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The Islamic state

On Politico “We Are Fighting Terrorists, But We Are Also Terrorists?”
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We are fighting terrorists, but we are also terrorists? You have to be joking, Mr. Trump! We can’t be both at once,” said Ali, a 36-year-old Iraqi from eastern Mosul who worked as an interpreter for the U.S. troops for two years after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. An Iraqi F-16 pilot who trained in the U.S., but did not wish to be quoted by name, was furious about Trump’s order. “We are on the verge of kicking ISIS out of Iraq and mitigating them in the entire Middle East, so why does this order come now?” he asked. “Why are you putting me in the same category as ISIS when I’m fighting them 24/7? When I’m on their hit list and my family are in danger?”

The ban isn’t just a symbolic slap to an ally: It also could have some immediate effects on the war effort: Iraqi pilots regularly travel to the U.S. for training on the American-made planes they fly. And the order, as originally written, didn’t make any exception for them. (The Pentagon is hoping to create a loophole that would allow them in.)

The Iraqi soldiers here are still working side-by-side with Americans: Though American troops left Iraq in 2011, around 5,000 Americans are back in support and advice roles for Iraqi forces, and to provide air cover. U.S. strikes against ISIS began in August 2014 after the jihadists seized Mosul and threatened the city of Erbil in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Iraqi troops say their personal relationship with American colleagues is still strong. But the ban threatens to undermine the partnership between the two countries at a crucial time in the ongoing fight.

“This is a new, real blow to U.S. Iraqi relations,” said Christine van den Toorn, director of the Institute for Regional an International Studies at the American University of Iraq. “This ban also goes further than anything in the past”, she said, adding, “It’s not a punishment on a government for its behavio, but on its people—most of whom have nothing to do with the violence that currently plagues their states.”
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Later van den Toorn points out that the biggest consequence maybe that Trump's posturing has made it very difficult for PM Abadi to support a continued US presence after Mosul. Both a problem in Trump's war on IS and a gift to Iran.
 
On TNI After Defeating ISIS, the Past May Come to Haunt Mosul
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Tal Afar has been the crux of Iraq’s problems before. The newly appointed national security advisor, H. R. McMaster, gained fame for defeating the Iraqi insurgency in Tal Afar in 2005, providing what some thought was a model for the U.S. surge that reduced the insurgency. We now know that McMaster’s fears about the future were correct. “One of the big grievances in Tal Afar was that we have a Shi’a-dominated, Iranian-influenced government in Baghdad,” he told PBS in 2007. In another interview, he said that the United States needed to “develop institutions that can survive and that will operate in a way that is at least congruent with our interests.” The same scenario exists today. From conversations over the last year with numerous Iraqis, it is clear that many fear the end of ISIS in Mosul and Tal Afar could set the stage for a new round of conflict. Various scenarios include the chance of Turkish intervention to protect Turkmens, or to strike at the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and a possible decision by the Kurds to seek independence.

The rise and fall of ISIS has sharpened and focused the divisions in Iraq, instead of healing them. “The reconquest won’t solve the problem that allowed ISIS to come in . . . an increasingly Shia-oriented government and a Sunni province with Sunni identification and is a by-product of the reality,” says Spyer. One thing aiding the government is that after years of conflict, some communities are either exhausted or have been displaced by the fighting. According to the International Organization for Migration, there are over three million internally displaced people in Iraq—about one in ten Iraqis.

Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are under arms today in a deeply divided society, which leaves U.S. policy in a bind. The United States now has twenty-seven years of experience working with Iraqis and fighting in Iraq, with little success. Only the Kurdish region has a pro-American, functioning and stable government. Brett McGurk, who was appointed by Barack Obama in 2015 as special envoy for the global coalition to defeat ISIS, is still at his post to provide continuity. However Defense Secretary James Mattis and McMaster may have new ideas. Both are hostile to Iran’s deep involvement in Iraq. With U.S. advisors operating closer to the front than at any other time in the anti-ISIS battle, Trump’s team will have to decide what comes next. If they follow McMaster’s former advice about Tal Afar, it means years of a major commitment. If they decide to draw down, that could leave the Kurds exposed and a new instability could emerge.
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My bold, pro-American Irbil may be but it's actually becoming increasingly unstable under the strongman Barzani who is clinging to power past his constitutional term. Echoes of the mistakes former PM Maliki made and behind that a too careless Whitehouse fixated on short term goals. The PUK in the Southern KRG long and Iranian ally is tending to look to Baghdad for support as are some other political groups in the KRG. While in Diyala the PUK Pesh clash with Turkmen Shia Hashd. The Disputed Areas at the edges of the KRG remain a bone of contention. What look like Kurdification policies are not a good thing for Sunni-Arab discontent. The good thing with the KRG is unlike the PKK that the US relies on in Syria it has a MV with Turkey. But this also pulls it into conflict with Baghdad which resents Turkish interference in Iraq. Irbil also needs a healthy relationship with Baghdad to balance the Turks.

Knight's is quote in this article worrying that without a US commitment IS will reemerge. There's a growing danger Iran will seek to exclude the US from Iraq after Mosul falls. It would be a mistake and a disservice to them to rely too heavily on the Kurds in Iraq. In fact the US would do well to take a friendly interest in various Kurdish questions in the region that if left myopically untended can lead to greater instability. PM Abadi needs US involvement to balance Iran but this faces a good deal of opposition in Baghdad often from within Abadi's own party. It's an awkward relationship for the US as it involves rubbing shoulders with the Iranians and Shia dominated Baghdad is an affront to some US allies but it would be unwise to neglect Arab Iraq.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 132, Feb 26, 2017
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There could be a change in plan in the Tal Afar district to the west of Mosul. First, the Hashd announced they had ended the first part of their sixth phase of operations there. At the same time, the Ninewa Council said that the special forces would take the town of Tal Afar itself. Originally the main goal of the Hashd was seizing the town. Then Turkey complained about the negative consequences of such an action and Baghdad signed an agreement with Ankara that the ISF would be given the duty. That never happened, and then the Hashd were again assigned liberating the village. There was no explanation for the newest change. If the ISF are to attack Tal Afar it will likely happen after Mosul because there are not enough forces to do both at the same time.

Pro-Iranian Hashd continued their propaganda against the U.S. in Tal Afar. The day before the Hashd claimed they had video of American planes dropping supplies to IS in the district. Today a Hashd leader told the media that it had documents and film to prove the U.S. Coalition had not only helped IS in Tal Afar, but Baiji and other parts of Iraq along with Syria. An Iraqi security analyst was quoted in Al Maalomah that it was not the Coalition, but rather Turkey that was responsible. There are a number of conspiracy theories surrounding America and Turkey backing the Islamic State. These were just the latest examples.
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On DefenceNews Commentary: President Trump’s counterterrorism paradox
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President Obama entered office in 2009 with promises similar to President Trump’s in 2017 – eliminating terrorist threats while limiting U.S. involvement in large, protracted conflicts. This so-called “right-sizing” of U.S. military presence in the Middle East increased reliance on SOF troops and drones as counterterrorism tactics. However, ISIS’s 2014 rout of U.S.-trained Iraqi Security Forces as part of its attempt to reestablish the “caliphate” showcased the weakness of this minimalist counterterrorism strategy.

A recent report noted that SOF unit deaths have skyrocketed relative to conventional units since the Obama administration’s 2010-2011 drawdown from Iraq, with 12 of the 18 service members killed in 2016 hailing from Army Special Operations or Navy SEAL units. A former SEAL Team Six officer noted that many veteran commandos have “been doing this non-stop for about 10 years” while numerous commanders of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and JSOC have voiced their concerns of SOF units “fraying” and “burning out” due to high operational tempos and long deployment lengths.

The United States government executed an average of 67 drone strikes per year between 2009 and 2015, causing approximately 2,500 combatant and 100 non-combatant deaths total. Despite the relatively low collateral damage ratio, U.S. drone use continues to face widespread global opposition, notably in key partner nations including Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. Whether seen as a violation to sovereignty or as a danger to non-combatants, the controversial program designed to limit the number of Americans in harm’s way is carefully scrutinized by several non-profits and further normalizing drones as a “go-to” tactic could tarnish the United States’ credibility.

The Obama counterterrorism doctrine proved effective at times, especially in the elimination of terrorist leaders, with SOF raids and drone strikes being responsible for the deaths of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki, respectively. Yet this approach pushed both programs to their operational limits while failing to contain the reemergence of ISIS and al Qaeda throughout the region. President Trump inherited this lopsided strategy, and although he wishes to reinvent the counterterrorism wheel, his options may be limited to following his predecessor’s approach if he wants results to match rhetoric.
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Trump's position is more convoluted than Obama's. Trump is both belligerently preaching a very broad war on Radical Islamic Terrorism that rather looks like a Crusade and pledged to avoid costly foreign entanglements. As usual with Trump cake is to be eaten, kept and then eaten some more.

As this snip points out Obama's CT based approach is really showing its limits as well. In some cases like Yemen it may have made things worse. It hasn't really dented the original target of the GWOT AQ. Despite laying waste to their leadership the organisation is undergoing a full blown renaissance. The Arab Spring originally seen as freedom on the march and a death knell for Salafi-Jihadis has led to their proliferation.

It rather demonstrated the dangers of neglecting stability in a poorly reconstructed Iraq with the reemergence of a much stronger IS. And a decade and a half of Nation Building in Afghanistan has pretty much failed to create stability there while spreading a terrorist infection into Pakistan. The Taliban is resurgent and both AQ and IS are active in the country.

What seems to be required is generational commitments to help mostly Muslim allies and multilateral collaboration. Things that don't remotely gel with the kooky strategic vision of much of Team Trump which is more prone to unilaterally bomb the shit out of any threat and see Islam itself as the root cause.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 133, Feb 27, 2017
The Iraqi forces continued to fight over south Mosul. Hawl al-Josaq north of the Mosul Airport and Tal Ruman on the northwest perimeter of the city were declared freed by the police forces and the 9th Division respectively. Those two neighborhoods were said to have been liberated on February 24. Dandan next to Hawl al-Josaq along the Tigris River was still contested after the Iraqi Forces (ISF) said they took it on February 25. After capturing Mosul Airport the Federal Police and Rapid Reaction Division have moved up the bank of the Tigris to secure the western side of the Fourth Bridge. This is where the ISF plan on building a pontoon bridge across the river. That’s being done by the 310th Engineering Company. It’s common to have the ISF say a place has been taken multiple times. Sometimes this is propaganda, sometimes its because a unit has moved through an area calling it freed, but then follow up forces have to actually check to make sure all the Islamic State fighters have been rooted out. Other times there is re-infiltration.
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IS fighting just as hard as they did in East Mosul.
 
On Reuters Mosul caught in 'strange and terrifying' battle as Islamic State foreign soldiers fight to the end
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"He's not Iraqi. He's probably not an Arab," said Mohammadawi, judging the man by his appearance and imperfect spelling. "The closer we get to the center, the more we come up against the foreigners".

Unlike Iraqi militants who can blend in with civilians and possibly slip through the net of security forces, foreign fighters have no escape and will therefore fight to the end. Mohammadawi said: "They don't flee like the locals".

There are noticeably more foreign militants in the western half of the city than the east, which Iraqi forces cleared one month ago after 100 days of fighting, Mohammadawi added.
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On Al Monitor Benghazi blowback hamstrings US role in post-IS Iraq
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On Feb. 27, more than 120 retired senior military officials wrote to Republican and Democratic in the House and Senate urging them not to shortchange US diplomacy. A day later, the Trump administration doubled down, floating a 37% cut to the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Hardin Lang, a former UN peacekeeping official now with the Center for American Progress, testified at the Feb. 28 hearing in favor of a "diplomatic surge" inside Iraq to deal with the post-IS aftermath. Without adequate follow-up, several lawmakers agreed, the conditions will remain ripe for another insurgency.

But Michael Knights, a fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, questioned the usefulness of such a surge in the current environment. He advocated for beefing up Iraq's security forces first and foremost to address Iraqis' top-of-mind safety concerns.

"From having been in Iraq a long time, if you can't get out of the embassy, if you can't move, if you can't meet people, it's a waste of time anyway," Knights said. "So in some ways if we're going to do the diplomatic surge it's got to include accepting risk, it's got to include perhaps re-establishing outstations in places like Hillah, where we killed off our main sort of consulate there during the withdrawal days."

Further complicating matters, the politically charged climate in Washington has been blamed for making US diplomats and development workers more risk-averse — and less effective. Many point to the partisan battle over the Benghazi attack that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans, which was followed by more than a dozen Republican-led hearings and inquiries.

"My sense in talking to diplomats is that … the entire system has become much more risk-averse as a result of Benghazi," Lang told Al-Monitor. He said USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, which used to embed with special forces under Pentagon authority in order to evaluate the political situation in places such as Afghanistan, no longer can do so.
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Ridiculous levels of institutional cowardice. Diplomatic leg work in unstable places always required accepting risks. Officials will get killed or kidnapped. It's not like taking a job with Apple.
 
On Politico What ISIS Fighters Think of Trump
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Trump feeds into another long-held agenda item of groups like al Qaeda and ISIS: to foster conditions under which the United States will suffer from as many self-inflicted wounds as possible. As jihadists I spoke with remarked, Trump is the ultimate self-inflicted wound. As terrorism analyst Brian Fishman has noted, these groups’ goal hasn’t always just been about bleeding the U.S. economically, but about weakening the social fabric of the country, chipping away at civil liberties and exacerbating tensions that lie just below the surface.

Jihadists have always argued that America only appears strong because of its military might and patriotic bluster – but it is weak at its core. It is a country, they argue, that is held together by a fragile commitment to “foundations” such as personal freedom and liberty. According to jihadi pundit Yaman Mukhaddab, the collapse of the United States will happen soon. “It will take place,” he wrote, “when the citizens lose their patience over the disappearance of these foundations.”

In a country with police shootings, racial tensions and war-fatigue, a president who some fear may crack down on civil liberties, further marginalize minorities, and turn America inward is, from the jihadist point of view, what they wanted all along. Jihadist groups were never naïve enough to think that they could defeat the U.S. militarily on the battlefield. Rather, the point was to draw them into a war of attrition, let them punch themselves out, make American Muslims aware of their insecure place in the country, and make American citizens afraid of each other.
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Let's just say they like the cut of his jib.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 134, Feb 28, 2017
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There were several reports on the difficult conditions within west Mosul. Reuters went along with a unit from the Rapid Reaction Division, which is moving along the Tigris River. Police talked about how the layout of the city with its winding roads and dense housing was slowing the advance. Two articles by Iraq Oil Report noted that Coalition and ISF shelling and air strikes were causing a high number of civilian casualties. Some buildings IS were using as fighting positions had civilians hiding in the basement who were killed when they were hit by Coalition planes. ISF shelling on Wadi Hajar and Mamun also killed and wounded a large number of people. Residents said they saw people trapped in collapsed buildings. During the day 31 people were said to have been killed by ISF fire and another 10 wounded. Finally, the Islamic State lined up 33 former police officers along the Tigris River and executed them. That was to intimidate the Iraqi forces and civilians on the other side of the river. Another 10 people were killed by IS mines, and 3 died and 2 were wounded by its mortar fire. West Mosul is very compact and there are several hundred thousand people still living there. Together that makes any shelling or bombing missions likely to cause collateral damage. The insurgents have consistently fired mortars and rockets upon liberated areas. This is mostly going unreported however.
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On ISW The Campaign for Mosul: February 22 - March 1, 2017
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The Popular Mobilization, meanwhile, is nearing Tel Afar, now a primarily Sunni Turkmen town and a historic insurgent hotspot. The militias, alongside two army brigades, will likely breach the city from the west within the coming weeks. Other militias currently operating further east of the city may make up ground during that time and match the western axis’s advance. The Popular Mobilization has cited the Iraqi Army Aviation (IAA) as a key participant in their advance towards the city and the IAA has been increasingly assessed to be providing the bulk of airstrikes for the militia operations. Doing so, however, reduces the U.S.’s ability to effectively leverage its airstrikes in order to condition militia participation in operations. The U.S. must establish a strategy that secures sufficient leverage over Iran to reduce its influence over Iraq’s security forces and ensure continued U.S. presence in Iraq beyond the Mosul operation.
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The perils of building up the Iraqi Air Force: making them independent.

The Iranians are also buying a new fleet of Russian ground attack aircraft. This won't match US capabilities but it'll likely feature in Iraq at some point. A fairly small, cheap, RuAF deployment in Syria is something the Iranians are learning from.

From The Musing On Iraq post up thread:
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The story of the United States dropping supplies to the Islamic State in Tal Afar continued. Two members of the parliamentary security committee brought it up. One claimed he had documents on 26 cases of the U.S. led coalition providing aid to IS, and called for an investigation. Another gave similar stories and called on the government to take action. Pro-Iranian Hashd groups have been spreading these reports since 2014. They play upon the plethora of conspiracy theories prevalent throughout Iraq. Many believe that the Americans are behind the Islamic State and if not directly its allies are. This sentiment is so strong that even Baghdad sometimes denies what Washington is providing in the fight against IS.
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The US has really big image problems in Iraq.
 

So that's a Syrian KDP affiliated Pesh trained by Irbil clashing with PKK affiliated Yazidis that if I recall correctly were getting funded by Baghdad. Kurdish alphabet soup getting real complicated.
 

When you consider the KDP Pesh was viewed as complicit by the Yazidi's in IS's moves against them and it was the Syrian PKK that came to their rescue this is a pretty bad day in Irbil minority relations.
 
On War On The Rocks A VETERAN OF THE BATTLE OF 73 EASTING OFFERS MCMASTER SOME FRIENDLY ADVICE
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From Operation Desert Storm in 1991 through his change of command in Afghanistan in 2012, nearly all of McMaster’s military operations abroad accomplished their near-term objectives, yet they failed to achieve sustainable, long-term strategic victory. This is a microcosm of U.S. foreign policy today, and this is why McMaster should challenge the status quo and re-think America’s grand strategy.

President George W. Bush praised McMaster’s success in Tal Afar, claiming he

shows how the three elements of our strategy in Iraq — political, security and economic — depend on and reinforce one another… [and] the people of Tal Afar have shown why spreading liberty and democracy is at the heart of our strategy to defeat the terrorists.​

The efficacy of the operation, however, must be examined not in tactical terms of what happened in 2005, but in strategic terms concerning what happened after the city was skillfully liberated.

McMaster’s regiment left Tal Afar in early 2006; before the year was out, sectarian violence had returned. The following year, a truck bomb exploded in a Shiite area of the city, killing 152 and wounding another 347. This physical bomb also ignited a political explosion that, as reported by The New York Times, “set off a wave of reprisals by Shiite policemen and others that left another 47 people dead and shattered the image of Tal Afar held up by American politicians last year as a model of a turbulent city turned peaceful.” This all took place during Bush’s administration. The violence was not because of President Barack Obama withdrawing from Iraq too soon. The city continued to suffer sectarian violence until it was captured by ISIL in June 2014.

Thus, the peace brought to Tal Afar in 2005 by U.S. forces evaporated less than a year after the troops left, descending into violence even worse than that which preceded their arrival. This episode is illustrative of how even brilliant tactical military victories do not always solve regional, complex political problems.
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And they'll likely be saying the same about the upcoming fall of Mosul and Raqqa a decade hence.
 
On Musings On Iraq Mosul Campaign Day 135, Mar 1, 2017
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As usual when people leave an IS controlled area they are screened by the security services. The first step is to isolate the men and boys from their families for questioning and to have their names run through wanted lists. Informers are often present pointing out people. Agence France Presse and Reuters were the latest to write about this process. There have been many concerns and complaints about the arbitrariness of this system. At the same time the ISF are dealing with a huge amount of people.

The Wall Street Journal returned to east Mosul to interview people there. One man said that his local government was working again, but they needed more time to be effective. Another complained about having no water and electricity. Some warned that there were still IS fighters amongst the population. Another problem was that checkpoints along the route from Irbil to Mosul were holding up supplies. One truck driver said the trip between the two cities used to take three hours, but now it could last up to 10. The delay is driving up prices for an already inflated market.
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Well Trump's secret plan to destroy IS he bullshitted about on the campaign trail was really just to ask the DoD people who had been planning the war what to do. A sensible approach that was mostly going to lead to incremental changes. There are an array of real world constraint and no magical solutions. Sabres rattled furiously and then business as usual.

Obama's GWOT was evolving towards greater use of ground forces, a looser RoE and shorter kill chains anyway anyway. Obama had effectively turned his back on the Syrian rebels and was deconflicting with Russia. Trump leans into that a bit more. The Turkey V PKK V IS complication is sticky problem that Obama hadn't resolved either. The volatile Trump's been surprisingly quiet while Euphrates Shield hampers taking Raqqa while the Pentagon has remained frustrated but painfully tactful with the Turks. There are clearly some doubts about the hasty reclaiming of IS territory and lack of holding forces but these are not new. Escalating against AQAP in Yemen is the biggest change so far.

Rhetorical changes (e.g. ISIS V ISIL) that the Bannonites seem to place absurd faith in and an unhelpful "Muslim Ban" are their main contributions. Farcically the second version of the latter is meant to remove Iraq from the list of banned countries as the DoD was plainly furious their most important ally against IS had been added. It's more been an extension of Breitbart's infantile kulturkampf against any sign of Political Correctness.
 

Iran backed Hashd elaborating as usual on a rather popular Iraq conspiracy theory.

It occurs to me US activity West of Mosul observed by AAH could be aimed at capturing the IS leadership who are believed to be out there.
 
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