iran.

While most Iranian Sunnis reject the ideology promulgated by IS and other Salafi jihadi groups, some of the government policies deemed oppressive appear to push more young Sunnis into the arms of jihadi groups, which are quick to exploit such situations. "Iranian Jews live in security under the protection of the government and have synagogues in Tehran and Esfahan,” said the narrator in the IS video from March, comparing the status of the over 1 million Sunnis in Tehran with that of the Iranian Jews who are mostly concentrated in the capital. “There is not a single mosque for the Sunni people in Tehran,” disputing the Iranian authorities’ assertion that there are nine Sunni mosques in the capital.

“This [jihadi] thought is spreading day by day. I think they must have grown by a hundredfold since the Taliban era," warned Qoureishi in the prison interview, adding, "I don’t think it is possible to contain these movements.”
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 181-182, Apr 15-16, 2017
The Golden Division was said to be finally assaulting the Old City, but that claimw as unclear. The unit was fighting in the Tanak neighborhood, which was declared freed on April 13, and in Thawra. There was also a report that the unit was pushing on the Fifth Bridge across the Tigris. The problem with that is the Golden Division is in the center and west of Mosul, and the Fifth Bridge is all the way on the other side of the city to the east. Also Tanak and Thawra have been fought over since the end of March, so the division has not entered any new areas yet. At the same time Iraqi propaganda often exaggerates progress so these may be new areas the unit was fighting over.

push on the Old City. That was in the Bab al-Tob, Bab Sinjar, and Bab al-Jadid neighborhoods. Bab al-Tob was officially declared liberated on March 15. The Federal Police were said to now have control of the areas around the Grand Mosque, but those types of comments have been made before. Overall, he police moved 200 meters into the district. The tough defenses of the Islamic State, the narrow streets, and dense layout of the buildings have proven a major impediment to the Iraqi police. That caused a month long pause in operations as the Golden Division advanced up the center of the city to push up along the flank of the Old City. The police have now moved back on the offensive, but it is probably still a tough fight ahead.
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 183, Apr 17, 2017
Image1_420171710546801793910.png

Shrinking slowly.
 
Kurdish feminist appointed as co-head of Raqqa civilian council - ARA News

Kurdish feminist Layla Mohammed was appointed as the co-head of the US-backed Raqqa civilian council, with Mahmoud Shawakh al-Busran as the Arab co-chair.

At just 27, Layla Mohammed was the first woman to rule over Tel Abyad town, where she was born. In 2006, she studied engineering at the university of Raqqa, but she fled Raqqa in 2013 to Kobani after Raqqa fell to the al-Qaida-affiliated Nusra Front.

Later after Tel Abyad was liberated in June 2015 from ISIS by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), she was appointed as co-chair....
 

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The KRG is an essential player in the reshaping of the political maps in the region, in Syria. But it cannot continue its important role in the current domestic crises. Therefore, the KRG should work on two paths: first to make radical reforms in the political, economic and all other fields; and second to have a regional Kurdish policy, which must be structured by all the Kurdish parties inside the KRG and other parts of Kurdistan.

All in all, If we’d had real leadership in the KRG, we would have already solved all the major problems as the problems in the Kurdistan Region are mostly because we have not had strategic thinkers, unlike other parts of Iraq or Syria where the problems have turned to sectarian. Unfortunately, since our leadership has proved incapable of providing democratic, just, transparent and accountable governance, the KRG is experiencing appalling days that could eventually turn into civil unrest.

The current generation of politicians have assumed positions of power, based not on merit but mere tribal ties and family roots; hence crises inevitably occur. Worse still, they too have inherited previous generations’ terrible habits; brushing the problems under the carpet, play the blame game and treating the masses like idiots.
The dynastic politics of the KRG.
 
On ISW Iraq Situation Report: March 20 - April 20, 2017
ISIS is waging a renewed offensive campaign in recaptured areas that could exploit vulnerabilities in the Iraqi Government’s ability to respond amidst accelerating political competition before upcoming elections. ISIS attempted to fix, penetrate, or divert security forces with ground attacks against the ISF and PMU at Baiji, Tikrit, and in Diyala. ISIS also attempted to conduct isolated attacks in secure areas near Baghdad, Fallujah, and Samarra, a reflection of historic attack patterns of the 2012-2013 era. Prime Minister Abadi faces competing requirements to manage a renewed Kurdish bid for an independence referendum and Turkish President Erdogan's threat of future Turkish military activity in northern Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Abadi is simultaneously campaigning to position himself politically to win in Iraq’s upcoming elections. Iran meanwhile continues to use its Iraqi proxies to produce cross-theater outcomes, undermining the legitimacy of the Iraqi state and demonstrating Iranian freedom of action in Iraq. The requirement for coalition military support in Iraq will endure after the recapture of Mosul, and could actually increase if political competition in Iraq undermines stability and creates new opportunities for ISIS and other Sunni insurgent actors.
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 185, Apr 19, 2017
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Al Mada had an article on Tal Afar. The town was surrounded by the Hashd months ago, but nothing has happened since. It is still up in the air whether the Hashd or the Iraqi forces will take the village. Turkey has warned against the latter being involved. What is obvious is that will not happen until Mosul falls. Al Mada talked with a Turkmen parliamentarian who was quoted that Abadi did not want to anger Ankara anymore and that was one reason why nothing has happened. The MP speculated that Baghdad would have to get the Americans involved in any future operation, and that would take care of Turkey’s concerns.
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Which would wind up the Iranians.
 
Hopefully once ISIS is pushed out o Iraq, the Iraqi sunnies will realise that they are not worth fighting for. The "caliph" will end like Sadam Hussain and Gadaffi, being dragged out of a mud-hole.
 
Hopefully once ISIS is pushed out o Iraq, the Iraqi sunnies will realise that they are not worth fighting for. The "caliph" will end like Sadam Hussain and Gadaffi, being dragged out of a mud-hole.
Not going to be as simple as that I'm afraid. There is whole sectarian aspect to the situation from both sides, Sunni and Shia.
 
On OCCT Extremist Construction of Identity: How Escalating Demands for Legitimacy Shape and Define In-Group and Out-Group Dynamics
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Screen Shot 2017-04-23 at 13.58.28.png
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J.M.Berger paper on radicalisation of extremist groups using the intriguing example of 19th century British Israelism. The belief that Anglo Saxons were the Lost Tribe of the Chosen People. Something you can still bump into amongst Loyalists in N.Ireland.

The graphic did make me think of parallels in the development of Salafi-Jihadis where with apocalyptic IS the Out-Group gets to be the rest of humanity including even other Salafis.
 
On The Orton Report Analysis: ‘Signs of Recovery for the Islamic State’
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Still, the major part of the answer to IS’s resilience lies, as Craig Whiteside has written, in its deeply bureaucratic structure and strategic outlook that gives it the ability to wage a Mao-style revolutionary warfare. IS has proven capable of moving through the three stages: an infiltration and building stage by terror and inducement; expansion with terrorist and insurgent tactics; and then into the decisive phase of governance and state administration. Just as importantly, IS can move back through the stages when necessary.

This means IS’s loss of territory should not be seen as the sole measure of how this war is going. What is needed in a revolutionary war is legitimacy over the long-term; if military defeats contain political victories, they can be absorbed, which is why IS has chosen simply to retreat in most areas before the attacks on its capitals. Fallujah was a classic case: IS held about two-thirds of the city; after evidence of atrocities by the Shi’a militias appeared, giving IS a political win, it pulled out within five days. The U.S.’s narrow focus on defeating IS, with the mistaken emphasis on when IS is defeated rather than how, has meant supporting Iranian-run Shi’a militias in Iraq and the PKK in Syria, playing into IS’s hands, legitimizing the group even as it loses territory, and assisting IS becoming a global movement that can mobilize its supporters abroad for external attacks.

The holding of a specific territory has never been the basis of IS’s legitimacy. Over the last year, IS has crystallized this view that the caliphate is more a cause than a destination, presenting the impending loss of its twin capitals, Mosul and Raqqa, as merely one stage in a cycle, part of the travails of the believers—a gift from god, indeed—to purify the herd before final victory. After inflicting terrible losses on the infidels, the jihadists will “retreat into the desert” temporarily, as they did last time only with hideouts stretching into Syria this time as well, and come back stronger, IS says. Given the conditions—no major U.S. troop presence on the ground; massive destruction, displacement, and persecution in the Sunni areas; heightened sectarianism; dysfunctional political systems all across the Fertile Crescent—IS’s belief that trends are on its side even more than in 2008 cannot be dismissed as self-serving delusion. In some areas those trends toward IS’s recovery are already becoming a reality.
Mao wrote about losing and retaking urban territory up to six times. I'm not sure IS are that impatient.
 
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