Urban75 Home About Offline BrixtonBuzz Contact

The Islamic state

On Al Monitor Iraq's 'Awakening' vets cautious about post-IS period
...
The operation to retake the western part of Anbar, which is still under IS control, has been put on hold. The Iraqi government's current priority is to retake western Mosul.

The tribal-based Sunni militias, known as Hashd al-Ashairi, are expected to play a dominant role in their native area, though within the PMU they are a small minority.

An Iraqi law passed on Nov. 26 made the PMU an official body, with salaries and pensions for the fighters. The law caps the number of fighters at 50,000, 15,000 of whom are supposed to be Sunni.

As Omar Sattar reported for Al-Monitor in early December, "Current figures indicate that there are 150,000 fighters in the [mobilization units'] ranks. The 2017 budget, however, includes funding for 110,000 fighters …," making it unclear who will be provided with salaries and who will not.

A security officer told Al-Monitor that the push west toward the Syrian border is expected to resume "soon," but that no official date had been set.

The various local tribal fighters, as well as information from informants on the ground, will be key to the fight. How those who take part in the fighting are treated afterward will likely be a decisive factor for Iraqi security in the years to come.
Click to expand...
The Sahwa this time round was a much smaller affair. Last time large numbers of Sunni Arabs with US support eventually fought the insurgency that a lot of them had been part of. Too many felt they were betrayed by the US and persecuted by Baghdad last time. After its last strategic defeat IS quickly targeted them for assassination or cooption. Some ended up fighting for IS. This experience also effected attempts to recruit tribal forces to fight IS in Eastern Syria that ISW have been talking up again recently. The perception that the US was an unreliable ally just using men only to abandon them was a damaging one.
 
On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: March 9-16, 2017
...
The U.S. and Coalition will need to ensure their continued presence in Iraq after Mosul’s recapture, which could occur within a month, in order to clear remaining ISIS-held areas and ensure stability in recaptured areas. Coalition Spokesman Col. John Dorrian stated on March 15 that there should be an “enduring [force] requirement” beyond Mosul’s recapture, but that Coalition members would need to discuss any force posture with the Iraqi Government. These conversations should focus on short-term requirements for continuing anti-ISIS operations post-Mosul and the long-term training mission to ensure a local security force that can hold recaptured terrain. Both will require continued U.S. and Coalition support in order to sustainably defeat ISIS, prevent its resurgence, or security the country.

ISIS is reestablishing its network and capabilities between Baiji and Tikrit. The police chief of Baiji, an oil town recaptured from ISIS in October 2015, stated that extremists carried out forty “hit-and-run” attacks in Baiji in the last month alone. The police chief previously categorized attacks in the city as “rare.” Attacks around Baiji extend beyond simple hit-and-run tactics, however. Two SVESTs detonated at a wedding party south of Baiji on March 9, killing more than 20 people. ISIS executed members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Baiji and detonated an SVEST in a home south of the city on February 25. Both incidents underscore ISIS’s advanced technical ability and that ISIS either has a cell in Baiji or steady access to the area. Attacks in Tikrit have likewise increased, despite the high level of security provided by the ISF and militias. ISIS detonated a SVBIED in central Tikrit on March 15, one of the few attacks inside Tikrit City since its recapture in March 2015. ISIS has been reviving its capabilities east of Tikrit, particularly in al-Dawr, over the past three months. The attack inside Tikrit, however, suggests an advancement in ISIS’s capabilities in the area. Reviving and maintain these networks and capabilities could allow ISIS to maintain strength in Iraq even after it loses control of Mosul.
Click to expand...
My bold, see Abadi's comment above and Abadi is one of the most US friendly politicians in Baghdad.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 150, March 17, 2017
3E5E955800000578-4324568-image-a-22_1489766769398.jpeg

Aftermath of a suicide bulldozer bomb in the Old City of Mosul (Daily Mail)

The Iraqi forces (ISF) renewed their offensive in the Old City in Mosul on March 17. The Federal Police and Rapid Reaction Division were still aiming for the Ground Mosque where Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate in 2014. The police were able to take several main streets and markets during the day. That symbolizes who much the campaign has slowed down. The dense layout of the Old City along with tough defenses by the insurgents has slowed things down considerably, mixed in with poor weather that has limited air support.
...
Click to expand...
 
On Jihadica Zawahiri is Not the Loser People Think he is
...
Further cementing Zawahiri’s position as number one in the hierarchy is the continuous reverence and praise he receives from senior ideologues affiliated with al-Qaida, who are extremely influential on the broader Jihadi masses. This was confirmed in a recent interview I conducted with Abu Qatada al-Filastini who confirmed Zawahiri is the sheikh to follow. In another interview with a student of Abu Qatada, I was told that Abu Qatada has stated that “if all people on earth go in one direction and Ayman al-Zawahiri goes in the other direction, I will follow the sheikh”.

Certainly, the initial passivity from al-Zawahiri in the immediate aftermath of the rise of the Islamic State was not a conscious move, but a sign of desperation as the al-Qaida leader did not know what to do. Along the way, however, he figured it out and his answer was to follow the strategic vision of a population-centric focus that was adopted by al-Qaida already before the conflict with the Islamic State started (and was mentioned as early as 2001 by al-Zawahiri himself). To follow the brutally violent, but nonetheless successful, approach of al-Baghdadi and his cadres was not the solution. This was a smart decision by al-Zawahiri as he now, a few years down the road, commands an al-Qaida that has probably never been stronger than it currently is.
Click to expand...
It wasn't really IS brutality it was their lack of subtlety. IS staged acts directly intended to provoke a US response while AQ kept its head down and used the Syrian and Yemeni revolts for cover rather than being the direct affront to the US IS was. After the Arab Spring AQ was actually at times fighting on the same side as the US. AQ, the original focus of the GWOT, began looking like a secondary threat when it was working busily to expand its influence. IS where the youthful bad boys and actually widely believed by Arabs to be a US/Baath/Iranian scheme to persecute them. Being the standard bearer of the anti-Assad cause that the US has betrayed and a more effective ruler than the fallen Yemeni government amidst a punitive famine inflicted by the coalition are good ways to attract support.

But IS's flash in the plan Caliphate should not be written off. The point was probably not lasting territorial control but a defiant act of propaganda by deed. IS summoned great powers to destroy it because defeat is an occasional friend it can live with. It has come back from strategic defeat before and laid waste to the Sunni Arabs that would resist it. Far fewer rose against it this time in Iraq. It plans to return once more for the last battle of the End Days and the people who dwell by the two rivers are now very scared of it. Sometimes it's better to be feared than loved.
 
On Jamestown To Afghanistan Not Syria? Islamic State Diverts Tajik Fighters South
...
Although a few Tajikistani citizens have attempted the Russia–Iran–Afghanistan route, ostensibly on orders from the Islamic State, the pathway is not yet fully established. More Central Asians can be expected to attempt that journey, but their success will depend on how tightly the Iranian government controls the border. The interdiction of one group trying to cross the border in February indicates a willingness on the part of the Iranian authorities to halt militant traffic. In summary, the diversion of Tajik recruits from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan is a sign of the Islamic State’s overall weakness rather than its strength. Given the group’s numerous setbacks, the IS’s recruitment rates are unlikely to return to their 2014 levels. Meanwhile, a few extra Central Asian militants will not tip the balance in ISKP’s favor in Afghanistan.
Click to expand...
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 151, March 18, 2017
...
The Telegraph had an interesting article following around the National Security Service (NSS) as it conducted raids in east Mosul looking for IS members. The agency receives hundreds of tips, mostly from city residents and arrests on average 30-35 people per week. They are then turned over to the Interior Ministry, which decides what will happen to them. Many IS members melted away into the population when the east was taken either to continue their work for the group or to simply escape justice. The NSS is therefore doing an important job to secure the city and reassure the populace that the militants are being hunted down. At the same time there was an incident several weeks ago where the Golden Division stopped the NSS from conducting a search accusing it of sectarian behavior. That confrontation led to a shootout between the two and several NSS members were arrested as well. That highlights that while the NSS’s activities are necessary, they have to be done without bias so that the goodwill the security forces and government has won from liberating the city will not be lost.
...
Click to expand...
 
On ISW Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: Nowruz Update
...
ISIS Wilayat Khorasan took advantage of ungoverned and remote spaces in northwest Afghanistan to expand its territory. ISIS expanded beyond its stronghold in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan and established a base to receive and train foreign fighters in northwest Afghanistan. Uzbek militants fighting with ISIS in Jowzjan province exerted social control by destroying Sufi shrines, burning civilian homes, and erecting prisons in early 2017. ISIS deployed recruiters from Zabul province to set up a training camp in Nimroz province in early 2017. ISIS will prioritize expanding its control in Afghanistan as it faces the loss of its capital cities in Syria and Iraq in 2017. ISIS will also attack Afghan state institutions directly. ISIS launched a complex attack against the ANSF national military hospital in Kabul on March 8, 2017. The attack demonstrated an increase in capability, insider access, and the transfer of techniques from other groups in the area or from ISIS’s core terrain.
...
Russia is undermining the U.S. and NATO by positioning itself as the key interlocutor of peace talks with the Taliban. General Nicholson expressed concern over the “malign influence” of Russia, Iran, and Pakistan and their support of terrorist groups inside Afghanistan in a press conference on December 2, 2016. He stated that the Russian narrative that Taliban militants are countering ISIS in Afghanistan is false, and further undermines the U.S. missions in Afghanistan. Russia plans to discuss Afghan peace talks with representatives from Iran, China, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan in Moscow in April 2017, following similar meetings in December 2016, February 2017, and March 2017. Russia is courting Afghan government officials to legitimize itself as a dominant regional actor in the Afghan conflict. Russia may use economic incentives, such as restoring Soviet-era infrastructure, to strengthen its ties with the Afghan government. Russia’s continued support for the Taliban will thwart the U.S. and NATO missions in Afghanistan, weaken the Afghan government, and position Russia to use peace talks in Afghanistan to assert its own legitimacy as a guarantor of international order. Russia will use its increasing influence in Afghanistan to weaken and ultimately oust NATO from Afghanistan.
...
Click to expand...
Dastardly Russki GWOT all about regional influence and escaping NATO encirclement. Not that the Americans might not occasionally have geopolitical intent in these things. Rushing to topple Saddam behind a thick screen of disinformation about WMDs and him being behind 9-11 comes to mind.
 
On MEE EXCLUSIVE: Sectarian militias have no place in Iraq, says Muqtada al-Sadr
...
"I'm afraid that the defeat of Daesh [Islamic State] is only the start of a new phase. My proposal is inspired by fear of sectarian and ethnic conflict after Mosul's liberation," he said.

"I want to avoid this. I am very proud of Iraq's diversity but my fear is that we may see a genocide of some ethnic or sectarian groups."

The interview took place in the upper floor of Sadr's two-storey home in Najaf, a pilgrimage city which houses the shrine of Imam Ali, sacred to Shias around the world.

The reception room was small and almost intimate by the lavish standards of most Iraqi VIPs' audience chambers. While some like to keep their guests waiting, Sadr was already in a chair when MEE was ushered in.

He listened to questions intently, smiling frequently, including during one surprise diversion when, unprompted, he suddenly said: "I'm very happy to see Britain leaving the European Union."

Asked why, he said the EU echoed US foreign policy. When I said that Britain also did on many issues, he replied with another smile: "I will bless you if you separate from the United States."
...
Click to expand...
Well we've had a Remain IS guy now we have a pro-Leave Shia militia leader.
 
On Al Monitor The coming Iran-US confrontation in Iraq
...
Meanwhile, the United States wants to play an active role in determining the future of the PMU and facilitating the demobilization or integration of the remaining PMU units into the Iraqi security forces in order to manage its power, as it might influence US interests in Iraq. The integration of the PMU into the existing security forces under the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry would prevent the buildup of strong institutions outside of the governmental structure, akin to the Iranian Basij. The United States is concerned that the PMU may turn into a Hezbollah-type proxy of Iran, potentially escalating regional rivalries by antagonizing regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Thus, the post-IS governance of Mosul — and the contribution of each of the involved forces in the distribution of power — appears likely to be the biggest challenge ahead. One of the possible scenarios is that Mosul will return to its pre-IS status, with the Iraqi central government assuming full authority over Ninevah province. Both Baghdad and Tehran support this scenario, although Sunni Arab communities and Kurds do not and believe that reverting to the previous situation will not solve security problems. Koushki said the favored US scenario is to turn Ninevah into a Sunni region like the Kurdistan region. He said the more serious US presence in Iraq in recent years shows that Washington’s purpose is to weaken the Iraqi central government and influence Baghdad’s political landscape. How Iran might respond to the latter remains unclear. The University of Tehran professor added, “While Iran advocates Iraq’s territorial integrity, it will support the decisions of the Iraqis.”
Click to expand...
 
I just started reading The Iran-Iraq War by Pierre Razoux. Looks like an impressive book.

It was first published in French in 2013. It speculates that a future leader of Iraq might well choose a war with Iran over the Shatt al Arab waterway to unite the country and heal the divide with the GCC's Princes.

And then IS took Mosul and stormed down the land of the two rivers pushing Baghdad far closer to Teheran. Not something I'd have predicted either.
 
On POMEPS Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: A Conversation with Afshon Ostovar

A podcast. Ostovar talks about the role of the fall of Saddam in opening up the big time for the IRGC. Moves from being a player with sub-state groups to move of a transnational actor with states. Really facilitated by their relationship to anti-Saddam Iraqi exiles and groups like Badr. The harried US under Obama leaves Iraq somewhat in the IRGC's hands. Then comes the war in Syria seen as severe threat to Iran where they employ their Iraqi militias as key assets. Then the rise of IS which galvanises Shia fears of Salafi hyper-sectarianism. Now the Iranians find themselves in powerful positions in a string of states running all the way to Lebanon including what is now probably a lasting occupation in Useful Syria. Ostovar seems to see this last thing as somewhat accidental.

I'd tend to agree it's really has had large elements of dumb luck. Since coming out as the biggest losers in the traumatic Iran-Iraq war the Iranians have proved very good at profiting from their enemies mistakes. The Israelis stumbling into Lebanon. Saddam's loot of Kuwait leading to an almost equally ill considered US grab for Baghdad. The proxy war with Sunni powers and the US in Syria. The genocidal sectarian mania of the Caliphate. The Iranians are weak but patient and usually well prepared with allies on the ground. Where the mighty US has an attention span of about two years at best Iran's runs over decades. Where the US or Russia have massive military capabilities Iran has its revolutionary human assets were they matter. Suddenly they find the Shia Crescent their enemies feared unexpectedly realised.

The Ayatollahs would probably attribute this string of extraordinary good fortune to the hand of Allah making their enemies mad and now Team Trump shambles over the horizon at the head of Shaytân-e Bozorg. That gift from Heaven could make a Supreme Leader overly cocky.

Ostovar's book Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards looks interesting.
 

This report expresses some optimism that local Raqqa tribesmen can be recruited as an anti-IS force but at one point ends up suggesting relying on exiles who have not been quite so enraged by 21st century US policy.

What's rarely acknowledged the US itself is really very unpopular with some tribes in the Middle Euphrates. Clumsy bombing of IS and what they see as tacit support for the brutal R+6 has not endeared DC to tribal leaders. Some tribes are still mourning the death of Saddam and greatly resent the US role in it.

Often unhappy with US support of the SDF and PKK. All four major Raqqa tribes hostile to the SDF and PKK. Disgusted that the Pentagon T&E program insisted they not fight the Regime or PKK but only IS. The Al-Na'im “hate Kurds more than Israelis”. The bad blood runs the other way with a Kurdish YPG fighter eager to get to Raqqa to kill all the al-Breij tribesmen who joined IS.

IS also not as unpopular as assumed with older generations rejecting it but ominously the younger folk revolted by Bashar's crony capitalism and drawn to radical Salafi causes. Interestingly largest tribe in Raqqa itself, Al-Bayattrah, is seen as really hostile to the R+6 and PKK but suffers from this split.

Sentiment has shifted agains the regime. The regime's current reliance on Iran is a big rub. Hatred for Iraqi Shia runs high they fear Iraqi Hashd will be deployed their way. It occurs to me this will only rise with the fall of Mosul and Tal Afar. They detest Apoist rule itself, fear their lands will be taken and women conscripted. Contact with the PKK has bred contempt with the SDF tending to draw on peripheral tribes not these ones in Raqqa. They fear the PKK will hand Raqqa back to Bashar and a terrible retribution while some of the older ones yearn for the days of Hafiz al-Assad.

Turkey and their rebels would appear to be the most welcome holding force though there may be some wishful thinking going on amongst Raqqa's tribesmen here based on the imminent arrival of the PKK in town. The report sees guarantees autonomy as being necessary. But I'd see a problem with that: can these mostly US/PKK/Regime hating people riddled with youthful Salafi-Jihadi sympathisers retain control by themselves? They've always been power brokers for external actors whose support they'll need even more now. And if the TSK lingered would they not start to be seen as an occupier?

This report really does make me think a force mostly made up of PKK fighters and stiffened by US troops taking Raqqa anytime soon is liable to have some pretty bad consequences in the longer term. It may be written with that effect in mind but appears well researched. However that's what is about to happen.
 

Funny, Trump really appears to get on better with an Arab Islamist than a German Ordoliberal.

His relationship with PM Abadi appears off to a much warmer start than Obama's lofty disdain for the little man.
 

So if you reorder that in terms of least hyped:
1. Russia
2. Cyber
3. China
4. Climate Change
5. Terrorism
6. Iran

I could argue about Climate Change which is both hyped and a serious long term problem but this is actually a pretty sensible short term US threat assessment hierarchy for the next decade. It's missing a pretty irrational and nuclear armed North Korea which might be near the top of this list.

Iran being most hyped has mainly got to do with a US preoccupation with Israeli security followed by energy security some way behind.

In an increasingly dangerous multipolar world our obsession with Salafi-Jihadi terrorist threats is probably going to end up looking like the Edwardian preoccupation with Irish Home Rule as the last system of globalisation slid towards collapse.
 
On TDS Shiite aid convoys enter Mosul, bringing relief and suspicion
...
'SECTARIANISM DOESN'T DISAPPEAR'

Reaction from locals, who have lived under the brutality of ISIS, has been mixed.

In western Mosul, the convoy that had driven through the checkpoint distributed blankets, water and food.

"They're giving good amounts of aid, and it includes fresh food and meat - better than we would get from other organizations," Omar Ibrahim, a 39-year-old carpenter and former soldier, said. "Sectarianism died with Daesh (ISIS)."

But another resident suspected ulterior motives.

"We're not against the aid, but against people imposing their views," Mahmoud, 39, said quietly as Shiite gunmen and federal police controlled the crowd.

"The way they're doing this - flying flags and coming in with guns, tells you there's something else behind it. It's a friendly face, but the aim behind it is domination," he said. He did not give his full name for fear of reprisals for speaking out on a sensitive topic.

It was in Mosul that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Sunni extremists' "caliphate" spanning areas of Iraq and Syria in 2014. The U.S.-backed Mosul offensive is on track to end the group's sway over territory in Iraq nearly three years later.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi recognizes the need to avoid recreating conditions that allowed IS to take root, including corruption in the security forces and marginalization of Iraq's minority Sunni population under predecessor Nuri al-Maliki.

To avoid sectarian tension, Abadi said the army and police would be the only forces to enter Mosul in the battle against IS, not the PMF.

PMF involvement in the campaign has however been crucial, helping encircle the extremists in areas around Mosul. But reliance on the Shiite groups will likely increase as the battle strains Iraq's military, analysts say.

Ramzy Mardini, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, said that behind the aid effort is likely a PMF bid to have a permanent presence either in or around Mosul.

"It's a war zone and the ultimate aim is to capture enemy territory. In that context, they're armed participants regardless of whatever role they play in the overall effort," he said.

"The government's degree of reliance on militia forces, Shi'ite or Sunni, only increases going forward," he said.

At another aid distribution point, one local said he feared PMF military encroachment into Mosul city.

"The reason for what's happening in Mosul in the first place is sectarianism. That doesn't just disappear."
Click to expand...
 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/230320172

At least 200 people have been killed in air strikes in the Mosul al-Jadida neighborhood of Mosul, most of them believed to be civilians.


Rudaw correspondent in Mosul Hevidar Ahmed said that 130 of the people were killed inside one house alone.


Around 100 others were hit inside another.


ISIS militants could be among the dead.


“Some of the dead were taking shelter inside the homes,” said the correspondent.


The advance of the Iraqi army has come to halt in the neighborhood due to the bombing.


Military officials told Rudaw that ISIS militants are deeply entrenched inside civilian homes.


The UN’s humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Lise Grande, told reporters last week that civilians are at risk whether they choose to flee the city or remain in their homes.


Those who choose to stay face extreme risks from crossfire, snipers, and explosive hazards; while families who choose to leave are equally at risk: families get separated, ISIS targets them, and there is a risk of explosive hazards.
Click to expand...
 
On The Intercept WAR CORRESPONDENTS DESCRIBE RECENT U.S. AIRSTRIKES IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND YEMEN
In Iraq, U.S. forces are helping Iraqi and Kurdish soldiers in their months-long battle to drive ISIS out of western Mosul. As many as 600,000 civilians are trapped there, amid widespread hunger and destruction, and more than 1,000 civilians were killed or injured last month in Iraq.

“There are American special forces on the ground but much more important than that is U.S. airpower, without which the Iraqi forces would not be able to get very far,” explained author and journalist Anand Gopal.

“And they’ve been hitting pretty much everything in sight and there’s been an extraordinary number of civilian casualties — just kind of gone through the roof in the last couple of months especially coming into Mosul.”

Gopal explained that the western half of the city, where the fighting is now, is the older part, with densely packed neighborhoods.

The “houses are really close together and so you can have a case where an ISIS sniper is on a house and the Americans are dropping bombs on the house and killing everybody inside including families that are cowering in the basement, people who are being shot on the street in sight. It’s a real humanitarian disaster that’s unfolding as we speak.”

The United States is also building up its own troop strength in Syria. “There the U.S. is allying with Kurdish forces — with the YPG — in the push towards Raqqa, and then if you look at the pattern of where the U.S. is deploying — where its airstrikes are hitting in Syria — what you see is the entire U.S. effort in Syria is to attack the enemies of [President] Bashar al-Assad,” Gopal said.
...
Click to expand...
Well this sounds like how the CTS took Ramadi: mainly by calling in Coalition air. The difference is West Mosul is packed with civilians. This was always going to be bloody.
 
From ICG Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid
...
That the new administration wants to prioritise operations against groups that plot against the U.S. is understandable, but counter-terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. The U.S. administration’s executive order banning entry from certain Muslim countries; the troubling rhetoric of some of its officials; the calling into question of some of the restraints imposed on military operations; and the proposed slashing of the State Department and development budgets all undermine its goal of protecting Americans from terrorism. More broadly, it should be cautious not to overlook or aggravate other sources of instability even as it takes steps to defeat jihadists. The big winners from any new disorder in the Muslim world would be groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda – whatever guise they ultimately assume.
...
Click to expand...
Pretty much every tweak Trump has so far made to Obama GWOT policy is highly questionable. Not that Obama's evolving policies were well conceived, actually often clearing up after his own miscalculations, but Team Trump often seems apt to compound errors and add more mistakes in a very short time.

Not much has changed as the details are still in the hands of the same Pentagon planners. Trump's decision to stop micro-managing may be wise but we'll see how that goes. The US military has a tendency to get caught up in tactical objectives, winning battles rather than wars, without political supervision.

What we do have is an apparent escalation in Yemen paying no attention to the biggest stability problem there: famine. Something AQAP will likely really capitalise on. In fact defunding agencies who might address that and giving a blank check to a very question Saudi led campaign that's making that worse. Then there is the Muslim ban debacle a faux counter terrorism move that actually has hampered the fight against IS. Knee jerk hostility to China also neglects not just their role in North Korea but Pakistan. Designating the MB as a terrorist organisation rather than often a bad actor among far worse is woefully stupid. The Bannonite demonisation Islam for domestic anti-immigration propaganda purposes is a particularly silly own goal hampering collaboration with Muslim allies. Leaning towards far right figures in Europe who are only likely to create a more violent stew of extremism is downright destructive. This is uniquely unexperienced and ideologically handicapped US administration to face such a challenge.

This report worries in particular about the new administrations apparent intent to neglect of diplomacy. I'd add this is at a time when US enemies are proving adept at such games particularly the Russians. One thing to be learnt from the Russians is the combination of military and information operations of which public diplomacy is a large part.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Similar threads

tim
Bizarre acts of terrorism - statue of Lenin and Mao blown up in Texas.
Replies
3
Views
439
belboid
belboid
Bingoman
Turkish terror attack 23rd October 2024
Replies
4
Views
918
_Russ_
_Russ_
tim
State murder in Singapore.
Replies
21
Views
868
A380
A380
JimW
Indian state implicated in murder of Sikh activist in Canada
2
Replies
30
Views
2K
_Russ_
_Russ_
Pickman's model
fascist republican state legislators (usa)
Replies
0
Views
404
Pickman's model
Pickman's model
Back
Top Bottom