The Islamic state

[CrabbedOne]

On CSM Undaunted by close calls, Iraqi soldier returns (again) to battle ISIS

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A high cost

The battle for Mosul has come at a high cost. One Federal Police commander, for example, whose forces have helped spearhead the offensive on the west of the city, told CNN this week that his unit of 130 had been whittled down by Mosul operations, dead and wounded, to just 27.

Mohamed’s unit, which he has belonged to for more than a decade, is a window on the scale of Iraqi casualties, and what motivates those who fight.

Mohamed is the personal driver of an Iraqi general – a rank that in most armies would rarely be on the front line itself. And yet, beside losing his turret gunner on Feb. 28, another incident just two days earlier saw an IS mortar hit the back of Mohamed’s vehicle, killing two and badly injuring a third member of his team.

Mohamed escaped unscathed – he had briefly moved away from the vehicle – and the general was elsewhere.

“Actually, I lose a lot of vehicles,” says Mohamed matter-of-factly. He had another close call earlier in the Mosul campaign, when an IS suicide car bomb destroyed all the vehicles around him, and blackened his own – but left him untouched.

“My life is for God, whether I die or not,” says the Shiite Muslim, whose family is very devout. “I’m a soldier, I think about my country. I’m not in a [sectarian] militia. I’m a soldier. That’s my duty; I have to do it.”

“I am not afraid, because I want to go to fight – either to die, or to live life,” says Mohamed. “So why be scared?”
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That's a very high casualty rate ~80%.

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

A Remain Jihadi; who knew?

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Oops!

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

 

[CrabbedOne]

Well consider what that HIMARS barrage above will do when it lands.

Sowell was pointing out earlier that while some coverage of Mosul has been excellent it seems to get treated as a 2nd or 3rd rank story by MSM editors. This is a huge contrast to the way the siege of East Aleppo or the last dust up in Gaza was treated. Seems even given IS as clickbait there just isn't an appealing victim narrative about bloodier events in Mosul.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On War Is Boring Iraqi Federal Police Weaponize Off-the-Shelf Drones, ISIS-Style

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Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters, who has been closely following ISIS’s drone war, said that the drones actually have the capability to be more ethical than a normal weapon system can be.

“You get to see exactly what you’re shooting at, they’re surprisingly accurate — likely reducing civilian casualties — and when you only have one or two bombs you want to make sure you hit the target first time,” Waters said via Twitter.

“They’re better than firing a bunch of 107-millimeter rockets into an area and hoping you hit something with ‘ISIS’ written on it,” he added.
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My bold, well quite.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 138, Mar 6, 2017

The Iraqi forces (ISF) went back on the offensive after a one day pause. On March 5 there were no operations due to the poor weather. On March 6 the ISF went back to work attacking along two fronts. First, the Federal Police and Rapid Reaction Division continued their push up the Tigris River assaulting the Danadan and Dawas neighborhoods, taking the former. The Golden Division moved up the center of south Mosul into Sumoud, Tal Ruman, Shuhada and Mansour. Danadan, Dawas and Tal Ruman had all been declared freed before. In Tal Ruman, the Islamic State were using civilians as human shields to try to stop the Iraqi advance. U.S. Apache helicopters as well as the mix of Coalition and Iraqi planes were seen overhead. The ISF are still in the tip of south Mosul pushing into the center, but are making steady progress. As usual, the Islamic State is putting up a stiff defense, but it is only a matter of time before it is broken.
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[CrabbedOne]

On Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi's Blog A Gazan Provincial Governor For The Islamic State

Overall, the resonance of the Islamic State (IS) among the Palestinian Arab populations in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza has been relatively low. Attempts to connect some recent Palestinian attacks on Israelis to IS have been unconvincing. Where support for IS does exist, it is primarily found in Salafi jihadi circles in Gaza, though there are no formal affiliates in Gaza, but rather pro-IS groups. Some of these groups have undoubtedly acted as feeders into IS ranks both in the Sinai area (where a formal wilaya- 'province'- was declared in November 2014) and to 'IS central' in Iraq and Syria. There have also been claimed links between Gaza and the IS affiliates in Libya.
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IS's lack of popularity amongst Pals is interesting. IS is given to burning the Pals flag and rates killing Muslims they see as apostates as a higher priority then killing Israelis. Like many Syrian rebels the supporters of PLO and Hamas are natural IS enemies mobilised by other squabbles.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Lawfare Two Cheers for Baghdad

When thinking about the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, it is important to remember a key difference in conditions on each side of the international border. While the Islamic State may believe (or at least proclaim) that this border is of no importance, that is simply untrue. On one side of the border, in Iraq, there is a functioning regime with democratic and representative governance that is able to provide a broad range of services—security, health, education—through its institutions. Iraqi democracy and government services are deeply flawed, but they are still quite real. As the Islamic State is pushed out of more and more territory, this government is ready—at least provisionally—to fill the vacuum left behind. On the other side of the border, in Syria, the central government is virtually non-existent outside of the capital, its institutions decidedly weakened, its legitimacy in tatters. The Syrian regime—dependent on Russian and Iranian support, and utilizing militia forces from Lebanon and Iraq—lacks the capacity to extend security and services into territory reclaimed from the Islamic State.

Obviously, the Assad regime retains some control in Damascus and the west and has made impressive military advances, most notably retaking Aleppo, but it is hard to envision it re-establishing control of much of eastern Syria. The level of brutality used by the regime has cost virtually all its legitimacy, at least with the majority Sunni Arab population. Absent that legitimacy, the regime lacks the overwhelming force to project power into the east; its forces will be stretched just trying to hold their existing gains. But on the other side of the border, Iraqi forces have liberated eastern Mosul and coalition-trained paramilitary forces and police are preparing to consolidate control in the area. Additionally, the relatively positive behavior of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units and absence of (the often-predicted) mass sectarian slaughter in any of the liberated cities stands in stark contrast to the behavior of the Islamic State, making the return of state control far easier.
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This is a very big difference.

Bashar Assad is not without some legitimacy in much of Useful Syria. Despite the monstrous brutality he's assessed by many as the least worst alternative and by more as an unmovable object. He may even be the most popular leader in the country if out of a bad bunch. But the long civil war and rebel strategy of attrition has severely depleted regime forces. He relies on press ganging youth even from areas of rebel support that have been taken. His allies have more limited ambitions than he has for controlling the country. His enemies would limit his victories as well carving zones of control into Syria. And Syria is poor. The Assad's will struggle on but Syria will have little hope of stability under them.

The Baghdad's Shia dominated government rivals Baathist Damascus for corruption but there is at least Najaf providing a moral centre that's well respected even by most Iraqi Sunni Arabs. And Baghdad has no shortage of manpower. The ISF is a very large volunteer army even when it collapsed under the shock effect of IS's daring advance in 2014 tens of thousands of men rushed to join the Hashd. Baghdad did stagger but it's fought back far more successfully against a Sunni Arab rising despite initially grudging support from the US. Likely this won't be last Sunni rising that Baghdad has to weather but Iraqis may eventually get the leaders they deserve.

 

[CrabbedOne]

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Speaking from just outside the municipality complex, Federal Police Brig. Gen. Fakher Al Bahadri said he ordered his forces to quickly push deep into Mosul and take the municipality buildings in order to "surprise" the enemy and overcome obstacles posed by western Mosul's terrain. The city's west is much more densely populated than the east and streets are narrow, preventing Iraqi forces from largely fighting from inside their armored vehicles.

"The plan was stupid," Daoud, the Federal Police solider who brought two casualties to the clinic Tuesday afternoon, said. "I don't know why we did that."

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musings On Iraq How Is The Islamic State Dealing With Its Defeat In Mosul? Interview With Charlie Winter On IS Media Output

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5. Mosul is ultimately going to fall, how do you think that will change the Islamic State’s overall propaganda and messaging?

We often hear that Mosul is of existential importance to the Islamic State. I don't think that's the case - far from it, in fact.

In my opinion, the Islamic State gave up on Mosul months ago, possibly even years ago. Holding the city was always just a propaganda play for it, one that will allow it in years to come to continue its utopian boast, even if it doesn't control it any more.

The Islamic State isn't a "normal" political movement working towards "normal" political goals. More than territory, it wants to accommodate the world to its ideology and, if that means taking over massive amounts of territory only to lose it a few months further down the line, then so be it.

All about shaping the Human Terrain and the Human Terrain of IS itself. Points out IS propaganda has moved from a recruiting focus to sustaining morale.

IS often behaves as if mainly involved in cultic sacred activities echoing scripture. That's confusingly combined with rather a lot of evident technocratic sophistication. As before it may be strategically defeated but refuse to accept defeat. As its internal narrative anticipates great valorised defeat before the final victory of the surviving core in the End Times. Remaining is prior to Expanding. The survivors will melt back into Iraq's Sunni Arab population and prepare for the next round.

It's often hard to explain terrorist group actions in terms of external political goals. As terrorism is pretty poor at achieving lasting external political ends often creating what appears to be a lot of pointless carnage. Some experts see propaganda by deed more as a recruitment and retention activity sustaining group cohesion. But then you can overstate the role rationality in these things. The history of terrorism is filled with very cohesive groups doubling down on "stupid shit" over a period of decades.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Part of an interesting thread.

IS is planning on fighting a long insurgency to prep the human terrain before rising again. If Baghdadi wanted to lead that being trapped in Mosul or Raqqa like Hitler in his Berlin bunker always was unlikely.

Mosul's main significance to IS is that it's an area of revenue generation. The Caliphates's economy is often supposed to be based on oil but actually it's mainly a feudal extortion racket taxing the population. This persisted at a mafia like level in Mosul after their last strategic defeat in 08. They've never even called Raqqa their capital. It's merely the biggest piece of urban turf they hold in Syria another income generator. IS is an Iraqi led organisation. They are not anywhere near as deeply rooted in the Syrian population. Syria was an effective recruiting poster and training area. There it has shades of being a colonial operation run by foreigners. The countryside around Mosul contains areas of heavy IS support like Tel Afar to the West. It's the near empty spaces with sympathetic Salafi populations that Baghdadi will likely seek to hide in.

 

[CrabbedOne]

Interesting thread, someone with limited Arabic appears to be faking up scarier versions of IS's "Rome" glossy lifestyle mag.

 

[CrabbedOne]

And another, Winter reckons IS suicide ops will go on long after the fall of Raqqa and Mosul.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 139-40, Mar 6-7, 2017

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musings On Iraq The Campaign for Mosul: March 2-8, 2017

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made a push towards central Mosul on March 7, retaking the government complex and securing a second bridge. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi arrived in Mosul for the occasion. The Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) continue to advance north by skirting along the river’s edge rather than penetrate into the dense Old City. The Federal Police and ERD have spearheaded operations in western Mosul instead of the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) which is leading a secondary line of effort in southwestern neighborhoods. The move was likely an effort to relieve the weary CTS of bearing the main thrust of the western operations. The ISF will likely continue to advance along the river, where the roads are wider and the ISF can remain in vehicles, until it reaches the 1st “Iron” Bridge. There it can turn west and advance towards the Great Mosque. Recapturing the mosque would be a symbolic victory in the anti-ISIS fight as the location where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance as Caliph in July 2014. The 9th Iraqi Army Armored Division alongside Popular Mobilization units meanwhile began efforts on March 7 to recapture the village of Badush, northwest of Mosul, seizing the nearby prison on March 8.
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[CrabbedOne]

 

[twentythreedom]

CrabbedOne do you think John Cantlie might still make it out alive? Assuming he hasn't died already of course. Last we heard he was in Mosul iirc.

Poor sod

 

[CrabbedOne]

CrabbedOne do you think John Cantlie might still make it out alive? Assuming he hasn't died already of course. Last we heard he was in Mosul iirc.

Poor sod

Cantile looked starved last I saw being used for IS agitprop. I'd not fancy his chances but what do I know. I'd guess if they'd killed him it would be on Youtube. I'd doubt he's in Mosul. IS still have lots of places to go to earth. Perhaps he can still get get lucky.

 

[twentythreedom]

Cantile looked starved last I saw being used for IS agitprop. I'd not fancy his chances but what do I know. I'd guess if they'd killed him it would be on Youtube. I'd doubt he's in Mosul. IS still have lots of places to go to earth. Perhaps he can still get get lucky.

Let's hope so. Fingers crossed for the poor chap

 

[CrabbedOne]

On ISW ISIS Sanctuary Map: March 9, 2017

 

[CrabbedOne]

On TSG The Unique Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan

Bottom Line Up Front:

• On March 8, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on a Kabul hospital that killed at least 30 people.

• Despite more than 15 years of a combat presence and billions spent on creating a central government, the spread of the Islamic State to Afghanistan shows how fragile the country remains.

• Neither the U.S. counter-insurgency strategy against the Taliban nor the U.S. counterterrorism strategy to battle al-Qaeda is suited for the fight against the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

• The proliferation of the Islamic State in Afghanistan represents a very different challenge that will require an entirely different approach to combat.
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They've been in Afghanistan for a while. Iran has been working with some Taliban factions against them.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day141 Mar 8, 2017

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The Economist was the latest to run a story on east Mosul. A man told the magazine there were no services and government in the city. Few aid groups were present as well. Baghdad has not appointed any administration leaving the security forces and the overwhelmed local government to run things. Much has been made of life returning such as shops opening, but they do not have much business as there are no jobs and people don’t have money. Many people stayed in east Mosul during the fighting, and when it was liberated more started returning. They did not want to be in the camps which are very restrictive on movement, and sought to secure their goods after stories of looting spread. People are trying to rebuild but it is very hard as there is no economy and Baghdad and aid groups lack the resources to make any meaningful changes. That has already led to some resentment, which could grow.
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[CrabbedOne]

On Niqash.org High Cost of Loving: In Northern Iraq, Some Kurdish Men Prefer Their Brides Budget

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Abdul Rahman Hewa is a young Iraqi Kurdish man who recently married an Arab girl. He says it was the high cost of marriage to a Kurdish girl that led him to his bride – that, and the fact that he decided that Arab women were “wiser and better looking than Kurdish girls. They take care of their husbands better.”

“These marriages have become much more acceptable recently,” Hewa explains. “It is the high cost of getting married in Kurdistan and the customs imposed on young men like me, that encourage us to marry into an Arab family instead. Then the couple can start married life free of the financial burdens that Kurdish society imposes on you, if you marry a Kurdish girl.”

Hewa says his wedding cost him around US$5,000 – that was for the ceremony and party and for language lessons so he and his new wife can understand one another better.

“I would have needed triple that amount – at least – to buy the gold that Kurdish families usually ask for, when their daughters marry,” Hewa says; gold jewellery and gifts are an important part of Kurdish weddings as families and the bride and groom gift each other the precious metal – it’s often seen as a kind of dowry.

The displaced Arab brides-to-be meet their potential husbands in different ways. Sometimes it is due to immersion in the host community where couples’ families come to an arrangement, other times it is due to random meetings in markets.

Hazem Razkar, 35, first spotted his Arab wife at the markets with her family, in the Iraqi Kurdish tourist town of Shaqlawa where he lives. “I was lucky because I speak pretty good Arabic and I was able to find out where she lives – that’s not difficult for us because we tend to know where people are living in our small community – and speak to her family,” Razkar says.

His wife’s family was actually renting an apartment from Razkar’s family friends so he was able to meet the girl briefly. After that he proposed formally, asking her family for their daughter’s hand.

“We’re very happy now,” Razkar says. In fact, he and his wife often work as mediators, even as marriage brokers, for other Kurdish-Arab couples. “We try to bridge the gap between the two groups and arrange for the families to meet. We also translate and help the families understand one another.”

“What I really noticed about the Arab women was that they never asked for money, the same way the Kurdish girls did,” says Assad Obaid, who owns a small jewellery store in Erbil, in Iraqi Kurdistan and who recently married an Arab woman himself. “I noticed this after dealing with so many people in my shop, both Kurdish and Arab.”

Obaid admits that he had heard about the growing number of successful Kurdish-Arab marriages but that he wed his wife simply because he fell in love.

She had come to his store with her family to buy gold jewellery for her sister’s wedding. “I was able to communicate with her family through a young Kurdish man who speaks Arabic,” the 36-year-old store owner explains. “And I didn’t have to pay a huge amount of money for gold for her. But to me, she is the ultimate treasure anyway.”

Bloody immigrants coming over here causing dowry deflation.

It used to be commonplace for Iraqi Kurds to speak Arabic but its been fading as the KRG pushes Kurdish. But love, or a tight fisted Kurdish groom, will find a way.

 

[CrabbedOne]

On Niqash.org Shooting For Political Stardom: Iraq’s Controversial Militias Fail To Agree On Unified Electoral Positions

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Meanwhile, as some analysts might expect, the militias known to be closer to Iran – this includes the League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq, the Jund Al Imam brigades and Harakat al-Nujaba– have decided they will enter into one alliance to contest elections. They will also be tied to former Iraqi prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who, despite being a controversial figure in Iraq these days, wants to return to power. The fact that Iran-allied militias prefer him as a candidate is a serious step toward his goal.

Meanwhile the cleric who started it all – the country’s leading Shiite Muslim authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali-Al-Sistani – has an altogether different opinion on the militias’ participation in politics. In 2014, with Iraq threatened by the IS group and the Iraqi military not responding appropriately to that threat, al-Sistani called for volunteers to form militias and defend the country. However, the elderly cleric has always insisted that the militias should only be temporary, insisting on calling them “volunteer militias”. He doesn’t like the idea of the militias going on to participate in Iraqi politics and has refused to receive those militia leaders who desire his endorsement for their political campaigns.

Al-Sistani has also announced that the militia closest to him, the Al Abbas brigade, won’t be going into politics.

 

[CrabbedOne]

In CTC Sentinel THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE ISLAMIC STATE’S VIRTUAL ENTREPRENEURS

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Conclusion

Social media, coupled with the ever-increasing availability of applications that offer encrypted messaging, has given virtual entrepreneurs the ability to both bypass Western counterterrorism measures and build close, trusting online relationships with recruits. As a result, virtual entrepreneurs have come to be seen by their followers as leadership figures from whom they can draw inspiration and take advice and instruction on how to act on their extreme beliefs.

Along with helping to inspire radicalized Westerners, the work of Islamic State virtual entrepreneurs has given the group new ways to take ownership of their attacks, ensuring that they continue to receive attention and media coverage. Crucially, virtual entrepreneurs require few resources and offer a very favorable balance between cost and benefit. This is particularly relevant today as the Islamic State continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria but retains its desire to remain relevant while maintaining a significant online presence and capability to strike Western targets.66

It is, therefore, no surprise that this trend is on the rise throughout the West. In Europe, the strengthening of security measures and increased military pressure have made it difficult for people to travel and join the Islamic State as well as for the group to train send operatives back home to conduct attacks. The resulting reduction in the flow of foreign fighters has seen virtual entrepreneurs favor encouraging more operations in European nations rather than helping to facilitate travel. In a recent analysis of 38 Islamic State-linked plots and attacks in Europe between 2014 and October 2016, 19 (50 percent) were found to have involved “online instruction from members of IS’s networks.”j

The story is similar in the United States. Since 2015, as seen in the cases of Abdulkader and Lutchman, some have been directed away from their initial intention to join the Islamic State by virtual entrepreneurs who ask them to instead focus on domestic attacks due to difficulties associated with travel. The authors’ current data shows that virtual entrepreneurs were involved in 21 percent of the total 38 plots in the United States in the same period as the European study.k While this number is lower—and in 2016, there was only one documented instance of a virtual entrepreneur being involved in a domestic plot (compared to six in 2015)—it may change. Due to the time it takes for cases to go to court, it will be some time before additional details come to light. It is worth noting as well that three of the most influential members of the Legion—Hussain, Hostey, and Khan—were killed in 2015, while Miski was arrested that same year and al-Sudani was killed in mid-2016. Whether or not they can be replaced remains to be seen.
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Social media and encrypted messaging defying attempts to interdict terrorists at borders.