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The Islamic state

On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: March 17-29, 2017
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Meanwhile, Iranian proxies in the Ministry of Interior and the Badr Organization have increased Iran’s influence in the Mosul operation.

  1. The ISF’s official media outlet listed the 2nd Badr Brigade’s operations together with the 9th IA Division northeast of Mosul city on March 22, suggesting a growing interoperability between the Popular Mobilization and the Iraqi Army. Coalition advisors are currently supporting the 9th IA Division.
  2. The Popular Mobilization entered Mosul’s city limits as part of a humanitarian campaign which it launched on March 14. Aid convoys entered recaptured western neighborhoods soon after, bearing the flags of the Badr Organization and Liwa Ali al-Akbar, a Hawza affiliated militia. Unidentified armed forces, likely Badr, accompanied the convoys.
  3. The Ministry of Interior, an Iranian client, appointed Abu Dargham al-Maturi as commander of the 6th Federal Police Division, a new unit that made its operational debut at the start of the western Mosul operation on February 19. Abu Dargham is also the commander of a Badr Organization’s brigade and has used his dual role to permit entry to proxy militias into off-limit operations. His appointment to the division underscores the risk of further Iranian infiltration into the ISF and inside Mosul.

The Badr Organization will continue to expand Iranian influence in Mosul after its recapture. It is already working to establish a political presence in northern Iraq. It may also try to coopt local tribal militias, currently acting as hold forces, as it did in Salah al-Din by financially supporting a tribal militia as part of the Popular Mobilization in early 2016. The Badr-controlled Ministry of Interior will likewise ensure that the Mosul Police Chief remains friendly to the central government and amenable to Iranian interests. The U.S. must ensure that the post-ISIS holding force in Mosul City is both controlled by the Iraqi government and responsive to its authority. The U.S. must contain and reduce Iran’s influence in Mosul. The Badr Organization’s direct presence in Mosul city and its environs places American service members at risk. Its continued presence in Mosul could also could drive sectarian tensions that ISIS or other insurgent groups could use to recruit, undermining the success of anti-ISIS operations.
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Perhaps inspired by IS as they've called for such tactics. Looking really unlikely they had any command and control.
 

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REMAINING MILITARY CHALLENGES

The metrics of the war against IS give a sense of what has been achieved so far and what remains to be done. The Kurds held a fortified 500-mile frontline with IS for nearly three years, while the ISF maintained a sprawling and porous frontline that meandered for over 1,250 miles. The ISF have reclaimed 36,000 square miles from the group, and the Kurds a further 3,140. Tal Afar, Hawija, al-Baaj, and the western Euphrates River Valley will need to be liberated next, mainly by ISF and PMU forces with occasional Kurdish assistance. The remaining IS-held or unsecured areas of Iraq comprise some 14,700 square miles of mostly desert terrain, presenting a huge challenge to the ISF.

In addition, the Syria border needs to be secured, including the 277-mile stretch under nominal ISF control and the 87-mile portion under nominal Kurdish control. The KRG's internal frontiers need to be secured against infiltration as well, but at the same time opened partially to allow normal trade with the rest of Iraq. This will require two-way intelligence sharing between Baghdad and Erbil, plus improved counterterrorism screening capabilities.

In short, much is still to be done, and the next stages of the war will require the ISF and Kurdish forces to develop new capabilities. Huge areas will need to be secured, many of them very remote, placing emphasis on wide-area surveillance technologies, helicopter-based rapid reaction forces, and logistical sustainment at faraway operating locations. Borders and internal checkpoints must be buttressed against the inevitable IS mass-casualty terrorism campaign that will follow the group's battlefield defeat. Intelligence and counter-organized crime capabilities also need to be improved to prevent IS from regenerating as an ultraviolent mafia, as it did in Mosul prior to 2014. There is a big job still to be done by the ISF, and a major supporting role for the Kurdish security forces.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States should recognize that Iraq and the KRG have been its greatest allies in the war against IS, and the Iraqis should accept that the American-led coalition effort has made their battlefield victories quicker and less destructive. Going forward, the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve mechanism should be maintained, as opposed to creating a new arrangement or seeking a formal Status of Forces Agreement (the latter option in particular could undermine Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi by forcing him to gamble his political career on a contested parliamentary treaty ratification that would likely fail). At minimum, Washington needs to commit to enhanced intelligence sharing and sustained security assistance to the Counter-Terrorism Service, army, and Federal Police for three to five years in order to build the new capabilities described above and let improvements take root.

Meanwhile, the coalition should encourage the ISF and KRG to continue the military cooperation that has made many of the victories over IS possible, including in the ongoing Mosul campaign. If defeating the Islamic State is Washington's "number-one goal in the region," as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated last week, then an ongoing, enhanced security cooperation program with Iraq and the Kurdistan region must be put in place to bolster America's most battle-hardened allies in this war.
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Knights points out the Pesh role gets over reported but tactfully credits them as the second most important actor against IS and the Hashd third.

Consider the territorial areas given above in this snip. If we were talking in terms of population ruled the ISF's contribution to defeating IS would be even larger. Iraqi's forces all deserve credit for being able (mostly) to collaborate against IS despite various fault lines; it is a contrast to Syria.

Sowell and Knights are right a new SOFA is hopeless. Abadi himself has persistently said he wants a limited US presence. Recently that on the ground that mainly involves trainers.
 
On LAT Trump administration stops disclosing troop deployments in Iraq and Syria
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That move deprives the public of information it has a right to know about the wars in which the U.S. is engaging, said Ned Price, National Security Council spokesman under Obama.

“The position of the Obama administration was that the American people had a right to know if servicemen and women were in harm’s way,” he said.

“It’s truly shocking that the current administration furtively deploys troops without public debate or describing their larger strategy.”

In addition to the number of troops being larger, American forces are now nearer to the front lines in both Iraq and Syria than they have been since the war against Islamic State began nearly three years ago.
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Well the Pentagon under Obama indulged in a great deal of creative accounting and denial of US troops being in combat as this escalated. The numbers deployed were often much higher than stated and it was pretty misleading to call what they were doing with their own 155mm guns in beneath SOP forward fire bases as "advising". The difference under Trump is inconvenient public accounting seems to have been abandoned.
 
On CMEC Mosul and the Limits of State Capacity
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While the CTS may well be the Arab world’s most accomplished counterterrorism force, its core 6,000 personnel, which Abadi moved to increase by 1,250 in mid-March, have been overused to pick up the slack of the ineffectual army units. In every major urban operation the past two years—Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah—the CTS has led the fight while the army recovered from its 2014 collapse, with Ministry of Interior forces also playing a strong role. Yet the tough street-to-street fighting in east Mosul, made bloodier by IS suicide bombing tactics, brought the CTS to its attrition limit. And this enabled Iraqi commanders to convince even a pro-Iran figure like Minister of Interior Araji that U.S. airstrikes are essential.

The failure of the army rebuilding effort may also have strategic implications for future U.S. military plans and Iraq’s domestic institutional balance. The new army units are the product of the Pentagon’s Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) program, a centerpiece of the Obama administration’s post-2014 Iraq policy. While ITEF’s equip and resupply provisions have been valuable to Iraq, the training prong of the program has fallen short. The CTS, which Iraqis colloquially refer to as the “Golden Division,” is a modest-sized force that the Pentagon developed over the course of a decade. Domestically, the army’s weak performance has boosted the status of the Ministry of Interior and its own security forces—potentially weakening the army’s ability to counterbalance the Shia militia-dominated Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd), which now has statutory standing as a military force.
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To me this seems like a pretty fair assessment.

You could compare this to regime forces in Syria with HA being a probably inferior equivalent to the CTS. The NDF/LDF being a far more crimogenic version of the Hashd that also has supplanted some army roles. The ISF being a far larger, better equipped all volunteer force compared to the often conscripted, depleted and demoralised SAA. Both standing militaries are what you might call a "check point force". Above them you have alien first world air forces capable of granting offensive victories when partnered with well motivated auxiliaries and regular fire support.

The new Iraq was conceived around a new army by a well established country with an old trusted officer corps. The CTS is in fact a small US trained Praetorian Guard directly reporting rather undemocratically to the Iraqi PM in a way reminiscent of Saddam's elite Republican Guard. Neither the ISF or the SAA it turns out is really are fit to serve as a lever of external control. That frustrates both Russian and American designs. This is partly by design because a meritocratic overly strong army free of officer corps state patronage is actually a threat to Arab states with strong kinship networks and weak institutions. The SAA is structurally coup proofed, poorly paid kleptocracy while the ISF is seeded with entrepreneurial officers with party/kinship loyalties. The rulers of such states are not so stupid as to create an instrument that might be used to control or supplant them. Without strong institutions that may take decades to develop or not appear at all in the case of Syria it is too easy to end up as an Army with a country like Pakistan, Egypt or 20th century Turkey. In Iraq the army's wasta has recovered somewhat but it's really been the irregular Hashd and Pesh militias that have enthusiastic popular support.
 
On Lawfare What I Learned from Reading the Islamic State’s Propaganda Instruction Manual
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By stripping away the field guide’s exhortative veneer, it is possible to illuminate the strategic underpinnings of the Islamic State’s staggering outreach success, not to mention forecast what might happen in the months and years to come.

While many interpret the group’s dwindling territorial prospects, diminished recruitment of new members, and disintegrating leadership as indicators of its impending demise, it would be wrong to imagine a post-Islamic State world at this time.

The organization has systemically used propaganda to cultivate digital strategic depth and, due to this, the caliphate’s ideas will be able to exist long after its proto-state collapses. In years to come, this resilience will enable the Islamic State to prolong—and perhaps even worsen—the terrorist menace it already presents.
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Charlie Winter again.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul campaign Day 166-167 March 31-April 1, 2017
For the first time the Islamic State was able to seize some territory from the Iraqi forces (ISF) inside Mosul. The insurgents took the Rajim al-Hadid neighborhood that was just freed on March 22. The area was being held by a tribal Hashd unit probably made up of locals. The Golden Division was still fighting in Yarmouk as well away and to the west of the Old City. A member of the Ninewa security committee said that there have been no real advances by the police for the last 15 days in the Old City. That stalemate has led to a revision of the battle plan. While the police hold down Islamic State fighters in the Old City, the Golden Division is moving up the flank to surround the district, while taking areas in the western section of the city.

stated that he’d lost 325 officers in the fighting in west Mosul. An American general testified to Congress a few days before that there had been 490 ISF fatalities in the battle for the western half of the city. That was immediately denied by the Iraqis. The stance of the ISF and government has been to not report casualties and deny any reports that have large numbers so this was a decided change in policy.
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Other problems with holding forces also mentioned.
 
On Al Monitor Will US keep military bases in Iraq after IS?
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Trump hinted March 20 that he intends to keep US forces in Iraq even once IS is gone. When asked whether the United States should withdraw from Iraq, he told journalists, "We should never have left."

A thousand US troops — and more from the international coalition — are based in Qayyara military air base near Mosul. There are indications these troops might remain in a post-IS Iraq.

Khalaf al-Hadidi, a Ninevah city council member, said the United States is very interested in the Qayyara area, about 56 kilometers (35 miles) south of Mosul in the Ninevah governorate, which is seen as a possible US alternative to Turkey's Incirlik Air Base. In a statement, Hadidi said, "US forces are constructing another base at the Mosul Dam. However, it is not as big as the Qayyara air base. Work is underway, and we expect that Washington will have influence [in the matter], particularly in Ninevah."

Hisham al-Hashimi, an Iraqi analyst and writer specialized in security affairs, told Al-Monitor there are about 8,400 US soldiers in northern and western Iraq at regular and temporary bases, which include Qayyara, Hamam al-Alil, Erbil, Dahuk, Sulaimaniyah, Kirkuk, Ayn al-Assad, Rabia, Habbaniyah, Halabja and the Baghdad International Airport. However, "All the places where US troops are present cannot possibly be called bases, but rather camps, as they do not use runways except for Baghdad International Airport," Hashimi noted.

Ammar Hikmat Baldawi, deputy governor of Salahuddin, confirmed to Al-Monitor that US troops intend to stay longer at bases in Balad and Tikrit in his governorate, and al-Mansuriya base in Diyala governorate.
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As I recall during the Obama SOFA talks a figure of 10K US troops remaining was floated. This was actually too few for PM Maliki who had some interests in balancing the Iranians to go out on a limb for as it was very unpopular with the Shia blocks; it still is. What was also discussed was the US holding some brigades in readiness in Kuwait which seems to be on the agenda again. A large US presence of about 6K people did remain around the huge Baghdad US Embassy, the CIA was active and there was at least one JSOC base up by Irbil airport. There was also meant to a "diplomatic surge" but in fact the Obama administration lost focus on a still fragile Iraq and wandered off to other adventures in Libya, Yemen and Syria. This last failure to stay attuned to what was happening in Iraq was certainly a very bad mistake. In 2012-13 there were very clear signs IS was coming back but this was played down. In the end when IS took Mosul in 2014 Obama was slow to deliver air support to Baghdad using that as a lever to oust Maliki who had failed as a strongman and fallen from favour. This was perhaps overly clever as Najaf would tell Maliki to stand down anyway. What that resulted in was a rapid expansion of Iranian influence in Baghdad and the rise of the often Khomeinist Hashd.

The difference with the US presence now is they are mostly out of sight in Kurdish and Sunni Arab areas. PM Abadi does not seem to be imagining a regular US combat troop presence just support activities. Again it's a matter of balancing Iran's influence who do want the US out of their backyard.
 
On War On The Rocks TRUMP’S MIDDLE EAST POLICIES ARE BOORISH AND BELLIGERENT, BUT SURPRISINGLY NORMAL
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Right now, however, the greatest risk comes from how a still untested and understaffed administration will respond to a sudden crisis. The pushback against Iran in Yemen could suddenly escalate. There could be a successful attack on U.S. troops deployed in Iraq and Syria. A sudden massive popular uprising could easily erupt in one or more of the fragile autocratic states for which he has doubled down support, such as Bahrain or Egypt. Israel might get drawn into a new war with Hezbollah or Hamas. The Palestinian Authority could collapse. It will be the response to those sorts of disruptive events — crises which have confronted every U.S. President — which will reveal Trump’s real intentions and capabilities in the Middle East. But for now, despite all the bluster and churn, Trump’s Middle East policy has proven quite remarkably normal.
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We do have to remember despite Obama's reputed dovishness he was involved in a whole series of expanding conflicts. He came into office vowing to withdraw from Iraq and defeat the Taliban effectively failed to do both and did a fair bit of "stupid shit". It proved difficult to depart from his predecessors policies as well.
 

Interesting thread, Sistani backed Shia Hashd hand in hand with soldiers of the Great Satan. Some dispute if they have IRGC support.
 

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It is believed that Assad, or senior officials in his regime, approved the use of chemical weapons against the backdrop of growing confidence in the regime’s stability following military successes since the regime completed its takeover of Aleppo in December.

Israeli security officials said they believe that even after the 2013 agreement to dismantle its chemical weapons stockpiles, the Syrian regime still kept residual quantities of chemical weapons, including sarin nerve gas. Most of the infrastructure for producing these weapons was destroyed as part of the agreement, and it is possible that Syria has been trying to rebuild the CERS weapons plant, including apparently relaunching the manufacture of chemical weapons.

Nevertheless, the gas used on Tuesday is likely to be the remnants of old stockpiles the Syrian regime held onto. Since the agreement, the regime has used chemical weapons of various types on a number of occasions, but this is the first time in almost four years that sarin, a particularly lethal gas, was used.
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Sarin usually has a short shelf life with a maximum of about five years. The Iraqi stuff lasted only a few weeks.

Of course there was a deterrence aspect with Israel connected with Syrian CW capabilities. They'd be understandably nervous about it. It's not so much the destructive effect but the area denial and terror aspects.
 
Thanks, it whiffed to high heaven. The fact I've been sighted with this tool suggests the need for a vpn.
 
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On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 170-171, Apr 4-5, 2017
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There is still wide speculation about the fate of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Fuad Hussein the chief of staff to Kurdish President Massoud Barzani claimed Baghdadi escaped Mosul in February 2017. Allegedly 300 fighters and 17 car bombs were used to clear a route out of the city for him. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi seemed to discredit the story by saying that Baghdadi had fled Mosul a long time ago. The Islamic State likely wrote off Mosul a while ago, and it was widely apparent when the government was going to launch its assault upon the city. There was therefore no good reason for Baghdadi to stay. IS is looking to rebuild not fade away and go down as martyrs.
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On Niqash.org An Impossible Job: Iraqi Border Guards See Extremists Crossing, But Dare Not Leave Barracks
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The border guard is different from other military forces, concedes Major General Ammar al-Qubaisi, who commands a corps of border guards. “We are working in remote areas far from the cities – such as the Saudi-Jordanian triangle, and the Syrian-Iraqi-Turkish area. These areas pose a major challenge and moving around in these areas is far from easy.”

For example, al-Qubaisi says, that whenever he takes leave and then tries to return to his base, he and his guards are almost always attacked. “There is an area of around 40 kilometres in which we must kill or get killed,” the commander told NIQASH. “We incur both human and financial costs when we take these roads. These incidents happen all the time to both officers and ordinary soldiers.”

“We just don’t have the capacity to protect our own men, who use their private vehicles to get to the barracks,” he continues. “This would require military patrols at certain times and in certain places in order to protect the soldiers who are simply coming and going.”

According to al-Qubaisi, things are not all bad though. He says the central government has approved the funding to purchase and equip 200 trailers for border guards as a first step toward replacing the police stations that have been destroyed by the IS group in these areas. The border guards will also be getting 12 thermal imaging cameras that can detect humans trying to cross a border at a distance of over 20 kilometres away.

Given the fact that leaving one’s barracks can mean death, its still unclear whether these will be much help.
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